Incidental Sequence Learning in Humans: Predictions of an Associative Account by Yeates, Fayme
! ! 1 
 
 
Incidental sequence learning in humans: 
Predictions of an associative account 
 
Submitted by Fayme Yeates to the  
University of Exeter as a thesis for the degree of 




This thesis is available for Library use on the understanding that it is copyright material 
and that no quotation from the thesis may be published without proper 
acknowledgement. 
 
I certify that all material in this thesis which is not my own work has been identified 
and that no material has previously been submitted and approved for the award of a 
degree by this or any other University. 
 !  
2 
 
 !  
Incidental human sequence learning 3   
Abstract !
This thesis aims to investigate how well associative learning can account for human 
sequence learning under incidental conditions. It seems that we can learn complex 
sequential information about events in our environment, for example language or music, 
incidentally, without being aware of it. Awareness is, however, a complex issue with 
arguments for (Dienes, 2012) and against (Shanks, 2005) the existence of implicit 
learning processes. A dual process account proposes that there exist two different 
learning systems, one based on conscious, controlled reasoning and rules, and the other 
based on automatic association formation, which can take place outside of awareness 
(McLaren, Green, & Mackintosh, 1994). This thesis attempts to use the predictions of 
an associative account in conjunction with a suitable method for investigating implicit 
learning: sequence learning (Destrebecqz & Cleeremans, 2003). The research involves a 
collection of serial reaction time (SRT) tasks whereby participants respond to on-screen 
stimuli that follow a sequence that they were (intentional learning) or were not 
(incidental learning) informed of. Following on from the experimental design of Jones 
and McLaren (2009) this thesis provides evidence that humans differ in their ability to 
learn different sequential contingencies. After training sequences of trials where the 
current trial location was twice as likely to be either: the same as (Same rule); or 
different to (Different rule) the location two trials before this, participants were far 
better at learning the latter rule. I found that this result was not adequately simulated by 
the benchmark associative model of sequence learning, the Augmented SRN 
(Cleeremans & McClelland, 1991), and present a revised model. This model, amongst 
other attributes, represents all the stimuli experienced by participants and can therefore 
learn stimulus-response contingencies. These seem to block learning (to some extent) 
about the Same rule thus providing an associative explanation of the advantage for 
acquisition of the Different rule. Further predictions regarding the role of additional 
stimuli alongside sequence learning were then derived from this associative account and 
tested on human participants. The first of these was that additional stimuli within the 
task will interact with sequence learning. I found that human participants show 
increased Same rule learning when additional, concurrently presented stimuli follow the 
previous element in the sequence. I demonstrate that when participants perform an SRT 
task where responses are predicted by the colour of a cue, they are able to learn about 
this relationship in the absence of awareness. Using this cue-response learning I further 
4 
investigate cue-competition between sequences and colours under incidental conditions 
and find evidence that suggests between cue associations may alter the influence of cue 
competition. These results altogether suggest that stimuli – both simple and sequential – 
can be learned under incidental conditions. This thesis further proposes that learning 
about simple and more complex relationships between stimuli interacts according to the 
predictions of an associative account and provides evidence that contributes to a dual 
process understanding of human learning. !  
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Chapter 1. General Introduction 
 
“Learning without thought is labour lost” 
Confucius 
 
The central aim of this thesis is to investigate how humans learn sequences incidentally. 
The first challenge in doing so is demonstrating that humans can, in fact, learn without 
awareness or intention. Whilst Confucius may suggest that we require thought to learn, 
it seems obvious that we are able to acquire a number of skills and behaviours without 
understanding the complex underlying rules that define them (Cleeremans & Dienes, 
2008) and this subject as a result has attracted great debate (Mitchell, De Houwer, & 
Lovibond, 2009; Newell & Shanks, 2014; Shanks & St John, 1994). Sequence learning 
is perhaps the most popular paradigm in which to study incidental learning 
(Destrebecqz & Cleeremans, 2003), as participants find it difficult to notice sequential 
patterns in serial reaction time (SRT) tasks even though they show evidence of learning 
through improved performance on these sequences after training (Lewicki, Czyzewska, 
& Hoffman, 1987; Nissen & Bullemer, 1987). How this occurs is not fully understood, 
as in addition to establishing whether this learning does or does not occur explicitly, it is 
possible that humans can automatically learn sequential information in a number of 
ways. Theories regarding incidental sequence learning and implicit learning more 
generally converge on the notion that we are somehow able to extract abstract, 
statistical regularities from the environment without being aware of them (Dienes, 
2012). It is suggested that an associative learning process similar to that proposed to be 
found in animals underlies implicit human learning (McLaren, Green, & Mackintosh, 
1994). This thesis attempts to investigate the specific predictions of an associative 
account of sequence learning using computational modelling to simulate and generate 
predictions regarding how altering various properties of the SRT task affects human 
sequence learning under incidental conditions.  
 
In the introduction to this thesis I will firstly discuss theories of human learning more 
generally, covering the debate between single and dual process accounts and how these 
impact on the study of sequence learning. I will then discuss why the study of sequence 
learning is a key issue in understanding human cognition, and not only because it lends 
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itself to demonstrating the existence of automatic learning processes. The ability to 
learn sequences is a phenomenon worthy of understanding in itself, as sequential order 
is an intrinsic property of many skills and activities acquired by humans; for example, 
motor skills, music and language. Specific accounts of how we learn sequences are 
discussed and their implications are situated within human learning in general. 
Computational models are also discussed, as they remain a popular way of investigating 
sequence learning and attempt to formalise and therefore test theories of how these 
processes occur. Studies of sequence learning are reviewed in terms of the specific 
issues associated with and development of the paradigm over the last quarter of a 
century. I will then discuss our current understanding of how humans learn sequences in 
terms of the variations that have been investigated within a simple SRT task: the 
influence of time and trial order; as well as the role of stimuli and responses. This leads 
me to consider the relationship between stimuli and responses within a task, and 
predictions about cue-competition between elements in a sequential learning SRT from 
an associative perspective are also discussed.  
 
1.1. Human learning processes  
One of the most noteworthy and commonly observable phenomena of the human mind 
is our ability to learn. We can acquire motor skills, language, concepts and categories to 
such a complex and extensive degree that these learned processes and information are 
themselves the subject of intensive study. How our mind understands and is able to 
interact with the world relies on learning: a process of vital importance to human beings. 
How do we learn? 
 
If we begin with perhaps the original research method employed by psychologists (see 
Watson, 1913): introspection, we can think of our own experience of learning to drive; 
playing an instrument; or learning languages, facts or ideas. We can sit down with the 
words and music to a song and learn to sing it, and our learning is the product of 
effortful study and intentional diligence. This, however, doesn’t seem to be the only 
way we can learn, as we may find ourselves singing a song we have heard a few times 
before and observe that some learning has occurred by accident without even being 
aware of it. Whilst this idea of being able to learn without awareness is intuitively 
acceptable, that we can learn both with and without awareness is heavily contested 
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(Beckers, Miller, De Houwer, & Urushihara, 2006; Brewer, 1974; De Houwer, 2009; 
Mitchell, De Houwer, & Lovibond, 2009; Shanks, 2010; Shanks & St John, 1994). 
 
It is generally accepted that humans are able to learn by some conscious, rule-based, 
verbalisable problem solving; whereby mental models or representations of the task are 
built in some way (De Houwer, 2009; Johnson-Laird, 1983; Matthews, Buss, Stanley, 
Blanchard-Fields, Cho, & Druhan, 1989). Indeed, the issue is not that these explicit 
learning processes can be denied; but that these cannot account for all learning observed 
in humans (McLaren, Forrest, McLaren, Jones, Aitken, & Mackintosh, 2014; Mitchell 
et al., 2009). A range of authors claim that there is a need to posit a further, separable 
learning system in humans that is functionally distinct from intentional and conscious 
learning and it characterized as an automatic process that operates outside of control and 
intention, that occurs in the absence of awareness of what is being learned (Evans, 
2003; Lewicki, 1986; McLaren, Green, & Mackintosh, 1994; McLaren et al., 2014; 
Reber, 1967; 1989).  
 
These dichotomous learning processes are popularly defined by the terms explicit and 
implicit (Shanks & St John 1994), which stem from the work of Reber (1967) who 
coined the term ‘implicit learning’ to describe the improved performance participants 
demonstrated on trained artificial grammars without being able to describe any rules or 
relationships. That there is more of a debate on the processes that underlie learning now 
than in the early days of psychology (Shanks, 2010) may come as a surprise to the naïve 
reader, for whom the existence of these two processes may seem introspectively 
obvious and beyond dispute. The following sections aim to summarise accounts of 
learning that are still as heavily contested today as they were when Reber (1967) 
discussed them over forty years ago (Cleeremans & Dienes, 2008). 
 
1.1.1. A dual-process approach 
One of the “oldest and most deeply entrenched dual-system theories in the behavioral 
sciences” is the dual-process account of human learning (Mitchell et al., 2009, p. 183). 
The appeal of a dual-system approach can been seen across psychology, with sets of 
two processes for memory (Squire, 1992); control (Forrest, 2012); social cognition 
(Chaiken & Trope, 1999) to name but a few. The human mind as a whole has itself been 
proposed to be constructed of these two systems (Kahneman, 2011) and this basic 
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explicit, controlled, conscious versus implicit, automatic and unconscious binary 
distinction pervades theorising across both the discipline and as a generally held belief 
regarding our behaviour. 
 
These two learning systems are described in a number of ways: procedural and 
declarative (Willingham, Nissen, & Bullemer, 1989); implicit and explicit (Reber, 
1967); automatic and controlled (Shiffrin & Schnieder, 1977). Essentially, a dual-
process approach to learning suggests that there “exist two qualitatively different types 
of learning” (McLaren, Green, & Mackintosh, 1994, p. 315). Therefore, whilst the 
names and processes involved might differ across theories, dual-process accounts argue 
that a single-system account does not fully explain human learning: as learning can 
operate automatically outside of control, intention and awareness.  
 
Mowrer (1947) suggested that psychologists should see conditioning and problem-
solving as two, functionally separable learning processes. He stressed the nature of the 
two systems, one (associationism) biologically linked with the autonomic nervous 
system; the second (hedonism), driven by the central nervous system. McLaren, Green, 
& Mackintosh (1994) formalised this distinction in contemporary terms and propose 
two systems: a rule-based system that employs verbalisable hypothesis testing by which 
to learn information; and an automatic system that learns through the automatic 
formation of associations (similar to the learning processes believed to occur in 
animals). Human learning and memory processes have also been explained in terms of 
both a rule based system (e.g., Simon & Lea, 1974; Nosofsky, Clark, & Shin, 1989) and 
an instance based system, that simply stores each event experienced (e.g. Medin & 
Schaffer 1978); however, the more popular explanation of implicit learning is based on 
the automatic formation of links between mental representations (Mitchell et al., 2009). 
 
1.1.2. A single-process approach 
The single-process approach suggests that there is no need to posit an additional, 
automatic learning system when a single, rule-based or propositional system can 
account for all instances of human learning. Proponents of this view (e.g. Beckers et al., 
2006; De Houwer, 2009; Mitchell et al., 2009) suggest that the automatic, associative 
links do not occur; and instead all learning is underpinned by qualified mental 
propositions with truth values, and therefore for learning of a contingency to occur 
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people must be aware of their relationship for an explicit propositional relation to be 
learned.  
 
The role of some form of automaticity within mental processes as a whole cannot be 
denied (Cleeremans, Destrebecqz, & Boyer, 1998) as it is introspectively obvious that 
we do not have explicit access to the intricate workings of our minds. However, 
Mitchell et al. (2009) outline clearly that their claims regarding the absence of 
automaticity refer entirely to learning, as perceptual and memory processes may or may 
not act in an automatic fashion. Cheng & Novick (1992) suggest that learning occurs 
through judgements that are based on observed contingencies (positive or negative) 
between stimuli, but that these must be observed. As a result, one can consider the 
defining maxim of a single-process account as: awareness of the relationship between 
events in the environment is the minimum requirement for learning.  
 
1.1.3. Central characteristics of dissociable learning systems 
The central issues surrounding the number of learning processes are those of awareness, 
rationality, and control. Evidence for the automatic component of a dual-process 
account can be inferred when learning is involuntary, if it occurs without any 
consciously accessible knowledge, or if it does not produce rational outcomes or 
behaviour. These definitive characteristics of dissociable learning processes are defined 
briefly here in the context of wider associative theory, as well as considering the 
implications for the study of sequence learning.  
 
1.1.3.1. Awareness 
Generally speaking, many of the arguments for and against a secondary, associative 
system centre around awareness. One essential difference between the two accounts is 
the presence or absence of explicit knowledge regarding a relationship between events. 
An associative learning system does not require this information to be absent, but 
suggests that this is not a necessary condition for learning. Therefore, a situation in 
which learning has occurred, but contingency knowledge is absent is one of the gold 
standards in support of dual learning processes. In an early review of the associative 
literature Brewer (1974) suggested that there existed no such demonstration, which is 
supported by recent critiques of current evidence for learning in the absence of 
awareness (Mitchell et al., 2009; Shanks & St John, 1994; Shanks, 2010). 
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However, the case has also been made that a variety of associative and implicit learning 
studies do provide convincing evidence of an absence of awareness and that selective 
citation is required to conclude that human learning is a single process (Dwyer, Le 
Pelley, George, Haselgrove and Honey, 2009). The issue of demonstrating an absence 
of awareness, however, is fraught with methodological issues, which will be discussed 
further in this section. Nevertheless, for implicit learning to be studied we must strive to 
achieve conditions whereby participants are unaware of what they are learning about to 




Another argument used in both criticism and defense of associative learning is 
rationality. Single-process accounts suggest that one, cognitive, explicit account can 
produce learning effects through propositions, rules and logical inferences that humans 
can and do make (De Houwer, 2009). Any instances of learning that do not appear to 
follow rational thought, therefore, can be suggested to support evidence of an automatic 
process (Dickinson, 1988; Shanks, 2007; Shanks & Dickinson, 1990). How we define 
rationality is key, though, and in this sense refers to sub-optimal behaviour as a result of 
learning (Shanks, 1995). This is unlikely in the context of a sequence learning 
experiment, as the nature of the task means that participants who learn the sequence will 
respond quicker and more accurately (Nissen & Bullemer, 1987) and therefore learning 
has a positive pay-off. Mitchell et al (2009) also point out that whilst propositions have 
a ‘truth’ value, this does not itself have to be rational, or indeed true. Consequently, 
sequence learning and this thesis have relatively little to do with the concept of 
rationality, which itself can be difficult to define and interpret (Shanks, 1995).  
 
1.1.3.3. Instructions and control 
The role of controlled cognitive effort is heavily relied upon in the study of implicit 
processes, as without the ability to unequivocally demonstrate that participants are 
unaware, another approach is to define a process by the volitional conditions under 
which it occurs (Jacoby, 1991). Learning can therefore be defined as intentional (with 
intention and control) or incidental (without intention and outside of control). 
Participants who demonstrate that they have learned information when they did not 
actively attempt to do so are used to provide evidence for implicit learning processes 
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(Dienes & Berry, 1997). This is the standard manipulation of most implicit learning 
tasks, which consequently involve some cover story or instructions that avoid reference 
to learning in order to ensure that participants do not attempt to engage any explicit 
learning process (Perruchet & Pacton, 2006). 
 
Given a simple instruction, however, participants can produce a large number of 
learning effects that are supposedly associative in nature. With no previous training, if 
instructed that there exists a contingency between two events (Cook & Harris, 1937) 
participants are able to produce the appropriate response with no need for the gradual 
build-up of associations. Similarly, given associative training schedules that should 
result in conditioned responding, participants are able to withhold a response if 
instructed to do so (Colgan, 1970; Lovibond, 2003). It seems that instructions can 
subsequently produce, alter, reduce and stop apparently automatic processes. These 
results are used to provide support for a single learning process, as it suggests that 
learning is not automatic and is in fact under our control (Mitchell et al., 2009). These 
results, however, do not exclude the possibility that implicit learning did or can occur; 
as this would imply that humans are able to control the expression of automatic mental 
processes (Jones & McLaren, 2009). Indeed, a study by Wan, Dienes, and Fu (2008) 
found that participants were able to intentionally choose from two implicitly learned 
artificial grammars without being aware of them. Therefore, it may be possible that 
participants can stop themselves from expressing implicitly learned information; or 
produce explicit learning effects that mimic those that seem automatic. However, these 
do not provide evidence that the implicit learning process was affected or controlled in 
any way, as the production of an associatively acquired response may simply be 
overpowered by explicit knowledge in these tasks.  
 
1.1.4. Conceptual issues in studying dual learning processes 
1.1.4.1. Restriction of a binary framework 
The case of control, as discussed above, provides an example of how defining dual 
learning processes as binary opposites (e.g. implicit versus explicit) provides us with a 
research framework with which to study them. For example, if we propose that explicit 
learning involves control, then we can expect that people will be able to explicitly 
choose to not learn; whereas implicit learning cannot be controlled and therefore will 
occur regardless of the intention of a person (Jacoby, 1991). Indeed, the understanding 
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of implicit or unconscious systems is generally framed in terms of a definition of the 
explicit or conscious (Reber, 1989). These dissociable, binary characteristics are the 
fundamental components of a structuralist understanding of the human world, where our 
understanding of one concept is meaningless without its complement (Hawkes, 2003).  
 
A binary pair of processes, however, is often insufficient to capture what are not two 
distinct functional systems but a continuum on which two things may seem the polar 
opposites but simply take up very different points on the same scale (for example, 
gender, Hird, 2000). Defining a mental function as a set of binary polar opposites may 
then, provide us with a framework that is introspectively agreeable but which restricts 
our ability to explore the functional properties of these systems. So it is possible that a 
dual-process account limits our understanding in an attempt to describe divergent 
phenomena. Indeed, research on the development of explicit knowledge in sequence 
learning tasks suggests that with gradual practice participants become aware as a result 
of the increasing strength of memory representations about the sequence (Shanks, 
Wilkinson, & Channon, 2003). This is a single process account that suggests that 
explicit knowledge is not the defining characteristic of one of two learning systems, but 
instead the product of greater learning within a single learning dimension (Cleeremans, 
2006; Shanks, 2005).  
 
1.1.4.2. Falsification of a single process account 
Gilbert (1999) suggests, however, that the term ‘dual’ is used instead of ‘two’ as the 
fundamental aim of psychology in understanding the mind is not to number the amount 
of processes that it may use, but to infer that a single process is not sufficient itself to 
account for the phenomena. Based on the ideas of both parsimony and falsifiability, 
whilst one system that can account for all behaviours is the ideal, the dual process logic 
proposes that the existence of instances that cannot be accounted for by a single system 
suggest the need for (at least) dual processes. This is a subtly different use of a dual-
process theory as framework and method, as it focuses more on inductive logic with a 
proof in principle and less on understanding, and is the logic most often employed in the 
study of implicit learning. As Shanks (2007, p. 297) points out in reference to human 
learning, a higher order set of problem solving processes are not refuted, there are 
simply those who suggest there “might be a separate type of thinking (associative) when 
people make instinctive judgements under conditions of less reflection”.  




This is a popular approach to the study of implicit learning, but there are inherent 
problems with attempting to falsify a single process account of learning. Importantly for 
the study of incidental learning is the issue of attempting to find evidence for the 
absence of awareness, which (issues with measurement aside), predicts the null 
hypothesis (the demonstration of no explicit learning). Null-hypothesis statistical testing 
(NHST) cannot provide us with evidence that something has not been explicitly learned, 
a problem for the conventional statistical method employed across psychology. NHST, 
however, is not the only statistical method for the interpretation of results and there 
have been a number of suggestions to circumvent this fundamental issue. Qualitative 
differences (Jiménez, Vaquero, & Lupiáñez, 2006); dissociations (Perruchet, 1985); 
state-trace analysis (Bamber, 1979); and Bayesian analyses (Dienes, in press) are all 
proposed as solutions to this issue, and the use and associated issues with these 
proposed solutions are discussed in Chapters 2 and 5 of this thesis. 
 
1.1.4.3. The case for ignoring the absolute number of learning processes 
Witnauer, Urcelay and Miller (2009) argue that a comparison between the two accounts 
as opposing theories of learning is flawed, as each is concerned with a different level of 
analysis. Indeed, the arguments surrounding the number of processes are considered by 
some to have little value, as Cleeremans and Dienes (2008, p. 401) assert: 
The verbal question of how many learning systems there are is in danger of 
being vacuous. If God were to tell us how many learning systems there were 
with a single number (one? two? three?), we would have learned nothing. 
Simply attempting to demonstrate implicit learning as a proof of principle, or to falsify 
a single system account is neither a sound theoretical approach nor the aim of this thesis. 
Rather than attempting to quantify the number of processes involved per se, this thesis 
attempts to investigate incidental sequence learning in humans and assumes the 
possibility that humans may be able to learn automatically. In doing so I aim to better 
understand whether or not automatic associations can form in humans as observed in 
animals (McLaren, Green, & Mackintosh, 1994), and how this occurs.  
 
As associative learning in humans is proposed to exist alongside explicit learning within 
a dual-process framework; any investigation of these processes must consider the 
single-process account and associated issues of studying a possibly implicit process. 
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This is important as we must consider the influences of explicit learning, as well as the 
possibility that this account more parsimoniously accounts for human learning. 
Therefore, whilst proving the occurrence of automatic, associative processes would be a 
challenge for any researcher (Shanks, 2010); couching an investigation of associative 
sequence learning processes within a single versus dual process argument is important.  
 
1.2. Studying implicit learning from an associative perspective 
Before moving on to discuss theories of how humans learn sequences, this section will 
briefly review attempts to study implicit associative learning processes in humans, with 
the conclusion that one of the most beneficial and methodologically promising is 
sequence learning in the SRT task. There are a number of literatures that investigate 
automatic or implicit learning processes in humans, which have considerable overlap in 
the subject of interest but can diverge widely in terms of theoretical and methodological 
position. Implicit learning, human associative learning and statistical learning research 
strands each attempt to determine how we learn, but are generally concerned with a 
different level of analysis. As a whole, the implicit learning literature has been 
concerned with methodological issues surrounding the elimination of an explicit 
explanation and defining the conditions under which implicit learning might occur, with 
less functional consideration given to the underlying processes and how these might 
occur. Associative learning research operates at a more detailed level of analysis, which 
functionally (and algorithmically) attempts to understand learning processes. Statistical 
learning research falls somewhere in the middle, borrowing concepts, paradigms and 
language from both pre-existing literatures (Perruchet & Pacton, 2006). Whilst these 
areas have by no means developed exclusively, the literatures could still offer much to 
one another in studying automatic or implicit learning in humans.  
 
As a general rule, associative learning studies attempt to further understand how 
humans come to learn associations between events; but they largely ignore the issues 
posed by a single-process, explicit account of the data. Implicit learning research, on the 
other hand, has developed through attempts to uncover the presence of unconscious 
learning processes and is hence suited to the study of human learning. In contrast, 
associative learning in humans has developed from the existing framework for animal 
learning, consequently methodological issues have not been so extensively considered. 
However, the functional explanations offered by associative learning elegantly explain 
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observed learning effects and the emergent, seemingly explicit phenomena produced by 
associative models provide an extensive and detailed account of human learning 
(Shanks, 2009). I will argue that the study of sequence learning offers an ideal 
experimental setting within which to investigate associative processes in humans that 
circumvents the issues faced by other paradigms.  
 
1.2.1. Human associative learning paradigms 
Research into human associative learning stems from a tradition of animal learning 
research, beginning with the famous Pavlov’s dogs (1927) and the first demonstration 
that learning occurred between repeatedly presented, temporally contiguous events in 
the environment. Classical or Pavlovian conditioning, as it is known, is one of the basic 
learning effects observed in species as simple as the sea slug Aplysia (Carew, Walters, 
& Kandel, 1981). The basic effect involves training an unconditioned stimulus (US), 
which evokes some autonomic, unconditioned response (e.g. salivation, eye-blink), 
alongside a neutral, conditioned stimulus (CS) such as a light, tone or odour. This CS is 
neutral in that presenting it alone should produce no response, and yet after training 
where the CS is presented before the US the CS comes to evoke a response when 
presented alone. CS-US pairings are usually defined by their temporal contiguity so a 
CS occurs before (trace conditioning) or overlaps the start of the US (delay 
conditioning).  
 
In humans, a variety of stimuli have been used as a US to provide evidence of 
conditioning responding, for example: aversive noises (Neumann & Waters, 2006); 
images (Levey & Martin, 1975); electric shocks (McAndrew, Jones, McLaren, & 
McLaren, 2012; Vervliet, Vansteenwegen, Baeyens, Hermans, & Eelen, 2005); flavors 
(Chambers, Mobini, & Yeomans, 2007); odours (Marinkovic, Schell, & Dawson 1989); 
as well as air puffs to the eye (Perruchet, 1985; Weidermann, Tangen, Lovibond, & 
Mitchell, 2009). However, participants are not necessarily unaware of the contingencies 
between CS and US. Whilst authors argue that certain stimuli have an automatic, 
stimulus-driven impact (Bliss-Moreau & Barrett, 2009), there exists the possibility that 
conscious expectation of a US following the presentation of the CS could lead to an 
explicitly produced response to the CS (Mitchell et al., 2009, although see Perruchet, 
1985). 
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Studies of causal reasoning in humans are themselves perhaps the biggest influence on 
the study of associative learning processes in humans after Dickinson, Shanks and 
Evenden (1984; Shanks, 1985) observed that when performing these tasks humans 
demonstrated the sort of associative effects shown in animals. These paradigms involve 
training participants that certain stimuli lead to certain outcomes, and their judgements 
of the likelihood of such an outcome given the stimuli are then measured to assess 
learning. Such research on humans is often conducted using elaborate scenarios, such as 
the allergist paradigm; where the participant plays the role of a doctor who is supposed 
to work out the nature of a hypothetical person’s food allergy. Participants rate the 
likelihood that a person is going to have an allergic reaction (the outcome, O) when 
presented with one or more food items as stimuli (e.g. an apple, A and a banana, B). If 
participants learn that A leads to O and B does not lead to O, we see their ratings of the 
likelihood of this event increase and decrease respectively when presented with A and B. 
Thus, simple discrimination learning and a host of other associative learning effects (e.g. 
blocking, Le Pelley, Oakshot, & McLaren, 2005; backwards blocking, Shanks, 1985) 
are demonstrated in such tasks.  
 
However, a number of papers have sought to demonstrate that propositions are used to 
solve causal reasoning tasks and not an associative system (Beckers, De Houwer, 
Pineño, & Miller, 2005; Lovibond, 2003). In defense of associative learning, studies 
with complex designs that produce convincing, non-rational learning effects that seem 
to occur outside of awareness and follow the predictions of an associative account have 
been provided (Haselgrove, 2009; Le Pelley, Oakshot, & McLaren, 2005; Karazinov & 
Boakes, 2007), which are hard to reconcile with conscious, explicit reasoning-based 
accounts. However, two fundamental issues with such paradigms exist, both of which 
centre around the use of elaborate cover stories. The first issue is that participants are 
asked throughout the task to make predictive judgements and therefore whilst the cover 
story means the task is not presented to the participants as a learning task, participants 
are explicitly required to attend to contingencies between events; violating the maxims 
for incidental learning and making learning possibly the product of explicit intentions 
accounted for by a single propositional process (Vadillo, Orgaz, & Matute, 2008). The 
second issue is that participants may rely on pre-established causal frameworks within 
these tasks (Waldmann & Holyoak, 1992). Participants making judgments about the 
relationship between symptoms and diseases were capable of learning associatively 
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only when the symptoms predicted the disease, and not when the disease predicted the 
symptoms. Waldmann and Holyoak (1992) suggest that participants rely on a pre-
conceived concept of causality to perform these tasks, suggesting that the process is not 
automatic nor based entirely on learning simple associations.  
 
1.2.2. Implicit human learning paradigms 
As there is a consensus that designing associative experiments where conscious and 
explicit, propositional processes cannot influence learning is incredibly difficult 
(Boakes, 2009; Seger, 1994; Shanks, 2007); I will now discuss evidence from studies 
that attempt to fulfill this criterion with a focus on identifying the most effective 
paradigm for the study of human associative learning.  
 
Reber (1967, p. 855) coined the term “implicit learning” when he employed an artificial 
grammar on which participants were trained across seven blocks. Letter strings of six to 
eight items in length formed the experimental stimuli, which were constructed from a 
Markovian grammar. These were presented once to participants for five seconds, who 
were required to immediately reproduce the stimulus in its absence. Reporting the 
number of errors participants made, whilst identical across the first two blocks, 
performance of participants in the control group (a random set of letter strings) 
plateaued, whereas participants who were experiencing letter strings constructed by the 
artificial grammar continued to improve. Due to being unable to verbally report the 
rules of the grammar, Reber (1967; 1989) suggested the presence of an unconscious 
system that could acquire abstract knowledge.  
 
Artificial grammar learning tasks have been used to study implicit learning processes 
across implicit (Dienes, Broadbent, & Berry, 1991), associative (Dienes, 1992), and 
statistical (Saffran, Aslin, & Newport, 1996) research areas. The grammatical stimuli 
involve complex underlying relationships within an abstract structure, which are hard 
for participants to verbalise and demonstrate explicit knowledge of (Cleeremans & 
Dienes, 2008).  The implicit learning literature also contains experimental designs based 
on visual search tasks (Chung & Jang, 1999); dynamic system control (Berry & 
Broadbent, 1984; Broadbent, Fitzgerald, & Broadbent, 1986); hidden covariation 
detection (Lewicki, 1986); probability learning (Reber & Millward, 1968); as well as 
sequence learning (Nissen & Bullemer, 1987; Lewicki, Czyzewska, & Hoffman, 1987).  
36  Chapter 1: General introduction 
!
In an attempt to avoid the influence of explicit processes, these paradigms all share or 
involve one or more of the characteristics outlined in Table 1.1. They share the common 
feature of complex, hard-to-detect, contingencies between events that Reber (1989) 
suggests is key in the design of implicit learning studies. If we present participants with 
simple contingencies, Reber (1989) suggests this will contravene the conditions 
necessary for the observation of implicit learning, as the simple nature of this 
relationship is readily dealt with by the explicit system. Whilst the implicit processes 
available are indeed capable of learning such simple associations, increasing complexity 
of the information to learn will not only reduce the ability of participants to employ an 
explicit, verbalisable set of rules to learn which may overshadow implicit learning; it 
will also make effective use of the implicit learning process and give preference to its 
deployment. 
 
Table 1.1. General characteristics of implicit learning tasks 
Shared characteristics Additional manipulations 
High contingency complexity Cognitive load (e.g. Le Pelley et al., 2005) 
Low contingency detectability Attention (e.g. Curran & Keele, 1993) 
Time pressure Subliminal stimuli (e.g. Weins & Öhman, 2002) 
 Low stimulus discriminability (e.g. Stevenson & Boakes, 2004) 
 
1.2.3. Sequence learning tasks  
Sequence learning tasks have become the dominant paradigm in the study of implicit 
learning (Cleeremans & Dienes, 2008) and take the form of a serial reaction time (SRT) 
task. Participants are usually required to respond to different on-screen stimuli that 
appear in a certain location with a different key press response as quickly and accurately 
as possible. The instructions given to participants simply encourage them to be fast and 
accurate and make no mention of learning or that the stimuli will follow some sequence. 
Whilst not without their own methodological issues, these studies circumvent the issues 
with explicit biases based on propositions shown in other implicit learning studies. An 
example would be tasks using cover stories such as an economic challenge, perhaps in a 
factory where wages, employee happiness, productiveness, etc. are manipulated by the 
participants who are instructed to simply alter these variables to produce the best 
solution; a task on which they show evidence of learning without rule knowledge (Berry 
& Broadbent, 1984; Broadbent, Fitzgerald, & Broadbent, 1986). However, these 
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paradigms, along with artificial grammar tasks, may be affected by the preconceptions 
of participants who “may be guided towards (or diverted from) the discovery of its 
underlying structure by prior knowledge of related real situations” (Perruchet & Pacton, 
2006, p. 237). 
 
By separating the contingency to be learned across time and trials this decreases the 
opportunity for participants to notice or look for contingencies (Jones and McLaren, 
2009) and avoids perceptual issues with training certain concurrent stimulus sets. This 
criticism is true for artificial grammar tasks (Shanks & St John, 1994) as well as in 
visual search tasks1. Participants in sequence learning tasks are instructed to respond 
quickly and accurately, which means there is not need to provide participants with an 
elaborate cover story to mask learning. To some extent, this also provides conditions of 
cognitive load or divided attention (although manipulations on cognitive load and 
attention in sequence learning investigate these influences further, e.g. Curran & Keele, 
1993; Stadler, 1995), as participants are aware of stimuli and responding to them but the 
speeded nature of the task and motivation to perform well may reduce the influence of 
explicit processes.  
 
1.2.4. Conclusions 
In this thesis, I therefore use sequence learning as the paradigm within which to study 
incidental associative human learning for the following reasons. Firstly, because this 
implicit learning task does not rely on stimuli whose properties carry explicit or 
perceptual significance that may provide an alternative explanation for any observed 
learning. Secondly, unlike other associative tasks with elaborate cover stories, this task 
was designed to be performed incidentally, and therefore offers an opportunity to 
investigate simple contingency learning from an associative perspective; without the 
influence of explicit learning processes. Whilst it is by no means the first study of 
associative incidental sequence learning (Cleeremans & McClelland, 1991; Jones & 
McLaren, 2009; Lee & Livesey, 2013) and automatic associations should occur 
regardless of the condition, the literature points to sequence learning as the best method 
to investigate implicit learning (Destrebecqz & Cleeremans, 2003) and therefore it is the !!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!
1 At the Meeting of the Experimental Psychology Society (EPS) January 10, 2014 David Shanks (Vadillo, Beesley, & 
Shanks, 2014) presented results from implicit learning studies using visual search tasks (including Beesley & Shanks, 
2012), of which Mike Burton offered this critique. This is discussed further in Chapter 6, but similar to Shanks & St 
John’s (1994) criticism of the artificial grammar task, participants may have been learning about some perceptual 
feature of the visual stimuli that is not captured by the explicit measures on the task. 
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optimal paradigm to select in order to investigate automatic, associative processes in 
humans.  
 
1.3. Theories of human sequence learning 
In the previous section I argued that sequence learning is the ideal task to investigate 
associative learning in humans, as it is the best implicit learning task available 
(Destrebecqz & Cleeremans, 2003) and it is these incidental conditions under which we 
expect associations to form and therefore associative learning to be observed (McLaren, 
Green, & Mackintosh, 1994). Further to this, and central to this thesis, is that sequence 
learning itself is a phenomenon worthy of study in its own right. Sequences of motor-
actions, phonemes and words make up our behaviours, speech and language; not to 
mention how we understand music and learn to play sports or perform any skill. 
Lashley (1951) noted that serial order was a key issue in understanding human 
cognition and behaviour, and various theories and computational models have since 
been developed to account for how humans learn sequences.  
 
It is not in dispute that humans can learn sequences, the literature is concerned primarily 
with what is learned (Dennis, Howard, & Howard, 2006). This thesis aims to address 
the next level of analysis in asking the fundamental issue of how sequences are learned. 
Both dual-process theories of human learning and theories of sequence learning 
converge on an associative perspective, but I will first consider alternative implicit and 
explicit accounts. I will further discuss computational models of sequence learning, 
which is a popular research strand as representing time and serial order in models of 
learning is a complex issue that is much debated within psychology and computing. It is 
also a major theoretical and methodological component of this thesis.  
 
1.3.1. Rule learning 
The most parsimonious account of sequence learning in humans is that we can simply 
learn rules in order to account for the apparent structure that is experienced when 
performing tasks. This follows a propositional perspective and requires the common 
features of a sequence to manifest as a mental representation of their abstract structure 
(De Houwer, 2009; Mitchell et al., 2009). This has early origins in the study of 
sequence learning in humans, with the work of Restle (1970) suggesting that 
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participants explicitly learn sequences by applying tree-like structural rules in order to 
understand and then acquire these sequences. Without intention to learn, research into 
the development of explicit knowledge in sequence learning tasks suggests that 
participants can form propositional rules just from experiencing a task, which can 
produce a step-increase in performance that correlates with self-reports of awareness 
(Hoffmann & Koch, 1997; Koch, 2007). These studies, however, also show evidence of 
gradual performance increases before this occurrence which suggest that early learning 
was occurring that did not rely on rule-based propositions (Rünger, 2012).  
 
1.3.2. Memory  
One defining aspect of all theories of sequence learning is that in some way they must 
account for the problem that contingencies between sequential elements are separated 
by time. This nearly always involves the influence of some form of memory (Hsiao & 
Reber, 2001) and consequently this leads some researchers to suggest that the most 
parsimonious explanation of sequence learning is simply an instance based account 
(Shanks & Perruchet, 2002; Shanks, Wilkinson, & Channon, 2003), where the 
experience of each trial and is stored in memory, and that increased training of certain 
trial orders would make certain instances gain stronger memory representations, thus 
producing improved response latencies. As a consequence of these strengthening 
memories, participants would also be increasingly likely to report and have conscious 
access to these instances, from which they could derive knowledge about underlying 
contingencies, sequences or rules (Shanks, 2005). This is not an incompatible approach 
to the associative perspective put forward in this thesis (Fu, Fu, & Dienes, 2008), as it 
does not specify how memory representations are formed.  
 
1.3.3. Chunking 
A variety of models of sequence learning involve some system that can classify 
instances according to their wider context within a sequence, for example: that the 
current trial was preceded by the same stimulus location. This leads to a model that 
involves a combination of chunks and hierarchic representation derived from the 
seminal work of Lashley (1951). As a model of sequence learning chunking has had 
mixed results (Curran, 1995): but it can describe explicit sequence learning effects well 
(Gordon & Meyer, 1987; Povel & Collard, 1982; Restle & Burnside, 1972); However, 
chunking itself does not offer a functional explanation of learning processes, as some 
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method by which chunks are formed and then learned is required. One suggestion for 
this is through the formation of associations, although other chunking models based on 
perceptual properties exist (e.g. the Elementary perceiver and memorizer [EPAM], 
Feigenbaum & Simon, 1962; 1984). When applied as a simple explanation of sequence 
learning under incidental conditions, chunking has descriptive strength, yet a 
computational instantiation is yet to demonstrate that simply chunking or grouping 
together trials into sub-sections sufficiently accounts for human performance on such 
tasks (Spiegel & McLaren, 2006). 
 
1.3.4. Chaining 
One of the oldest theories in representing serial order is that of chaining (Ebbinghaus, 
1964) where pairs of sequential elements are associated together, as on each trial the 
current stimulus is the cue for the next stimulus (Lashley, 1951). Simple chaining 
models only consider these pairwise associations, which are problematic for longer or 
more complex sequences that share many elements (Hartley & Houghton, 1996). 
Models can contain these pairwise associations as part of a common trace formed across 
the experiment (e.g. the sequential pairwise associative memory [SPAM] model, 
Wallace & Fountain, 2002), which avoids these issues, however these models are 
unable to ignore non-predictive elements within a probabilistic sequence, leading to 
interference and a lack of learning (Spiegel & McLaren, 2006). 
 
1.3.5. The simple recurrent network (SRN) 
Jordan (1986) suggested that a model of learning needed to encode for time in some 
way and produced a network that involved recurrent connections between output and 
input units within a three-layer connectionist neural network. This network involved 
input and output layers, with a layer of hidden units in between these that encode an 
internal representation of the input before this is passed to the output. Hidden layers are 
suggested to be essential to modelling more than simple contingencies between events 
(McClelland & Rumelhart, 1986) and are the component of such networks that give 
them such emergent power (Ellis & Humphreys, 1999). The recurrent connection 
between output and input meant that output on trial t would be copied back into the 
model at t + 1, therefore, a memory for the last trial would appear within the model 
when making a prediction about the current trial. 
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Jordan networks were, ultimately unsuccessful in producing a model of a wide range of 
sequential phenomena, as Elman (1990) refined the application of a recurrent loop 
within a neural network with far superior success in accounting for human performance. 
This network - the SRN is shown in Figure 1.1 and involves a similar structure to a 
Jordan net, but recurrence occurs with the activations of the hidden units on t being fed 
back into the model at t + 1. Thus a memory for the internal representation of the last 
trial is fed back into the model as input on the next trial. It is a connectionist neural 
network that is organised into layers of units that constrain the directional flow of 
activation. A set of input units are activated according to local or distributed external 
input to represent task stimuli and activation passes forward (hence the term feed-
forward, McClelland & Rumelhart, 1986) through multiple connections to a set of 
output units. The activation of these output units are used to train the network, 
representing the responses or task outcomes – in sequence learning the SRN is trained 
to predict the next element in the sequence. The difference between the expected output 
and actual outputs activation is used to calculate an error term. This is passed backwards 
(back-propagation) through the model connections, updating the weights according to 
an error correction rule (Rumelhart, Hinton, & Williams, 1986).  
 
 
Figure 1.1. The simple recurrent network (SRN, Elman, 1990). Input units feed forward 
external activation to a hidden layer of units which create a distributed, internal representation 
of that input. This is fed-forward to output units, which are trained to produce the outcome 
expected in the task through some supervised error correction. This error is back-propagated: i.e. 
passed backwards through the model, updating the strength of connections between the units. 
On each trial the hidden unit activations are copied back into context units, which act then as 
input alongside external input on the next trial. 
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The SRN is the most popular model in simulating not only sequence learning but a 
variety of other forms of implicit learning with great success (Dienes, 1992; Dienes, 
Altmann, & Gao, 1999), although adaptations to the basic model are required for it to 
account for certain human learning effects (Beesley & Le Pelley 2010; Cleeremans & 
McClelland, 1991). The SRN is able to learn complex, probabilistic sequential rules and 
abstract structures that give it extraordinary explanatory power in accounting for varied 
and diverse phenomena (Beesley, Jones, & Shanks, 2012). 
 
1.3.6. Other models 
There are a number of computational models that can deal with learning structure over 
time in the associative literature as well as the SRN: the linear associative shift-registrar 
(Gureckis & Love, 2010); the augmented SRN (AugSRN, Cleeremans & McClelland, 
1991); the auto-associative recurrent network (AARN, Dienes, 1992; Maskara & 
Noetzel, 1993); the temporal recurrent network (TRN, Dominey, 1998); domain-
transfer SRN (Dienes, Altman, & Gao, 1999); and the APECS SRN (Jones, Le Pelley, 
& McLaren, 2002). Further parallel neural models (Hikosaka et al., 1999), synaptic 
cluster models (Dehaene, Changeux, & Nadal, 1987), hidden markov models (Baum, 
1972) and adaptive resonance theory models (ARTMAP, Carpenter, Grossberg, & 
Reynolds, 1991) all represent time and memory in some way as this is a fundamental 
challenge for any learning model. Further to this, dual process models (e.g. Keele, Ivry, 
Mayr, Hazeltine, & Heuer, 2003; Sun, Slusarz, & Terry, 2005) attempt to account not 
just for implicit sequence learning performance, but further explicit and attentional 
components of sequence learning that I do not consider here.  
 
Therefore, as the aim of this thesis is the development of understanding of human 
associative learning using an incidental sequence learning task; the model I will employ 
as the starting point for my investigations is the Augmented SRN (AugSRN, 
Cleeremans & McClelland, 1991), which is a version of the SRN that attempts to not 
only simulate sequence learning, but also to account for sequential effects (which are 
discussed in detail in section 1.5.1.2). As SRT tasks involve both associative learning of 
sequences as well as some possible short-term priming of the previous trials, this model 
incorporates both, and has been successful in simulating the complex pattern of 
subsequence learning effects demonstrated by Jones and McLaren (2009). The AugSRN 
is discussed in full detail in Chapter 3, but essentially in adopting this model I intend to 
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use it to investigate automatic associative processes in humans. The model is therefore 
chosen based on its prior success in modelling sequence learning and used as a 
functional complement to associative theory in predicting human behaviour on 
incidental sequence learning tasks. I do not subsequently propose that a better account 
of sequence learning itself does not exist; as this thesis examines to what extent the 
AugSRN can account for human data and thus how effective (this computational model 
of) associative learning theory is when applied to the incidental learning of sequences.  
 
1.4. Measuring human sequence learning  
Now that I have considered how we might account for human sequence learning I will 
provide a brief overview of the key developments that have occurred in the literature 
since Nissen & Bullemer (1987) produced evidence of apparently implicit learning on 
the SRT task, starting with the measurement of explicit knowledge. This is a key 
concern of this thesis as evidence of truly implicit learning is difficult to obtain. This 
section converges on the use of both explicit tests of knowledge (despite the issues 
associated with taking these after the learning event occurs) alongside a computational 
approach based on associatively predicting human sequence learning in order to find 
evidence for automatic, associative processes. 
 
1.4.1. The general SRT paradigm  
Whilst not all tasks are the same, sequence learning tasks involve participants 
responding to stimuli (usually on-screen shapes or lights) that appear in certain 
locations. The number of stimuli and locations differs between experiments, but 
participants are required to make accurate speeded responses with (usually) spatially 
compatible key-presses to each stimulus. Therefore, SRT tasks of sequence learning are 
characterised as visuo-spatial speeded motor response tasks. The first demonstration of 
implicit learning in SRT tasks is attributed to Nissen and Bullemer (1987) but the task 
was also used by Lewicki, Czyzewska and Hoffman (1987).  
 
Tasks usually involve three phases: training, test and post-experimental explicit 
knowledge tests. Training and test phases involve responding to the SRT task, which in 
training follows a certain sequence that participants are not told about (incidental 
conditions). Test phases involve responding to sequences of trials that are either random 
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or follow the sequence on some occasions but not others. After the SRT task has 
finished participants are then usually asked to perform some test that intends to 
ascertain the extent of their explicit knowledge about the sequences involved in the task.  
 
Measurements are taken in terms of both response latencies (reaction time, RT) and 
error rates are taken as an index of incidental performance on the task, as increased 
speed and less errors on trials that follow the sequence are taken to suggest that 
participants have learned this sequence and are therefore faster and more accurate 
(Nissen & Bullemer, 1987). Measurements of explicit learning are discussed in more 
detail in section 1.4.3 and vary from simply asking participants what they know about 
the task (Reber, 1967) to more complicated task designs, for example the process 
dissociation procedure (Jacoby, 1991). Measurement issues in SRT tasks of sequence 
learning are therefore discussed first, before I move on to examining the sort of 
sequences used in SRT tasks. 
 
1.4.2. Measuring implicit learning in the SRT task 
An SRT task is ideal for measuring implicit learning as it employs an indirect measure 
of learning in RTs and error rates. Asking participants to predict what will happen next, 
as in prediction learning tasks (e.g. Reber & Millward, 1968), or indeed how much they 
know about contingencies or what rules they think may be in play all attract attention to 
the relationship of the trained stimuli (Shanks & St John, 1994), which is an obvious 
problem for an incidental task. Such tests can be considered direct, where participants 
are explicitly asked about their knowledge in some way; on the other hand tests can be 
indirect, where learning is measured without letting participants know this is being 
measured (Merikle & Reingold, 1991). RTs and errors can therefore provide an indirect 
and objective measure of incidental learning, however, there are a number of 
considerations that must be taken into account.  
 
The first is simply the use of appropriate controls, as speeded responding on a task 
across training does not provide evidence of learning per se and may represent a non-
learning priming effect. SRT tasks of sequence learning must, therefore provide a 
suitable control group who perform the same task without the presence of sequences 
(Nissen & Bullemer, 1987) to ensure that improved responding is due to the presence of 
the sequence itself in the sequence-trained group. Some studies use a within-subject 
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control of untrained or random sequences (e.g. Jiménez & Vázquez, 2005) or a post-
training random test or transfer phase (Shanks & Perruchet, 2002) in order to reduce the 
number of subjects required for the task. I will demonstrate in section 1.5.1.2 that this is 
not an adequate design in controlling for other associated issues in SRT tasks. 
One important criticism leveled at many studies of sequence learning that otherwise 
involve a strong experimental design (Anastasopoulou & Harvey, 1999; Shanks & 
Johnstone, 1999) is the issue of speed-accuracy trade off (Jones & McLaren, 2009). If a 
group of sequence-trained participants demonstrates reduced response latencies 
compared to a control group, this may be as a result of faster but less accurate 
responding in the sequence-trained groups. The presence of a sequence may cause 
participants to respond differently, but this may not be an improvement over the control 
group, nor the result of incidental learning. Many studies in the implicit learning 
literature as a whole, not to mention the sequence learning literature, only report either 
the reaction times or accuracy of participants. It is, therefore, important to detail both 
measures of performance on an SRT task to eliminate the possibility that participants 
trained on sequences are not becoming simply quicker but less accurate, or vice versa, 
compared to the control groups.  
 
1.4.3. Measuring explicit learning in the SRT task 
Measuring the presence or absence of conscious mental processes is a complex area of 
debate, and similar to all psychological measurements suffers from attempting to 
measure latent psychological processes through manifest variables (Newell & Dunn, 
2008). Generally, tests of learning can be organised into three groups, tests of: 
acquisition, knowledge and retrieval (Cleeremans et al., 1998). As well as indirect and 
direct tests as described above (Merikle & Reingold, 1991), tests can also be classified 
as objective, where a measurement compares learning against chance performance, or 
subjective, where participants report their belief in their own knowledge (Dienes, 2004). 
The title of the section is somewhat misleading as measuring any explicit learning is not 
what researchers wish to do in implicit studies. Whilst researchers wish to demonstrate 
the absence of explicit learning, in doing so we must ensure that explicit processes are 
given every chance to appear on test in order to provide convincing evidence they do 
not, therefore a suitable measure of explicit learning is given far greater attention than 
the implicit learning measures themselves.  
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Classically, arguments surrounding tests of explicit knowledge begin with the 
discussion of verbal self-report, as employed by Reber (1967) and in original sequence 
learning studies (Nissen and Bullemer, 1987); which are criticised for a lack of 
sensitivity as they do not measure learning at the detailed level that implicit measures, 
discussed in the next section do (Shanks & St John, 1994). Forced choice tasks are 
suggested to provide some test of conscious knowledge at a more sensitive level, which 
usually involve making recognition judgements (Perruchet & Amorim, 1992), fragment 
completion (Willingham, Nissen, & Bullemer, 1989), or sequence generation – where 
participants are asked to predict which trial comes next or produce a sequence (Jiménez 
et al., 2006). However, these direct measures of explicit knowledge are not free of 
automatic bottom-up responses when presented with stimuli that have been learned and 
cannot be assumed to be exclusive of the influence of automatic processes (Merikle & 
Reingold, 1992).  
 
Subjective measures of explicit knowledge have also been proposed as an index of 
explicit knowledge, as asking participants whether they are guessing or not can give a 
criterion of whether participants are engaging in explicit processes (Cheesman & 
Merikle, 1984; Dienes & Berry, 1997). This is difficult to instantiate during a sequence 
learning task, as asking questions about the task as it progressed would reveal the nature 
of learning that was meant to be implicit. Therefore, questions regarding participants 
introspective performance are insensitive and could be influenced by decay over time or 
indeed bias (Dienes, 2004). A further suggestion is the zero-correlation coefficient, 
which suggests that if subjective confidence ratings in performance do not correlate 
with objective learning measures then there is no evidence of explicit awareness of what 
has been learned (Dienes & Berry, 1997). However, a corollary of this argument is that 
subjective and objective measures are independent of one another and are not 
influenced by the other, which is unlikely to be the case (Jacoby, 1991; Merikle & 
Reingold, 1992).  
 
Most studies of associative learning attempt to demonstrate the absence of explicit 
knowledge (Cleeremans et al., 1998) rather than acquisition, as this is measured post-
learning. Whilst RT and error rates across training provide learning curve data with 
which to analyse on-line acquisition of learning, explicit tests post-SRT task can always 
be argued to suffer from memory decay or interference (Shanks & St John, 1994). 
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Explicit tests that occur after the SRT task therefore may not capture a learning process 
that occurred through (now inaccessible) explicit propositions (Shanks & St John, 1994).  
 
Consequently, sequence learning tasks offer no definite solution to assess the extent to 
which participants may or may not have engaged in explicit learning processes, as the 
nature of implicit serial response tasks ultimately require that explicit checks on 
learning are conducted post-training. This is due to both keeping participants from 
uncovering the nature of the task and so as to avoid disruption of the speeded nature of 
responding and thus the learning of the sequences. Both subjective and objective 
measures of explicit knowledge were taken in the studies in this thesis after a test 
(extinction) phase of the experiments, which are consequently subject to criticism for 
the reasons discussed here. Whilst I acknowledge these criticisms, alongside 
investigating learning under incidental conditions and predicting human learning 
performance on the basis of associative theory I hope to provide a convincing account 
of automatic processes, as I will discuss in the following section.  
 
1.4.4. Other methods to demonstrate incidental learning 
Rather than relying on explicit tests entirely, Seth, Dienes, Cleeremans, Overgaard and 
Pessoa (2008) provide a review of behavioral and biological measures of explicit 
processes, and conclude that a variety of measures are required to converge on any 
assumptions about the nature of the processes involved. This section briefly considers 
additional measures or tests that further attempt to understand what sort of learning 
occurs in SRT tasks.  
 
1.4.4.1. Process purity 
Firstly, it is worth restating here that, although tests may be classified as direct, indirect, 
subjective, objective, or any other classification; it does not logically follow that they 
measure any particular mental process (Newell & Dunn, 2008). Reaction times and 
accuracy on a task, for example, do not exclusively measure performance in the absence 
of conscious attention and motivation (Merikle & Reingold, 1992). We cannot isolate 
the study of a mental process such as learning without the influence of explicit thought 
as well as a whole host of other perceptual and cognitive processes at work, so we 
cannot assume that any test is process-pure (Jacoby, 1991). Assuming that all measures 
of learning are therefore capturing other mental processes, which is the best in this case 
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to use? Indeed, they do not just measure learning, but also the amount of knowledge that 
is stored, and are therefore linked intrinsically with memory systems. Combined with 
other task demands, perceptual influences, variables such as motivation and how well 
participants understand the instructions it is very difficult to compare the results of any 
two different tasks and be sure of what this difference might mean.  
 
Shanks and St John (1994) propose that this is an intrinsic problem for implicit learning 
studies that can only be solved under the assumption that measuring learning after the 
learning event should be used as a marker for what was learned during the event, as to 
assume that it decays before this point would suggest that the learning is too weak to be 
of interest. If this is the case, we must measure both implicit and explicit knowledge at 
the same time, with matched sensitivity. The process dissociation procedure (PDP, 
Jacoby, 1991) attempts to do just this in order disentangle the two processes, originally 
used in the context of implicit and explicit memory.  
 
In the context of a sequence learning task (Destrebecqz & Cleeremans, 2001; Wilkinson 
& Shanks, 2004) this involves two tests (whose order may be counterbalanced) where 
participants are required to: produce responses that follow the trained sequence 
(inclusion test); and produce responses that do not follow the trained sequence 
(exclusion test). Implicit knowledge will act to encourage responses consistent with the 
trained sequences on both tests, whilst explicit knowledge will only positively influence 
correct sequence generation on the inclusion test. Using this procedure with a response-
stimulus interval of 0 seconds (as discussed in Karazinov & Boakes, 2007) participants 
provided evidence for sequence learning in the exclusion test and therefore of implicit 
learning. However, Wilkinson and Shanks (2004) failed to replicate the results and a 
variety of other authors have called this procedure into question (Curran & Hintzman, 
1997; Dodson & Johnson, 1996; Graf & Komatsu, 1994). 
 
1.4.4.2. Biological solutions 
A proposed solution is to employ a biopsychological or neuropsychological measure as 
an index of learning. fMRI (Willingham, Salidis, & Gabrieli, 2002); event related 
potentials (Fu, Bin, Dienes, Fu, & Gao, 2013); eye-tracking (Marcus, Karatekin, & 
Markiewicz, 2006); PET (Destrebecqz et al., 2005) have all been used to demonstrate 
some support for implicit learning of sequences. These offer sophisticated and real-time 
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measures of on-line learning, unlike direct tests. These methods, however, are often 
costly and give little clear evidence of implicit learning, as we must still infer their 
index of implicitness from the studies whose status as implicit is the issue under 
question.  
 
Another solution is to use clinical populations, which may be impaired on learning tasks 
(e.g. amnesiacs, Clark & Squire, 1998; McGlinchey-Berroth et al., 1997; Squire, 1992), 
where we can compare performance with normal participants and assess learning in 
comparison to participants who are unable to learn. Whilst this provides evidence for 
the sort of neurological structures that may be involved in learning, this has a multitude 
of issues, namely in comorbidity of deficits and a lack of understanding regarding the 
nature of the learning impairment, as the brain area may selectively impair perception, 
attention, acquisition, retrieval or a variety of other associated components of the 
learning process.  
 
1.4.4.3. Computational considerations 
In a comprehensive review of measures of implicit and explicit knowledge Seth et al. 
(2008) conclude that there is no definitive measure of either implicit or explicit 
knowledge, and recommend a combination of measures. This thesis takes their view, 
that measurements should provide results which build on understanding and that an 
integrated approach based on some theoretical framework offers a way in which to 
provide greater understanding of these processes. Hence, associative learning theory 
will be used to make specific, behavioural predictions about how humans learn 
sequences incidentally; and these will be tested experimentally.  
 
As previously discussed, all tests, implicit and explicit; direct and indirect; biological or 
behavioural are all problematic as they may not simply measure learning per se, indeed, 
all psychological measures suffer from being simply manifest variables of the latent 
variables that we wish to measure (see Newell & Dunn, 2008). Rather than combining 
behavioral and neurological measures, which both suffer from this manifest issue, a 
computational approach means that one can directly measure any aspect of the model, 
then manipulate and quantify the learning processes at work. A computational model of 
human sequence learning can therefore be used to provide researchers with substantial 
explanatory power. Indeed, Cleeremans and Dienes (2008, p. 401) suggest that in the 
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study of human learning processes “what we really need to know are the principles by 
which a working computational model of human learning could be built”. Given that the 
thesis attempts to investigate associative processes in humans, there seems no better 
method than to examine the predictions of a computational, associative model and test 
these on humans. 
 
1.5. Variations within the standard SRT task 
There are a number of features that have been varied across the standard SRT sequence 
learning paradigm that have led to various methodological refinement and also provide 
insight into how learning of sequences occurs. The obvious variable that one might 
manipulate within a sequence learning task is the sequence itself, which is discussed 
first in terms of the sequences used in SRT tasks. Participants demonstrate different 
learning effects depending on various sequence attributes: whether they are fixed or 
probabilistic or conditional; their length and the number of sequential elements that they 
involve. Further to this, participants demonstrate different response effects in an SRT 
task based on various attributes of the task trial order and these sequential effects are 
discussed in terms of both controlling for and accounting for these effects within a 
model of human incidental sequence learning. Sequences are not only defined by their 
trial order, but also by time itself and how this is manipulated within SRT tasks of 
sequence learning is also discussed. Finally, I will consider the two elements of the SRT 
task: perceptual characteristics of the stimuli and the nature of the motor responses 
required, and consider what manipulations of these can tell us about sequence learning 
and discuss how they are currently represented within models of human sequence 
learning. 
 
1.5.1 Sequence learning and sequential effects 
This section deals with difference between sequence learning and sequential effects. 
Throughout the thesis I refer to sequence learning as evidence of learning about the 
trained sequential patterns or contingencies intended by the experimenter. Sequential 
effects are generally defined as the influence of trial order on speeded responding in an 
SRT task (Anastasopoulou & Harvey, 1999) and, when considered, are generally taken 
as an experimental confound to be controlled for in sequence learning tasks (Jones & 
McLaren, 2009). It is entirely possible that participants automatically learn about many 
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aspects of the task outside of the sequence of interest, including random elements of 
trial order. Whilst sequential effects attract theoretical interest and themselves , for the 
purpose of this thesis they are considered separately to learning about the trained 
sequence itself for purposes of clarity.  
 
1.5.1.1. Sequence learning 
As mentioned in this section introduction, there are a variety of sequences that have 
been used in the sequence learning literature. These can be divided into roughly two 
paradigms, the first being those experiments that use one or more fixed, repeating 
sequences to train participants. Participants in Nissen and Bullemer’s (1987) original 
demonstration of implicit sequence learning, for example, were required to press four 
different keys for four different stimuli (A, B, C and D) that followed the sequence: D-
B-C-A-C-B-D-C-B-A continuously ten times in a block for eight blocks (with no 
demarcation between each sequence). The second type of sequence learning studies use, 
instead of this repeating sequence, some sequential structure. Rather than trial locations 
following a fixed sequence, they can follow a set of underlying rules that results in an 
abstract structure. Cleeremans and McClelland (1991), for example, employed the same 
Markovian structure used by Reber (1967) to construct his artificial grammars.  
 
The first, fixed sequential structures are used in most of the early sequence learning 
literature (Stadler & Neeley, 1997), which lead to a variety of issues. These sequences 
in some instances do not control for the number of stimulus presentations in each 
location, therefore participants in Nissen and Bullemer’s (1987) study may have been 
able to respond less to 'D' and 'A' and more to 'B' and 'C' to give them some advantage 
on the task (DeCoster & O’Mally, 2011). They also involve increased likelihood of 
certain first order transitions, for example B is followed by C twice, but never by A; as 
well as there being no possibility that stimuli can repeat. There are therefore two 
essential problems with fixed sequences: the first being that some elements or structural 
components within a sequence may be learned, rather than the whole sequence itself. 
This suggests that explicit knowledge tests may fail the information criterion (Shanks & 
St John, 1994) as well as demonstrating that participants may not be demonstrating 
sequence learning at all (Stadler & Neeley, 1997).  
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The second problem is that certain trial orders may naturally produce response 
differences, for example participants may be faster to respond to a repetition compared 
to an alternation (Soetens, Boer, & Huetings, 1985). These sequential effects are a vital 
point of consideration for sequence learning studies when attempting to demonstrate 
learning, as well as being worthy of interest in their own right (see section 1.5.1.2). The 
presence of these sequential effects is an issue as many studies not only use a fixed 
sequence that may suffer from them but the same fixed sequence used by Nissen & 
Bullemer (1987; Stadler, 1992), or a similar 12-item fixed sequence introduced by 
Reber and Squire (1998; DeCoster & O’Mally, 2011).  
 
Probabilistic sequential structures do not follow the same, fixed sequence throughout, 
with a propensity to discourage explicit processes (Cleeremans, 1993); they have an 
abstract structure (Cleeremans et al., 1998); following the maxim of complex, abstract 
stimuli relationships suggested by Reber (1989) and hence are preferred in the study of 
sequence learning (Jones & McLaren, 2009). However, this does not exclude them from 
sequential effects, as artificial grammars such as the one used by Cleeremans and 
McClelland (1991) do not control for the number of stimulus presentations in each 
location nor the number of first order transitions between trials (Anastasopoulou & 
Harvey, 1999). Reed & Johnson (1994) suggest instead that the SRT task should always 
use second order conditional (SOC) sequences, where the location of the response 
stimulus on each trial is uniquely determined the previous two trial locations. These 
match for the number of locations and first order transitions between stimuli, although 
these often do not allow repeats to occur, which introduces a sequential effect in itself. 
Whilst first order transitions can be balanced, there will be an influence of higher order 
sequential effects (i.e. the effect of trial orders preceding the previous trial; 
Anastasopoulou & Harvey, 1999; Soetens, Boer, & Huetings, 1985).  
 
If we balanced the number of trial orders precisely in a task then we can propose there 
would be nothing to learn about, as trial order would be controlled and thus 
pseudorandom with every possible response location and transition equally likely 
(Anastasopoulou & Harvey, 1999). Therefore, in order to control for the inevitable 
influence of sequential effects when a sequence is introduced, we must compare not 
only performance to a control group who have not experienced these sequential effects, 
but we must eradicate the influence of these sequential effects in a matched, 
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pseudorandom test phase where learning in the sequence-trained groups can be 
demonstrated compared to control participants.  
 
Studies that have been successful in controlling for these sequential influences 
(Anastasopoulou & Harvey, 1999; Shanks & Johnstone, 1999), as well as presenting a 
full account of both RT and error data are limited (Jones & McLaren, 2009). I recognise 
that controlling for sequential effects produces significant methodological constraints in 
terms of the type of sequences that participants can learn, the need for a between subject 
control, and the need for a test phase. Following Jones and McLaren (2009) this thesis 
involves a two-choice SRT task, which enables a simpler control for sequential effects, 
as the number of stimuli, and therefore of first-order transitions, and therefore higher-
order transitions are limited and more easily balanced. This structure also allows for a 
simple, probabilistic structure to be introduced to relationships between stimuli (Jones 
& McLaren, 2009; Lee & Livesey, 2013), for example, the likelihood of a first-order 
repeat or alternation can be changed in the sequence-trained group; and controlled for 
by the pseudorandom control group where either is equally likely.  
 
1.5.1.2. Sequential effects 
Whilst sequential effects have been proposed as something that sequence learning 
studies are required to control for (Anastasopoulou & Harvey, 1999) they make up a 
thriving research literature in and of themselves in understanding human perception and 
performance (Soetens, Melis, & Notebart, 2004). I want to outline how this impacts 
upon a computational associative account of sequence learning.  
 
Computational models of sequence learning such as the AugSRN (Cleeremans & 
McClelland, 1991) have attempted to account for these effects, primarily the effect of 
the previous trial (t – 1) on the current trial (t) in order to better account for the variance 
in human performance on the task. The first-order effect observed by Bertelson (1961, 
1963) that participants are faster at responding when the t is in the same location as t – 1 
(a first-order repeat) was incorporated in the model by adding response-units which 
introduced short-term priming of the previous response. Jones and McLaren (2009) 
observed this first-order repeat preference and it was well modelled by the AugSRN, 
which provided a good explanation of human behaviour on the task. Therefore, the 
model contains a non-associative (no long-term learning occurs with respect to this 
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response priming) component in order to account for certain response patterns. This 
thesis aims to similarly account for human response preferences with a computational 
model, and so sequential effects as well as sequence learning will be considered.  
 
1.5.1.3. Associative predictions 
As mentioned previously, Jones and McLaren (2009) provide a demonstration of 
sequence learning that is not confounded by either sequential effects or a speed-
accuracy trade off, thus making it the methodological starting point for the experimental 
work presented in this thesis. Additionally, the account that Jones & McLaren (2009) 
provide of their data is associative, and the AugSRN and human performance under 
incidental conditions are equivalent, in terms of both sequence learning and sequential 
effects. The specific details of the paper are discussed at length in the introduction to 
Chapter 2, but in brief the amount of sequence learning that occurs under incidental 
conditions differs in the task depending on the particular trial order of certain 
‘subsequences’, which are all taken from a probabilistic structure based on the same 
underlying rule.  
 
The AugSRN provides evidence that these differences are the result of competition 
between trial-by-trial associations, which reduces the error term for certain sequences 
that hence restricts learning. Jones and McLaren (2009) therefore suggest that learning 
about relationships between previous trials can block learning about sequences on 
subsequent trials. This might also suggest, however that participants in the task are not 
able to extract the abstract sequential structure trained on the task and instead learn 
specific instances. Consequently, the first Chapter in this thesis aims to further 
investigate these claims regarding competition between trial-by-trial associations within 
a similar SRT task design, but using a different underlying stochastic structure to the 
trials experienced by their (Jones and McLaren's) sequence-trained participants to 
investigate the associative predictions regarding sequence learning.  
 
1.5.2. Time 
The study of sequence learning is primarily concerned with variations in trial order, as 
this is the essential information that is acquired when learning a sequence. The 
influence of time itself on sequence learning has attracted considerable attention in 
recent years. SRT sequence learning tasks are generally fast paced, a design feature 
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borne out of attempting to avoid the explicit development of propositions (i.e. rule 
induction) that is shared by human associative learning studies (e.g. Karazinov & 
Boakes, 2007). This suggests that explicit processes are thought to occur given greater 
time between stimuli within an SRT task, and indeed this was found by Destrebecqz 
and Cleeremans (2001; 2003) as manipulating response to stimulus interval (RSI) had 
no effect on incidental learning, but participants demonstrated explicit knowledge when 
RSIs were increased to 1500 milliseconds (ms). Further authors were unable, however, 
to replicate these results (Fu et al., 2008; Norman, Price, & Duff, 2006; Wilkinson & 
Shanks, 2004). Indeed, Frensch and Miner (1994) propose that time has the opposite 
effect on learning, and suggest that increasing the RSI produces a reduction in learning. 
Researchers tend however, to agree that RSI has little influence on incidental learning, 
however fixed or patterned RSIs produce greater incidental sequence learning than 
random RSIs (Shin, 2008), which suggests that time is encoded and learned about when 
learning about sequences (Miyawaki, 2006; Rünger, 2012). This is not something that 
models of sequence learning such as the SRN account for as time is simply represented 
in a step-wise trial-by-trial fashion (Destrebecqz & Cleeremans, 2003). 
 
In addition to this, time has a differential effect on sequential effects (Soetens, Melis, & 
Notebart, 2004) as increases in RSI tend to produce a change in first-order response 
preferences from repeats to alternations. This is again suggested to be due to the 
influence of explicit expectations, this time akin to a gambler’s fallacy heuristic where 
participants expect an alternation to be more likely (Jarvik, 1951). This suggests that 
both sequence learning and sequential effects may interact with one another and time to 
produce the pattern of responding in humans. Jones and McLaren (2009) used a fixed 
RSI of 500 ms in their task, which is shorter than the ‘explicit’ RSI manipulation used 
by Destrebecqz and Cleeremans (2001; 2003) but also longer than similar experiments, 
such as Cleeremans and McClelland (1991). Jones and McLaren (2009) accordingly 
increase the learning rate of the AugSRN to better capture the longer RSI, which 
crudely represents time. The influence of time on sequence learning is addressed by the 
simulations involved in Chapter 3 of this thesis, which consider the influence of time 
and order within each trial, as well as between each trial.  
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1.5.3. Stimuli and responses 
One much debated element of sequence learning tasks is to what extent the perceptual 
and motor components of the task are learned and represented. Whilst Willingham 
(1999) demonstrated that learning about sequences can be entirely response based; other 
demonstrations suggest that sequence learning can occur to stimuli that are purely visual 
in nature (Heyes & Foster, 2002; Howard, Mutter, & Howard, 1992; Marcus, Karatekin, 
& Markiewicz, 2006) with no responses whatsoever. In a study by Mayr (1996) 
participants were trained in a task where both the shape of the stimuli and the location 
of the stimuli followed two, different, independent sequences. Participants showed 
evidence of being able to learn both sequences when required to respond to shapes and 
not locations, suggesting that participants were able to learn both response-based 
sequences regarding shapes alongside stimulus-based sequences regarding locations 
(Mayr, 1996). It is debated whether sequence learning involves associations between 
stimuli (S-S learning, Heyes & Foster, 2002; Howard, Mutter, & Howard, 1992); 
responses (R-R learning, Nattkemper & Prinz, 1997); or the previous response and 
current stimulus (R-S learning, Ziessler & Nattkemper, 2001). Whilst studies are 
concerned with which one of these occurs, it is entirely possible that more than one 
occurs.  
 
Models of sequence learning may consider stimuli and responses a moot point, as when 
represented locally within a computational model, responses (if correct) can be 
represented in the same way as stimuli. Associative models of sequence learning 
generally represent a sequential element as a single event (t) that predicts the next 
sequential element (t + 1). I will argue in this thesis that this does not accurately 
represent the task conditions experienced by humans in an SRT task. It is entirely 
possible that an associative system can learn S-S, R-R and R-S associations, as well the 
often overlooked associations (in this context anyway) between stimuli and responses 
(S-R learning). Participants are not required to associatively learn that each stimulus in 
the task requires certain responses, as they are instructed how to respond, which is why 
models and theories are not concerned with stimulus-response learning; as this is not 
involved in the learning of sequences. However, there is a perfect contingency between 
these stimuli (e.g. the light that flashes) and the required response (e.g. the key to be 
pressed), so we can expect that practice will have some effect on the strength of the 
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stimulus-response association. Whilst these stimulus-response associations are not a 
necessary condition for learning about sequences associatively, I will investigate to 
what extent an associative model predicts how these associations might interact with 
incidentally learned sequences. Similar to the account of sequential learning effects 
observed in Jones and McLaren’s (2009) study, stimulus-response associations may 
compete with sequence learning and produce a differential effect.  
 
1.6. Variations on the standard SRT task 
There have been a number of variations on the SRT task that introduced dual tasks 
(Cohen et al., 1990; Curran & Keele, 1993; Jiménez & Mendez, 1999) in order to 
investigate whether sequence learning requires cognitive effort or selective attention. 
Whilst these produce interesting results that can inform our understanding of sequence 
learning, this section will focus on the variations on the standard SRT task that, 
following from the previous section regarding stimuli and response, associative learning 
theories may provide specific, testable predictions about. These tasks are those that 
include additional stimuli, which may be expected to interact with the sequence 
learning in some way. The number of such studies to date is small and I will conclude 
that they provide no suitable evidence that incidental learning about two sets of 
contingencies interact. Finding an associatively predicted effect of cue-competition in 
implicit learning literature as a whole is lacking when the presence of such an effect 
achieved under incidental conditions would provide strong evidence for the occurrence 
of automatic, associative processes (Beesley & Shanks, 2012). A central aim of this 
thesis is therefore to investigate how additional stimuli or cues within a sequence 
learning task have an effect on the incidental learning of these sequences in order to 
demonstrate associative learning in humans.  
 
1.6.1. Additional concurrent stimuli 
Sequence learning tasks usually involve visuo-spatial stimuli, but some tasks also 
involve additional stimuli or stimulus elements (e.g. colour or shape). In recent studies 
by Abrahamse and colleagues (Abrahamse, Lubbe, Verway, Szumska, & Jaskowski, 
2012), sequence learning tasks have investigated the claim that sequence learning can 
be potentiated by concurrent stimuli that also follow the sequence (Robertson & 
Pascual-Leone, 2001; Robertson, Tormos, Maeda, & Pascual-Leone, 2001). Robertson 
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and colleagues demonstrated that the learning of sequences of stimulus locations or 
colours of sequences was stronger when these two sequences were contingent than 
when only locations or only colours were used alone; however, they did not use the 
same sequences nor the same tasks at test to assess learning correctly. In doing so 
Abrahamse et al. (2012) found that participants show no difference between learning 
about locations alone compared to when colours were congruent with these. This 
suggests that other stimuli have little effect on sequence learning, and that sequence 
learning is strongly linked to responding. This merits further investigation, as 
Abrahamse et al. (2012) investigated location alone sequence learning with a single 
colour stimulus, whereas the location and congruent colour condition involved four 
colours and locations. It is possible therefore that colour-location associations in fact 
interfered with learning about the sequence, or that the colour information was not 
perceived as separate to the location information and the one colour-response unit was 
represented as a single compound stimulus.  
 
1.6.2. Additional between-trial stimuli 
Nissen and Bullemer (1987) provided evidence that in a dual-task version of their SRT 
task that an additional counting task that involved tones presented during the RSI 
disrupted incidental sequence learning. They took this to suggest that reduced attention 
to the sequence led to reduced learning, indicating that implicit learning requires some 
element of selective attention. Stadler (1995) provides a different account of these 
results and suggests that the concurrent tone counting task actually disrupts the 
sequential order as it is encoded, and that it is not attention but interference from these 
additional tone stimuli that impairs sequence learning. This, to some extent, may be 
interpreted associatively, as a representation of a separate element within the RSI may 
influence the associations made between the sequential stimuli or responses. Indeed, if 
the responses are the only element of the task implicated in the learning of sequences 
then additional between-trial stimuli should not have an effect on sequence learning, 
however, if stimuli also drive sequence learning then we can expect associations 
between these stimuli to be disrupted.  
 
It is not clear in these dual tasks, however, to what extent incidental processes are 
interfering with one another, as the secondary task is made explicit to participants and 
therefore a host of influences including working memory, perceptual and cognitive load 
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could produce these effects. In this thesis I will aim to investigate further the possibility 
that sequence learning is affected by additional stimuli presented concurrently within 
the SRT task. However, instead of examining these stimuli as part of an additional dual-
task scenario where additional, explicit influences on processing may account for 
differences in performance, I will investigate how the associations formed between 
these additional stimuli and existing elements of the task interact with the learning of 
sequences. 
 
1.6.3. Additional cues 
Further to this, there are a number of studies that investigate sequence learning 
alongside learning about additional contingencies. Beesley and Shanks (2012) proposed 
that excellent support for the presence of associative learning processes in humans 
would be provided if a task could show that learning about two contingencies competed 
with one another following established learning effects observed in animals, for 
example blocking (Kamin, 1969). Whilst they found no evidence of cue-competition in 
humans using a visual search task, I will argue in Chapter 6 of this thesis that such a 
task may not involve two forms of competing incidental learning, and further examine 
whether we can find evidence of an interaction between learning about two incidentally 
acquired contingencies. This would provide strong evidence that humans were learning 
associatively and is therefore a central aim of this thesis.  
 
In the context of SRT tasks, Cleeremans (1997, p. 74) investigated a novel version of 
the SRT task where the colour of the stimuli on each trial predicted the next response in 
the sequence, which was “inspired by work on overshadowing in conditioning 
experiments with animals”. With an aim to investigate whether colour-response learning 
would overshadow sequence learning, Cleeremans (1997) found that whilst participants 
learned about colours that this did not interact with sequence learning, providing no 
evidence of overshadowing and therefore no evidence for associative processes. This 
conclusion, however, may be flawed for a number of reasons. Firstly, participants were 
instructed about the presence of colour contingencies and therefore this learning is 
likely to have been explicit, which could explain the lack of an associative interaction 
between the two learning processes (Jiménez & Méndez, 1999).  
 
60  Chapter 1: General introduction 
!
Jiménez and Méndez (1999) adapted Cleeremans’ (1997) task and provided evidence 
from a version of the study where participants did not receive explicit colour-
contingency information. They were trained incidentally that colours predicted the next 
trial alongside sequence learning and no evidence colour-response learning, nor of an 
interaction between the two was found. Jiménez and Méndez (1999) concluded that 
there was no evidence of associative overshadowing, however, both of these studies did 
not provide a control group for sequence and colour contingency learning, which is an 
investigation that will be conducted within this thesis. Furthermore, the studies did not 
entertain the possibility that blocking or overshadowing may occur in the other 
direction: with the colour contingency learning being overshadowed by the sequence 
learning. Both studies assume that colour learning will be stronger as it is firstly a 
simple relation to learn, however, this presupposes that associative learning systems 
have some advantage when learning simple conditional probabilities over more abstract 
stochastic structures. On the one hand this makes some intuitive sense, but the rich 
variety of complex and abstract sequences that a simple SRT model have been shown to 
learn suggest that an associative system is ideally suited for learning these stochastic 
relationships (Beesley, Jones, & Shanks, 2012). The authors (Cleeremans, 1997; 
Jiménez & Méndez, 1999) further suggest that overshadowing of sequences is expected 
by colours due to the temporal contiguity of colours with the next response, whereas 
sequences occur with greater latencies before the trial to be predicted. Issues of time 
were discussed previously, and whilst no conclusive answer was reached, it is of course 
possible that learning increases over time, which was suggested and functionally 
modelled by McClelland (1979). 
 
1.6.4. Summary 
Altogether, these variations on the SRT task provide no conclusive evidence for or 
against automatic, associative learning processes. The methodologies of the various 
tasks outlined do not properly control for the number of stimuli across conditions 
(Abrahamse et al., 2012) or provide control groups for sequence or additional 
contingency learning for comparison (Jiménez & Méndez, 1999). Subsequently, authors 
have been unable to conclude that there is evidence for an interaction between stimuli or 
contingencies and sequence learning; which would provide insight into how incidental 
learning processes occur. Following Beesley and Shanks (2012) this thesis attempts to 
investigate cue-competition between contingencies within an SRT as would be expected 
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if human incidental learning were indeed associative, thus providing strong evidence 
that automatic learning processes occur through association formation. 
 
1.7. Concluding remarks 
Instead of “fighting old battles” (McLaren et al., 2013, p. 194) and merely attempting to 
demonstrate the presence of implicit learning, this thesis assumes the possible presence 
of automatic learning processes and aims to investigate whether, under incidental 
conditions, we can reliably study and computationally model human associative 
learning. To best study associative processes in humans, a sequence learning approach 
is adopted which is considered the best task to investigate incidental human learning 
(Destrebecqz & Cleeremans, 2003). Further to the methodological advantages provided 
by investigating associative learning using this task, sequence learning is an interesting 
phenomenon in and of itself.  
 
This thesis aims to investigate human incidental learning at the intersection of 
computational, implicit and associative approaches. I will examine human learning 
under incidental conditions and ask whether an associative model can capture the 
sequential learning observed in participants, as well as the sequential effects that occur 
in humans. Further to this I will investigate the effect that additional stimuli and 
contingencies between cues and responses in the SRT task have on incidental sequence 
learning. Through this, the intention of the thesis is to investigate evidence of the 
automatic formation of links between events in the environment and to investigate 
functionally how these associative processes may occur in the human mind.  
 
Jones & McLaren’s (2009) results demonstrate that the trial order of the sequences 
themselves produce effects that, according to associative predictions, can come to 
interfere with learning about certain sequences. This provides the basis for the first 
experiment in this thesis, which investigates further the possibility that associations 
formed between trial-by-trial random orders compete with learning about stochastic 
structures (trained, probabilistic elements of the trial order) within an incidental 
sequence learning task. Chapter 3 takes a computational approach in order to investigate 
how a model of sequence learning (the AugSRN, Cleeremans & McClelland, 1991) 
accounts for the human data provided in Chapter 2. As outlined in this introduction, the 
issues of trial order, timing and the role of stimuli and responses are all key variables 
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within the SRT task, which are addressed in the context of this modelling work. Chapter 
4 investigates the role of additional concurrent stimuli within a SRT sequence learning 
task using predictions of the model outlined in Chapter 3. Further predictions regarding 
the learning of incidental cue-response contingencies are tested in Chapter 5, which are 
then incorporated alongside sequence learning in Chapter 6 to investigate whether 
evidence for cue-competition between two incidental contingencies can be found.  
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Chapter 2. Sequence learning, subsequence learning 
and sequential effects 
 
In this chapter I investigated sequence learning under both incidental and intentional 
conditions in an experiment inspired by the work of Jones and McLaren (2009). In two 
experiments presented here, participants were trained across two sessions on a two-
choice SRT task that followed a stochastic structure determined by one of two rules. 
Both rules involved the trial before the last, so the current trial could be predicted based 
on whether the trial two trials previous was a left or a right two thirds of the time. Jones 
& McLaren (2009) observed a double dissociation between learning of the subsequence 
XXX under incidental and intentional conditions. As part of learning of a sequential 
rule, participants demonstrated an absence of learning about XXX under incidental 
conditions, but exclusively learned this subsequence intentionally. Learning of this 
subsequence in Experiment 1 presented here suggests that impaired learning of 
subsequence XXX depends on the structure of sequential contingencies, providing 
support for an associative account of learning under incidental conditions. Experiment 2 
provided evidence of learning under intentional conditions that was extremely similar to 
Experiment 1, and these results are discussed in the context of methodological issues 
with dissociations and state-trace analysis (Bamber, 1979). The results of Experiment 1 
provide a detailed set of sequence learning and sequential effects that provide a 
framework within which to investigate computational models of learning in Chapter 3.  
  
2.1. Introduction 
2.1.1. Jones and McLaren (2009) 
Chapter 1 argued that sequence learning provides an ideal paradigm in which to study 
implicit or incidental learning in humans, as this involves complex sets of contingencies 
that are hard to notice. Sequence learning also provides a challenge for traditional 
models of associative learning, as learning contingencies between events that are 
separated by time and intervening stimuli is beyond simple associative models that have 
no means of representing previously experienced stimuli (i.e. some memory). This is an 
issue for associative explanations of automatic learning in humans, when learning about 
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sequences and series of events across time. In this section I will outline the procedures 
and results obtained in the sequence learning task devised by Jones and McLaren (2009), 
which forms the basic experimental design for Experiments 1 and 2. Jones and McLaren 
(2009)’s account of the pattern of results, supported by the simulations of the 
Augmented SRN (AugSRN, Cleeremans & McClelland, 1991), suggest that competing 
contingencies between events in the sequence produce learning effects for certain trial 
orders. 
 
Participants were trained over six sessions (two for the intentional participants) of 
roughly one hour on a simple two-choice serial reaction time (SRT) task that involved 
pressing one of two keys to one of two on-screen stimuli. These stimuli were simply 
white circles that always appeared in the same location, either on the left or right hand 
side of the screen. Under incidental conditions participants were told that the task was 
simply measuring reaction times (RTs) and accuracy to these stimuli, and no mention 
was made of the sequence learning that could occur. Under intentional conditions 
participants were told to look for patterns and sequences and work out what was going 
on to help them in the task. 
 
As discussed in Chapter 1, this sequence learning was not of repeating strings of trials, 
but the trials were constructed with a probabilistic structure whereby some trial orders 
were twice as likely as others. This meant that with only two stimuli, sequential effects 
could be adequately controlled for within-subjects. The number of right and left stimuli; 
the number of repeats and alternations experienced between the current trial (t) and the 
previous trial (t – 1); as well as between t -1 and the trial before this (t – 2) were equal 
for each subject, and therefore no difference in the distribution of these sequential 
features could explain the observed learning. The unavoidable nature of training certain 
trials orders as more likely however, results in a possible sequential confound, as 
improved performance in a group trained on certain trial orders could be due to some 
preference for responding to these trial orders and therefore a (between-subjects) control 
group is required to control for these sequential effects.   
 
The trial orders trained (i.e. those more likely to occur) were based on an exclusive-or 
rule, a classic learning problem in connectionist modeling literature (Minsky & Papert, 
1969; Rumelhart, Hinton, & Williams, 1985). This rule is based on two items, which 
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produce either an ‘exclusive’ case (both items are the same) or an ‘or’ case (both items 
are different). Translated into the current task, if the rule occurred on 100% of trials: 
when one receives two consecutive stimuli on the right side of the screen, or two on the 
left (the exclusive-case) then the next trial would be a right trial, for example. If the two 
trials just experienced swapped from right to left, or left to right (the or-case) then the 
current trial would be a left trial. These contingencies, however, did not occur on 100% 
of trials and were trained by way of a stochastic structure whereby participants could 
use this rule to predict the current stimulus location on two thirds of trials during 
training (although the trials were pseudorandom and the rule predicted the response at 
50% during test). 
 
Within this structure, therefore, there was a stochastic, underlying sequential exclusive-
or rule to the trial order that participants could learn about. Due to this structure, certain 
runs of trials to t – 2 were more likely. Taking the example above where exclusive-case 
= right stimulus (R) and or-case = left stimulus (L) then the trial orders: RRR, LLR, 
RLL and LRL were twice as likely to occur than: RRL, LLL, RLR, LRR. Consequently, 
as well as investigating the extent to which humans can learn the probabilistic 
sequential exclusive-or rule, learning could be broken down into these triplets or 
“subsequences” (Jones & McLaren, 2009, p. 541). As the exclusive-or rule was 
counterbalanced across participants between right and left stimuli, they are referred to in 
terms of Xs and Ys rather than Rs or Ls. Jones and McLaren (2009) provide evidence of 
differential learning of each of these subsequences; and so it follows that an associative 
model of human learning must account for these subsequence learning effects (for 
example, more learning of RRR compared to RLR) as well as sequential effects (the 
effect of the previous trial order – trained or untrained – on responding) and sequence 
learning (learning of the rule that underlies the probabilistic structure). 
 
2.1.3. Cue competition and subsequence learning  
This subsequence learning is investigated further in this chapter, as Jones and McLaren 
(2009) observed that under intentional conditions, participants only demonstrated 
learning of the subsequence XXX (and not XYY, YXY, or YYX). The opposite was 
true of participants who completed the task incidentally, who showed no evidence of 
learning the subsequence XXX nor XYY, some of YXY and evidence of learning of 
YYX. The explanation of XXX learning in the intentional case and not the incidental 
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case was that participants simply noticed this salient string of trials and therefore 
explicitly performed better on these trials, as evidenced by reports obtained in a 
structured interview following the task. Learning of this subsequence, Jones and 
McLaren (2009) suggest, can therefore be used as a marker of whether participants are 
engaging with rule-based, hypothesis testing.  
 
The apparent dissociation between the incidental learning of subsequences is difficult to 
reconcile with an explicit rule-based account. An explanation, however, can be provided 
by the AugSRN, which provides a convincing simulation of human performance on the 
task. The AugSRN (as described in Chapter 1 and in more technical detail in Chapter 3) 
learns by way of two sets of connection weights between the units in the model, both 
with their own learning rates. The ‘slow’ weights (lower learning rate, no decay) are 
simply the associative connections that learn the underlying statistical structure of the 
contingencies in play: these weights learn the exclusive-or sequential contingencies and 
simulate sequence learning. The ‘fast’ weights (higher learning rate, experience decay) 
were introduced by Cleeremans and McClelland (1991) to account for short-term 
priming effects observed in SRT tasks: transient learning of trial-by-trial mappings that 
produce sequential effects observed in humans. Jones and McLaren (2009) suggest that 
it is the competition that occurs between these fast, transient associations and the 
learning of the underlying statistical contingencies that influences the learning of 
subsequences.   
 
Jones and McLaren (2009) propose that for the XXX case, the trial-by-trial mappings 
are the same (X [t – 2] leads to X [t – 1], followed by X [t – 1] leads to X [t]). This leads 
to an effect akin to blocking: the transient learning of these trial-by-trial contingencies 
by the fast weights reduces the error term involved in calculating the amount of learning 
that can occur. This restricts learning of the mapping between t – 1 and t, which is the 
crucial trial on which the exclusive-or rule predicts a response. As a result, due to the 
competition between transient trial-by-trial learning (sequential effects) and the more 
permanent learning of the stochastic structure, simulations of the AugSRN (and humans 
under incidental conditions) are impaired on learning of this subsequence. This cue 
competition account of sequential effects and sequence learning not only accounts for 
the observed subsequence learning differences, but as such provides excellent evidence 
for automatic cue competition and therefore associative processes in humans. 
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It may also, however, be possible that participants under incidental learning were using 
some chunking, or instance based learning, which resulted in the differential learning of 
some sequences due to some attentional bias towards or away from subsequences with 
repetitions; or some other motor or perceptual preference for certain subsequences. 
Indeed, these results could provide strong support for such a theory, suggesting that 
participants were not learning the stochastic exclusive-or rule at all, but simply learning 
some of these subsequences as instances. It could also be possible that learning under 
incidental conditions is limited, and participants were restricted to learning only a small 
number of subsequences, chunks or instances. This seems unlikely, as there were only 
four subsequences of three trials to learn in total.  
 
This chapter aimed to investigate Jones & McLaren’s (2009) associative cue 
competition account of subsequence learning in a similar task under both incidental and 
intentional conditions, matched for training length unlike in the original experiments. 
The experiments sought to investigate further whether competition from within-
subsequence contingencies were responsible for the learning deficit of XXX under 
incidental conditions, or whether a chunking-based instance account could explain this 
result. This experimental chapter was further designed in order to generate additional 
learning effects that a computational model would be required to account for (which are 
discussed in Chapter 3). The experiments finally attempted to assess whether 
participants trained on the subsequence XXX have “the potential to be used as a marker 
as to whether people are engaging error-correcting associative learning or rule-based 
hypothesis-testing” (Jones & McLaren, 2009, p. 540). 
 
2.2. Experiment 1: Incidental sequence learning 
Instead of using a counterbalanced exclusive-or rule for the construction of the 
sequential contingencies that participants were trained on, this experiment involved a 
between-subject design comparing learning of one set of sequential contingencies to 
another. These contingencies followed the same rule structure: one could predict the 
current trial based on the trial before the last. This differs from the Jones & McLaren 
(2009) sequential contingency, as the exclusive-or contingency depends on both the 
previous trial and the trial before the previous trial jointly determining the likelihood of 
either response on the current trial. The between-subject manipulation was 
complementary: one group was trained that the current trial was more likely to be the 
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same as the trial two trials previous (Same), and the other group could predict the 
current trial as more likely to be the opposite response to the one two trials previous 
(Different).  
 
Both Same and Different groups experienced the same number of left and right stimuli 
and the same number of repeats and alternations between responses. The two groups 
differed only in respect to the construction of their training trial order, which comprised 
of subsequences of XXX, YYY, XYX and YXY for Same, and XXY, YYX, XYY and 
YXX for Different (described in more detail below, see section 2.2.1.3.). As the 
subsequence learning observed under incidental conditions by Jones & McLaren (2009) 
suggested greater learning of the subsequences YYX and YXY, with some difficulty in 
learning the subsequences XXX and XYY (those ending in a repeat), this suggests that 
learning about the Same rule may be reduced compared to the Different rule. However, 
the Different rule group was trained on the subsequence XYY, which was also learned 
poorly under incidental conditions (albeit less so than the subsequence XXX).  
 
As mentioned above, participants needed to be sensitive to both of the two previous 
trials in order to predict the current trial in Jones and McLaren’s (2009) study, however 
this was not the case in Experiment 1. In the Same group (who are trained with XXX), 
the middle X is not required for a prediction; they are also trained with XYX. Therefore, 
Experiment 1 alters the stochastic structure of the sequence rule in order to assess the 
effect of trial-by-trial contingencies on sequence learning. The influence of short-term 
learning of previous trial order that Jones and McLaren (2009) suggest competes with 
sequence learning (reducing learning of subsequence XXX) may be altered if the 
relationship between the sequence elements that leads to these sequential effects is 
changed. Evidence for this interaction between sequence learning and effects would 
provide support for some competition between the two producing differential 
subsequence learning, as suggested by Jones and McLaren (2009). However, if 
subsequence XXX is not learned under incidental conditions then an instance or 
chunking based account that suggests that this subsequence is simply harder learn may 
provide a better explanation of the result. 
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2.2.1. Method 
2.2.1.1. Participants 
96 participants (aged between 18 and 29 [M = 21.1]; 70 female and 26 male) were 
recruited from undergraduate students at the University of Exeter and were awarded £10 
for participation. Participants provided informed consent prior to taking part in two 
sessions lasting roughly one hour each. Participants were randomly allocated into one of 
the four possible conditions, described in more detail in section 2.2.1.3. 
 
2.2.1.2. Materials and Stimuli 
The experiment was run on an Apple iMac with Superlab software. Participants were 
seated roughly 50cm from the screen, which contained two white circle outlines on a 
black background throughout the task. These white circle outlines were 19 mm in 
diameter and positioned vertically in line with the screen centre, and 22 mm either to 
the left or the right of the screen centre horizontally. The response stimulus was a white 
filled circle (18.5 mm diameter) that was placed within one of the two circle outlines, 
giving the white circle outline the appearance of lighting up or filling in. Participants 
were required to press the spatially compatible ‘x’ and ‘>’ key presses on a QWERTY 
keyboard to the left or right response stimulus, respectively.  
 
2.2.1.3. Design 
The experiment was a two-choice SRT task comprising two sessions of twenty blocks 
each. Each of these blocks contained 120 trials, with all twenty blocks of the first 
session and first fifteen blocks of the second session acting as training; and the final five 
blocks acting as test. Depending on the group that participants were assigned to, across 
training participants received either blocks containing sequential contingencies 
(Experimental) or no sequential contingences (Control). There were no sequential 
contingencies present in any group during the five blocks of test. Participants were 
randomly allocated either Same or Different sequential contingencies to learn (a dummy 
variable for the Control group). See Table 1.1 for the between-subject design of 
Experiment 1. 
 
Pseudorandom block construction. The construction of the trial order of left and right 
response stimuli experienced in each block followed Jones and McLaren (2009): 
subsequences were used to construct both training blocks containing sequential 
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contingencies as well as pseudorandom test blocks. Within a two choice task there are 
eight possible trial orders that a run of three trials may take (R and L are used here for 
right and left, respectively): R-R-R; R-R-L; R-L-R; R-L-L; L-L-L; L-L-R; L-R-L; and 
L-R-R. For pseudorandom blocks (for all Control groups and for the five blocks of test 
for all groups) all of these eight triplets (5 instances of each: 40 triplets in total) were 
randomly ordered and concatenated to make a continuous string of 120 right or left 
trials. The amount of right and left trials in total, as well as the number of repeats and 
alternations experienced up to two trials before the current trial was therefore controlled 
for. On any given trial there was no way of using any information from the previous 
trial(s) to predict the current trial location. Therefore the probability of predicting the 
correct response on any trial, based on none or any of the previous trials, was 50%. 
 
Table 2.1. Table showing the between-subject design of Experiment 1, with 24 
participants in each of the four possible conditions of the 2 x 2 design (Rule: Same or 
Different; Group: Experimental or Control). Each cell contains the type of sequential 
contingencies that participants experienced for 35 blocks of training and 5 block of test, 
where all groups received pseudorandom blocks.   
 Same Rule Different Rule 
 Experimental Control Experimental Control 
     
Training Same Pseudorandom Different Pseudorandom 
Test Pseudorandom Pseudorandom Pseudorandom Pseudorandom 
 
Training block construction. For training blocks in the experimental groups, a similar 
triplet procedure was used, but instead of using all eight possible triplets, a subset of 
half of these were selected (what Jones & McLaren, 2009, p. 541, term “subsequences”). 
Participants in the Experimental Group were trained on either Same or Different rules, 
which I will describe in turn. The Same rule involved the triplets RRR; RLR; LLL; and 
LRL – all of which followed the same pattern: that the first and third item in the triplet 
is the same. Training blocks for participants in the Same condition were constructed 
using 10 of each of these four triplets, randomly ordered and concatenated to make 120 
with equal likelihood of right or left trials, as well as repeats or alternations.  
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Unlike the pseudorandom blocks, participants could use the sequential contingencies 
between the current trial and the one two trials back to help them predict the response 
stimulus location and therefore their own response. Due to the triplet structure, on every 
third trial in the block participants were able (in principle) to predict the response 
stimulus location based on the trial before the previous trial 100% of the time. It is 
important to note that this structure was not made explicit to participants and trials 
occurred in series with no demarcation of triplets or any special status attributed to third 
trials as participants were required to respond to each trial. Every third trial was one of 
the four trained subsequences. On all other first and second trials in the block of a triplet, 
this sequential contingency occurred by chance – as the arbitrary ordering of the trained 
subsequences meant that all possible triplets occurred across a block. For example, RRR 
followed by LRL and LLL produced the following trial order: RRRLRLLLL. This set 
of nine trials therefore contains, on a trial by trial basis, the following triplets: Trial 1 
and 2 – no triplet (not enough previous trials); Trial 3 – RRR (consistent with Same 
rule); Trial 4 – RRL (inconsistent with Same rule); Trial 5 – RLR (consistent); Trial 6 – 
LRL (consistent); Trial 7 – RLL (inconsistent); Trial 8 – LLL (consistent); and Trial 9 – 
LLL (consistent). Whilst every third trial had a 100% likelihood of the trained 
subsequences, on the first and second trial of each triplet participants had a 50% 
probability of being able to predict the current trial based on the trial two trials previous.  
Overall, this adds up to a partial reinforcement schedule of two out of three trials 
following the Same rule, a 67% probability of being able to predict the current trial as 
the same response location as the one that occurred before the last. 
 
Those participants in the Experimental group and the Different condition were trained 
with the complementary rule, that the current trial could be predicted on 67% of trials as 
the opposite response location to the one that occurred two trials previously. The 
training blocks for these groups were constructed in the same way as for the Same 
condition, with ten of each of the subsequence triplets RRL; RLL; LLR; and LRR 
randomly ordered and concatenated for each block. This produced a 100% sequential 
contingency following the Different rule on every third trial and chance on other trials, 
leading to the same 67% sequential contingency as outlined for the Same group above. 
 
During both training and test, it was therefore possible to compare how participants 
perform in both speed and accuracy of responding to trials that are consistent with those 
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subsequences that they have been trained on, as well as those subsequences that are 
inconsistent with the trained sequential contingencies. However, these Consistent and 
Inconsistent trials did not occur with equal frequency throughout training, hence five 
pseudorandom test blocks containing an equal likelihood of trials that were consistent or 
inconsistent with the trained sequential rule allowed for a matched comparison between 
Experimental and Control groups. Trials in the Control groups were also given dummy 
Consistent or Inconsistent labels, depending on whether participants were assigned the 
Same or Different condition. There were no differences between these two Control 
groups, who received 40 pseudorandom blocks with no sequential contingencies to 
learn, apart from the arbitrary label of each trial as Consistent or Inconsistent that 




After obtaining informed consent, participants were instructed to simply respond as 
quickly and accurately as possible to the stimuli, and that the task was investigating 
how practice had an effect on peoples’ speed and accuracy of responding to simple 
stimuli. No mention was made of any contingencies, relationships, sequences or 
learning. Participants were reminded of these instructions at the beginning of the second 
session. 
 
At the beginning of each block participants were instructed to press any key to start. 
Each trial began with an inter-trial interval of 500 ms where a black background with 
two white circle outlines was presented. The response stimulus (the left or right white 
circle) would then appear on screen until either the participant made a keypress 
response or the trial timed out after 4000 ms from the presentation of the response 
stimulus. RTs were measured from the onset of the response stimulus. If participants 
pressed an incorrect key, or the trial timed out, the computer issued a beep sound.  
 
At the end of each block participants saw a white screen that told them their average RT 
and the percentage of trials on which they made an error for that block. Participants 
were not able to move to the next block for 30 seconds, during which a countdown 
timer was displayed on screen underneath their performance feedback. They were 
instructed to rest for these 30 seconds, with the next block beginning with a ‘press any 
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key’ command so participants could have rested for longer if required. Deviating from 
Jones and McLaren (2009), no monetary incentive was given for speed or accuracy, 
which was a decision based entirely on practical constraints. I hoped that participants 
were incentivised enough to perform quickly in order to minimise the time spent 
performing the task and that their errors would be tempered by the use of the loud beep 
tone when making an error, as well as the presentation of error feedback, which, 
anecdotally, participants seemed very aware of and encouraged them to improve 
throughout.  
 
A short verbal structured interview was given at the end of the second session, in which 
participants were asked about what they had noticed in the experiment. They were 
asked structured questions that led from asking what they thought about the task; to 
whether they noticed anything interesting about the task; to whether they noticed any 
patterns or sequences; and finally whether they could describe or guess at any patterns 
or sequences. Participants were finally debriefed and thanked for their participation.  
 
2.2.2. Results 
Average reaction times (RTs) and proportion of errors were taken on each trial for each 
participant. Trials following an error were excluded from the analysis (Laming, 1979), 
and errors were counted only from those trials where participants made the incorrect 
response (e.g., pressed the ‘x’ key instead of the ‘>’ key) and not for any other incorrect 
key press or trials that timed out (these and the following trial were excluded from the 
analysis). Each trial (apart from the first two in each block) was considered in terms of 
the preceding two trials, and therefore in each block there were eight possible trial types 
corresponding to each possible triplet. For example, every R trial preceded by two R 
trials was classified as a RRR trial. Therefore, depending on the rule underlying trained 
contingencies the eight subsequences can be divided into four consistent and four 
inconsistent subsequences, preceded by RR, RL, LL, or LR. Consistent sequences for 
the Same group are RRR, RLR, LLL, and LRL and inconsistent: RRL, RLL, LLR, and 
LRR; the opposite for the Different rule group. These Consistent and Inconsistent trials 
were arbitrarily assigned in the case of Control groups.  
 
An average RT and error score was calculated for each of these triplets at test. Across 
training a weighted average was calculated, as outlined by Jones & McLaren (2009). As 
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the likelihood of certain trial orders up to three trials prior to the current trial (t – 3) was 
not balanced in the experimental groups this weighted average meant that for each 
subsequence an average was first taken, for example, of each RRR trial preceded by a R 
trial (a RRRR trial) and then separately for RRR trials preceded by a L trial (a LRRR 
trial). The two of these averages were themselves averaged, providing a control for 
sequential effects up to the third order, with effects any more trials previous to this 
producing negligible effects of around one millisecond (Jones & McLaren, 2009). Jones 
& McLaren (2009) found no special status of the third trial (which was 100% consistent 
with the rule) and so no attention was paid to the position (first, second or third) of the 
trial within the triplet structure used to construct the sequences. All 118 usable trials in a 
block (117 trials in a training block because of this weighting procedure) were therefore 
included in the analysis.  
 
The weighted average procedure meant that 16 possible trial quadruplets were produced, 
each of which would occur 7.5 times per block on average if equally likely. The reduced 
likelihood of certain quadruplets of trials coupled with participant errors meant that 
simply analysing trials in one block was likely to result in missing data. Consequently, 
these averages were computed across five blocks (the next smallest factor of 35), which 
we refer to henceforth as Epochs (of which there are seven across training – 35 blocks; 
and one at test – 5 blocks).  
 
Following this weighted average a difference score was calculated, under the 
assumption that those subsequences inconsistent with the trained sequential rule were 
predicted to have higher RTs and errors, hence participants should be slower and less 
accurate on these trials. Therefore, the average RT and proportion of errors for 
Consistent triplets were taken from the Inconsistent average RT and proportion of errors 
for each triplet (e.g. RRL minus RRR; RLL minus RLR; LRR minus LRL; LLR minus 
LLL for the Same rule group. The opposite calculation was made for Difference rule 
groups). A higher difference score in participants RTs or errors indicates better 
performance. This difference score is the dependent measure plotted on the graphs and 
used to analyse performance on the task. These four Subsequences were therefore 
referred to as RR, RL, LL and LR when comparing the two groups, referring to the two 
previous trials experienced before the current trial, which differed depending on the 
Same or Different rule. 
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Data was analysed first separately for each sequential rule group, with a mixed analysis 
of variance (ANOVA) examining the factors Group (Experimental versus Control); 
Epoch (7 sets of five training blocks); and Subsequence (RR, RL, LL, LR) across 
training, and Group and Subsequence at test. The data was then compared across the 
sequence rule groups, with training analysed by an ANOVA comparing: Group; Rule 
(Same versus Different); Epoch; and Subsequence, with test examined by Group; Rule 
and Subsequence. Both average RTs and proportion of error scores were analysed and 
within-subject main effects and interactions are reported with p values that correct for a 
departure from sphericity (Huynh-Feldt) with the unadjusted degrees of freedom.  
 
2.2.2.1. Same rule learning 
First we take the Same rule group, who were trained on the subsequences RRR, RLR, 
LLL and LRL (these were twice as likely to occur as RRL, RLL, LLR and LRR across 
training). 
 
Evidence of learning. The ANOVA revealed a main effect of Group in both RT 
difference score, F(1,46) = 160, p < .001, MSE = 1757, ηp2 = .776; and proportion of 
errors, F(1,46) = 8.22, p = .006, MSE = .103, ηp2 = .152, across training, suggesting that 
the Experimental group performed better on trained subsequences than inconsistent 
subsequences than the Control group, see Figure 2.1. This effect persevered at test in the 
RT difference score, F(1,46) = 49.1, p < .001, MSE = 515, ηp2 = .571; but not quite in 
the proportion of errors, F(1,46) = 3.23, p = .079, MSE = .019, ηp2 = .066. The influence 
of a speed-accuracy trade off can be ruled out as the direction of the non-significant 
error difference scores show higher scores for the Experimental group. This suggests 
that we have good evidence that the Experimental group have learned to perform more 
quickly and accurately on trials consistent with the trained rule.  
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Figure 2.1. RT (top panel) and proportion of error (bottom panel) difference scores across 
training (left panel) and test (right panel) for Experimental and Control groups trained on Same 
rule subsequences. Error bars show standard error. Note: the blank between Epochs 4 and 5 
represents the break between the two sessions. 
 
There was a significant effect of Epoch, RT difference score, F(6,276) = 11.8, p < .001, 
MSE = 384, ηp2 = .204; and proportion of errors, F(6,276) = 9.84, p < .001, MSE = .010, 
ηp2 = .176. Figure 2.1 demonstrates the increasing trend of interest here, which indicates 
a general practice effect. The Experimental group performed increasingly better than the 
Control group as training went on, as demonstrated by a significant interaction between 
Group and Epoch in both RT difference score, F(6,276) = 9.57, p < .001, MSE = 384, 
ηp2 = .172; and proportion of errors, F(6,276) = 3.29, p = .012, MSE = .010, ηp2 = .067. 
This provides evidence for learning, which is not apparent in the first epoch of the 
experiment but clearly develops across training.  
 
Subsequence effects. There was an effect of Subsequence on RT difference scores 
during training, F(3,138) = 4.92, p = .011, MSE = 4865, ηp2 = .097; and errors, F(3,138) 
= 17.9, p < .001, MSE = .027, ηp2 = .281. This main effect does not reflect differences in 
learning of the subsequences (dealt with in the following section), and captures 
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differences in performance of the subsequences, regardless of whether participants were 
in Experimental or Control groups. Errors show a preference for responding to the 
consistent triplets RRR and LLL opposed to RRL and LLR, but the RTs show this is a 
result of a speed-accuracy trade-off, with participants performing better in terms of 
speed to the subsequences RLR and LRL compared to RLL and LRR. At test RT 
difference score is not significant, F(3,138) = 1.71, p = .184, MSE = 1079, ηp2 = .036; 
but proportion of errors show a main effect of Subsequence, F(3,138) = 4.98, p = .009, 
MSE = .012, ηp2 = .098. Subsequences RRR and LLL were performed more accurately 
compared to RRL and LLR than the other two trained subsequences compared to their 
inconsistent counterparts.  
 
 
Figure 2.2. RT (top panel) and proportion of error (bottom panel) difference scores across 
training (left panel) and test (right panel) for the Same rule, Experimental (filled bars) and 
Control (open bars) groups across the four trained Subsequences. The RRR column, for 
example, shows performance on ‘consistent’ RRR trials subtracted from ‘inconsistent’ RRL 
trials. Error bars show standard error.  
 
Subsequence learning. One thing each subsequence shares in common is a difference 
score of greater than zero, which will be discussed and compared across the Rule 
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conditions in section 2.2.2.3. The main effect of Subsequence suggests only a difference 
in which subsequences are performed better, regardless of whether participants were 
trained on these subsequences or not. It is the interaction between Subsequence and 
Group that can reveal whether any subsequences were learned better than others and 
thus whether there is any difference in subsequence learning (rather than sequential 
effects described in the previous section). However, we found no evidence of such an 
interaction across training, which suggests that there is no evidence that the 
subsequences were learned differently.  
 
Learning of individual subsequences was analysed separately, taking first the 
subsequence RRR. Using ANOVA with Epoch and Group across training and Group at 
test, we find a significant effect of Group in RTs across training, F(1,46) = 30.6, p 
< .001; and at test, F(1,46) = 8.87, p < .001, but not in proportion of errors across 
training, F(1,46) = 3.10, p = .170; nor at test, F(1,46) = 1.67, p = .404. The subsequence 
LLL demonstrated learning across training RT difference score, F(1,46) = 26.0, p 
< .001, and errors, F(1,46) = 7.47, p = .018; as well as in RT difference scores at test, 
F(1,46) = 7.28, p = .019; and error difference at test, F(1,46) = 5.34, p = .046. Therefore, 
there is quite good evidence for the learning of subsequences RRR and LLL (or XXX), 
contrary to the incidental participants in Jones and McLaren (2009). The subsequence 
RLR also showed evidence of learning across training in both RT difference score, 
F(1,46) = 26.1, p < .001, and errors, F(1,46) = 7.82, p = .015. There was also learning 
evident at test in the RTs, F(1,46) = 8.46, p = .011, but not in errors, F(1,46) = .116, p 
> .9. The subsequence LRL was also learned, with a Group effect across training in RT 
difference score, F(1,46) = 19.7, p < .001 but not errors, F(1,46) = 4.28, p = .088. This 
was the same at test, with RT difference scores producing an effect of Group, F(1,46) = 
12.1, p = .002, but not errors, F(1,46) = .714, p = .805. Therefore, all subsequences in 
the Same group showed at least some evidence of learning. 
 
Subsequence showed an interaction with Epoch in RT difference score, F(18,828) = 
3.24, p = .001, MSE = 502, ηp2 = .066; but not proportion of errors, F(18,828) = 1.17, p 
= .311, MSE = .009, ηp2 = .025, see Figure 2.3. This Subsequence and Epoch interaction 
showed no evidence of an interaction with Group (RT difference score, F(18,828) 
= .644, p = .806, MSE = 502, ηp2 = .014; proportion of errors, F(18,828) = .962, p = .470, 
MSE = .009, ηp2 = .020), suggesting those Subsequence effects observed show no 
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evidence of being effected by training type or time. Across training the RTs show that 
the subsequence effect is numerically reduced, with the faster responding to RLR and 




Figure 2.3. RT (top panel) and proportion of error (bottom panel) difference scores across 
training Epochs for the Same rule groups across the four trained Subsequences. The RRR data 
points, for example, shows performance on ‘consistent’ RRR trials subtracted from 
‘inconsistent’ RRL trials. The data are collapsed across all 48 participants regardless of 
Experimental or Control groups. Error bars show standard error. 
 
Ceiling effects. The observation of good performance on the subsequences consistent 
with the Same rule regardless of group (difference scores above zero for both 
Experimental and Control groups) leads neatly to the suggestion that participants may 
be performing at ceiling and therefore they cannot perform any better on these 
subsequences, restricting learning. As Jones & McLaren (2009) propose, one can 
examine this possibility through an analysis of inconsistent trials. If we suggest that on 
the consistent RRR trials, the Same group are at ceiling, then the inconsistent RRL trials 
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cannot be at ceiling (in terms of performance) if learning had made these slower and 
less accurate. Therefore, we can assess learning from these inconsistent trials alone, 
with slower and less accurate trials in the Experimental group on these inconsistent 
subsequences providing evidence of learning that cannot be accounted for by a ceiling 
effect.  
 
Bonferroni corrected comparisons were conducted on inconsistent subsequence RTs and 
errors in a mixed ANOVA with Epoch, Subsequence and Group across training and 
Sequence by Group at test. A Group effect (demonstrating learning in the absence of a 
ceiling effect) was demonstrated across training in the RTs, F(1,46) = 5.48, p = .047, 
MSE = 13508, ηp2 = .106, and errors, F(1,46) = 10.9, p = .004, MSE = .031, ηp2 = .192, 
as well as at test in the errors, F(1,46) = 17.1, p = .001, MSE = 2346, ηp2 = .271; but not 
in RTs, F(1,46) = .313, p > .9, MSE = .031, ηp2 = .007, with the direction of the effect 
showing slower and less accurate responses to inconsistent subsequences in the 
Experimental group compared to the Control group. This suggests that learning was 
evident in the absence of a ceiling effect, as learning is not restricted to consistent 
subsequences that may suffer from a ceiling effect in response speed or accuracy. In 
summary, all of the subsequences were learned and there was no subsequence 
interaction with Group, which suggests that there were no differences in how well these 
subsequences were learned.  
 
2.2.2.2. Different rule learning 
The Different rule group, who in the Experimental group were trained on the 
subsequences RRL, RLL, LLR and LRR (these were twice as likely to occur as RRR, 
RLR, LLL and LRL across training) was analysed in the same way as the Same group 
(as described in section 2.2.2.1). 
 
Evidence of learning. There was a very strong main effect of Group for the Different 
rule participants, in both RT difference score, F(1,46) = 101, p < .001, MSE = 4618, ηp2 
= .686; and proportion of errors, F(1,46) = 53.4, p < .001, MSE = .056, ηp2 = .537, see 
Figure 2.4. This remained significant and was a strong effect at test, RT difference score, 
F(1,46) = 51.7, p < .001, MSE = 615, ηp2 = .529; and proportion of errors, F(1,46) = 
28.2, p < .001, MSE = .009, ηp2 = .380, providing good evidence of learning of Different 
rule subsequences. 
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Figure 2.4. RT (top panel) and proportion of error (bottom panel) difference scores across 
training (left panel) and test (right panel) for Experimental and Control groups trained on 
Different rule subsequences. Error bars show standard error. Note: the blank between Epochs 4 
and 5 represents the break between the two sessions. 
 
As in the Same rule group, there was both an effect of Epoch, RT difference score, 
F(6,276) = 32.0, p < .001, MSE = 326, ηp2 = .410; proportion of errors, F(6,276) = 7.73, 
p < .001, MSE = .005, ηp2 = .144, and an interaction between Epoch and Group, RT 
difference score, F(6,276) = 5.55, p < .001, MSE = 326, ηp2 = .108; and proportion of 
errors, F(6,276) = 8.02, p < .001, MSE = .005, ηp2 = .149, across training. Figure 2.4 
demonstrates that the difference between Experimental and Control groups does 
develop somewhat across training, although this learning is apparent from the first 
Epoch, suggesting it is acquired rapidly. 
 
Subsequence effects. There was a main effect of subsequence (see Figure 2.5) across 
training in both RT difference score, F(3,138) = 9.37, p < .001, MSE = 6980, ηp2 = .169; 
and proportion of errors, F(3,138) = 4.39, p = .021, MSE = .048, ηp2 = .087, and in 
proportion of errors at test, F(3,138) = 7.15, p < .001, MSE = .009, ηp2 = .135, but not at 
test in RT difference score, F(3,138) =1.25, p = .293, MSE = 615, ηp2 = .026. This was 
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expressed as greater accuracy on RLL subsequence compared with the other 
subsequences, but better RT difference scores to RRL and LLR across training. 
Crucially, there was no evidence of an interaction between Subsequence and Group 
across training, RT difference score, F(3,138) = .727, p = .471, MSE = 6980, ηp2 = .016; 
and proportion of errors, F(3,138) = .197, p = .783, MSE = .048, ηp2 = .004, nor at test in 
both RT difference score, F(3,138) = 2.39, p = .096, MSE = 615, ηp2 = .049; and 
proportion of errors, F(3,138) = .678, p = .512, MSE = .009, ηp2 = .015. This suggests 
that there is no evidence that subsequence effects were different due to training 
experience across subsequences.  
 
 
Figure 2.5. RT (top panel) and proportion of error (bottom panel) difference scores across 
training (left panel) and test (right panel) for the Experimental (filled bars) and Control (open 
bars) Different rule groups across the four trained Subsequences. The RRL column, for example, 
shows performance on ‘consistent’ RRL trials subtracted from ‘inconsistent’ RRR trials. Error 
bars show standard error. 
 
Subsequence learning. The learning of each subsequence was assessed through a series 
of Bonferroni corrected comparisons, taking first the subsequence RRL. Using an 
ANOVA with Epoch and Group across training and Group at test, we find a significant 
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effect of Group in RTs across training, F(1,46) = 18.9, p < .001; and in errors, F(1,46) = 
16.6, p < .001, as well as errors at test, F(1,46) = 5.95 p = .037; but not at test in RTs, 
F(1,46) = 4.78, p = .068. The subsequence LLR demonstrated learning across training 
RT difference score, F(1,46) = 26.4, p < .001, and errors, F(1,46) = 14.4, p = .001; 
again as well as in errors at test, F(1,46) = 5.88, p = .039, but not RTs, F(1,46) =2.65, p  
= .221. This is evidence for learning of the subsequences RRL and LLR. The 
subsequence RLL also showed evidence of learning across training in both RT 
difference score, F(1,46) = 50.0, p < .001, and errors, F(1,46) = 39.2, p < .001. There 
was also learning evident at test in the RTs, F(1,46) = 21.6, p < .001; and errors, F(1,46) 
= 6.94, p < .001. The subsequence LRR was also learned, with a Group effect across 
training in RT difference score, F(1,46) = 21.2, p < .001 and errors, F(1,46) = 28.1, p 
< .001. There was also strong learning at test, with RT difference scores producing an 
effect of Group, F(1,46) = 23.6, p < .001, with errors also showing evidence of learning 
at test, F(1,46) = 17.1, p < .001. Therefore we have strong evidence for the learning of 
the subsequences RRL and LLR (YYX). 
 
The Subsequence effect itself interacted with Epoch in RT difference score again, 
F(18,828) = 3.68, p < .001, MSE = 617, ηp2 = .074; but not proportion of errors, 
F(18,828) = 1.55, p = .094, MSE = .005, ηp2 = .032, nor Epoch and Group (RT 
difference score, F(18,828) = .918, p = .529, MSE = 326, ηp2 = .020; and proportion of 
errors, F(18,828) = 1.19, p = .283, MSE = .005, ηp2 = .025), suggesting that simply 
performing the task for increasing time had an effect only on the speed of responding to 
subsequences, and that differences in Subsequence learning did not change across 
training. This is shown in Figure 2.6, where we can see that the subsequences speed 
advantage for RRL and LLR, similar to in the Same group, reduces over the second 
session.  
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Figure 2.6. RT (top panel) and proportion of error (bottom panel) difference scores across 
training Epochs for the Same rule groups across the four trained Subsequences. The RRL data 
points, for example, shows performance on ‘consistent’ RRL trials subtracted from ‘inconsistent’ 
RRR trials. The data are collapsed across all 48 participants regardless of Experimental or 
Control groups. Error bars show standard error. 
 
2.2.2.3. Same versus Different rule learning 
When comparing the data across the different Rules there was a strong main effect of 
Rule in both RT difference score, F(1,92) = 469, p < .001, MSE = 3187, ηp2 = .836; and 
proportion of errors, F(1,92) = 78.1, p < .001, MSE = .079, ηp2 = .459 across training, as 
well as RT difference score, F(1,92) = 248, p < .001, MSE = 565, ηp2 = .729; and 
proportion of errors, F(1,92) = 63.6, p < .001, MSE = .007, ηp2 = .409 at test. The main 
effect of Rule comprises both Experimental and Control groups, and therefore tells us 
little about learning, but about the sequential effects underlying performance. The 
pattern of responding demonstrated by the Control groups is of interest, as this shows a 
difference score of greater than zero for the Same Control group, suggesting that the 
Same rule subsequences were overall performed faster and more accurately than the 
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inconsistent (Different rule subsequences) regardless of training. This main effect 
therefore probably reflects the overall performance preference for subsequences RRR, 
RLR, LLL and LRL.  
 
We can see this overall Rule effect in Figure 2.7, which plots the results from both 
experiments on one graph and highlights the importance of Control groups in 
controlling for sequential effects. It is immediately apparent that the Control groups are 
a reflection of one another around a difference score of zero, with better performance on 
Same rule subsequences compared to Different rule subsequences. Without these 
Controls it would appear that performance on the Same rule was far better than on the 
Different rule in the Experimental groups. However, when comparing the groups across 
their learning through the interaction between Group and Rule across training the 
converse is apparent, proportion of errors, F(1,92) = 4.20, p = .043, MSE = .062, ηp2 
= .044 and supported by the numerical trend towards better performance on the 
Different rule in the RT difference score, F(1,92) = 3.64, p = .059, MSE = 3856, ηp2 
= .038; and the numerical direction at test, RT difference score, F(1,92) = .325, p = .570, 
MSE = 1233, ηp2 = 004; proportion of errors, F(1,92) = 2.30, p = .133, MSE = .007, ηp2 
= .024. This provides evidence that the two sequential rules were learned differently, 
with the Different rule sequences learned better than the Same rule sequences.  
 
This difference between Rules across Experiment and Control groups interacts with 
Epoch across training, RT difference score, F(6,552) = 3.16, p = .007, MSE = 330, ηp2 
= .033; but not proportion of errors, F(6,552) = 1.52, p = .184, MSE = .007, ηp2 = .016, 
suggesting that learning of the two different sequential contingencies progressed at a 
different rate. Indeed, we can see that whilst the learning of the Different rule appears 
rapidly in the RT difference measure but then improves little across training, that the 
Same group learns steadily across the training epochs.  
 
Subsequence effects did not show evidence of an interaction with Group and Rule 
across training: RT difference score, F(3,276) = .397, p = .654, MSE = 5938, ηp2 = .004; 
proportion of errors, F(3,276) = .529, p = .569, MSE = .037, ηp2 = .006, nor at test: RT 
difference score, F(3,276) = 1.33, p = .266, MSE = 1095, ηp2 = .014; proportion of 
errors, F(3,276) = .979, p = .379, MSE = .011, ηp2 = .011.  
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Figure 2.7. RT (top panel) and proportion of error (bottom panel) difference scores across 
training (left panel) and test (right panel) for Experimental and Control groups trained on Same 
(black lines) and Different (blue lines) rule subsequences. Error bars show standard error. Note: 
the blank between Epochs 4 and 5 represents the break between the two sessions. 
 
2.2.2.4 Post-experimental interview 
The questions in the post-experimental interview suggest that participants were unable 
to verbalise any knowledge about sequences, and were all unable to report the rule. 
Some participants, when asked “Did you notice any patterns or sequences to the 
responses that you were required to make?” did report noticing long strings of repeats or 
patterns of alternations, but these were not restricted to the Same Experimental group. 
Across each of the Experimental and Control groups, participants were just as likely to 
report noticing repeating trials, but they were also just as likely to report that they 
thought the sequence was random. A small number of participants reported trying to 
count or investigate to see whether there was a sequence, even though none had been 
mentioned, but reported that this made them slower and worse at the task so they 
quickly gave up on doing this. There were no scaled responses to how much people 
believed there was a sequence (e.g. Curran, 1997) or how confident they were in these 
judgments (Dienes & Berry, 1997) therefore no further analysis was carried out.  
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2.2.3. Discussion 
Experiment 1 provided evidence that humans are able to learn both Same and Different 
rules under incidental conditions. Whilst both groups learned the trained sequential 
contingencies, the Different rule produced more learning than the Same rule. The 
Experimental Different group learned more rapidly than the Same group and this 
learning was more robust, evidenced by the Group interaction apparent across training. 
The Group effect (the measure of learning) itself survived at test in the Different rule 
case for errors and RTs, but only in RTs in the Same group.  
 
This supports the predictions of the associative account as the Same group involved the 
subsequence XXX (both RRR and LLL); which was shown in previous work to be more 
difficult to learn due to a blocking effect (Jones & McLaren, 2009). Evidence of an 
Experimental over Control group advantage across RTs in training suggests, however, 
that participants were at least able to learn the subsequences RRR and LLL in the Same 
rule group reported here, unlike Jones & McLaren (2009). The associative account 
predicts better learning of YXY compared to XXX, which was not found here. Further 
to this, there was evidence for learning of the subsequences RLL and LRR in the 
Different rule condition, which is contrary to the findings of Jones & McLaren (2009), 
that subsequences ending in a repetition demonstrated little or no learning under 
incidental conditions. Indeed, the greatest learning under incidental conditions in 
Experiment 1 was shown for subsequence XYY (RLL and LRR). 
 
That these subsequence learning effects were not identical to Jones and McLaren (2009) 
provides evidence that humans are not simply better at learning some forms of 
subsequence, which might be proposed by some instance or chunking based account of 
learning. The difference between the two experiments is in the structure of the trained 
sequences, as in Experiment 1 participants were trained to predict t from t – 2, whereas 
the exclusive-or rule in Jones & McLaren (2009) training participants that t was 
predicted by the combination of both t – 1 and t – 2. This suggests that a difficulty in 
learning subsequences XXX and XYY was not restricted to these subsequences and 
their trial order, but also to how this related to the structure of the underlying trained 
contingency.  
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Support is therefore provided for an associative account of human learning, as altering 
the relationship between subsequence trial-by-trial order and the trained sequential 
contingencies produced a different pattern of human learning. It is possible that the 
exclusive-or rule in Jones and McLaren (2009) may have been simply more difficult to 
learn. However, Jones and McLaren (2009) trained participants for over twice the 
amount of trials as Experiment 1, which seems a convincing demonstration of the lack 
of XXX learning in the exclusive-or case rather than this simply being more difficult to 
learn; or not having enough time to emerge. If one reduced the subsequences in the 
Experiment to their structures, for example in the Same group: RRR and LLL both 
involve three of the same response (or two repeats between first and second order 
transitions) and RLR and LRL both involve two alternations; then the Same and 
Different group were only trained on two different subsequence transition structures. 
Therefore Jones & McLaren’s (2009) participants could be argued to have had a more 
difficult task and given a limited capacity for learning subsequence structures been 
unable to learn one or two of the subsequences. This suggestion, however, relies on an 
instance based account that suggests chunks are encoded on the basis of structure and 
not precise locations (left or right), which somewhat undermines the instance-based 
premise on which such a theory is built. 
 
It is also possible of course that the nature of the two training contingencies led to a 
difference in explicit strategy or verbalisable knowledge, as repeating chunks were 
more likely in the Same group of Experiment 1. In the exclusive-or case (Jones & 
McLaren, 2009) participants experienced one of either a RRR or LLL trial (as a third 
trial) on one in four trials in training blocks. Participants in the Same group experienced 
either a RRR or LLL as a third trial on one in two trials, meaning that they could have 
noticed these repeating chunks more easily and therefore some verbalisable learning of 
these subsequences is produced. However, this would provide support for the alterative 
result, that the Same rule would produce more learning (unless one assumes that a 
conscious strategy impairs learning, which in the case of Jones & McLaren, 2009 
occurred for all subsequences but XXX). 
 
The subsequence effects observed clearly and robustly demonstrated that participants 
preferred to respond to trials that have been preceded either by two of the same response 
location (e.g. RRR) as well as two alternations (e.g. RLR). These sequential effects are 
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unaffected by training or experience with the task and seem to occur either very rapidly 
or may be preexisting preferences that remain robust across the task. Performance is 
worse for the complementary Different rule subsequences, RRL and RLL (as well as 
LLR and LRR). The advantage for simply responding to Same rule subsequences could 
restrict learning of these subsequences due to ceiling performance, however a Group 
effect was demonstrated in inconsistent trials alone, suggesting this that cannot explain 
the Same-Different rule learning difference.  
 
One final thing to note is that the sequential effects observed in the Control groups of 
Experiment 1 do not match those subsequence sequential effects observed in Jones & 
McLaren (2009), whose control group performance followed the pattern (from preferred 
to least preferred): XXX, XYY, YXY, YYX, although XYY and YXY were relatively 
close around zero on their RT difference scores. The sequential effects observed in the 
Control groups in Experiment 1 suffer somewhat from speed-accuracy trade-off and in 
that case are more difficult to interpret, however, difference scores are always above 
zero for the Control performance on XXX and YXY subsequences, whereas XYY and 
YYX subsequence performance is always below zero. One explanation for this 
difference could be the length of training, as one could propose that after five sessions 
those participants trained with pseudorandom sequences would eventually begin to 
learn that all subsequences are equally likely, however Jones & McLaren (2009) do not 
provide evidence of the progression of learning nor sequential effects across training to 
analyse this possibility. The control groups in both studies were essentially identical but 
for training length and the presence of a performance reward, which could have 
influenced the speed and accuracy of responding in Jones and McLaren’s (2009) study. 
Participants were motivated to perform as quickly and accurately as possible, which 
suggests sequential effects may have been influenced by the speed of responding to 
stimuli (e.g. Frensch, 2003; Soetens, Boer, & Huetings, 1985).  
 
Altogether, this experiment provides evidence that participants can learn sequences 
based on a t – 2 probabilistic contingency under incidental conditions. Whilst these 
rules do not differ in contingency nor predictive trial order; they are nevertheless 
learned differently by participants in this experiment. Participants learn more about 
sequences that follow a rule whereby t is twice as likely to be different to t – 2 
(Different rule); over learning that t is twice as likely to be the same as t – 2 (Same rule). 
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The difference in learning seems unlikely to be explained by a rule-based account of 
learning, and suggests that, as observed by Jones and McLaren (2009), participants may 
be learning sequential contingencies associatively and therefore trial-by-trial 
contingencies can interfere with certain subsequence learning.  
  
2.3. Experiment 2: Intentional sequence learning 
Experiment 1 demonstrated some learning of the subsequence XXX compared to the 
lack of learning evident for this subsequence in Jones and McLaren (2009). This may be 
due the reduced cue competition between transient trial-by-trial contingencies and 
sequential contingences. As Experiment 1 uses Same and Different rules to train 
participants, these depend only on trial t – 2, and trial t – 1 is no longer important for the 
sequential learning as it was in Jones and McLaren’s (2009) study. The subsequence 
XXX is therefore not a marker for incidental learning, as impaired implicit learning of 
this subsequence is dependent on the trained sequential rule itself. The second study in 
this thesis aimed to investigate how participants learned these rules and subsequences 
under intentional conditions, whereby they were instructed to actively search for and 
use sequences, patterns or rules that they noticed and were explicitly told that there were 
contingencies in the task. Participants in Control groups were told the same instructions 
to control for the effect that the rule-based hypothesis testing may have on the 
sequential effects themselves. As Jones & McLaren (2009) found that participants were 
able to notice the subsequence XXX and learn about this explicitly, I expected that 
participants in the Same group would experience more learning under intentional 




96 participants (aged between 18 and 35 [M = 21.1]; 73 female and 23 male) were 
recruited from undergraduate students at the University of Exeter and were awarded £10 
for participation. Participants provided informed consent prior to taking part in two 
sessions lasting roughly one hour each. Participants were randomly allocated into one of 
the four possible conditions. 
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2.3.1.2. Materials and Stimuli 
The materials and stimuli were the same as for Experiment 1 (see section 2.2.1.2). 
 
2.3.1.3. Design 
The experiment designed followed that of Experiment 1 exactly (see section 2.2.1.3). 
 
2.3.1.4. Procedure 
After obtaining informed consent, participants were instructed to respond as quickly and 
accurately as possible to the stimuli, but also that the task was made up of sequences of 
trials that participants could use to improve their performance. Participants were 
explicitly made aware that whilst we would be recording their speed and accuracy, that 
the task may contain sequences that might be difficult to notice, but that they should try 
to discover it and use these sequences to help them make predictions about where the 
trial would appear next. Participants were reminded of these instructions at the 
beginning of the second session. Each trial followed the same sequence as outlined in 
the procedure for Experiment 1 (see section 2.2.1.4).  
 
As in Experiment 1, a short verbal structured interview was given at the end of the 
second session, in which participants were asked about what sequences they had noticed 
in the experiment. They were asked the same structured questions as the incidental 
group, that led from asking what they thought about the task; to whether they noticed 
anything interesting about the task; to whether they noticed any patterns or sequences; 
and finally whether they could describe or guess at any patterns or sequences. 
Participants were debriefed and thanked for their participation at the end.  
 
2.3.2. Results 
Weighted averages were calculated and analysed for each subsequence as for the 
incidental participants in Experiment 1 and separate analyses for Same and Different 
sequential rules are given first, before a comparison between the two is presented. 
 
2.3.2.1. Same rule learning 
An ANOVA investigated Epoch; Group (Experimental or Control); and Subsequence 
(RRR, RLR, LLL, LRL) across training and Group and Subsequence at test.  
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Evidence of learning. The main effect of Group (see Figure 2.8) was apparent across 
training, RT difference score, F(1,46) = 94.5, p < .001, MSE = 3256, ηp2 = .673; 
proportion of errors, F(1,46) = 27.4, p < .001, MSE = .054, ηp2 = .373, and in RT 
difference score at test, F(1,46) = 19.3, p < .013, MSE = 1759, ηp2 = .295; and 
proportion of errors, F(1,46) = 9.00, p = .004, MSE = .006, ηp2 = .164. Taken together, 
this provides evidence that the Intentional participants learned the Same rule sequences, 
which carried through to test. 
 
 
Figure 2.8. RT (top panel) and proportion of error (bottom panel) difference scores across 
training (left panel) and test (right panel) for Experimental and Control groups trained on Same 
rule subsequences. Error bars show standard error. Note: the blank between Epochs 4 and 5 
represents the break between the two sessions. 
 
There was little evidence that the main effect of Group interacted with Epoch across 
training in either RT difference score, F(6,276) = 2.22, p = .067, MSE = 963, ηp2 = .046; 
and proportion of errors, F(6,276) = 1.93, p = .092, MSE = .007, ηp2 = .040. Whilst the 
Experimental group had an advantage across training, this was evident from the first 
Epoch and only numerically increased with more training. Epoch itself had a main 
effect in both RT difference score, F(6,276) = 6.02, p < .001, MSE = 963, ηp2 = .116; 
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and proportion of errors, F(6,276) = 6.34, p = .015, MSE = .046, ηp2 = .121. This 
suggests that training had no differential effect on Experimental and Control groups, 
and therefore that the difference between them was relatively stable throughout.  
Subsequence effects. The main effect of Subsequence was significant in the RT 
difference score across training, F(3,138) = 3.88, p = .029, MSE = 7267, ηp2 = .078; and 




Figure 2.9. RT (top panel) and proportion of error (bottom panel) difference scores across 
training (left panel) and test (right panel) for the Experimental (filled bars) and Control (open 
bars) Same rule groups across the four trained Subsequences. The RRR column, for example, 
shows performance on ‘consistent’ RRR trials subtracted from ‘inconsistent’ RRL trials. Error 
bars show standard error. 
 
There was also a significant main effect in both RT difference score, F(3,138) = 3.85, p 
= .022, MSE = 1559, ηp2 = .077 and proportion of error difference score, F(3,138) = 
11.8, p < .001, MSE = .005, ηp2 = .204 at test. This Subsequence effect did not show 
evidence for an interaction with Group at training: RT difference score, F(3,138) = .363, 
p = .672, MSE = 7276, ηp2 = .008; proportion of errors, F(3,138) = .688, p = .508, MSE 
94  Chapter 2: Sequence learning and effects 
= .020, ηp2 = .015, or at test: RT difference score, F(3,138) = .524, p = .605, MSE = 
1559, ηp2 = .011; proportion of errors, F(3,138) = .178, p = .908, MSE =  .005, ηp2 
= .004. 
 
This suggests that the Subsequence effect itself occurred regardless of whether 
participants were trained or not, and in the RTs across training and test followed the 
pattern observed in Experiment 1, that subsequences RLR is performed quicker 
compared to RRR and LRL compared to LLL, however both RRR and RLR produce 
faster responses than LLL and LRL. Again, as with Experiment 1 this takes the form of 
a speed-accuracy trade off, as the non-significant pattern of responding to subsequences 
in the errors across training show a more accurate responding to the RRR and LLL 
subsequences compared to their inconsistent counterparts than RLR and LRL, with 
higher accuracy to LRL and LLL subsequences compared to RLR and RRR 
subsequences. 
 
Intentional participants demonstrated an interaction between Epoch and Subsequence, 
RT difference score, F(18,828) = 2.91, p = .004, MSE = 1255, ηp2 = .060; and 
proportion of errors, F(18,828) = 1.88, p = .030, MSE = .005, ηp2 = .039, see Figure 2.10. 
These variations across block reflect the opposite pattern to Experiment 1 as the 
subsequence effects, rather than collapsing across the experiment by the second session, 
seem to increase across training and may reflect active hypothesis testing. Indeed, 
greater performance to RRR and LLL begins to emerge in both measures towards the 
end of training, suggesting greater attention and performance emerges to these 
subsequences. The interaction did not, however, provide evidence of an interaction with 
Group, RT difference score, F(18,828) = .781, p = .620, MSE = 1255, ηp2 = .017; and 
proportion of errors, F(18,828) = .429, p = .959, MSE = .005, ηp2 = .009, suggesting that 
any Subsequence variation across Epochs has no influence on learning.  
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Figure 2.10. RT (top panel) and proportion of error (bottom panel) difference scores across 
training Epochs for the Same rule groups across the four trained Subsequences. The RRR data 
points, for example, shows performance on ‘consistent’ RRR trials subtracted from 
‘inconsistent’ RRL trials. The data are collapsed across all 48 participants regardless of 
Experimental or Control groups. Error bars show standard error. 
 
Subsequence learning. As for Experiment 1, a series of Bonferroni corrected 
comparisons were conducted on each subsequence taking first the subsequence RRR. 
Using an ANOVA with Epoch and Group across training and Location and Group at 
test, a main effect of Group was found across training in RTs, F(1,46) = 19.8, p < .001, 
and proportion of errors, F(1,46) = 13.8, p = .001. This was supported by learning at test 
in RT difference scores, F(1,46) = 6.25, p = .032, but not proportion of errors, F(1,46) = 
1.07, p = .614. The subsequence LLL also demonstrated learning across training in both 
RTs, F(1,46) = 19.5, p < .001, and errors, F(1,46) = 20.2, p < .001; but not quite in test 
RT difference scores, F(1,46) = 4.68, p = .071; nor errors, F(1,46) = 2.45, p = .249. This 
provides some evidence of learning the subsequences RRR and LLL (XXX). There was, 
however, also learning of the subsequences RLR and LRL. RLR showed a Group effect 
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across training RTs, F(1,46) = 22.4, p < .001, and errors, F(1,46) = 15.5, p = .001, as 
well as test RTs, F(1,46) = 16.6, p < .001, but not errors, F(1,46) = 5.18, p = .055. The 
subsequence LRL also showed evidence of learning across both training measures: RTs, 
F(1,46) = 15.9, p < .001; errors, F(1,46) = 14.1, p = .001, as well as in RTs at test, 
F(1,46) = 6.46, p = .029, but not test error difference scores, F(1,46) = 4.89, p = .064. 
This suggests that participants learned the subsequences RLR and LRL (YXY) as well 
as the subsequence XXX, in contrast to the intentional participants in Jones and 
McLaren’s (2009) experiment, who learned only XXX.  
 
Ceiling effects. As suggested for the incidental Experiment 1 participants, performance 
could have been restricted by the subsequence effects experienced in the Same group, as 
responding to subsequences RRR, RLR, LLL, LRL meant that participants may have 
been responding at ceiling. RTs and errors measures may have been unable to show a 
learning effect as participants may have been responding as quickly and accurately as 
possible to consistent subsequences. Taking the inconsistent trials only (which are 
expected to be slower and less accurate for the Experimental group, and therefore do not 
suffer from this ceiling issue) learning was observed in the Same group at test in RTs, 
F(1,46) = 5.59, p = .045, MSE = 4782, ηp2 = .108 and errors, F(1,46) = 9.00, p = .009, 
MSE = .013, ηp2 = .164 (Bonferroni corrected for multiple comparisons). This suggests 
that participants demonstrate learning regardless of a possible ceiling-effect. However, 
again in this study there is no Subsequence by Group interaction, as all subsequences 
are learned and under Intentional conditions participants again do not learn these 
subsequences differently. 
 
2.3.2.2. Different rule learning 
An ANOVA investigated Epoch; Group (Experimental or Control); and Subsequence 
(RRL, RLL, LLR, LRR) across training and Group and Subsequence at test.  
 
Evidence of learning. The Different rule learning condition showed strong evidence of 
learning across both training: RT difference score, F(1,46) = 136, p < .001, MSE = 4457, 
ηp2 = .747; proportion of errors, F(1,46) = 56.4, p < .001, MSE = .071, ηp2 = .551, and 
test, RT difference score, F(1,46) = 61.9, p < .001, MSE = 708, ηp2 = .574; and 
proportion of errors, F(1,46) = 33.2, p < .001, MSE = .008, ηp2 = .419. This provides 
strong evidence of learning (see Figure 2.11), with the Experimental group performing 
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significantly better than the Control group. Similar to the Incidental group in 
Experiment 1 there was an interaction with Epoch, RT difference score, F(6,276) = 8.69, 
p < .001, MSE = 482, ηp2 = .159; and proportion of errors, F(6,276) = 8.90, p < .001, 
MSE = .007, ηp2 = .162. The learning therefore showed evidence that it developed across 
the experiment, and the Different rule group shows evidence that this learning was 
acquired rapidly, with a difference between Experimental and Control groups apparent 
from the first Epoch. 
 
 
Figure 2.11. RT (top panel) and proportion of error (bottom panel) difference scores across 
training (left panel) and test (right panel) for Experimental and Control groups trained on 
Different rule subsequences. Error bars show standard error. Note: the blank between Epochs 4 
and 5 represents the break between the two sessions and explains the dip in performance 
observed between the two blocks. 
 
Subsequence effects. The Intentional Different group showed evidence of a 
Subsequence main effect across training in errors, F(3,138) = 6.55, p = .004, MSE 
= .045, MSE =, ηp2 = .125; but not RTs, F(3,138) = .405, p = .601, MSE = 12351, ηp2 
= .009, and in both the errors at test, F(3,138) = 15.5, p < .001, MSE = .014, ηp2 = .252; 
and RT difference score, F(3,138) = 3.69, p = .037, MSE = 1764, ηp2 = .074, see Figure 
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2.12. Therefore, regardless of whether participants were trained or not, across training 
and test they showed a performance benefit for the subsequences RLL and LRR over 
RRL and LLR in errors, and the opposite effect (a speed-accuracy trade off) in RTs, 
with faster performance to the subsequences RRL and LLR.  
 
 
Figure 2.12. RT (top panel) and proportion of error (bottom panel) difference scores across 
training (left panel) and test (right panel) for the Experimental (filled bars) and Control (open 
bars) Different rule groups across the four trained Subsequences. The RRL column, for example, 
shows performance on ‘consistent’ RRL trials subtracted from ‘inconsistent’ RRR trials. Error 
bars show standard error. 
 
There was little evidence for an interaction between Subsequence and Group at training, 
RT difference score, F(3,138) = .364, p = .626, MSE = 12351, ηp2 = .008; proportion of 
errors, F(3,138) = 2.52, p = .096, MSE = .045, ηp2 = .052; although this trend in errors 
suggests that the relative learning of LRR in Experimental compared to Control groups 
(and to some extent RLL) is approaching significance and somewhat poorer than for 
RRL and LLR subsequences. There was very little evidence for an interaction at test: 
RT difference score, F(3,138) = .843, p = .415, MSE = 1764, ηp2 = .018; proportion of 
errors, F(3,138) = .736, p = .458, MSE = .014, ηp2 = .016. The Subsequence main effect 
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interacted with Epoch (see Figure 2.13) in errors, F(18,828) = 2.35, p = .046, MSE 
= .025, ηp2 = .049; but not RT difference scores, F(18,828) = 2.00, p = .055, MSE = 
1625, ηp2 = .042; nor with Epoch and Group, RT difference score, F(18,828) = .633, p 
= .726, MSE = 1625, ηp2 = .014; and proportion of errors, F(18,828) = .679, p = .629, 
MSE = .025, ηp2 = .015. This suggests that these effects may not have been based on 
learning, and again as with the Same group perhaps reflect the changing attention or 
hypothesis testing of the Intentional participants, regardless of the information available 
to them, as performance on both RT and error measures increases for the subsequences 
RLL and LRR across training, regardless of the training that participants received.  
 
 
Figure 2.13. RT (top panel) and proportion of error (bottom panel) difference scores across 
training Epochs for the Different rule groups across the four trained Subsequences. The RRL 
data points, for example, shows performance on ‘consistent’ RRL trials subtracted from 
‘inconsistent’ RRR trials. The data are collapsed across all 48 participants regardless of 
Experimental or Control groups. Error bars show standard error. 
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Subsequence learning. Again using a series of Bonferroni corrected comparisons the 
subsequences were taken alone to investigate which of these were successfully learned. 
An ANOVA with Epoch and Group across training and Location and Group at test 
demonstrates a main effect of learning across training for the subsequence RRL, RT 
difference score, F(1,46) = 30.5, p < .001; proportion of errors, F(1,46) = 42.3, p < .001, 
and at test in both RTs, F(1,46) = 9.58, p = .007, and proportion of errors, F(1,46) = 
15.6, p = .001. The LLR subsequence was also learned well, with a main effect of group 
across training in both RT, F(1,46) = 26.1, p < .001, and error difference scores, F(1,46) 
= 39.7, p < .001; as well as at test in RTs, F(1,46) = 6.41, p = .030, and errors, F(1,46) = 
13.6, p = .001. Therefore, there is strong evidence for learning of the subsequence YYX, 
which is also the case for XYY, as there is evidence of learning across training in both 
measures for RLL: in RTs, F(1,46) = 42.7, p < .001, and errors, F(1,46) = 18.5, p 
< .001; as well as at test in both RTs, F(1,46) = 17.6, p < .001, and errors, F(1,46) = 
7.16, p < .001. Subsequence LRR was also learned well, with evidence from training 
RTs, F(1,46) = 16.9, p < .001, and errors, F(1,46) = 15.5, p < .001, as well as test RTs, 
F(1,46) = 15.7, p < .001, providing support for learning. Test errors, F(1,46) = 2.78, p 
= .204, do not reach significance for the subsequence LRR. Therefore, contrary to the 
findings of Jones and McLaren (2009), under intentional conditions participants seemed 
to have no trouble in learning the subsequences RRL, RLL, LLR, and LRR.  
 
2.3.2.3. Same versus Different rule learning 
I begin with an ANOVA comparing Epoch; Group; Rule and Subsequence across 
training and Group; Rule and Subsequence at test. All p values reported are corrected 
for multiple comparisons using a Bonferroni adjustment. There was a significant effect 
of Rule across training, RT difference score, F(1,92) = 329, p < .001, MSE = 3856, ηp2 
= .781; proportion of errors, F(1,92) = 52.8, p < .001, MSE = .062, ηp2 = .365, and test, 
RT difference score, F(1,92) = 123, p < .001, MSE =  1233, ηp2 = .573; proportion of 
errors, F(1,92) = 60.7, p < .001, MSE = .007, ηp2 = .398. This demonstrates the very 
strong effect of subsequences, as this main effect occurred regardless of training and 
reflects the benefit of simply performing subsequences RRR, RLR, LLL and LRL over 
RRL, RLL, LLR, LRR. Rule also interacts with Group across training, RT difference 
score, F(1,92) = 6.46, p = .013, MSE = 3856, ηp2 = .066; and proportion of errors, 
F(1,92) = 4.96, p = .028, MSE = .062, ηp2 = .051; and at test in proportion of errors, 
F(1,92) = 5.63, p = .020, MSE = .007, ηp2 = .058, but not RT difference score, F(1,92) 
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= .256, p = .614, MSE = 1233, ηp2 = .003. Figure 2.14 compares the performance of both 
Rule conditions across training and test, which shows that the Different rule is learned 
better than the Same rule. 
 
 
Figure 2.14. RT (top panel) and proportion of error (bottom panel) difference scores across 
training (left panel) and test (right panel) for Experimental and Control groups trained on Same 
(black lines) and Different (blue lines) rule subsequences. Error bars show standard error. Note: 
the blank between Epochs 4 and 5 represents the break between the two sessions. 
 
Whilst the Intentional conditions provided evidence for a difference in learning between 
the two Rule conditions under Intentional conditions, this is not qualitatively different 
from the learning observed in Experiment 1. Rule interacts with Subsequence in errors 
across training, F(3,276) = 19.6, p < .001, MSE = .032, ηp2 = .175; but not RTs, 
F(3,276) = 2.98, p = .065, MSE = 9622, ηp2 = .031. There was also an interaction at test 
in both RT difference score, F(3,276) = 6.58, p = .002, MSE = 1595, ηp2 = .067; and 
proportion of errors, F(3,276) = 26.4 p < .001, MSE = .009, ηp2 = .223. This, however, 
simply reflects the sequential effects observed in Experiment 1, that participants 
preferred responding to Same rule subsequences and struggled most with Different rule 
subsequences. These effects showed little evidence of being affected by Group: training, 
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RT difference score, F(3,276) = .396, p = .625, MSE = 9622, ηp2 = .004; and proportion 
of errors, F(3,276) = .960, p = .377, MSE = .032, ηp2 = .010; test, RT difference score, 
F(3,276) = .848, p = .428, MSE = 1595, ηp2 = .009; and proportion of errors, F(3,276) 
= .829, p = .443, MSE = .009, ηp2 = .009, suggesting that there was no evidence for the 
influence of learning on these preferences. Similarly, the interaction across training 
between Epoch, Rule and Subsequence, RT difference score, F(18,1656) = 4.07, p 
< .001, MSE = 1094, ηp2 = .042; and proportion of errors, F(18,1656) = 2.78, p = .008, 
MSE = .013, ηp2 = .029, was not itself affected by Group and therefore is not related to 
learning, RT difference score, F(18,1656) = .831, p = .595, MSE = 1094, ηp2 = .009; and 
proportion of errors, F(18,1656) = .508, p = .826, MSE = .013, ηp2 = .005.  
 
2.3.2.4. Post-experimental interview 
When asked the same questions as the incidental participants in Experiment 1 
participants in Experiment 2 gave surprisingly similar answers, even though they were 
informed about the presence of sequences. No participants reported being able to work 
out the rule, and reported that they thought the sequence was random or not with a 
similar frequency across the Experimental (19 reported that they thought there were no 
sequences) and Control group (22 participants reported that they thought there were no 
sequences). Similar to Experiment 1, participants reported noticing strings of repeats 
and alternations regardless of their group or rule, and reported either giving up on 
looking for sequences as they thought they did better by not concentrating; or that it was 




Experiment 2 provided evidence of learning of both Same and Different rules under 
intentional conditions. As with Experiment 1, this learning was greater and more robust 
for the Different rule group and there was no apparent qualitative difference between 
Incidental and Intentional conditions. The prediction regarding intentional attention 
towards and consequently greater learning of the subsequence XXX (RRR and LLL, 
both Same rule subsequences) suggested that those participants using intentional rules 
would learn more in the Same rule group did not manifest in greater learning compared 
to the Different rule group.  
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That participants could learn RLR and LRL subsequences under intentional conditions 
(and as well as RRR and LLL) in this experiment when they did not in Jones and 
McLaren’s (2009) study is interesting. Why this difference between participants in 
Jones & McLaren’s (2009) intentional condition and Experiment 2? One explanation 
could be a ceiling effect as participants may be already responding as quickly and 
accurately as they can on the RRR and LLL subsequences, however an analysis of the 
inconsistent trials showed this not to be the case. Both experiments lasted for two 
sessions, however Jones & McLaren (2009) incorporated a pre-training test phase, 
where participants experienced pseudorandom control blocks before beginning their 
training. They were not told that these blocks were pseudo-random and simply 
instructed as participants were in the case of Experiment 2. Therefore, participants in 
Jones & McLaren’s (2009) intentional group would have been both: trained for fewer 
blocks in total; and would have experienced a change between pseudorandom blocks 
and those with sequential contingencies. It seems unlikely that a shorter length of 
training would produce greater learning of subsequence XXX, but the alternative 
proposal regarding 10 blocks of pseudorandom pre-training may provide an explanation 
of this difference, as Jones & McLaren (2009) did not find evidence of differential 
subsequence learning at test. This suggests that the post-training pseudorandom blocks 
led to some unlearning or withholding of information regarding subsequence learning. It 
follows then, that under intentional conditions one would expect a change in trial 
structure to produce qualitative differences in strategy and performance. If this is the 
case, it seems possible that experiencing pseudorandom trials before training produces 
an effect when these trials begin to follow a sequential structure. The sudden 
appearance after the second Epoch of more strings of repeats would perhaps have 
attracted more attention than in the case of Experiment 2, where contingencies were in 
play from the first instance in Experimental groups.  
 
There was no qualitative difference between learning in Different rule groups under 
intentional and incidental conditions, with all subsequences learned well in both cases. 
This provides some evidence that the instructional manipulation may not have had a 
huge effect on the learning processes involved. Jones & McLaren (2009, p. 546) 
reduced the six-session incidental length to two due to the probability that “participants 
would find it difficult to maintain hypothesis testing” for this length of time. Jiménez & 
Méndez (1999) suggest that participants can still demonstrate sequence learning 
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regardless of whether participants experience divided attention, which may provide 
some evidence that regardless of whether participants attempt to work out subsequences, 
that the cognitive strategies they may be using might not impact on the underlying 
learning processes that seem extraordinarily similar to those observed under incidental 
conditions.  
 
The possibility that participants simply give up on hypothesis-testing suggests that 
using intentional participants in order to understand the qualitative differences between 
the two systems is not methodologically ideal, as participants (in either condition) do 
not necessarily follow these instructions. Indeed, many participants in the intentional 
condition reported that they found it easier to ‘just do’ the task, or that they gave up 
looking for sequences or patterns as they found it too difficult. Conversely, some 
participants under incidental conditions reported that they noticed or even looked for 
subsequences. It has been suggested by a variety of authors that these self-reports of 
strategies provide a post-hoc way to analyse participants (e.g. Curran & Keele, 1993), 
however this has a number of issues of control, as well as sensitivity of the information, 
which may have been the case for participants who did not report doing the task in some 
other way than instructed. A better, on-line measure of hypothesis testing could be 
derived from eye-tracking (e.g. Marcus, Karatekin, & Markiewicz, 2006) or using ERP 
markers (e.g. Fu, Bin, Dienes, Fu, & Gao, 2013) however this requires assumptions 
regarding the biopsychological measures and would still require an instructional 
manipulation (which would itself be checked by these assumed markers of hypothesis-
testing).  
 
The best evidence provided in Experiment 2 for the occurrence of conscious, rule-based, 
hypothesis testing is the changing subsequence effects across the experiment, regardless 
of whether participants were in Experimental or Control groups. This suggests that 
some shift in performance across the experiment occurs to subsequences, regardless of 
whether learning is occurring, which I suggest is explained by attentional changes to 
patterns observed in the data throughout training. That these, possibly intentional, 
processes do not interact with Group, suggests the evidence of learning that we have in 
Experiment 2 occurs outside of awareness. Whilst participants may engage with some 
hypothesis testing, this apparently has no effect on their learning.  
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Indeed, the results of the post-experimental interview reveal that participants made very 
little progress in discovering any rules underlying the task, and consequently were 
inclined to give up on their search. No participants could report the rule, or any element 
of the rule, which provides a strong indication that these Intentional participants did not 
possess explicit knowledge about the sequences. Therefore, in summary participants in 
the Intentional condition did not possess explicit knowledge. They may have been 
approaching the task differently, and attempting to uncover or search for patterns 
however it seems as if they were unable to find any patterns or rules as evidenced by the 
absence of a difference between the two conditions and the lack of explicit sequence 
knowledge exhibited by the Intentional group even after two hours of experience with 
these sequences.  
 
2.4. Comparing incidental and intentional learning  
Comparing the Incidental (Experiment 1) and Intentional (Experiment 2) experiments in 
a basic and qualitative way, as suggested by Jones & McLaren (2009) has already been 
discussed above to some extent. The two experiments do not provide evidence of a 
learning difference, as all groups learn all subsequences to some extent and the 
Different rule is learned more than the Same rule, regardless of instructions. Indeed the 
similarity between the results of the two conditions seems to suggest that participants 
under both sets of instructions learned in the same way. That this learning was entirely 
propositional, however, seems unlikely, as Experiment 2 produced evidence of 
sequential effects that differed across training, suggesting that participants shifted their 
performance across the task depending on some attention to or focus on different 
patterns or subsequence elements. Further to this, participants did not follow in either 
Experiment 1 or 2 the intentional subsequence learning observed in Jones & McLaren 
(2009) and instead both produced effects better reconciled with those produced by an 
associative model. How then are we to consider these results? 
 
2.4.1. Comparing incidental and intentional conditions 
An ANOVA with a Bonferroni correction for multiple comparisons was conducted to 
compare learning of the Same rule and, separately,  learning of the Different rule across 
the two instruction conditions. Training data was analysed by Block (7); Group 
(Experimental vs Control); Subsequence; and Condition (Incidental vs Intentional).  
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There was no interaction between Condition and Group for the Same rule nor 
interaction between Condition and any other variable, providing support for the earlier 
suggestion that participants were performing the task similarly regardless of task 
instructions. The Different rule was also not learned differently by participants under 
intentional conditions and no interaction occurred between Condition and any other 
variable. What these results tell us about functionally separable learning processes is 
unclear. Jones & McLaren (2009) found that intentional learning followed the opposite 
pattern to incidental participants, which suggests that a qualitatively different learning 
processes was involved, as an exemplar or instance was learned by participants in the 
intentional condition whereas participants learned subsequences on the basis of 
associative predictions incidentally. All participants in Experiments 1 and 2, however, 
seem to demonstrate similar patterns of behaviour and therefore can be accounted for by 
a single process. Consequently, the instructed manipulation did not engage one system 
versus the other.  
 
2.4.2. Qualitative differences and process purity 
A simple ‘qualitative differences’ account (Jones & McLaren, 2009; Shanks, 2010) of 
two learning processes has been shown to be more complex than one might assume, as 
one cannot be sure (with current measurements of human psychological processes, 
Shanks & St John, 1994) that the learning processes: (a) occur in isolation; (b) occur as 
a result of the instructed manipulation; or (c) occur in isolation as the result of an 
instructed manipulation. The dual-process account suggests that verbalisable rule-based 
learning can control and take precedence over automatic learning (e.g. Reber, 1989), but 
that the automatic system is processing at all times; forming associations between 
stimuli regardless of intention (McLaren, Green, & Mackintosh, 1994). This suggests 
that automatic processes will always occur and that under this assumption we could 
extract the influence of one from the other (e.g. Jacoby, 1991). 
 
Jones & McLaren (2009) provide evidence that intentional learners only show evidence 
of XXX learning, which could be due to explicit encoding of this sequence, but they do 
not consider why the other subsequences have not been learned. There is increasing 
influence of what some consider non-automatic processes (Shanks, 2010) such as 
attention, in the explanation of associative learning phenomena (Pearce & Hall, 1980; 
Mackintosh, 1975). Nissen and Bullemer (1987) demonstrated that attention to other 
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tasks could reduce incidental sequence learning and whilst the reason for this is debated 
(Jiménez and Méndez, 1999; Stadler, 1995) this suggests that some explicit influences 
may interrupt or interact with automatic processes, which is sometimes taken as 
evidence for the non-implicit nature of these processes (e.g. Shanks, 2010). Therefore, it 
may not be the case that there are two entirely separate systems and that automatic 
learning processes encode and learn all information available at all times (Pearce & 
Bouton, 2003). It may instead be the case that conscious effort can reduce or increase 
automatic learning by changing the amount of attention to the stimuli (Jiménez & 
Méndez, 1999) or interrupting the sequence itself (Stadler, 1995) in some way. There 
may, therefore, be a more complex interaction between the two that we are unable to 
tease out by simply instructing participants to do so one way or the other. Without 
understanding of how these two processes may interact we may be unable to dissociate 
the two (Sun, Slusarz, & Terry, 2005). 
 
2.4.3. Dissociation logic 
Many researchers concede the likelihood of an interaction between the two processes, 
for example Willingham, Nissen, & Bullemer (1989) demonstrate that increased 
awareness of stimulus regularities improved performance on the ‘implicit’ SRT task; yet 
they still suggest that the learning systems involved operate in parallel. These 
comparisons usually rely on dissociation logic, which as mentioned in the general 
introduction, has been shown to be essentially flawed (Dunn, 2003). The simple logic of 
which involves the demonstration that manipulating a given independent variable 
affects one dependent variable and not another. This single dissociation has been used 
to provide evidence for implicit learning as a functionally separate system (Jiménez & 
Méndez, 1999; Reber & Squire, 1994) but greater evidence is provided by authors who 
provide evidence of a double dissociation, where two independent variables produce 
complementary single dissociations on the same two dependent variables (Dominey et 
al., 1998; Jiménez et al., 2006; Jones & McLaren, 2009).  
 
Jones & McLaren (2009) essentially provide evidence of such a double dissociation, 
with Group (Experimental versus Control) as the independent variable, a single 
dissociation is demonstrated as learning (the dependent variable) is observed for 
subsequences YYX and YXY, but not XXX. The opposite is true under intentional 
conditions (learning of XXX and not YYX or YXY), suggesting the presence of 
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multiple systems. Loftus (1978) has criticised the use of dissociations with bounded 
variables, such as accuracy, as floor and ceiling effects can be demonstrated to produce 
dissociations. Jones & McLaren (2009) avoid this critique with their analysis of 
inconsistent trials as reported for Experiments 1 and 2 here.  
 
However, Dunn (2003) proposes that the logic of dissociations is fundamentally flawed, 
as whilst one can infer that a variable has an effect on performance of a given task, one 
can never infer that a variable has no effect on the performance of another task. In the 
case of the subsequence learning dissociation proposed by Jones & McLaren (2009) this 
means that the lack of learning for subsequence XXX under incidental conditions and 
the other subsequences under intentional conditions cannot be shown to be unaffected 
entirely by instruction. Indeed, when learning these subsequences as part of a different 
sequential structure in Experiments 1 and 2 participants do show an effect of incidental 
learning on the subsequence XXX.  
 
2.4.4. State-trace analysis 
As a solution to the study of single/multiple-process accounts of latent psychological 
processes, Dunn instead proposes the solution of state-trace analysis (Bamber, 1979; 
Dunn & Kirsner, 1988; Loftus, 1978). Instead of demonstrating single or double 
dissociations, state-trace analysis instead requires two dimensions, representing either 
one dependent variable measured under two different conditions, or two different 
dependent variables. In the case of Experiment 1 and 2 this could be the learning of 
Same and Different rule sequential contingencies. Performance is plotted across the 
trace of the experiment, i.e. across some continuous measure of time or number of 
blocks to produce the function of interest. In this case, this would correspond to plotting 
learning across the epochs of training. These plots can then be made for two or more 
independent variables of interest– these are the states. Here an example of a state 
manipulation would be both an incidental and intentional set of points. The crucial 
analysis consists of determining whether our two plots are best described as part of one 
continuous function, or require two distinct functions to capture each trace. 
 
State-trace analysis has been applied to a large number of research areas where the 
question regarding the number of processes involved in a certain phenomena are 
disputed, including: category learning (Newell, Dunn, & Kalish, 2010; Newell, 2012), 
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cognitive development (Mayr, Kleigl, & Krampe, 1996), the face inversion effect 
(Loftus, Oberg, & Dillon, 2004; Prince & Heathcote, 2009), remember-know judgments 
(Dunn, 2008; Heathcote, Bora, & Freeman, 2010) and the neuroscience of recognition 
memory (Staresina, Fell, Dunn, Axmacher, & Henson, 2013). The remember-know 
judgments fall closest to the current line of investigation, which aim to investigate two 
(explicit and implicit) memory systems, but the only investigation so far to my 
knowledge involving two distinct learning processes is the work of Forrest (2012) who 
found evidence for multiple functions (and therefore for more than one process) 
underlying task-switching under two different task instructions.  
 
2.4.4.1. State-trace analysis of Experiments 1 and 2 
A state-trace analysis was conducted on the data, as described above taking the 
incidental (Experiment 1) and intentional (Experiment 2) results separately as the two 
states that we wish to investigate the dimensionality of. The dimensions (Same and 
Different) rule learning are taken as the dependent variables of interest for the axes, 
although a further difference score has to be calculated between the Groups as the 
Experimental or Control groups alone do not produce a dependent measure of learning. 
A learning score was therefore calculated for each Experimental participant for each 
Epoch in the first session as the difference between Experimental and average Control 
performance for that Rule. A by session analysis was used as the second session starts 
with a performance dip after the break between sessions, which obscures learning as a 
simple function of training: the trace. Figure 2.15 demonstrates the resulting plots for 
both RTs and errors across training for the data produced in Experiments 1 and 2. 
 
These state-trace plots demonstrate firstly what the ANOVA showed, namely that the 
Different rule was learned better regardless of condition (note the larger scale of the 
Different rule axes compared to the Same), but the plots also seem to show that these 
functions may be separate on visual inspection (a method used by McCarley & Grant, 
2008, in the interpretation of state-trace plots). This provides support that not only have 
the instructions produced some difference in sequence learning; further to this that there 
may be two functionally separable learning processes driving this difference. The 
functions on the error plots do not meet all of the requirements, however, for a full 
state-trace analysis, as they do not follow monotonic functions and do not demonstrate 
adequate overlap to infer how many functions are produced. Indeed error data is 
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suggested as incompatible with state-trace analysis as participants may be near floor on 
the task (Newell, 2008). The RT difference data are clear, however, and do seem to 
indicate two separate functions. 
 
 
Figure 2.15. State-trace plots of RT (top panel) and error (bottom panel) learning scores across 
the first four training Epochs (all of Session 1, left panel) and first three training Epochs of 
Session 2 (right panel) for the two sequence Rules (Same: y axis and Different: x axis) in both 
Incidental (Experiment 1, shown in grey) and Intentional (Experiment 2, shown in red) 
conditions. Error bars show standard error. 
 
There are a number of statistical methods to analyse state-trace plots in the literature 
(Spearman’s Rho [Loftus, Oberg, & Dillon, 2004]; maximum likelihood estimate 
[Newell & Dunn, 2008] and Bayesian models [Prince, Hawkins, Love, & Heathcote, 
2012]), but I follow Forrest (2012) whose work on learning processes is most 
conceptually related to these data. Using a stepwise multiple regression, Same rule 
learning (arbitrarily) was predicted from Different rule learning, with Condition added 
to the model in order to assess whether this variable could significantly increase the fit 
of the model and provide evidence for multiple functions. In Session 1, adding 
Condition to the model approached significance, R2 change = 6.7%, F(1,5) = 6.28, p 
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= .057, increasing the already high R2 value from 88.1% (R2adj = 86.1%) to 94.7% (R2adj 
= 92.6%). In Session 2, adding Condition to the model does significantly improve the fit 
of the model, R2 change = 76.8%, F(1,4) = 13.4, p = .035, increasing the R2 value from 
5.9% (R2adj = 1.8%) to 82.8% (R2adj = 72.3%). This suggests that perhaps there are two 
distinct learning processes at work within the data. Whilst these Conditions may not 
have had a qualitative impact on which rule or subsequence was learned, this suggests 
that learning may have in fact involved more than one process. 
 
2.4.4.2. State-trace analysis of computational simulations 
What state-trace analysis can tell us about the dimensionality of the processes involved 
can, however, be called into question. Using a simple recurrent network (SRN, Elman, 
1990, as discussed in Chapter 1 and described in more detail in Chapter 3) to simulate 
human performance on the task, I produced the same state-trace analysis performed on 
human data on two sets of model simulations. The task, the rules, number of trials and 
blocks were identical to Experiments 1 and 2, as described above, however the model 
was not simulated under different conditions to form the states of interest, but with 
different learning rates. For a further explanation of the role of learning rates within the 
SRN, see Chapter 3, but for the purposes of this explanation, by simply increasing the 
amount of learning on each trial, the simulations of the task using an SRN produced two 
visibly divergent state-trace functions, see Figure 2.16.   
 
A model with a higher learning rate learns less about Different rule sequences relative 
to Same rule sequences, this suggests that the state-trace methodology is sensitive to 
variations within a single process (learning rate), rather than providing evidence of 
multiple processes. Therefore, that the state-trace plot for incidental and intentional 
human performance (Figure 2.15) differs does not necessarily imply that two or more 
processes were at work. This suggests that participants under intentional conditions 
could have varied in some single process parameter, for example, by analogy to the 
model simulation they could have learned more on each trial than under incidental 
conditions. Moreover, it seems that a state-trace plot may claim to circumvent the 
problems faced when attempting to uncover the number of processes underlying such 
functions (Loftus, Oberg, & Dillon, 2004) but this simulation result suggests that it may 
be sensitive to variations within a single process and coupled with the results of Ashby 
(2014) call the method into question. Importantly for this thesis, despite the difference 
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between Incidental and Intentional performance on a state-trace plot; this cannot 
provide conclusive evidence for the presence of functionally separable learning 
processes, though it is suggestive.  
 
 
Figure 2.16. State-trace plot of mean squared error (MSE) learning scores across the all seven 
training Epochs for the two sequence Rules (Same and Different) in both low (0.15) and high 
(0.40) learning rate simulations of the simple recurrent network (SRN, Elman, 1990). Error bars 
show standard error. 
 
2.5. General Discussion 
Experiment 1 provided evidence of learning under incidental conditions, with the 
stochastic Different rule learned better than the Same rule. The subsequence learning 
effects observed in Experiment 1, however, suggest that participants were not impaired 
at learning subsequence XXX under incidental conditions as shown in Jones and 
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McLaren (2009). This suggests that rather than participants struggling to learn the 
subsequence XXX per se, subsequence learning occurs differently depending on the 
stochastic structure of the trained sequence itself. While the exclusive-or rule trained in 
Jones and McLaren (2009) required that participants use both of the two trials preceding 
the current trial to predict the required response; the Same and Different rules in 
Experiments 1 and 2 only required that participants use the one trial that occurred two 
trials previous to the current, for which two explanations can be offered. 
 
The first is that participants in Experiment 1 employ a more explicit strategy, that has 
been shown to increase learning of the subsequence RRR and LLL, which occurred 
more frequently in the Same rule group than in Jones & McLaren’s (2009) exclusive-or 
rule case. Therefore, participants in Experiment 1 may have noticed the XXX 
subsequence more and, as a result, learned this subsequence more. It seems unlikely that 
this is the case, as evidenced by the intentional case (Experiment 2). If indeed the 
increased occurrence of XXX led to more noticing of this sequence and therefore more 
learning in Experiment 1, we would also expect to see this (to a greater extent) when 
participants were instructed to look for and use sequences in Experiment 2. As we do 
not see greater learning of the Same rule under intentional conditions or an interaction 
between subsequence learning and conditions it seems unlikely that some verbalisable 
strategy is accounting for the difference here. 
 
The second explanation of such a result comes from the cue competition account of 
XXX learning in Jones & McLaren’s (2009) model of the results: that the reduction in 
error term based on the previous two trials following the same mapping from previous 
to current trial (X leads to X, followed by X leads to X) would block learning of the 
sequential contingency occurring at t. In the exclusive-or case, as both mappings were 
required to accurately predict t, as the first mapping (t - 2 to t – 1) reduces the error term 
for the second case (t -1 to t), then the amount of learning is blocked. In Experiment 1 
only the relationship between the first and last items in the subsequence are important 
for learning the Same rule, therefore, participants may learn that the mapping from t – 2 
to t – 1 has no contingency with t and thus learn to disregard this mapping, with the 
resulting consequence a reduction in the cue competition effect. The effect, however, 
may not be entirely eradicated as the Same rule is still learned less well, therefore 
learning the overall structure of the sequential contingencies may not be protected from 
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the influence of some short-term carry over from the previous trial, even when this has 
no relationship to the trained contingencies.  
 
This account relies on the short-term priming system applied in the AugSRN (e.g. 
Cleeremans & McClelland, 1991), which is the subject of Chapter 3. Further work is 
required to ascertain whether the sequence learning observed with Same and Different 
rule sequences was indeed produced by this interaction between transient trial-by-trial 
sequential effects and the nature of the trained sequential contingencies. This highlights 
the advantage of a computational approach, as the precise mechanisms by which 
learning can occur can be examined in great detail. Therefore, the next aim of this thesis 
is to attempt to model the results of Experiment 1, with a very precise set of human 
learning effects provided by both previous research and the differential subsequence 
learning effects produced by the Same and Different rule structures.  
 
There was no qualitative difference between Experiment 1 and 2 as defined by a 
difference in subsequence learning, possibly suggesting that participants did not 
exclusively perform the task intentionally in this condition and that the instructional 
manipulation was not effective. Indeed participants were unable to express any 
knowledge about the sequential rule, even though they had been trained over two long 
sessions on the task. This suggests that while they may have had volitional control over 
their intention to learn on the task, that they were still unable to discover a pattern 
explicitly. It may also be the case that they discovered patterns but did not express this 
knowledge in the interview or on the task itself (Lee & Livesey, 2013).  
 
It seems that incidental processes remained present in both conditions regardless of 
intention to learn, as Different rule learning was greater in both experiments and 
sequence learning was relatively unaffected when participants employed explicit 
strategies. Whilst it might be possible to take these results as evidence for a single 
learning process that is not different depending on the volitional conditions under which 
the task is performed; the results of Jones and McLaren (2009) clearly suggest that this 
is not the case. Further evidence that both the Incidental and Intentional pattern of 
learning was driven by automatic, associative processes may be provided if the 
Different rule learning advantage can be simulated by a model of associative learning, 
which is the subject of Chapter 3.   
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The difficulty in comparing these two conditions within a dissociable framework are 
numerous, and assumptions regarding test and process purity, the lack of interaction 
between the two processes, and dissociation logic cause problems in trying to establish 
the processes that underlie learning on such tasks. State-trace analysis (Bamber, 1979) 
was offered as the best available solution to understanding the processes that underpin 
performance on a task (Loftus, Oberg, & Dillon, 2004; Newell & Dunn, 2008; Prince et 
al., 2012), but whilst functions produced by the second session of training (and to some 
extent the first) provided some evidence for multiple functions, state-trace analysis 
might reveal variation within some single process and does not necessarily suggest that 
the instructed manipulation produced a functional difference in the processes involved.  
 
This further suggests that relying on control when dealing with awareness is difficult, as 
participants are not only subject to the influence of possible automatic processes, but are 
not necessarily able to or likely to follow these instructions. In a task like this, which is 
very demanding and quite boring, participants in both Incidental and Intentional 
conditions reported a whole variety of different motivations, strategies and experiences. 
The likelihood that all participants in the Intentional condition performed with perfect 
control and were able to isolate their explicit learning and apply this on each trial is slim, 
therefore instructing participants does not ensure either the presence or absence of 
explicit learning; if ultimately participants are unable to uncover what is to be learned. 
Whether participants could notice and use these Same and Different rule sequences is a 
question not addressed in this thesis, but forms a future research strand that might 
involve longer training, the use of hints or even explicitly giving participants the rules 
and asking them to use them, although this does not always result in learning on the 
SRT task (Lee & Livesey, 2013). 
 
Further discrepancies between Jones and McLarens’ (2009) results and those reported 
here lie in the sequential effects observed in control groups under both conditions. Jones 
and McLaren (2009) simply observed a first order repetition advantage, with 
participants preferring to respond to subsequences XXX and XYY, with control 
subjects responding to YXY and YYX with a difference score of below zero. However, 
there was no difference in the control performance of participants in terms of whether 
they preferred a trial that immediately followed the same response location or not; as 
there was evidence for a speed accuracy trade-off between faster responses to first order 
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alternations, and more accurate responding to repeats. Whilst these effects were 
therefore unclear, subsequences with difference scores above and below zero were 
clearly RRR, LLL, RLR and LRL (above zero) and RRL, LLR, RLL and LRR (below 
zero). Therefore, in Experiments 1 and 2 control participants showed a preference for 
faster and more accurate responding to Same rule subsequences over Different rule 
subsequences. There should be no difference between the experience of control subjects 
between Jones and McLaren (2009) and this study, however, the length of training was 
greater in Jones and McLaren's study, and participants were given monetary rewards for 
fast and accurate responding. It is not entirely clear why either of these changes would 
influence sequential effects on control subjects, however Chapter 3 attempts to 
investigate these issues computationally.  
 
Altogether, while the disparity between the Jones & McLaren (2009) dissociation 
between intentional and incidental conditions is a convincing demonstration and 
framework within which to investigate human learning, this is based on the assumptions 
that: (1) participants followed the incidental and intentional instructions and (2) that 
these instructed conditions were able to isolate or give preference to particular learning 
processes. Experiments 1 and 2 provide evidence that an instructed comparison between 
participants may not produce clear-cut subsequence learning differences, and without an 
understanding of how the systems operate or a superior method of disentangling these 
results we are unable to use this research design to better understand human learning.  
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Chapter 3. Modelling stimulus-response associations 
and sequence learning 
 
In Chapter 3 I aim to investigate whether the sequence learning effects observed in 
Experiment 1 can be simulated by the Augmented SRN (AugSRN, Cleeremans & 
McClelland, 1991), which has previously provided a convincing account of Jones & 
McLaren’s (2009) data by means of competition between transient trial order learning 
effects and learning of the sequential contingencies. The AugSRN, however, was unable 
to demonstrate the learning observed in Experiment 1 under the parameters described 
by either Jones & McLaren (2009) or Cleeremans & McClelland (1991). Further 
investigations using an SRN (Elman, 1990) and exploring the parameter space both 
manually and using optimisation procedures provide a convincing demonstration that 
the SRN or AugSRN is unable simulate the results of Experiment 1. What these models 
lack, however, is any representation of simple stimulus-response contingencies 
experienced on each trial, which are not important for sequence learning. When 
introduced into the AugSRN these produce the learning effects observed in Experiment 
1, suggesting that cue competition between simple stimulus-response mappings and 
sequential information (as well as transient trial-by-trial learning) has an effect on 
learning of different subsequences. 
 
3.1. Introduction 
Chapter 2 presented evidence of differential sequence learning under incidental 
conditions, as participants trained on the Different rule (that the current trial [t] can be 
predicted as the opposite location to two trials previous [t – 2]) learned more than those 
trained on the Same rule (that t can be predicted as the same location as t – 2), even 
though the Different rule subsequence are performed worse than Same rule 
subsequences. As discussed in Chapter 1, the Augmented SRN (AugSRN) is a version 
of the SRN (Elman, 1990) adapted to account for the trial order effects observed in 
human serial reaction time (SRT) tasks (Cleeremans & McClelland, 1991). While the 
SRN is a seminal model regularly employed in the simulation of sequence learning 
(Beesley, Jones, & Shanks, 2012); the SRN is unable to account for trial-by-trial effects 
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such as enhanced responding to repeated stimuli, for example. Therefore, the AugSRN 
is proposed to be the best model of human sequence learning (Jones & McLaren, 2009). 
This chapter aims to investigate the detailed pattern of the learning and sequential 
effects demonstrated in Experiment 1, which provide a framework with which to 
accurately assess a computational model of human learning.  
 
As mentioned in Chapter 2, Experiment 1 showed not only greater performance of 
Same over Different subsequences in Control groups (sequential effects); but human 
participants showed evidence of greater Different rule learning compared to Same rule 
learning. Whilst the Same rule was learned less well, there was still evidence of learning 
of XXX and strong learning of XYY: although neither of these subsequences were 
shown to be learned under incidental conditions over greater training in Jones and 
McLaren’s (2009) study. The cue competition effects observed between transient trial-
by-trial contingencies could account for these results if participants had learned to 
disregard the middle trial in a subsequence, as neither group in Experiment 1 required 
this trial to predict t. To ascertain whether the relationship between transient trial order 
learning effects and more permanent learning of the underlying sequential contingencies 
within the task could produce these subsequence learning effects, the AugSRN was used 
to simulate the task. 
 
3.2. The Augmented SRN 
The AugSRN is described in detail here, with the construction and components of the 
model discussed in this section. The first aim of this Chapter was to produce a version 
of the AugSRN that matched the simulations produced by Jones and McLaren (2009). 
 
3.2.1. Model construction 
The model was constructed and simulated using MatLab software and the details of the 
construction of the model and all of the parameters and aspects of the simulations are 
described below. The model was constructed using the specifications outlined in 
previous research and incorporating the parameters given in Jones and McLaren (2009) 
for the simulation of these results. The method of simulation is also described, which 
was run in a way that attempted to approximate the human Experiment 1 as closely as 
possible. Each iteration of the model represents a trial in the human experiment, and 
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therefore 4800 iterations simulated two ‘sessions’ worth of one participant’s data. The 
connection weights and the hidden unit activations were then reinitialised, representing 
the random variation produced across different human participants (Juola & Plunkett, 
1998). The model was then run again for 4800 iterations, and this was done for each of 
the 96 total participants in Experiment 1.  
 
3.2.1.1. Model architecture 
The model is constructed of units that are organised into four layers: input, hidden, 
output and response (shown in Figure 3.1). Each unit in each layer is connected to each 
unit in the next layer, so each input unit has a connection with each hidden unit, each 
hidden unit with each output unit, and each output unit with each response unit.  
 
 
Figure 3.1. Structure of the AugSRN (Cleeremans & McClelland, 1991). Input units (bottom) 
include both left (L) and right (R) stimuli as well as a copy of the hidden units on the previous 
trial and a bias (a unit that is always on). Activation flows in the direction of the arrows, with a 
set of hidden units (middle) passing activation forward once more to output and then response 
units, again representing L and R stimulus locations and/or responses (top).  
 
Input units. There are three types of input unit, the first (shown bottom right in Figure 
3.1) simply representing the left or right stimuli experienced by participants. The second 
is a hidden bias unit (shown bottom in Figure 3.1), which is a single unit that always has 
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an activation of 1. The third are context units (shown bottom left in Figure 3.1), which 
contain a direct copy of the hidden unit activations on the previous trial. There are then, 
the same number of context units as hidden units (in this case 20); and therefore there 
were 23 input units in total in the AugSRN.  
 
Hidden units. 20 hidden units (shown in the middle in Figure 3.1) receive activation 
from the input units, which they feed-forward into the output units. On every trial the 
hidden unit activations are also copied directly into the context units, ready to feed these 
internal representations back into the model on the next trial.  
 
Output units. 2 output units (shown second from top in Figure 3.1) form the new layer, 
one for each left and right stimuli again. 
 
Response units. These form the final layer (shown top in Figure 3.1) in the network and 
there are again 2 response units, one for each left and right stimuli. 
 
3.2.1.2. Representation and activation of task input and output 
Input units and activation. The two input units that discretely represented a left or right 
stimulus were given an activation of 1 to simulate that stimulus was present; and 0 
when it was absent. Therefore, on each iteration of a simulation one of two units would 
be activated and the other not, depending on the type of trial (right or left) being 
simulated. As outlined above, activation of the two input units discretely representing 
stimuli at t (InputR and InputL) was externally manipulated to values of 1 or 0 depending 
on the trial sequence. The bias unit was always activated to a value of 1, and the context 
units were given the activation values on each trial exactly equal to the hidden unit 
activations on the previous trial: 
 !"#$%&$!:!" ! = !!"##$%!:!"(! − 1) 
(Equation 3.1) 
 
This means that the internal representation of the previous trial was fed back into the 
model at t and is therefore the recurrent element that enables the model to learn 
contingencies across trials and to represent time. 
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Hidden units and activation. Each of the 23 input units had two connections to each of 
the 20 hidden units, which totals 920 connections through which activation flows 
forward on each trial. The amount of activation that is fed from each of these input units 
through each of the connections to each hidden unit is determined by the strength of 
each connection (w) between two units and the logistic activation function (Rumelhart, 
Hinton, & Williams, 1986). Therefore, for a unit j, receiving input from one unit I, its 
activation, !"#$! !is: 
 !"#$! = ! 11+ !!(!"#$!!×! !") 
(Equation 3.2) 
 
However, as already indicated, for each unit within the AugSRN there are two 
connections (described in more detail in sections 3.2.1.3 and 3.2.1.4): a ‘fast’ (wFast) 
and ‘slow’ (wSlow) connection for each unit, so activation for the hypothetical unit j as 
part of an AugSRN would be calculated as: 
 !"#$! = ! 11+ !!((!"#$!!×! "#$%!")!(!"#$!!×! "#$!!")) 
(Equation 3.3) 
 
Thus, for each unit with multiple connections, these connection weights and activation 
values can be summed to provide a measure of net input that are converted to activation 
of the unit in question through the logistic activation function: 
 !"#$%&'#!"##$%!= ! (!"#$%! !×! "#$%!"##$%!!"#$%!)+ !(!"#$%!!×! "#$%!"##$%!!"#$%!)+ !(!"#$%!"#$!×! "#$%!"##$%!!"#$%!"#$)+ !(!"#$%&$!!×! "#$%!"##$%!!"#$%&$!)+ !(!"#$%&$!!×! "#$%!"#!"#!!"#$%&$!)+ !… !(!"#$%&$!"!×! "#$%!"##$%!!"#$%&$!")+ (!"#$%! !×! "#$!!"##$%!!"#$%!)+ !(!"#$%!!×! "#$!!"##$%!!"#$%!)+ !(!"#$%!"#$!×! "#$!!"##$%!!"#$%!"#$)+ !(!"#$%&$!!×! "#$!!"##$%!!"#$%&$!)+ !(!"#$%&$!!×! "#$!!"##$%!!"#$%&$!)+ !… !(!"#$%&$!"!×! "#$!!"##$%!!"#$%&$!")! 
(Equation 3.4) 
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!"#$%&'#!"##$%! = (!"#$%! !×! "#$%!")+ (!"#$%! !×! "#$!!") 
(Equation 3.5) 
 !"##$%! = ! 11+ !! !"#$%&'#!"##$%!  
(Equation 3.6) 
 
Output units and activation. The output units also discretely represented a left or right 
stimulus, and on each iteration the model was trained to predict the next trial. For 
example, if the first two trials experienced by participants were a right and then a left, 
the first trial would involve activation of the right input unit (InputR) to 1, and the left 
input unit (InputL) to 0. The target activation on that first trial was set for the right 
(TargetOutputR) as 0.1, and for the left (TargetOutput) as 0.9 both activations 
corresponding to that required on the next trial.  
 
The output units receive input from the hidden units in the same way, with activation 
for one output unit calculated from the net input of 40 connections (20 fast and 20 slow), 
and therefore the activation of the right output unit can be calculated as: 
 !"#$"#! = ! 11+ !! !"#$%&'#!"#$!"!  
(Equation 3.7) 
 !"#$%&'#!"#$"#! = (!"##$%! !×! "#$%!")+ (!"##$%! !×! "#$!!") 
(Equation 3.8) 
 
The difference between this target output and the activation of the output units (OutputR 
and OutputL; discussed in section 3.2.1.2) was taken as an index of how well the model 
predicts the next trial and therefore how much it has learned and is able to use this to 
predict the next trial. This was calculated on each trial by taking the average of the 
squared differences between target and actual output activations, a mean squared error 
(MSE): 
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!"#$"#! "#(!) = (!"#$%&'(&)(&!(!)!!"#$"#!(!))!!(!"#$%&'(&)(&!(!)!!"#$"#!(!))!! ! 
(Equation 3.9) 
 
The discrete response units may also be used as an index of task performance (as in 
Cleeremans & McClelland, 1991; and Jones & McLaren, 2009), but the essential 
comparison between target and actual activation is the same. The response unit MSE 
can be calculated as:  
 !"#$%&#"! "# ! = (!"#$%&'%()*+(%!(!)!!!"#$%&#"!(!))!!!(!"#$%&'%()*+(%!(!)!!!"#$%&#"!(!))!!  
(Equation 3.10) 
 
MSE is therefore a measure of prediction strength that can index RT performance on the 
next trial (Jones & McLaren, 2009), as MSE will decrease with increased prediction 
strength, as one expects RTs to do with increased prediction strength. Smaller MSE 
values therefore indicate greater learning (less difference between expected and actual 
output/responses), and these reflect shorter RTs on the next trial as the MSE measures 
prediction regarding the next trial, and therefore reflects the speed of responding to the 
next trial in humans: 
 !" ! = !"# ! − 1  
 (Equation 3.11) 
 
MSE values were taken from either Output or Response units (depending on the 
simulation, detailed below) when inputs reflect t – 1, which gives RT for trial t for the 
eight different triplets in each block. Difference scores between inconsistent and 
consistent subsequences were calculated as outlined in Experiment 1 (see section 2.2.2).  
 
Response unit activation. To capture the influence of the previous trial location or 
response, two response units were activated depending on the corresponding output unit 
on that trial, and incorporating a decayed trace (weighted by k, which takes the value of 
0.5) of the previous response:  
 !"#$%&#"! ! = !!"#$"#! ! + !!!×! 1− !"#$"#! ! !×!!"#$%&#"!(! − 1)  
(Equation 3.12) 
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At this point, a MSE was calculated, using the equation outlined in this section. After 
this, the response units were set to the appropriate binary response required of the task, 
thus on the first trial example already given where t is right and t + 1 is left, ResponseL 
would be set to 1 and ResponseR to 0, following Cleeremans & McClelland (1991). 
Each trial is considered a correct trial as the model approximates RT responses that in 
human data were only analysed for correct trials. Further decision-making processes 
that would enable the modeling of error data (e.g. Jones, Wills, & McLaren, 1998; Wills 
& McLaren, 1997) were not employed as these elements may have interfered with the 
analysis of the purely associative processes of interest (Jones & McLaren, 2009). 
 
3.2.1.3. Error-correction and back propagation  
After the input unit activation on a single model iteration or trial had fed forward 
activation all the way to the response units, these feed-forward connection weights were 
updated according to back-propagation of error. This means that, from the output units 
backwards, a difference between target and actual activations was calculated, forming 
the basis for the amount of learning that would occur (how much each connection 
weight would change). This followed the standard back-propagation algorithm for error-
correction as developed by Rumelhart, Hinton and Williams (1986), taking the delta 
rule, whereby the amount of change in connection weight is a function of the difference 
(error) between output unit activation and the trained target activations. Thus, the error 
term for the output units was computed as follows: 
 !!"#$"#!!"##$%! = !"#$%&'(&)(!! − !"#$"!! !×!(1− !"#$"!!)!×! "#$"!! 
(Equation 3.13) 
 
The error is then back-propagated to connections between the input and hidden layer 
using the delta from this first set of error calculations: 
 !!"##$%!!"#$%!= !!"#$"#!!"##$%! !× ! !"#$!!"#$"#!!"##$%! + !!"#$!!"#!"!!"##$%!+ !!!"#$"#!!"##$%! !× ! !"#$!!"#$"#!!"##$%! + !!"#$!"#$"#!!"##$%! !×!(1− !"##$!!)!×! "##$!! !(Equation 3.14) 
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Each ‘slow’ connection weight between any two units (again the hypothetical i and j) is 
updated simply by calculating the change in weight multiplied by both the learning rate 
(α) parameter (described in section 3.2.1.5) and the activation of the unit feeding 
activation forward through the connection and adding this to the pre-existing connection 
weight: 
 !"#$!!" = !"#$!!" + !"#$! !×!!!" !×!!!"#$ !(Equation 3.15) 
 
For ‘fast’ learning rates this calculation also involves an element of decay, as the 
previous connection weight is multiplied by the constant k (with a value of 0.5) and 
hence the learning is more transient as it decays by half at each time step:  
 !"#$!!" = !!"#$!" !×!! + !"#$! !×!!!" !×!!!"#$ 
(Equation 3.16) 
 
3.2.1.4. Learning parameters 
Learning rates (α) usually take a value between 0 and 1 and thus reduce the amount of 
weight change that can occur on each trial: producing gradual learning of contingencies 
and avoiding radical step-changes on each trial that produce oscillations in performance. 
These learning rates vary from model to model and across simulations, for instance 
Jones and McLaren (2009) use a slightly higher learning rate than Cleeremans and 
McClelland (1991). These issues of parametisation are discussed later in this Chapter 
(see section 3.3.1), but in general terms the AugSRN has two sets of connection weights 
between each unit in the model, defined by their learning rates (as well as the presence 
[fast weights] and absence [slow weights] of decay).  
 
The slow weights enable associative learning through a lower learning rate that 
encourages strong associations that accrue gradually over time. Fast weights have been 
suggested by various authors as a secondary component of learning that influences 
subsequent trials but have little permanent effect (Hinton & Plaut, 1987; McClelland & 
Rumelhart, 1985). To account for the transient effects observed in SRT tasks, 
Cleeremans and McClelland (1991) introduced fast weights that had a higher learning 
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rate than the slow weights, thus producing greater learning. However, these fast weights 
also decay by half over each trial, meaning that this learning is short lived.  
 
The learning rates employed in simulations are often altered, and are generally accepted 
to be free parameters that can be altered, depending on the task, stimuli or even to 
represent individual differences in human performance (McLeod, Plunkett, & Rolls, 
1998). Cleeremans and McClelland (1991) used learning rates of 0.15 and 0.2 for slow 
and fast learning rates, respectively. Jones and McLaren (2009) argued that as their task 
involved fewer stimuli (two rather than six) and longer response-stimulus interval (RSI: 
500 ms rather than 120 ms), this justified an increased learning rate: of 0.4 and 0.533 
for slow and fast learning rates, respectively. The proportional difference between the 
slow and fast learning rates was matched across the two studies. As Experiment 1 is 
based on Jones and McLaren’s (2009) study, the learning rate parameters of 0.4 and 
0.533 were the ones used in the simulation of Experiment 1. 
 
3.2.1.5. Simulation procedure 
As mentioned previously, the simulation of human performance attempted to match 
Experiment 1 as closely as possible. 96 simulations of 4800 trials were run, each 
representing one human participant: 48 Control and 48 Experimental. Half of the 
simulations were trained on pseudorandom trial orders throughout, as outlined for 
Control groups in Experiment 1. The other 48 participants were either trained on 4200 
trials that followed Same or Different rules described in Chapter 2. The trial 
construction and ordering was exactly the same as for human participants and data was 
analysed in the same way, with MSE at output for input at t – 1 taken as an index of RT 
performance on the task, with an inconsistent minus consistent difference score 
calculated for each block and the four trained subsequences. As for the human 
participants in Experiment 1, this difference score was calculated for all groups over 
118 trials on each test block, even though there was no simulated break or separation 
between blocks. Weighted averages were calculated for 117 trials across each training 
block to control for t – 3 sequential effects. 
 
At the beginning of each simulation of 4800 trials, to represent a new participant the 
connection weights between all units were randomly given weights between -0.5 and 
0.5 and the hidden units were reset and given activations of 0.5. This provides some 
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variation and error into the simulations, approximating individual differences between 
subjects (Juola & Plunkett, 1998).  
 
3.2.2. Simulation 1: Jones & McLaren (2009) 
3.2.2.1. Simulation procedure 
As a check on the model, the Jones and McLaren (2009) incidental learning experiment 
was simulated. This involved 80 simulations, 40 each Experimental and Control, with 
Control groups receiving pseudorandom blocks throughout. There were 10 pre-training 
blocks (1200 pseudorandom trials) for the Experimental networks, which were then 
trained for 80 blocks (9600 trials) on sequences constructed using the same procedure as 
described in Chapter 2, but with an exclusive-or rule rather than a Same of Different 
rule. Therefore the model was twice as likely to experience: XXX, XYY, YYX, YXY 
than the complementary, inconsistent subsequences (XXY, XYX, YYY, YXX). Note 
that Xs and Ys used as R and L was counterbalanced across networks. This was 
followed by a further 10 post-training test blocks (1200 further pseudorandom trials) 
and 10 further training blocks (1200 further exclusive-or trials). 
 
3.2.2.2. Results 
The results were analysed by an ANOVA on the MSE difference scores taken between 
inconsistent and consistent subsequences with the factors Epoch (Sets of 5 blocks as for 
Experiment 1 and 2: 16 across training and 2 across test), Group (Experimental versus 
Control) and Subsequence (XXX, XYY, YYX, YXY). There was a large main effect of 
Group across training, F(1,78) = 592, p < .001, MSE = .002, ηp2 = .884, and test (post-
training), F(1,78) = 67.1, p < .001, MSE = .001, ηp2 = .463, with the post-training test 
results shown in Figure 3.2, alongside a reproduction of these same test results from the 
AugSRN simulations presented in Jones and McLaren (2009). These results match 
those found by Jones and McLaren (2009): with an interaction between Subsequence 
and Group at test, F(3,234) = 31.4, p < .001, MSE = .002, ηp2 = .287 that followed the 
same ordinal pattern as produced in both their human participants and the model. 
Therefore the AugSRN constructed for this thesis could provide evidence of differential 
subsequence learning and accurately simulate human performance under incidental 
conditions as found by Jones and McLaren (2009). Note that the precise sequences 
experienced by each network, as well as randomization of weights at the start of 
simulations meant that the two sets of simulations will not match precisely.  




Figure 3.2. MSE difference scores for the post-training phase of AugSRN simulations taken 
from the current work (left panel) and the work of Jones and McLaren (2009, right panel). Error 
bars are shown for the current simulation (although obscured by the plot markers as these are 
very small) and show standard error. 
 
3.3. Simulation 2: Simulating Experiment 1 with the AugSRN 
3.3.1. Simulation details 
The procedure for simulating Experiment 1 is described in section 3.2.1.5, and matches 
the experimental design outlined in Chapter 2. Using the AugSRN and the parameters 
outlined by Jones and McLaren (2009) the model was used to simulate human between-
subject performance differences on the incidental sequence learning task. The analysis 
of each set of simulations was treated in the same way as human RT and error 
difference scores. ANOVAs investigated learning in each of the two Rule groups 
(comparing Experimental to Control for Same and Different rules, separately) followed 
by a Bonferroni corrected analysis of the full model, involving Block, Group, Rule and 
Subsequence across training and test. The decision was made to average MSE across 
Blocks rather than Epochs due to the interest in the evolution of learning across time. 
Whilst analysis at this level of detail was not possible for the human participants as a 
weighted average across training led to missing values, the AugSRN did not make 
errors and therefore all trials could be included in the analysis and the course of training 
could be analysed in greater detail. The model was trained with learning rates of 0.4 and 
0.533 for slow and fast weights, respectively and 20 hidden units.  
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3.3.2. Results 
3.3.2.1. Same rule learning 
Those networks trained on the Same rule showed a large amount of learning as 
evidenced by the strong effect of Group: across training, F(1,47) = 801, p < .001, MSE 
= .041, ηp2 = .945; and at test, F(1,47) = 1133, p < .001, MSE = .003, ηp2 = .960, shown 
in black in Figure 3.3. Block had a main effect across training, F(34,1598) = 19.9, p 
< .001, MSE = .007, ηp2 = .297, that interacted with Group, F(34,1598) = 77.4, p < .001, 
MSE = .007, ηp2 = .662 suggesting that learning developed across training. There was 
also a Block effect at test, F(4,188) = 142, p < .001, MSE = .001, ηp2 = .751 that 
interacted with Group, F(4,188) = 119, p < .001, MSE = .001, ηp2 = .718, demonstrating 




Figure 3.3. AugSRN simulation of Experiment 1 using parameters outlined by Jones and 
McLaren (2009) for both Same (black) and Different (blue) rules across training blocks and test 
blocks. Filled diamonds show Experimental networks, open diamonds Control networks. Error 
bars show standard error.  
 
Subsequence had a large effect across training, F(3,141) = 13151, p < .001, MSE = .009, 
ηp2 = .996; and test, F(3,141) = 6068, p < .001, MSE = .001, ηp2 = .992, which is shown 
in Figure 3.4 in black. This suggests that the model is sensitive to sequential effects, as 
regardless of training, there was a large preference for responding to subsequences RRR 
and LLL compared to RRL and LLR over performance to RLR and LRL compared to 
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RLL and LRR. These sequential effects did not interact with Group at training, F(3,141) 
= .510, p = .576, MSE = .009, ηp2 = .011, nor at test, F(3,141) = .773, p = .501, MSE 
= .001, ηp2 = .016, suggesting that these subsequence effects were not affected by 
learning, and therefore that the models did not produce evidence of differential 
subsequence learning within the Same group.  
 
 
Figure 3.4. AugSRN simulation of MSE difference scores on the different subsequences trained 
in Experiment 1, using parameters outlined by Jones and McLaren (2009) for both Same (black) 
and Different (blue) rules across training (left panel) and test (right panel). Experimental 
networks are shown by filled bars and Control networks by open bars. Error bars show standard 
error.  
 
Subsequence did interact with Block across training, F(102,4794) = 118, p < .001, MSE 
= .008, ηp2 = .715, and this interaction did itself interact with Group, F(102,4794) = 2.76, 
p < .001, MSE = .005, ηp2 = .055, as shown in Figure 3.5. These effects, while not 
observed in humans in Experiment 1, demonstrate the gradual learning of the 
subsequences RLR and LRL (collapsed into XYX) as well RRR and LLL (collapsed 
into XXX) that develops differently for both sets of networks.  
 




Figure 3.5. AugSRN simulation of MSE difference scores on the different subsequences trained 
in the Same group as in Experiment 1 (top panel), using parameters outlined by Jones and 
McLaren (2009) collapsed into XXX (RRR and LLL) and XYX (RLR and LRL). Experimental 
networks are shown by filled diamonds and Control networks by open diamonds. Bottom panel 
shows human performance from Experiment 1 across training for Experimental (filled bars) and 
Control (open bars) groups on all four Same rule subsequences in RT (bottom left panel) and 
error (bottom right panel) for comparison. Subsequences RRR and LLL (XXX) are shown in 
yellow bars and RLR and LRL (XYX) are shown in green bars corresponding to the model data. 
Error bars show standard error. 
 
For the Same rule trained networks, as shown in Figure 3.5 the Control networks 
approach zero from either side of the x axis across training, demonstrating some 
learning of the absence of contingencies within the sequential structure that being to 
counteract the sequential effects. These reach asymptote, however, and still demonstrate 
the initial advantage for XXX (over XXY) and disadvantage for XYX (over XYY). 
These sequential effects do not follow the pattern observed in Experiment 1. Whilst 
training errors demonstrated an advantage for XXX over XYX, RTs showed the 
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opposite Sequence effect (although neither of these effects were significant); suggesting 
that there is no difference between the subsequences. However, the performance on 
both subsequences were well above a difference score of zero in Experiment 1 in both 
RT and errors (see Figure 3.5, bottom panel): therefore the AugSRN did not simulate 
the sequential effects observed in humans.  
 
3.3.2.2. Different rule learning 
The networks trained on the Different rule showed an effect of Group across training, 
F(1,47) = 134, p < .001, MSE = .077, ηp2 = .741; and at test, F(1,47) = 148, p < .001, 
MSE = .016, ηp2 = .759, providing evidence that the AugSRN could learn this sequential 
contingency, as shown in blue in Figure 3.3. There was a significant effect of Block 
across training, F(34,1598) = 409, p < .001, MSE = .017, ηp2 = .897; and test, F(4,188) = 
8.08, p < .001, MSE = .001, ηp2 = .147, that interacted with Group across training, 
F(34,1598) = 44.0, p < .001, MSE = .017, ηp2 = .484, which demonstrated a gradually 
increasing difference between Experimental and Control groups with training. There 
was also an interaction between Block and Group at test, F(4,188) = 9.75, p < .001, 
MSE = .001, ηp2 = .172, which provides evidence of extinction when networks 
performed on pseudorandom blocks after training.  
 
Subsequence had an effect across training, F(3,141) = 12641, p < .001, MSE = .012, ηp2 
= .996, and test, F(3,141) = 3586, p < .001, MSE = .003, ηp2 = .987 (shown as blue bars 
in Figure 3.4). This was the inverse set of sequential effects observed for the Same 
networks, with better performance on subsequences RLL and LLR (compared to RLR 
and LRL) than on subsequence RRL and LLR (compared to RRR and LLL). This did 
not interact with Group across training, F(3,141) = 3.25, p = .065, MSE = .012, ηp2 
= .065, nor test, F(3,141) = 3.02, p = .060, MSE = .003, ηp2 = .060, suggesting that the 
Subsequence effect was not itself affected by learning, nor was there evidence for the 
differential learning of subsequences within the Different rule. Subsequence did interact 
with Block across training, F(102,4794) = 127, p < .001, MSE = .004, ηp2 = .738, but 
not test, F(12,564) = .456, p = .787, MSE = .008, ηp2 = .010. This is shown in Figure 3.6, 
which demonstrates the opposite pattern in the Control networks as for the Same rule 
network (shown in Figure 3.5): the relative advantage and disadvantage for the 
subsequences XYY and YYX, respectively which converged towards a difference score 
of zero across training. Human participants in Experiment 1 showed Control 
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performance on the subsequences in the Different group to be uniformly below zero 
(see Figure 3.6, bottom panel), and therefore the XYY performance does not accurately 




Figure 3.6. AugSRN simulation of MSE difference scores on the different subsequences trained 
in the Different group as in Experiment 1, using parameters outlined by Jones and McLaren 
(2009) collapsed into XXY (RRL and LLR) and XYY (RLL and LRR). Experimental networks 
are shown by filled diamonds and Control networks by open diamonds. Bottom panel shows 
human performance from Experiment 1 across training for Experimental (filled bars) and 
Control (open bars) groups on all four Different rule subsequences in RT (bottom left panel) 
and error (bottom right panel) for comparison. Subsequences RRL and LLR (XYY) are shown 
in pink bars and RLL and LRR (XYY) are shown in blue bars corresponding to the model data. 
Error bars show standard error. 
 
3.3.2.3. Same versus Different learning  
To assess the between-‘subject’ comparison of interest, the networks were again 
compared as the human participants were across training and test with a Bonferroni 
corrected ANOVA on MSE difference scores with Block, Group, Subsequence and 
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Rule as the factors of interest. Rule had a large effect across training, F(1,94) = 1807, p 
< .001, MSE = .059, ηp2 = .951, and test, F(1,94) = 416, p < .001, MSE = .009, ηp2 
= .816; which captures the sequential effects observed in the task, with performance on 
Same subsequences overall better than for Different subsequences throughout the 
simulation (see Figure 3.3). This overall difference simulates human participants, 
regardless of the subsequence effects that did not follow human performance as 
discussed previously. There was an interaction between Rule and Group across training, 
F(1,94) = 54.1, p < .001, MSE = .059, ηp2 = .365, although not at test, F(1,94) = 3.70, p 
= .115, MSE = .009, ηp2 = .038. This reflects greater learning of the Same rule compared 
to the Different rule, the opposite sequence learning effect to the one observed in 
Experiment 1. The non-significant interaction at test also supports numerically greater 
learning of the Same rule, providing evidence that the simulation does not produce the 
learning effects observed in humans. 
 
3.3.3. Discussion 
The simulation of Experiment 1 produced evidence of learning of both Same and 
Different rules and of sequential effects, however, the essential learning difference in 
humans of better Different rule learning compared to the Same rule was not simulated 
by the AugSRN here. The AugSRN produces the same pattern of sequential effects in 
Control networks as observed in Jones & McLaren (2009); which as discussed in 
Chapter 2 was not the pattern of sequential effects observed in Experiment 1. Whereas 
the AugSRN and Jones and McLaren’s (2009) participants demonstrated better 
performance on subsequences ending in a repeat, Experiment 1 found better 
performance to Same rule subsequences, regardless of whether they ended in a repeat or 
alternation; suggesting that a higher-order sequential effect was evident that is not 
captured by the AugSRN. 
 
Running the parameters used by Jones and McLaren (2009), the model learned more 
about the Same rule than the Different rule, the opposite effect to the one obtained 
experimentally, providing evidence that the simulation was unable to account for human 
performance. This may be due to the learning parameters, which deviate from those 
suggested by Cleeremans and McClelland (1991) and whilst these may have been 
appropriate when simulating Jones and McLaren’s (2009) six-session experiment, they 
may not appropriately simulate human performance in just two sessions. As the 
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networks were trained for the same amount of trials as the human participants, this 
difference between the tasks seems unlikely to merit a change in the rate of learning.  
 
It could be that differences across motivation or participant samples produced a 
different amount of learning, however, as Jones and McLaren (2009) employed 
University of Cambridge students and paid them more money for taking part in the 
experiment, as they were given the opportunity to earn bonuses on top of being paid a 
minimum of £4 per hour. These differences, some may argue, should not have an effect 
on incidental learning, which is characterised as operating outside of intention, effortful 
control or attention (McLaren et al., 2014). However, some authors have suggested that 
decreased attention has an effect on incidental performance on a incidental learning task 
(Tanaka, Kiyokawa, Yamada, Dienes, Shigemasu, 2008), or that indeed measures of 
intelligence, correlate with learning rates (Tomas & Karmiloff-Smith, 2003) or even 
strength of associative learning (Kaufman, DeYoung, Gray, Brown, & Mackintosh, 
2009). These issues, while highly debated, could of course still account for why the 
AugSRN simulates one set of human performance correctly, but is unable to do so for 
another set of human participants. To investigate this further, the learning parameters of 
the model were manipulated in further simulations. 
 
3.4. Different versus Same rule learning 
As suggested previously, the learning rates applied to the model are not fixed and can 
be easily changed. In order to attempt to simulate the human performance observed in 
Experiment 1, there were first changed to those suggested by Cleeremans and 
McClelland (1991) when developing the AugSRN. 
 
3.4.1. Simulation 3: Cleeremans & McClelland (1991) parameters 
3.4.1.1. Simulation details 
Cleeremans and McClelland (1991) suggest smaller learning rate parameters of 0.15 
and 0.2 for slow and fast weights, respectively, along with 15 hidden units. These 
changes were made to the model but all other parameters, model details and procedure 
remained the same as for Simulation 2.  
 




Analysed in the same way as for Experiment 1 and Simulation 2, learning is observed 
for both rules in the Group effect: Same rule training, F(1,47) = 155, p < .001, MSE 
= .032, ηp2 = .768; and test, F(1,47) = 135, p < .001, MSE = .010, ηp2 = .742; Different 
rule training, F(1,47) = 82.2, p < .001, MSE = .016, ηp2 = .636, and test, F(1,47) = 60.1, 
p < .001, MSE = .006, ηp2 = .361. It is clear that there is little difference made by these 
parameter changes, therefore there is no need to further analyse the detailed pattern of 
subsequence learning. A significant Bonferroni corrected interaction between Group 
and Rule across training, F(1,94) = 24.8, p < .001, MSE = .024, ηp2 = .209, and test, 
F(1,94) = 19.2, p < .001, MSE = .008, ηp2 = .169, demonstrated that learning was greater 
for the Same rule. Again providing evidence of the opposite learning effect to that 
observed in humans. 
 
3.4.1.3. Discussion 
The simple parameter change to lower learning rates and less hidden units slightly 
reduced the overall learning, but had no qualitative impact on the learning effect 
observed in Simulation 2: that the Same rule was learned better than the Different rule. 
This suggests that some reduction of attention or learning in Experiment 1 compared to 
Jones and McLaren’s (2009) study does not explain the effects found in my research, 
and the AugSRN is still unable to simulate Experiment 1.  
 
It could be that the response units in the AugSRN, which prime the previous response 
and have a substantial effect on the way that the model produces sequential effects, do 
not reflect human processes. As seen in both Same and Different groups, the model 
produces a strong preference for subsequences XXX and XYY compared to XXY and 
XYX, suggesting that the priming of the last response has a strong influence on 
performance right from the first Block of training. However, MSE difference scores for 
both Control and Experimental groups on XXX and XYY reduce over the first few 
Blocks, suggesting that the models are learning to ignore this bias. Indeed, this is 
observed in the first few blocks in simulations of Jones and McLaren (2009)’s study, 
seen in Figure 3.7. This overproduced advantage for XXX could be the cause of the 
Same group learning advantage seen in Simulations 2 and 3. Further to this, as Control 
networks in the Different group experience a benefit on the subsequence XYY due to 
this response priming, contrary to the subsequence effect (poor performance) observed 
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in humans, this may have reduced the amount of learning observed for this subsequence 
and therefore of the rule as a whole. 
 
 
Figure 3.7. AugSRN simulation of MSE difference scores on the different subsequences trained 
in the Jones and McLaren (2009) exclusive-or task, using parameters outlined by Jones and 
McLaren (2009). Experimental networks are shown by filled diamonds and Control networks 
by open diamonds. 
 
3.4.2. Simulation 4: AugSRN without response units 
3.4.2.1. Simulation details and results 
The response units were removed from the AugSRN, which essentially reduces the 
model architecture to that of the SRN (Elman, 1990); with input, hidden and output 
layers only. The models still differ, however, in the existence of two sets of connection 
weights, fast and slow, for the AugSRN. The SRN only contains one, stable set of 
weights equivalent to the AugSRN’s slow weights that do not experience decay. The 
learning rate parameters and hidden units were returned to those outlined in Jones and 
McLaren (2009, slow learning rate: 0.4; fast learning rate: 0.533; hidden units: 20) and 
the simulations were run according to the procedure outlined for Simulation 2. The 
MSE was calculated not from the difference between response unit activations and 
expected responses (as there were no longer response units within the model), but the 
difference between output unit activations and responses, as outlined in section 3.2.1.2. 
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The model did not differ from the AugSRN in its preference for Same rule learning over 
Different rule learning across training and test.  
 
3.4.3. Simulation 5: AugSRN without fast weights 
As the removal of the response units made little difference to the pattern of results 
observed, it is perhaps logical to assume that the response units, which prime 
responding for a short term are not causing the disparity between human and model 
performance. The learning of transient trial orders, as facilitated by the fast weights in 
the AugSRN may therefore be the problem. As the response units have one-to-one 
connections with the output units, and are not involved in error correction or back 
propagation, they are simply a priming mechanism that gives precedence to the previous 
response made. The fast weights, with higher learning rates than slow weights, and a 
half-decay each time step were suggested to account for the short-term learning of 
contingencies between trials, therefore these do not apply necessarily to response 
repetitions alone and can produce a short-term influence of experiencing X followed by 
Y on the subsequent X trial (on which a Y is predicted more likely, Hinton & Plaut, 
1987; McClelland & Rumelhart, 1985).  
 
3.4.3.1. Simulation details and results 
The AugSRN architecture was reinstated, as outlined in section 3.2.1.1, see Figure 3.1. 
The new model involved a set of response units, from which the MSE was taken and 
difference scores calculated. The parameters for learning rates and hidden units were as 
Simulations 2 and 4 (following Jones & McLaren, 2009) and the simulation procedure 
the same. The only difference between this model and Simulation 2 was that the fast 
weights were no longer included in the model. Learning therefore occurred only through 
one component (learning rate: 0.4) that experienced no decay. The results of Simulation 
5 show again that the model, this time without fast weights, was unable to simulate the 
increased learning of the Different rule observed in Experiment 1. The model was 
consequently adapted further to investigate whether both the response units and fast 
weights may be responsible for producing sequential effects that influence Control and 
Experimental subsequence performance and reduce learning in the Different group.  
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3.4.4. Simulation 6: SRN 
3.4.4.1. Simulation details 
Simulation 6 used the SRN to simulate performance on the task, with the architecture 
depicted in Figure 3.9. The model had no response units and no fast weighted 
connections. The slow learning rate parameter was matched to Jones and McLaren 
(2009) and set as 0.4, with 20 hidden units. The MSE was again calculated from the 
output activation as in Simulation 4. The SRN also produced the same pattern of results 
as the AugSRN, regardless of whether the response units or fast weights were included 
in the model. Therefore, simulation of the between-subject difference between human 
participants on Different rules compared to Same rules was not easily modeled by any 
standard version of the SRN using the parameters outlined by Jones and McLaren 
(2009). At least within these learning rate parameters, the model was unable to produce 
these learning effects and this suggests that either these parameters were incorrect, or 
that the model has a more fundamental issue. To investigate the learning parameters of 
the model fully, before discounting the AugSRN as the best model of sequence learning, 
the parameter space was fully investigated. 
 
There could, of course, be an issue with human participants, and there could be some 
difference between the human groups in Experiment 1 that the model does not simulate. 
For instance, one group may simply learn more due to increased attention or motivation 
as a result of some aspect of the sequences experienced themselves. This is entirely 
possible, as the Same group contained subsequences XXX and YXY, the experience of 
which was often anecdotally reported as containing a noticeably high number of strings 
of repeats and alternations. As participants find these subsequences easier to respond to, 
they may notice these subsequences explicitly (to some extent) and either: switch to 
such an explicit system; pay less attention; or be motivated to learn less. While, as 
mentioned previously, there is substantial debate about whether an incidental, automatic 
system may or may not be affected by explicit knowledge (Sun, Slusarz, & Terry, 2005) 
this is a possibility.  
 
Revisiting the human data, we might suspect that if Experimental participants in Same 
and Different rule conditions were responding differently that there would be evidence 
of some quantitative difference in speed or accuracy with which participants completed 
the task, regardless of whether they were responding to consistent or inconsistent 
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stimuli. Bonferroni corrected comparisons comparing the Same and Different rule 
Experimental groups in their raw average RTs and proportion of errors to each 
subsequence (consistent and inconsistent) demonstrate no difference in either RTs 
across training, F(1,46) = .005, p > .9. Average RT [ms]: Same, M = 286.0, SE = 4.37; 
Different M = 285.5, SE = 4.37) nor proportion of errors, F(1,46) = .002, p > .9 
(proportion of errors: Same, M = .076, SE = .011; Different, M = .075, SE = .011). 
Therefore, it seems unlikely that either group differs in their strategy, motivation or 
attention, which would influence responding in some way. It could also be the case that 
participants were simply not using an associative system to learn the task. The benefit 
for the Different rule group would be hard to reconcile with this view, as participants 
find it harder (if anything) to notice or verbalise this rule and therefore a Same rule 
group advantage might be expected.  
 
3.5. Optimisation of the AugSRN 
3.5.1. Optimisation Procedure 
To investigate whether the AugSRN was indeed a suitable model of human learning, a 
search of the parameter space was necessary. Following such a search by hand, it was 
clear that a non-exhaustive trial-and-error procedure was not going to be successful in 
producing an AugSRN capable of simulating human learning on this task. The model 
contains a number of parameters that could be altered, with the absolute values of each 
as well as the interaction and proportional differences between them providing a 
multitude of possible conditions in which one could simulate Experiment 1. Therefore, 
an optimisation procedure was run, which attempted to find the parameters that 
produced MSE with the best fit to human data.  
 
The MatLab FMINSEARCHBND function was employed in order to attempt to 
minimise the difference between human and model performance by altering free 
parameters in the model. These were the: number of hidden units; fast learning rate; 
slow learning rate; and constant k (fast weight decay). Fast and slow learning rates and 
constant k were bound between 0 and 1. The number of hidden units was bound 
between 1 and 9999. The optimisation procedure was given the target of human test 
performance; the values for errors were chosen as these demonstrated the larger 
difference. Same and Different Experimental and Control networks were trained in 
order to minimise the difference between model performance and human performance. 
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As MSE did not necessarily approximate human error rates, a constant was used for 
each set of 96 networks which was calculated for each set of parameters as the optimal 
constant that would transform model MSE values to those equating to human error rates. 
This constant was calculated by means of an optimisation procedure that attempted to 
reduce the difference between the MSE and human data. Multiplying the constant by 
the MSE values produced transformed model MSE for each of the four groups (Same 
Experimental; Same Control; Different Experimental; Different Control) which were 
able to be compared to human performance using a further mean squared error 
calculation (which I will call the Optimisation MSE). This target (the difference 
between transformed model MSE and human performance) was used to minimise the 
error in the optimisation procedure.  
 
In order to avoid the fminsearchbnd procedure getting stuck at local minima, the model 
was run from a variety of starting points. These were selected randomly between the 
bounds of each parameter. Further to this all four possible model architectures simulated 
previously (AugSRN; AugSRN without response units; AugSRN without fast weights; 




Simulations were classified depending on whether they fulfilled the following criteria, 
which were identified as the key features of human performance: (1) the correct ordinal 
pattern of group performance (from highest to lowest: Same Experimental; Same 
Control; Different Experimental; Different Control); (2) larger learning of Different rule 
over Same rule; and (3) performance in both Same rule groups and Different 
Experimental networks with difference score greater than zero, i.e. these three groups 
all performed above a difference score of 0. A table of the number of models that 
fulfilled these criteria can be seen in Table 3.1, with 5837 simulations out of 75303 
simulating all three correctly.  
 !  
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Table 3.1. Table showing number of simulations (of 96 networks each) that simulated 
the task as part of the optimisation procedure. Simulations were classified according to 
whether the pattern of results for each group followed: the correct serial order or not; 
performance of three of groups above a difference score of zero or not; and whether the 
Different or Same rule were learned better.  
 Correct Serial Order Incorrect Serial Order 
 Three groups > 0 Three groups not 
< 0 
Three groups > 0 Three groups not 
< 0 
Same > Different 16171 26028 3414 0 
Same < Different 5837 13169 10414 0 
 
The results from the human experiment at test were converted into differences for the 
purposes of visualising the data. Both the sequential effects and sequence learning were 
measured by such a difference. Firstly, the sequential effects were calculated as the 
difference between Different and Same rule in performance of Control groups only. 
Sequence learning was calculated first from the Experimental minus Control learning 
difference score for each rule, and then a further difference between Same and Different 
rule learning was taken as an index learning of the sequences. Both differences reflect 
Different over Same performance or learning, with these scores for human performance 
shown in Table 3.2, and show that while Different Control group performance is the 
inverse of Same rule Control effects, that the learning in the Different group is larger 
than the Same group.  
 
Table 3.2. Results for Experiment 1, showing both RT and error difference score 
performance for Control groups only for Sequential effects and learning scores (the 
difference between Experimental and Control difference scores) for the final Epoch of 
training performance. Sequential effect scores are calculated by taking the difference 
between the Control group Different rule scores and Same rule scores. Sequence 
learning scores are taken from the difference between Same rule learning (Experimental 
minus Control difference scores) and Different rule learning scores (Experimental 
minus control difference scores). 
 Sequential effects Sequence learning 
 Difference scores  Learning scores  
 Same Different Different - Same Same Different Different - Same 
RTs 20.8 -18.7 -39.5 23.0 25.7 2.70 
Errors .056 -.059 -.115 .036 .073 .037 
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These 5937 models are plotted in Figure 3.8, with the Optimisation MSE (the difference 
between the transformed model MSE difference scores and human error difference 
scores) plotted on the y axis. This is a measure of how close the model is to predicting 
the human data. The z and x axes plot two key aspects of the human experimental 
results, the scores for both the sequence learning effect (greater learning of Different 
rule than Same rule sequences, z axis) and the sequential effects (greater performance 
on Same rule subsequences than Different rule subsequences, y axis).  
 
 
Figure 3.8. Plot of the 5937 models that fulfilled ordinal pattern of results observed in human 
participants. Mean squared difference between transformed MSE difference scores and human 
error difference scores is plotted on y axis; the sequential effects score (preference in responding 
to Different over Same rule subsequences) on the z axis; the sequence learning score (learning 
of Different over Same rule subsequences) is plotted on the x axis. Note, only the simulations 
that show greater Different over Same rule learning, as well as greater Same over Different 
sequential effects. Human performance is shown by the red circle.  
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As we can observe from Figure 3.8, no models approach the degree of sequence 
learning found in humans, with no ANOVA of these models producing a significant 
interaction between Sequence and Group. Therefore, whilst the AugSRN is able to 
simulate the order of results, the learning difference between Same and Different rules 
never reaches significance. 
 
3.5.3. Discussion 
The result of both a trial-and-error search of the parameter space and extensive 
optimisation of the free parameters of the model have led to no simulation that 
adequately captures human performance. Whilst the AugSRN is able to produce 
simulations that prefer Different rule learning over Same rule learning, these differences 
are small and not significant. Given the small amount of variance associated with these 
simulations this provides a convincing demonstration that the SRN or AugSRN is 
unable to produce the learning effects observed in humans. This suggests that the 
AugSRN in its current form is not a suitable model of human learning under incidental 
conditions. 
 
3.6. Stimulus-response associations 
3.6.1. Cue competition and subsequence learning 
With the AugSRN unable to produce the pattern of responding observed in human 
participants, the next step was to ask what this model lacks that produced the advantage 
for Different over Same subsequences. Performance across training and test on errors 
(which produced a reliable Group by Rule interaction) in Experiment 1 demonstrated 
learning of subsequences in the following order, from greatest to least: XYY; YYX; 
YXY; XXX, although this difference was not significant. The explanation offered by 
Jones and McLaren (2009) for the poor learning of XXX – that trial-by-trial 
associations compete with sequential contingencies – goes some way to explain the 
poorer performance of the Same rule group; but this does not explain why YXY is 
learned less well than XYY and YYX. Similarly, if the transient learning of X -> X 
reduces the error term (and therefore the amount of learning that occurs) for the second 
X -> X in the triplet; then we should see the most learning for YYX, as the first 
mapping (Y -> Y) does not occur in the second instance within a triplet (Y -> X) and 
therefore the error term will be higher and more learning will occur about this instance. 
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This is not the case with human participants, as there are no differences between 
subsequence learning. Whilst the first set of trial-by-trial mappings within a triplet are 
not important in predicting the Same and Different rule subsequences as they were in 
the exclusive-or case, an eradication of the transient cue-competition effects proposed 
by Jones and McLaren (2009) would result in an absence of subsequence learning 
effects altogether.  
 
It is possible that a vital component of the SRT task and how humans represent the task 
is missing from the SRN and simulations using such models. The SRN receives input 
regarding the current trial and produces a prediction, which is taken as an index of 
responding for the next trial in the sequence. Therefore, in a standard SRN only the 
current response stimuli or the response made (given that they should be the same thing) 




Figure 3.9. Elements in trial sequence of any SRT task at trial t and t + 1. In the AugSRN and 
SRN (top panel) either the response stimuli or response made at trial t are used as input to 
predict output (trained to the response made at t + 1). In the RASRN (bottom panel) all elements 
of the trial sequence are used, with the response made at t and the response stimuli at t + 1 used 
to predict the response at t + 1.  
 
Consequently, the SRN ignores the current stimuli that are presented to humans in an 
SRT task between t and t +1 (Destrebecqz & Cleeremans, 2003). Traditionally, as the 
SRN attempts to model trial-by-trial contingencies and relationships across time, these 
simple stimulus-response (S-R) mappings on each time step of the model are not 
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represented, as they are surplus to the requirements of a sequence learning 
demonstration. Thus, in a standard SRT task, the stimulus that indicates the next 
response in the sequence is actually not represented in a typical SRN simulation that 
endeavours to predict the next response based on previous trials. 
 
If both the previous response and current stimulus were used to predict the current 
response required, then these two inputs and their relationship with the previous trials 
could produce a cue competition effect that would account for human performance on 
the task. As simple associations form between each trial and their output, this might 
increase learning about XYY and YYX above the Same rule. That nature of the 
Different rule sequential contingency is that t – 2 is more likely to be in the opposite 
location to t. Therefore, the stimulus-response associations on t – 2 and t are not the 
same, and therefore learning about the relationship between t – 2 and t is not blocked. 
Learning about t – 2 in the Same rule, however, may be blocked by the representation of 
the stimulus-response association of t – 2 which occurs on t. 
 
The model was, as a result, altered to include a better representation of the task given to 
humans, including input to represent the previous trial in the sequence (the Previous 
Response) as well as the current on-screen stimuli that participants were required to 
respond to, see Figure 3.9. To represent the ITI in between these two events, these 
inputs were given different activation values, with the previous response receiving a 
higher activation value to represent the increased time that participants had to process 
this information whilst making a prediction. The current stimuli are only on screen for a 
short time, with the occurrence of these stimuli prompting an immediate response. 
Therefore, whilst the current stimulus (t + 1) has a perfect relationship with the required 
response (t + 1); it has less time to accrue learning. The context units were given a 
higher activation value than both previous responses and current stimuli, as this internal 
representation of the task was in place before the previous response and current stimuli.  
 
3.6.2. Simulation 7: RASRN 
3.6.2.1. Simulation details 
To better represent the task, the model architecture of the AugSRN was altered to that 
shown in Figure 3.10. The response units were removed, as these were found to make 
little difference to the subsequence effects above. As these units accounted for data that 
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involved both shorter RSIs (Cleeremans & McClelland, 1991) as well as when 
participants were motivated to respond extremely quickly (Jones & McLaren, 2009) and 
I observed no bias towards a first-order repeat preference in humans (Experiment 1, this 
thesis), these units were serving no useful purpose. Another modification was to add 
two new units, representing the current stimuli, as input with small activation values (of 
0 for off and 0.1 for on) to represent the shorter time this input was available when 
making the prediction regarding the output (or response) to be predicted. The input in 
the AugSRN (now explicitly representing the previous correct response) was given an 
activation value of 0.75, with the context units given a higher value still (1.3 times the 
activation of the hidden units on the previous trial) to represent the time course of each 
trial. In all other instances the model remained unchanged and a simulation of the task 
was run with: 20 hidden units; a slow learning rate of 0.2; and fast learning rate of 0.5. 
 
 
Figure 3.10. Structure of the Revised AugSRN (RASRN). Input units include representations of 
both left (L) and right (R) previous responses and L and R current on-screen stimuli as well as a 
copy of the hidden units on the previous trial and a bias (a unit that is always on). Activation 
flows in the direction of the arrows, with a set of hidden units passing activation forward once 
more to output and then response units, again representing L and R responses. 
 
3.6.2.2. Results 
The revised AugSRN (RASRN) results were analysed in the same way as the previous 
simulations, and showed a main effect of Group for both Same rule and Different rule 
networks, see Figure 3.11. Same rule learning: training, F(1,46) = 755, p < .001, MSE = 
.058, ηp2 = .943; and test, F(1,46) = 562, p < .001, MSE = .011, ηp2 = .916; Different rule 
learning: training, F(1,46) = 220, p < .001, MSE = .119, ηp2 = .827; and test, F(1,46) = 
80.4, p < .001, MSE = .040, ηp2 = .639. When compared to one another, Group and 
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Sequence interacted across training, F(1,92) = 12.9, p = .001, MSE = .088, ηp2 = .123; 
and test, F(1,92) = .4.48, p = .037, MSE = .025, ηp2 = .046. The crucial test of the 
difference between the two groups showed that the Different rule was learned 
significantly better than the Same rule.  
 
 
Figure 3.11. RASRN simulation (Simulation 7) of Experiment 1 using a slow learning rate of 
0.2; a fast learning rate of 0.5 and 20 hidden units for both Same (black) and Different (blue) 
rules across training blocks and test blocks. Filled diamonds show Experimental networks, open 
diamonds Control networks. Error bars show standard error. 
 
The sequential effects and subsequence learning observed in the RASRN was also far 
closer to that observed in Experiment 1, see Figure 3.12, with performance on XXX and 
YXY subsequences above zero and for YYX and XYY subsequences below zero (i.e. 
Same advantage over Different in Controls). The model also followed the ordinal 
pattern of sequential learning and effects seen in human errors across training and test, 
with better performance to RRR and LLL over RRL and LLR compared to RLR and 
LRL over RLL and LRR. Learning was numerically greatest for XYY; followed by 
YXX; YXY and the least learning was observed for XXX. The Subsequence effects 
were significant in both Same and Different groups across training: Same, F(3,138) = 
568, p < .001, MSE = .035, ηp2 = .925; Different, F(3,138) = 815, p < .001, MSE = .035, 
ηp2 = .947; and test: Same, F(3,138) = 12.6, p < .001, MSE = .005, ηp2 = .215; and 
Different; F(3,138) = 32.1, p < .001, MSE = .002, ηp2 = .411. The Same group 
demonstrated an interaction between Subsequence and Group across training, F(3,138) 
= 6.74, p = .005, MSE = .035, MSE = ., ηp2 = .128; but not at test, F(3,138) = 1.07, p 
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= .354, MSE = .002, ηp2 = .023; providing some evidence for the differential learning of 
these subsequences. The Different group showed a significant interaction at test, 
F(3,138) = 5.13, p = .010, MSE = .005, ηp2 = .100; but not training, F(3,138) = 2.86, p 
= .078, MSE = .024, ηp2 = .059.  
 
 
Figure 3.12. RASRN simulation (Simulation 7) of Experiment 1 showing performance of 
Experiment (filled bars) and Control (open bars) networks on all four subsequences in Same 
(black) and Different (blue) rules across training (left panel) and test blocks (right panel). Error 
bars show standard error. 
 
3.6.2.3. Discussion 
The RASRN, with the simple addition of units representing the SRT task, was able to 
simulate the differences that the AugSRN could not. By introducing the current stimuli 
in the RASRN, the model was able to experience the SR contingencies that participants 
were exposed to. Therefore, the conditions required to simulate human learning on this 
task combine competition between sequential contingencies; transient trial-by-trial 
contingencies, and stimulus-contingencies. Whilst SR contingencies were not 
previously instantiated in SRN and AugSRN simulations; as they are not required to 
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produce sequence learning, it seems they are required to accurately simulate human 
subsequence learning and effects.  
 
There are issues associated with this model still however, specifically including the 
variability between and within each model. Whilst networks have hidden unit 
activations and weights reset to represent new participants, the error associated with 
each network is incredibly small, as well as the variance across blocks. Also the model 
does not capture the dip in performance seen in human participants between the two 
sessions. Whilst these issues remain (and are discussed in more detail in Chapter 7) the 
RASRN demonstrates cue competition between the SR contingencies and sequence 
learning. This produces less learning of the Same rule, and more learning of the 
Different rule in line with the sequence learning effects produced by humans. The 
sequential effects of the RASRN also follow those of humans, with the Same rule 
sequences showing higher MSE difference scores in control networks, compared to 
below zero MSE difference scores for Different rule control networks. Therefore, the 
model provides strong evidence that extending the associative account to encompass 
these realistic stimulus conditions provides the best explanation of the subsequence 
learning effects demonstrated in Experiment 1. 
 
3.6.3. Simulation 8: RASRN simulation of Jones and McLaren (2009) 
Further issues arose, however, when the RASRN was used to simulate the Jones and 
McLaren (2009) task as outlined in section 3.2.2. The results are shown alongside Jones 
and McLaren’s in Figure 3.13, where it is clear that the model now demonstrates the 
sequential effects observed in Experiment 1. Hence, whilst learning of XXX does not 
occur, and learning of XYY and YXX is still apparent, the learning of YXY has 
disappeared and the model has reversed the sequential effects observed for XYY and 
YXY. It is a concern then that the model does not perfectly model both sets of data 
within these parameters. This may be due to the variability in human performance and 
as such, using only these parameters, it is not possible to say that the RASRN cannot 
reproduce the results of Jones and McLaren (2009).  
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Figure 3.13. MSE difference scores for the post-training test phase of RASRN 
simulation 8 taken from the current work (left panel) and the human error data taken 
from Jones and McLaren (2009).  
 
The success of the AugSRN in modeling Jones and McLaren’s (2009) results on a 
similar task, and the RASRN’s success in modeling the human data from Experiment 1 
do not provide opposing theories about the development of learning under incidental 
condtions. Both tasks were run independently on different human samples, and whilst I 
do not dispute that the sequence learning effects were reliable, both remain a single 
study and only one demonstration of these effects. It would be ill advised to suggest the 
experimental or computational investigations thus far can reach a definitive conclusion 
about the exact mechanisms and parameters within which to simulate learning, and I 
suggest that further work using the sequences in both tasks is needed to establish better 
how a model could account for both sets of data. 
 
The subsequence effects presented in Experiments 1 and 2 suggest that a far bigger 
preference may be given to responding to YXY than is indicated by Jones and McLaren 
(2009) and that participants are faster (but less accurate) on YYX over XYY. As 
discussed in Chapter 2, the discrepancy between the Control groups in these two studies 
is the issue here, as both were conducted under the same conditions with control groups 
trained in similar ways, therefore further studies are required to ascertain the nature of 
these sequential effects and determine whether the length of training or monetary 
reward-feedback involved in the Jones and McLaren (2009) study was the cause of 
these differences, and to ascertain the reliability of these sequential effects.  
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3.7. General Discussion 
Chapter 3 has discussed the construction of the AugSRN and its successful simulation 
of the Jones and McLaren (2009) human sequence learning results. However, both the 
same parameters and a variety of alternate versions of the model were unable to 
simulate the results of Experiment 1, as the model could never produce a simulation that 
demonstrated significantly greater learning of the Different rule over the Same rule. The 
model was optimised using a bounded search of the parameter space, with random 
starting points and a number of possible model architectures used. Still no model could 
produce a simulation of the human between-subject result that the Same rule was not 
learned as well as the Different rule.  
 
Considering the subsequence effects observed in Experiment 1 in more detail, the cue 
competition account offered by Jones and McLaren (2009) did not fit the pattern of 
results as there was some learning of the subsequence XXX, as well as an advantage for 
the YXY subsequence in Control groups. This account can, however, explain these 
results if the task is represented in its entirety. The SRN and AugSRN involve one trial 
predicting the next, and do not account for the stimulus-response (SR) relationships that 
occur in the SRT task between the stimulus on-screen and the response required and 
made. However, humans experience these contingencies and their presence in the task 
may come to block learning about t – 2 when t – 2 is the same (Same rule) as t, as these 
stimuli share the same stimulus-response association. 
 
The RASRN, a version of the AugSRN adapted to include these current stimulus units, 
replicated the results of Experiment 1 and suggests that this account of the relationship 
between trial order and current on-screen SR contingencies can account for the 
incidental learning of humans on this SRT task. This suggests that humans are both 
sensitive to SR contingencies, and that these contingencies can compete and interact 
with sequential contingencies and trial-by-trial effects. That humans are sensitive to SR 
contingencies is, of course, not a novel proposal but the interaction between current on-
screen stimuli and trial-by-trial effects and sequential contingencies has not, to the best 
of my knowledge, been considered nor simulated. Traditional models of associative 
learning consider SR or stimulus-outcome links on a trial by trial basis, irrespective of 
any sequential effects or influence of serial trial order. Models of sequence learning do 
not require SR associations to learn sequences, and therefore do not include them in 
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general, which does not accurately represent the task conditions (Destrebecqz & 
Cleeremans, 2003) nor does this account for the possible associations that may occur.  
 
Whilst other models have included representations of the current trial stimuli 
(Cleeremans, 1993; Destrebecqz & Cleeremans, 2003), these have not included simply 
providing the model with these inputs (both t and t – 1 when predicting t). In these cases, 
t was introduced to the model as part of a separate, non-recurrent learning system. This 
poses a fundamental question about how we believe human learning occurs: is it always 
recurrent, or only sometimes recurrent? It might seem obvious that stimulus-response 
associations do not require recurrence in order to be learned, but to take this position 
would be to suggest that certain stimuli are treated differently by our learning system. If 
we simply presuppose that humans immediately deploy recurrence to stimuli that follow 
a sequence, but do not do these for other stimuli (e.g. Cleeremans, 1997) this suggests 
that participants can intrinsically recognise sequential stimuli and have volitional 
control over whether recurrence occurs. This seems highly unlikely, and therefore there 
must be some reason to propose that sequential information is learned by a separate, 
recurrent system over and above the fact that it involves sequential contingencies. 
Beyond giving a human or model simply one trial, all stimuli, whether they have 
sequential contingencies or not are presented in some order one after the other. 
 
Separating sequential and non-sequential stimuli in terms of recurrence could be 
explained if recurrence is taken to represent some characteristic of the sequence that is 
fed back to a participant that is not true of other stimuli. This may be explained then by 
some motor response element of sequence learning, as whilst stimuli are responded to, 
the recurrent loop may represent feedback about the sequence of motor responses made. 
This may reflect the motor cortex loop with the basal ganglia (Middleton & Strick, 
2000), that has been implicated in impaired sequence learning when damaged (Siegert 
et al., 2006). However, responses alone are not necessary for sequence learning to occur, 
and participants are able to learn sequences of stimuli that involve no responding 
(Dennis, Howard, & Howard, 2006). It is generally accepted that the motor component 
of SRT task learning is dominant (e.g. Bischoff-Grethe, Goedert, Willingham, & 
Grafton, 2004; Abrahamse et al., 2012). The simulation results of this chapter and the 
evidence provided by Experiment 1 support Willingham’s (1997) suggestion: that both 
motor and perceptual elements are important.  
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If recursion were only applicable to motor actions then the application of recurrent 
models in the study of language (e.g. Elman, 1990; Dienes, 1992) would be 
compromised. This seems unlikely as language itself is highly recursive in structure 
(Rohmeir, Dienes, Gao, Fu, 2014). There may be some other a priori reason for 
assuming that only certain, sequential stimuli are learned by a recurrent network; but I 
suggest that requiring multiple learning systems that separate stimulus-response and 
trial-by-trial learning is not parsimonious. Further to this, the results of Experiment 1 
suggest that learning about these stimulus-response contingencies interacts with 
sequence learning in a way that provides strong evidence for these stimuli being 
processed by the same system. 
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Chapter 4. Concurrent stimuli and sequence 
learning: Testing a prediction of the RASRN  
 
In this chapter I examine the influence of the two sets of input now included in the 
RASRN, and how the RASRN predicts that human sequence learning will be affected 
by variations in these inputs. Chapter 3 demonstrated that both previous responses and 
current on-screen stimuli were found to be required to produce a simulation of human 
learning in Chapter 2, and therefore the RASRN was used to predict how human 
learning would progress when the influence of current stimuli or previous responses 
were increased. Two new units with activation values that matched the current stimulus 
units were activated in the same sequential pattern as the current element in the 
sequence being predicted (Current), the previous element in the sequence (Previous), or 
were simply random (Random). The sequential contingencies used were those of the 
Same group in Experiment 1. The RASRN showed that sequence learning was, if 
anything reduced in the Current condition relative to the Previous condition, suggesting 
that the increased influence of stimulus-response associations interfered with learning of 
the Same rule sequential structure. A behavioural experiment was conducted to test this 
prediction using a modified version of Experiment 1, with all participants performing 
on Same rule sequences to the same two-choice SRT task. The manipulation of interest 
was that two new stimuli were introduced: either a high or low tone played concurrently 
with the appearance of the on-screen response stimuli (Experiment 3); or yellow or 
purple circle fills within the response stimuli instead of the white stimuli used in 
Experiment 1 (Experiment 4). In both experiments I found that participants learned 
more about the Same rule in the Previous condition over the Current condition, 
following the prediction of the RASRN. Human learning in the Random new stimuli 
condition, however, did not match up with model predictions, nor did the raw 
performance scores on consistent and inconsistent subsequences, suggesting that whilst 
additional stimuli do indeed influence sequence learning, this may not be fully captured 
by the RASRN. The results of Experiment 3 and 4 suggest that an additional cue may 
potentiate sequence learning of the Same rule if it provides information about the 
previous element of the sequence.  
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4.1. Introduction 
The RASRN in Chapter 3 showed evidence of being able to simulate human learning 
under incidental conditions. The SRN, AugSRN and the parameter space searched 
between these models were unable to account for the advantage for learning of Different 
rule sequential contingencies over Same rule contingencies. The AugSRN was able to 
simulate Jones and McLaren’s (2009) data, but this sequential rule relied on 
contingencies where both the t – 2 and t – 1 were involved in predicting t. The RASRN 
represents both the between trial contingencies that participants learn, as well as the 
stimulus-response contingencies present on every trial. Instead of using the SRN to train 
the current stimulus predicting the next response, the RASRN was altered so that a 
representation of the previous (correct) response made as well as the stimuli on screen 
are both involved in predicting the outcome of a given trial.  
 
The AugSRN does not include a representation of the current stimuli when predicting 
that trial, which suggests that regardless of the current stimuli that are on-screen or 
presented to participants; a prediction based on the previous trial will have been made. 
The RASRN, however, includes such a representation of stimuli and therefore stimulus-
response contingencies can develop. Even though these are not required to learn 
sequences, their influence on sequence learning may be important. In representing both 
on-screen stimuli and the previous response within the model this changed sequence 
learning in favour of Different rule sequences. As a result, we have some evidence that 
by introducing the influence of these two inputs – the current and previous trial – this 
leads to differences in how well sequences were learned. The RASRN can be used to 
generate a prediction about the influence of these units on human learning and in doing 
so guide the design of experiments with which to test its suitability as a model of 
sequence learning and provide support for the associative account of these processes in 
humans.  
 
To investigate this further, I wanted to examine how increasing the influence of either 
the current stimuli (t) or the previous response (t – 1) might influence the learning of 
sequences and subsequences, as well as sequential effects in humans. Following dual-
stimulus versions of the SRT sequence learning task (Abrahamse et al., 2012; Robertson 
& Pascual-Leone, 2001) the model was altered to contain two further input units to 
represent two hypothetical new stimuli, which were given the same activation value as 
the current stimulus units with the idea that these would occur at the same time. These 
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inputs (or stimuli) could then be given corresponding activations to either the current 
stimulus (Current) or the previous response (Previous) in a sequence, as a between-
network (or between-subject) comparison. A random new stimulus condition was also 
simulated. Therefore, these new stimuli could be congruent (Current) or random 
(Previous, Random) with respect to the current response, as well as following the 
trained sequence (Current, Previous) or not (Random). 
 
Concurrent stimuli in the Current group that have a perfect relationship with another 
stimulus are defined by Abrahamse et al. (2012) as redundant, as there is already a cue 
(location) that can be used to learn about sequences. Robertson and Pascual-Leone 
(2001) were perhaps the first authors to present such a redundant dual-stimulus 
sequence learning task and provided evidence that participants learned more when two 
correlated and concurrently presented stimuli (locations each with a specific colour) 
followed a sequence than when just locations or colours were presented.  Abrahamse et 
al. (2012) suggested that Robertson and Pascual-Leone’s (2001) result was a 
consequence of using different sequences across dual and single stimulus conditions. In 
a replication they found that no improvement in performance occurs in the dual-
stimulus group and therefore suggest that these concurrent stimuli are not learned about 
and have no influence on the task (Abrahamse et al., 2012). 
 
The previous two chapters in this thesis predict instead that stimulus-response 
associations will (differentially) affect sequence learning, even if they are ‘redundant’. 
As human learning was better simulated by the RASRN when the current stimuli 
experienced on the trial were introduced, in Chapter 3 I discussed the possibility that 
stimulus-response associations interfered with learning of the Same rule to a greater 
extent because of the shared stimulus-response mappings between t – 2 and t (the trials 
that determine the probabilistic sequential structure). In the dual-stimulus task presented 
by Abrahamse et al. (2012), which used a 12 element second order conditional (SOC) 
sequence, which involved no first order repeats and only one mapping (2-1-2) that 
involved two of the same stimuli. It is possible, therefore that stimulus-response 
associations may not have been able to interfere with such a structure.  
 
Consequently, in this chapter the effect of additional stimuli on sequence learning will 
be put under greater scrutiny, with the detailed pattern of stimulus-response and 
sequence learning investigated through the use of subsequences and a simple 
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probabilistic two-choice structure as used in the previous two chapters in this thesis. 
Based on the changes to the AugSRN discussed in Chapter 3 as a result of the human 
pattern of responding found in Chapter 2, the role of current and previous trial 
information in sequence learning is compared. I intend to use the predictions of the 
RASRN regarding stimulus-response associations to design and then run a sequence 
learning SRT task with human participants that involve some additional stimuli with the 
aim of testing the suitability of the RASRN as an associative explanation of human 
learning. 
 
4.2. Simulation 9: A prediction of the RASRN 
Before conducting any human experimental work, the RASRN was used to simulate 
possible human performance in order to produce an a priori prediction regarding the 
effect of additional stimuli that followed the current stimulus (t) or previous response (t 
– 1). As mentioned previously, with the aim of matching a possible human experiment, 
the activation of the two new stimulus units would match the current stimulus activation 
values (0 and 0.1) and these stimuli would therefore be presented concurrently. Three 
network simulations were run: one where current stimulus units and new stimulus units 
were entirely matched (the Current New Stimulus condition), and so each time the left 
current stimulus unit was activated, so was the corresponding one of the new stimulus 
units. The second condition (Previous condition) involved the matched activation of 
each new stimulus unit and the previous response units (although the new stimulus units 
were activated at 0 and 0.1 rather than 0 and 0.75). Therefore, if the left previous 
response was activated, so was the corresponding new stimulus unit. A further set of 
networks were trained on randomly activated new stimuli, with each unit activated an 
equal amount of times but with no relationship to either current stimuli or previous 
response activations. Whilst I ran both Different and Same rules on Experimental and 
Control networks, I will concentrate on the Same rule Experimental condition as this is 
where we expected (and found) stimulus-response associations to have the biggest 
effect. 
 
4.2.1. Simulation details 
4.2.1.1. Model construction 
The model (see Figure 4.1) comprised 2 input units that represented the required 
response (left or right) on the previous trial (t - 1) in a two-choice SRT task which are 
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shown on the bottom right of Figure 4.1. Two further input units represented the two 
on-screen response stimuli (left or right) that participants were expected to respond to 
on the current trial (t). The model differed from that described in Chapter 3 with the 
inclusion of 2 further input units, which represented the new stimuli that I added to the 
task, representing the new stimuli in this task. These are pictured in Figure 4.1 as a high 
or low tone (Experiment 3) or two different colours (Experiment 4). A further 20 input 
units acted as context units and a single bias unit that was always activated to 1 also 
made up the input layer. 20 hidden units and 2 output units (to represent the response 
required to trial t, left or right) made up the next two layers of the model.  
 
 
Figure 4.1. RASRN architecture for the simulation of Experiments 3 and 4. The model has 
input that comprises of the previous response made, as well as the current on-screen stimuli in 
the task. This involves a left or right on-screen response stimulus as well as either a high (Hi) or 
low (Lo) tone (Experiment 3) or the colour of the response stimulus itself was either purple or 
yellow (Experiment 4). Context units and a bias unit make up the remainder of the input, from 
which activation is fed forwards to a hidden layer of units and again to output units. 
 
All of the simulation details were as described for the RASRN in Simulations 7 and 8 in 
Chapter 3. Learning rates were 0.2 and 0.5 for slow and fast weights, respectively. The 
bias unit was always activated to 1, whilst the other input units had different activation 
values. These were set according to the length of time the inputs have been available, to 
add some crude approximation to the time course of each trial. Therefore, having just 
occurred before a response is required, the current stimuli (including both the on-screen 
response stimuli and the new stimuli) were given an activation of 0 (off) or 0.1 (on). 
The previous response units were given a higher activation value (0.75 for on, 0 for off) 
as the input from this response has been around for longer. The context units, which are 
a copy of the last trial’s hidden units, represent the internal representation of the task, 
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and were updated before the occurrence of a response on t – 1, and therefore have the 
highest activation value, 1.3 times the hidden unit values on the previous trial and 0 for 
off. The weighted connections between these units and the hidden layer involve 
activation and error correction as described in Chapter 3 (see section 3.2.1). 
 
4.2.1.2. Design 
Following the experiments described in Chapter 2, the training was to last 35 blocks of 
120 trials, with 5 blocks of test: totaling 4200 training trials and 600 test trials. Training 
blocks comprised of Same rule subsequences, constructed in the same way as described 
in Chapter 2 (see section 2.2.1.3) with the same contingency (two out of three trials 
followed Same rule across training). Test blocks were made up of pseudorandom trial 
order.  
 
New stimuli. The key manipulation in this study was in the introduction of two new 
stimuli, which in the model were represented simply as two new ‘current stimulus’ 
input units. The relationship that the stimuli had to the current trial (t) differed, 
according to the group networks were assigned to: Current, Previous or Random (see 
Table 4.1 for the design). One of the two new stimuli would occur on each trial and 
each stimulus overall occurred equally within and across all blocks, regardless of group. 
In the Random group either stimulus was likely on either L or R trials, and therefore 
there was no relationship between the new stimuli and the response stimuli locations 
throughout training and at test.  
 
Table 4.1. Design of Simulation 9, with 24 networks run in each of the three conditions. 
 New Stimulus Contingency with response stimulus at: 
  t t - 1 
Current = !"#$%!∨!(!) 100% 50% 
Previous = !"#$%!∨!(! − 1) 50% 100% 
Random random 50% 50% 
 
The Current group experienced a new stimulus that had a 100% contingency with the 
current trial: for example, on every R trial new stimulus A occurred, and on every L 
trial the new stimulus B occurred. This relationship occurred throughout training and 
test. The Previous group new stimulus had a 100% contingency with the previous 
response stimulus, so if t – 1 had been an R trial, trial t might be an R or L trial but new 
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stimulus A would always occur. Similarly new stimulus B would always occur at trial t 
when t – 1 was an L trial. In the Previous group case the new stimulus had no 
relationship whatsoever with the current trial, as A and B occur with equal likelihood on 
an R or L trial. Therefore, this matches the Random group somewhat in terms of what 
participants experience on each trial, as this Previous group offers no immediate 
information to participants about the required response.  
 
The previous response (t – 1) is itself not required in the Same rule (predicted from t – 
2), and it might be predicted to have no positive influence over learning as it simply 
adds no additional direct information about the current trial. Whilst the Current group 
might seem intuitively like the new stimuli and offer additional salience or activation to 
the sequence of trials experienced, the 100% contingency between new stimuli and 
current response-stimuli could encourage simply stimulus-response learning and may go 
some way to block learning about sequences, as shown in Chapter 3. 
 
4.2.1.3. Simulation procedure 
The RASRN was run over 72 networks, each one with hidden unit activations reset and 
weights between units randomized between -.5 and .5, to represent the participants that I 
intended to run on Experiment 3. All of these networks received training on Same rule 
sequences and pseudorandom blocks at test. I also ran a further 72 Control networks 
that received pseudorandom training and test blocks which are presented in Figure 4.2 
but not analysed here. In all regards, but for the new stimulus units, the simulation 
followed the RASRN details as in Chapter 3 for the Experimental Group.  
 
4.2.2. Results 
4.2.2.1. Same rule learning 
MSEs were taken as an index of RT performance on t + 1 (see Chapter 3, section 3.2.1) 
and a difference score calculated, taking MSE on subsequences consistent with the 
Same rule away from inconsistent MSE. An ANOVA was conducted on the 
Experimental data only with Block, New Stimulus and Subsequence as factors across 
training and test separately. Control network results were not analysed here as 
participants in the following experiments were all trained under Experimental 
conditions and this analysis attempts to provide the basis for the human experimental 
design. They are shown in Figure 4.2 for a visual comparison only to demonstrate that 
the following New Stimulus effects discussed do have an effect on sequence learning 
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and not just performance. Whilst the Experimental networks show similar performance 
across the first twenty blocks of the experiment (see Figure 4.2), after this a difference 
emerges between the groups (main effect of New Stimulus) that is significant across 
both training, F(2,69) = 13.6, p < .001, MSE = .0061 ηp2 = .282, and at test, F(2,69) = 
353, p < .001, MSE = .017, ηp2 = .911.  
 
 
Figure 4.2. MSE difference scores for RASRN simulation of new stimulus task for 
Experimental (filled diamonds) and Control (open diamonds) networks with Current (black), 
Previous (blue) and Random (grey) new stimuli conditions across training and test blocks. All 
networks were trained on Same rule sequences. Note that Control networks are not analysed in 
this section and are provided as visual data here for comparison. Error bars show standard error.  
 
Analysed further through a series of Bonferroni corrected pairwise comparisons, the 
Current group perform significantly worse than the Random group across training, 
F(1,69) = 19.5, p < .001, MSE = .001, ηp2 = .221; and test, F(1,69) = 524, p < .001, MSE 
= .001, ηp2 = .884. The Current group also perform worse than the Previous group 
across training, F(1,69) = 21.1, p < .001, MSE = .001, ηp2 = .234; and significantly 
worse at test, F(1,69) = 534, p < .001, MSE = .001, ηp2 = .886.  
 
The RASRN provides evidence that the Current group learns these sequences the worst, 
with Previous and Random sequence learning at roughly the same level. Before 
exploring this result further, we can see that the networks showed a large effect of block 
across training, F(34,2346) = 673, p < .001, MSE = .022, ηp2 = .907, which reflects the 
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learning about the stimulus-response contingencies. In all three conditions the RASRN 
is able to learn the perfectly predictive relationship between stimulus and response, and 
this begins to overshadow sequence learning as MSE difference scores trend towards 
zero. The block effect further interacts with New Stimulus, F(68,2346) = 58.1, p < .001, 
MSE = .022, ηp2 = .628. This demonstrates the emergence of the New Stimulus 
difference across training, which was stable at test, as while there is an overall Block 
effect, F(4,276) = 512, p < .001, MSE = .001, ηp2 = .881, this does not interact with New 
Stimulus, F(8,276) = 1.38, p = .231, MSE = .001, ηp2 = .038.  
 
To further investigate these relationships the raw MSE for consistent and inconsistent 
subsequences are presented in Figure 4.3. These show evidence of a trend towards 
better responding regardless of whether they are consistent or inconsistent, providing 
evidence for the role of stimulus-response learning occurring throughout the simulation. 
As we can see, as the Current New Stimulus trained networks experience a higher 
stimulus-response contingency: this results in greater stimulus-response learning 
compared to the other two groups and consequently less sequence learning overall.  
 
 
Figure 4.3. MSE for RASRN simulation of new stimulus task for Current (black), Previous 
(blue) and Random (grey) new stimuli conditions across training and test blocks for consistent 
(filled diamonds) and inconsistent (open diamonds). All networks were trained on Same rule 
sequences (Experimental). Error bars (mostly obscured by the markers) show standard error. 
 
As a result, the RASRN predicts that when humans perform the task that the Current 
group will learn less about sequences due to this cue-competition. Of further interest is 
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the absence of a difference between the Previous and Random groups, as this suggests 
that random noise and additional activations that represent the previous stimulus 
element have the same (or lack of) effect on sequence learning. This suggests that by 
disrupting the stimulus-response associations formed on each trial the model is able to 
learn more, as the overshadowing effect of stimulus-response learning on sequence 
learning is reduced. 
 
4.2.2.2. Subsequence learning and effects 
Subsequence also has a large effect on the networks across training, F(3,207) = 798, p 
< .001, MSE = .031, ηp2 = .920, and approached significance at test, F(3,207) = 2.55, p 
= .082, MSE = .002, ηp2 = .036, shown in Figure 4.4. Across training this did not interact 
with New Stimulus, F(6,207) = .317, p = .817, MSE = .031, ηp2 = .009, with networks 
responding to RRR and LLL better than RLR and LRL. At test, the subsequence effect 
interacted with New Stimulus, F(6,207) = 3.83, p = .005, MSE = .002, ηp2 = .100, as the 
Current group produced greater learning of subsequences RLR and LRL relative to 
RRR and LLL, with the other groups showing no difference between subsequences.  
 
 
Figure 4.4. MSE difference scores for subsequences XXX (RRR and LLL collapsed, yellow 
bars) and YXY (RLR and LRL collapsed, green bars) from RASRN simulation of new stimulus 
task for Current, Prevous and Random new stimuli conditions across training blocks (left panel) 
and test blocks (right panel). All networks were trained on Same rule sequences. Error bars 
show standard error. 
 
Whilst all three groups of networks show a strong initial preference for the XXX (RRR 
and LLL) subsequences, it seems that this disappears by test as networks are able to 
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learn both the subsequence and the stimulus-response relationships are able to begin to 
block the influence of trial-by-trial effects on the YXY (RLR and LRL) subsequences. 
As the Current networks receive more activation of these stimulus-response 
relationships than Previous and Random networks, this effect is consequently increased.  
 
Block also interacted with Subsequence across both training, F(102,7038) = 321, p 
< .001, MSE = .011, ηp2 = .823, and test, F(12,828) = 2.01, p = .041, MSE = .001, ηp2 
= .028, see Figure 4.5. This follows from the Subsequence by New Stimulus interaction, 
as for all groups across training it is easy to see that the subsequences RLR and LRL 
increase in performance to above that of RRR and LLL, reflecting the increasing 
influence of stimulus-response associations for all new stimuli, that was shown to be 
larger then at test for the Current group. However, the interaction between all three 
variables was not significant across training, F(204,7038) = .939, p = .605, MSE = .011, 
ηp2 = .027, nor test, F(24,828) = .769, p = .729, MSE = .001, ηp2 = .022, suggesting that 
whilst there was an interaction with Subsequence and New Stimulus at test this did not 
change across the blocks.  
 
 
Figure 4.5. MSE difference scores for all four trained subsequences: RRR, LLL (yellow lines), 
RLR and LRL (green lines) from RASRN simulation of new stimulus task for all Experimental 
networks, regardless of new stimuli condition across training and test blocks. All networks were 
trained on Same rule sequences. Error bars show standard error. 
 
4.2.3. Discussion 
The RASRN  predicts that participants on this task will learn least about sequences in 
the Current group, with the Previous group and Random group producing the most 
Same rule sequence learning. This suggests that, if participants are learning using the 
166 Chapter 4: Concurrent stimuli and sequence learning 
!
mechanisms involved in the RASRN, that increasing the salience of the current on 
screen stimuli (the Current group) does not improve learning of these sequences relative 
to the within-subject inconsistent subsequence control (as in Robertson & Pascual-
Leone, 2001), it will in fact damage it. An intuitive, performance based account of this 
task may propose that discriminable stimuli, congruent with the stimuli that you are 
already learning would be preferred over incongruent, potentially distracting or noise 
providing stimuli that have no relation to the current response required. However, as the 
networks in the Current group are given double the amount of activation applicable to 
training a simple, 100% contingency between units and output, the model starts to learn 
that these units reliably predict the outcome in such a way that begins to overpower the 
trained sequential contingency (the Same rule). Therefore, additional concurrent stimuli 
may be neither redundant nor helpful as the associative account predicts that stimulus-
response learning can interfere with sequence learning (as demonstrated in Chapters 2 
and 3 of this thesis) and that the Current group will be worse at learning the Same rule 
sequences. 
 
Interestingly, this effect of additional stimuli is restricted to the Same rule subsequences, 
as running this task on the Different rule produces no difference between the New 
Stimuli networks (see Figure 4.6). As the learning of the Different rule is stronger than 
for the Same rule in the RASRN, this could be protecting the model from the learning 
of current stimulus-response contingencies. This could also suggest that the learning 
effect of the New Stimulus is restricted to the subsequences found in the Same group, or 
that it interacts with this rule in some specific way. This suggestion falls in line with the 
results from modelling work in Chapter 3, as the introduction of the current stimulus 
units led to a reduction in Same rule learning, allowing the Different rule learning 
advantage observed in Experiment 1 to appear. In line with suggestions in the previous 
chapter, the Current networks trained on the Same rule have a perfect relationship 
between current stimuli and the required response; as well as the t – 2 stimulus location 
that is used in the learning of the subsequence rule. This provides further evidence that 
these ‘same’ relationships between t – 2 and t are harder to learn with increased 
interference from stimulus-response associations.  
 




Figure 4.6. MSE difference scores for RASRN simulation of Different rule sequences for 
Current (black), Previous (blue) and Random (grey) new stimuli conditions across training and 
test blocks. Error bars show standard error. 
 
4.3. Experiment 3: Tones and Sequences 
To investigate the predictions of the RASRN the task outlined for the simulations was 
run on human participants, with the expectation that those participants experiencing two 
new stimuli that are entirely congruent with the existing response stimuli in the two-
choice SRT task will show worse performance than when these new stimuli correspond 
with the previous trial or when they are simply random. The new stimuli chosen for the 
task were two tones, played through headphones for 50 ms with the onset of the on-




72 participants (aged between 18 and 48 [M = 21.7]; 51 female and 21 male) were 
recruited from undergraduate students at the University of Exeter and were awarded £10 
for participation. Participants provided informed consent prior to taking part in two 
sessions lasting roughly one hour each. Participants were randomly allocated into one of 
the three New Stimulus conditions, Current, Previous or Random. 
 
4.3.1.2. Materials and stimuli 
The experiment was run on an Apple iMac with PsychToolbox for MatLab software. 
Participants were seated roughly 50 cm from the screen, which contained two white 
circle outlines on a black background throughout the task. These white circle outlines 
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were 19 mm in diameter and positioned vertically in line with the screen centre, and 22 
mm either to the left or the right of the screen centre horizontally. The response 
stimulus was a white filled circle (18.5 mm diameter) that was placed within one of the 
two circle outlines, giving the white circle outline the appearance of lighting up or 
filling in. Participants were required to press the spatially compatible ‘x’ and ‘>’ key 
presses on a QWERTY keyboard to the left or right response stimulus, respectively. The 




The experiment was a two-choice SRT task comprising two sessions of twenty blocks 
each. Each of these blocks contained 120 trials, with all twenty blocks of the first 
session and first fifteen blocks of the second session acting as training; and the final five 
blocks acting as test. All participants received training blocks where response stimuli 
followed Same rule sequential contingencies. This was trained according to a two thirds 
contingency, as described in Chapter 2 (section 2.2.1.3) with participants able to predict 
the location of a response stimulus on trial t as the same location as t – 2 on two out of 
three trials. This means that the triplets RRR, RLR, LLL and LRL were twice as likely 
to occur as RRL, RLL, LLR and LRR. Across the five test blocks all participants 
experienced a pseudorandom response stimuli trial order, as described in Chapter 2 (see 
section 2.2.1.3).  
 
Tone stimuli. Regardless of the group participants were assigned to, on every trial a high 
or low tone played when the response stimuli appeared on screen. Which tone (high or 
low) occurred depended on the group participants were assigned to. As described above 
in Simulation 9, the stimuli either occurred with a 100% contingency determined by the 
current trial (Current); a 100% contingency determined by the previous trial (Previous); 
or randomly (Random). High and low tones occurred in all groups with equal frequency 
and in the Random group occurred with equal frequency on both R and L trials, as these 
were arranged by randomising 30 high and 30 low tones over the 60 R trials in a block, 
and 30 high and 30 low tones over the 60 L trials in a block. The Random group 
therefore experienced no contingency between the tones and any response stimulus in 
the task. 
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The Current and Previous group tones were constructed according to the response 
stimulus sequence in place. Across training and test the tones had the same relationship 
with the response stimuli in these two groups. In the Current group on every trial there 
was a perfect correlation between the response stimulus and the tone frequency: for 
example, a high tone occurred on every R trial and a low tone occurred on every L trial. 
Tone assignment was counterbalanced across participants (half experienced R = High, L 
= Low; the other half R = Low, L = High).  
 
The Previous group was arranged in much the same way, with a 100% contingency 
between a response stimulus and tone frequency, but the response stimulus in question 
was the previous trial. For example, if the previous trial was an R, the tone would 
always have a high frequency, regardless of whether the current response stimulus was 
L or R. This was also counterbalanced, with participants experiencing either R(t – 1) = 
High and L(t – 1) = Low, or R(t – 1) = Low and L(t – 1) = High. The Previous group 
then experienced no contingency between the response stimulus location and the tone 
frequency at t; but a 100% contingency between the response stimuli at t – 1 with the 
tone frequency at t.  
 
4.3.1.4. Procedure 
After obtaining informed consent, participants were instructed to simply respond as 
quickly and accurately as possible to the stimuli, and that the task was investigating 
how practice had an effect on peoples’ speed and accuracy of responding to simple 
stimuli. Participants were told that at the same time as the stimuli came up on screen, a 
tone would sound through the headphones. They were instructed to listen to these tones 
but that they should respond to the on screen stimuli. No mention was made of any 
contingencies, relationships, sequences or learning. Participants were reminded of these 
instructions at the beginning of the second session. 
 
At the beginning of each block participants were instructed to press any key to start. 
Each trial began with an inter-trial interval of 500 ms where a black background with 
two white circle outlines was presented. The response stimulus (the left or right white 
circle) would then appear on screen and simultaneously either the high or low frequency 
tone would sound for 50 ms. The response stimulus would remain on screen until either 
the participant made a keypress response or the trial timed out after 4000 ms from the 
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presentation of the response stimulus. RTs were measured from the onset of the 
response stimulus. If participants pressed an incorrect key, or the trial timed out, the 
computer issued a low beep sound, which was qualitatively different to the 50msec tone 
stimulus. The procedure in all other ways directly followed that for Experiment 1, 
described in section 2.2.1.4.  
 
4.3.2. Results 
As for Experiments 1 and 2, average RTs and proportion of errors were calculated for 
each participant across training blocks and test for each subsequence. RTs were only 
taken for correct trials that did not follow an error. Errors were calculated as the 
proportion of trials on which participants made the incorrect key-press response (i.e. 
they pressed x instead of > for a right response stimulus trial) and not those trials that 
timed out or involved an incorrect key-press of any other key on the keyboard. The first 
two trials of each test block and first three trials of each training block were not 
included in the analysis, as these could not be assigned a subsequence. Training average 
RTs were weighted across response stimulus location at t – 3, and, as this leads to 
missing values averages for each subsequence, were calculated over two blocks (which 
constitute an Epoch). This number was used instead of the 5 blocks in Experiment 1 and 
2 in order to produce a more sensitive measure of the changing influence of the tones 
across the experiment, but this meant that block 35 (the final training block) was 
dropped from the analysis. Difference scores were calculated, taking performance on 
consistent subsequences (RRR, RLR, LLL, LRL) from inconsistent subsequences (RRL, 
RLL, LLR, LRR, respectively) and higher scores therefore indicate better performance 
on trained consistent subsequences over inconsistent subsequences. See section 2.2.2 
for more details.  
 
An ANOVA was performed on RT and error difference scores across training and test. 
Training data compared the seventeen training Epochs; New Stimulus (Current; 
Previous or Random); and Subsequence (RRR, RLR, LLL and LRL). Test data was 
analysed for differences between the five Blocks; New Stimulus; and Subsequence. All 
within-subject main effects and interactions are reported with p values that correct for a 
departure from sphericity (Huynh-Feldt) with the unadjusted degrees of freedom. 
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4.3.2.1. Same rule learning 
There was a main effect of New Stimulus across training RT difference scores, F(2,69) 
= 3.88, p = .025, MSE = 21248, ηp2 = .101, and errors, F(2,69) = 5.58, p = .006, MSE 
= .611, ηp2 = .139; as well as in errors at test, F(2,69) = 4.86, p = .011, MSE = .191, ηp2 
= .124; but not RTs, F(2,69) = 1.44, p = .245, MSE = 7391, ηp2 = .040, see Figure 4.7. In 
all cases (training and test, RTs and errors) the Previous group learn numerically more 
than the other groups, which is supported by Bonferroni corrected pairwise comparisons 
comparing Previous and Random groups across training RTs, F(1,69) = 7.08, p = .029, 
MSE = 312, ηp2 = .093; errors, F(1,69) = 11.2, p = .004, MSE = .009, ηp2 = .139; and test 
errors, F(1,69) = 9.59, p = .008, MSE = .010, ηp2 = .122; but not RTs, F(1,69) = 2.84, p 
= .289, MSE = 370, ηp2 = .040.  
 
 
Figure 4.7. RT (top panel) and error (bottom panel) difference scores for participants in 
Experiment 3 for Current (black), Previous (blue) and Random (grey) new stimuli conditions 
(tones) across training and test blocks. All participants were trained on Same rule sequences. 
Error bars show standard error. 
 
Whilst the Previous group was consistently above the Current group, this difference was 
not significant across training RTs, F(1,69) = .381, p > .9, MSE = 312, ηp2 = .005; errors, 
F(1,69) = 3.09, p = .250, MSE = .009, ηp2 = .043; test RTs, F(1,69) = .489, p > .9, MSE 
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= 370, ηp2 = .007; nor errors, F(1,69) = 3.50, p = .197, MSE = .010, ηp2 = .048. Similarly, 
the Current and Random group were not significantly different across training RTs, 
F(1,69) = 4.18, p = .134, MSE = 312, ηp2 = .057; errors, F(1,69) = 2.51, p = .354, MSE 
= .009, ηp2 = .035; test RTs, F(1,69) = .973, p = .982, MSE = 370, ηp2 = .014; or errors, 
F(1,69) = 1.50, p = .674, MSE = .010, ηp2 = .225, although the Current group were 
consistently above the Random group. 
 
Epoch across training had a significant effect in both RTs, F(16,1104) = 11.4, p < .001, 
MSE = 1604, ηp2 = .142, and errors, F(16,1104) = 14.8, p < .001, MSE = .035, ηp2 = .177. 
This provides some evidence of learning across the experiment, although without a 
control group this development in both RT and error performance cannot be attributed 
to a speed-accuracy trade off but could be a familiarisation with the task rather than 
sequence learning. This learning or familiarisation did not show evidence of a 
significant interaction with New Stimulus in RTs, F(16,1104) = 1,11, p = .327, MSE = 
1604, ηp2 = .031; but did in the errors, F(16,1104) = 2.04, p = .004, MSE = .035, ηp2 
= .056, suggesting that learning is occurring more rapidly for the Previous group, as 
each group are performing with the same accuracy in Epoch one, with the difference 
between groups emerging across the two sessions of training. The Current group appear 
to perform higher than the Random group in both RTs and errors for the most part, 
although a post-hoc Scheffé correction between Current and Random groups just falls 
outside of significance, F(2,69) = 2.84, p = .065, MSE =  .013, ηp2 = .076, hence there is 
no conclusive evidence of greater learning in the Current group.  
 
There is support for a learning difference in the last block of test in the errors, with a 
significant main effect of New Stimulus, F(2,69) = 4.84, p = .011, MSE = .088, ηp2 
= .123, which suggests that a learning effect has emerged over training that shows 
greater learning in the Previous group than the Random group in a Bonferroni corrected 
comparison, p = .009. At test there was a main effect of Block only in the error 
difference scores, F(4,276) = 2.57, p = .043, MSE = .023, ηp2 = .036, not RT difference 
scores, F(4,276) = 1.28, p = .282, MSE = 1710, ηp2 = .018. This reflected an overall 
trend towards the extinction of learning (which was not contradicted by the non-
significant direction in the errors), but this again showed little evidence of an interaction 
with New Stimulus in either RTs, F(8,276) = .755, p = .618, MSE = 1710, ηp2 = .021, or 
errors, F(8,276) = .596, p = .767, MSE = .023, ηp2 = .017. 
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It is clear when the data is split into inconsistent and consistent subsequence RTs and 
proportion of errors, see Figure 4.8, that the pattern of results does not follow those 
produced by the RASRN. In errors, responding to consistent subsequences was the 
same across the three New Stimulus groups. Whilst the RASRN performed better on 
inconsistent subsequences in the Current group towards the end of training, the human 
participants show a worsening in performance in errors across training on inconsistent 
subsequences. This produces larger difference scores throughout and RT scores show 
better performance for Current and Previous groups across training on consistent 
sequences, again not a prediction of the model.  
 
 
Figure 4.8. Average RTs and proportion of errors for human performance on new stimulus task 
for Current (black), Previous (blue) and Random (grey) new stimuli conditions across training 
and test blocks for consistent (filled circles and bars) and inconsistent (open circles and bars). 
Error bars show standard error. 
 
4.3.2.2. Subsequence effects and learning 
Subsequence had an effect across training RTs, F(3,207) = 9.69, p < .001, MSE = 15903, 
ηp2 = .123; training errors, F(3,207) = 4.35, p = .017, MSE = .120, ηp2 = .059; test RTs, 
F(3,207) = 3.96, p = .018, MSE = 4998, ηp2 = .054; and test errors, F(3,207) = 3.93, p 
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= .009, MSE = .031, ηp2 = .054, see Figure 4.9. These Subsequence effects demonstrate, 
as in Chapter 2, a speed-accuracy trade off, with better performance on YXY 
subsequences (RLR and LRL compared to RLL and LRR, respectively) than XXX 
subsequences in terms of speed of responding. The opposite is true for accuracy, with 
better performance on XXX subsequences compared to YXY subsequences. These 
Subsequence effects showed no evidence of an interaction with the New Stimulus 
group: relevant interaction for training RTs, F(6,207) = .407, p = .786, MSE = 15903, 
ηp2 = .012; errors, F(6,207) = .627, p = .632, MSE = .120, ηp2 = .018; test RTs, F(6,207) 
= .713, p = .596, MSE = 4998, ηp2 = .020; and errors, F(6,207) = .656, p = .685, MSE 
= .031, ηp2 = .019.  
 
 
Figure 4.9. RT (top panel) and error (bottom panel) difference scores for subsequences for all 
participants, regardless of New Stimulus condition, across training blocks (left panel) and test 
blocks (right panel). Error bars show standard error. 
 
The Subsequence effect did interact with Epoch across training (see Figure 4.10) in the 
RTs, F(48,3312) = 2.30, p < .001, MSE = 2290, ηp2 = .032; but not errors, F(48,3312) = 
1.10, p = .322, MSE = .026, ηp2 = .016, nor with Block at test in RTs, F(12,828) = .797, 
p = .623, MSE = 1528, ηp2 = .011, or errors, F(12,828) = .980, p = .465, MSE = .013, ηp2 
Incidental human sequence learning 
!
175 
= .014. This training RT effect also interacted with New Stimulus, F(96,3312) = 1.40, p 
= .033, MSE = 2290, ηp2 = .039, suggesting that whilst performance on YXY remained 
stable, participants in the Previous group experienced a more rapid learning of 
subsequence XXX than the other groups in the RTs. This interaction between Block, 
New Stimulus and Subsequence was also apparent in RTs at test (see Figure 4.10), 
F(24,828) = 1.44, p = .024, MSE = 1528, ηp2 = .049, suggesting that the subsequence 
XXX suffers from less extinction in the Previous group, as the RT difference score for 
this subsequence only gradually reduces after Block 2, whereas a more dramatic 
reduction in this subsequence is seen in Current and Random groups after Bock 1.  
 
 
Figure 4.10. RT (top panel) and error (bottom panel) difference scores for Current (black lines); 
Previous (blue lines); and Random (grey lines) New Stimulus groups on subsequences XXX 
(RRR and LLL collapsed, filled triangles) and YXY (RLR and LRL collapsed, open circles) 
across training Epochs.  
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4.3.3. Discussion 
Experiment 3 provides evidence that when learning Same rule subsequences under 
incidental conditions, participants who heard two tones that corresponded with the on-
screen response stimuli learned less than when the tones corresponded with the previous 
stimuli. This follows an associative account as the Current group learned less than the 
Previous group, going some way to confirm the predictions of the RASRN. However, 
both raw RT and error performance on consistent and inconsistent subsequences do not 
follow the pattern of results observed in the RASRN. Furthermore, the Random group, 
whose tones had no relationship to current nor previous response stimuli locations, 
performed (numerically) the worst in learning the Same rule sequential contingencies. It 
therefore seems unlikely that participants are performing according to the exact 
predictions of the RASRN. 
 
We can begin our analysis of these results by asking if we see evidence of the RASRN 
prediction that stimulus-response learning is restricting learning in the Current group in 
humans? There is no conclusive answer provided by Experiment 3, as the humans do 
not demonstrate RT and error difference score decreases for any New Stimulus 
conditions across training as they do for all groups in the RASRN; and more rapidly in 
the Current networks. Conversely, participants in Experiment 3 demonstrate increasing 
RT and error difference scores throughout the task, suggesting that the model perhaps 
involves a stronger stimulus-response association than are formed in humans as this is 
not enough to overshadow sequence learning in Experiment 3. This does not suggest 
that stimulus-response associations are not formed, nor that they have no effect; as the 
Current group respond faster and more accurately than Previous and Random groups, 
but yet show numerically reduced learning compared to the Previous group.  
 
The Random group provides the strongest evidence of a departure from the predictions 
of the RASRN, as this group demonstrates the poorest human sequence learning 
compared to model predictions placing it as equal to the Previous group. This suggests 
that the influence of these stimulus-response units is perhaps more complex than the 
RASRN currently predicts; but it is difficult to interpret these differences. The Random 
group may be worse than the Previous and Current groups as it disrupts the sequence, or 
it may have no effect on sequence learning and this may provide evidence that the 
Current and Previous groups both perform better than what we would expect if no dual-
stimuli were present. It is also possible that the presence of an adaptive learning rate 
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may have been adversely effected by the random noise in the Random group. In this 
case the learning rate may have been reduced, subsequently learning about the sequence 
reduced. Further modelling using the RASRN with a set of simulations that have no 
additional stimulus units show precisely the same pattern as the Previous and Random 
groups, therefore the model predicts that performance in both Previous and Random 
cases is not affected by these additional stimuli. The only manipulation that affected 
sequence learning is the enhancement of S-R learning in the Current group; which 
results in less sequence learning. This is investigated further in Experiment 4 where a 
group that has no contingencies was tested to enable a comparison between the three 
existing New Stimulus groups and a no-new stimulus case to attempt to discover in 
which groups we see more or less Same rule learning than we would expect from the 
simple single-stimulus SRT task; hence enabling further understanding of the 
underlying processes and their effect on learning.  
 
A further possibility that may explain the results in Experiment 3 is that the tones 
produce some qualitative difference between Current and the other two groups, which 
produces some unwanted effect. Participants in the Current group often said that they 
used the tone as cues to respond and clearly heard two distinct tones for each side, 
without fail. Participants in the Previous and Random groups tended to say that they 
either attempted to ignore the tones, or did not even recognise that there were two 
different tones, as they thought that these were not part of the task. It seems unlikely 
that this qualitative difference in and of itself caused the differences on the task, as if 
this were the case the Random and Previous group performance would match. It could 
be instead that the influence of the stimulus-response association between each tone and 
response is reduced in some way in the Current group. This could be because 
participants pay less attention to the response stimuli as they are simply responding to 
the tones, or it could be because this condition is simply easier and participants are 
motivated to learn less. On the other hand, participants may have been provided with a 
memory of the previous trials, making the sequence learning task simply easier to do 
and therefore learning may have increased in the Previous group.  
 
An advantage for the Previous and Current groups could also be mediated by the 
counterbalanced tone mappings in the Current group. On each trial regardless of the 
tone counterbalancing in the Previous group there was no contingency between a high 
or low tone and either response stimulus location. As the Current group experienced a 
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relationship on each trial between the tone and response stimulus location, this group 
could have been affected by the spatial-musical association of response codes (SMARC, 
Rusconi, Kwan, Giodano, Umiltà and Butterworth, 2006). It has been shown that people 
are predisposed to perceive sound in certain locations, with high tones appearing higher 
in the space or towards the right, and low tones appearing lower and to left. Participants 
in the Current group were analysed based on the tone counterbalancing, and therefore 
whether the high and low tones were consistent with the SMARC effect or not were 
compared in an ANOVA with Epoch (across training) or Block (across test), 
Subsequence and Counterbalancing (SMARC Compatible or Incompatible). No main 
effect of Counterbalancing was found across RT training, F(1,22) = .015, p = .904, MSE 
= 18908, ηp2 = .001; training errors, F(1,22) = .065, p = .801, MSE = .606, ηp2 = .003 or 
RT test, F(1,22) = .001, p = .970, MSE = 8291, ηp2 = .001, nor errors, F(1,22) = .885, p 
= .357, MSE = .190, ηp2 = .039, therefore it seems that there was no influence of a 
SMARC effect in the Current group that may have interfered with or influenced the 
results of Experiment 3. 
 
Whilst the SMARC effect was found not to influence the Current group, the tones may 
had some additional effect or have been more salient in this group, thus changing 
perhaps their relative activation level and influence as input. It could also be the case 
the model was unable to accurately model the data due to its matched temporal 
representation of the tones (which occurred for less time [50 ms]) than the visual 
response stimulus (response terminated). As the current stimulus units were all activated 
at the same level, this difference between on-screen response-stimuli and tones is not 
represented accurately in these model activations.  
 
Altogether it is difficult to ascertain the effect of the tones on sequence learning with no 
control group, as the Random group also experienced tones and I am consequently 
unable to conclude exactly what effect that the tones have. Taken with the possibility 
that the tones may have been producing unwanted explicit or perceptual confounds to 
the main learning effect of interest, I decided to investigate these effects without the 
strong experiential influence of the tones and with a control no-concurrent-stimulus 
condition for comparison. A replication of the study was therefore designed with New 
Stimuli that were visual rather than auditory, to investigate whether learning in the 
Previous group was significantly better than the other groups, or whether some property 
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of the tones led participants to produce these effects and learning with simply visual 
stimuli would better follow the predictions of the RASRN. 
 
4.4. Experiment 4: Colours and Sequences 
As discussed above, the stimuli chosen to represent the New Stimuli units in 
Experiment 3 could have introduced several confounds that altered learning as predicted 
by the RASRN. The salience and length of time that the stimuli were presented for 
(tones and on-screen white circle response stimuli) were not matched, as well as there 
being the opportunity to pay attention to one modality or another in the Current group. 
Participants in this study were trained on the same task, this time for only one session, 
as the effect in human participants emerged across the first few Epochs of training. The 
New Stimuli used were colours, rather than tones, with two different colours that took 
the place of the white circle response stimuli. These colours followed the relationship 
(or not) with the sequence of response-stimuli locations as described above for Current, 
Previous and Random groups, as well as a further No-Colour group who were trained 




96 participants (aged between 18 and 33 [M = 20.5]; 71 female and 25 male) were 
recruited from undergraduate students at the University of Exeter and were awarded £5 
or one course credit in exchange for participation. Participants provided informed 
consent prior to taking part in one session lasting roughly one hour. Participants were 
randomly allocated into one of the four New Stimulus conditions, Current, Previous, 
Random or No-Colour. 
 
4.4.1.2. Materials and stimuli 
The materials and stimuli used followed Experiment 3 (see section 4.3.1.2), except for 
the tones and colour of the response stimuli. The tones were no longer involved, and 
therefore participants did not wear headphones. The response stimulus in this 
experiement, instead of always being a white filled circle, was in most groups a 
coloured filled circle (18.5 mm diameter) that was placed within one of the two circle 
outlines, giving the white circle outline the appearance of lighting up or filling in with a 
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particular colour. The colours used were purple (RGB: 128,0,255) and yellow (RGB: 
255,255,0) for the participants in Current, Previous and Random groups. The No-
Colour group experienced white (RGB: 255,255,255) response stimuli on all trials. The 
relationship between these colours and which location they appeared in is described 
below. Participants were required to press the spatially compatible ‘x’ and ‘>’ key 
presses on a QWERTY keyboard to the left or right response stimulus, respectively.  
 
4.4.1.3. Design 
The experiment was a two-choice SRT task comprising of one session of twenty blocks. 
The first sixteen blocks acted as training; and the final four blocks acted as test. All 
participants received training blocks of Same rule sequential contingencies, as described 
earlier. Across the five test blocks all participants experienced a pseudorandom 
response stimulus trial order. 
 
Response stimuli colour. Participants in the No-Colour group simply experienced white 
response stimuli on all trials, following exactly the materials and stimuli experienced in 
Experiment 1. The data was not simply reused from Experiment 1 as those participants 
were trained across two sessions and tested after 35 blocks of trained; however in the 
current experiment participants were trained on only one session and tested after sixteen 
blocks. The Random group experienced response stimuli that were equally likely to be 
either purple or yellow, with 30 each yellow and purple randomly allocated to the R 
trials across a block and 30 each yellow and purple response stimuli colour randomly 
allocated to L trials. There was no contingency between the colour of the response 
stimuli and the location.  
 
The Current and Previous groups were also organised as described for Experiment 3, 
with the Current group experiencing a 100% contingency between the response stimulus 
colour and location, and the Previous group experiencing a 100% contingency between 
the previous response stimulus location and current colour. Therefore, in the Current 
group one response stimulus location would fill in purple and the other would fill in 
yellow in every instance. The Previous group experienced an equal amount of left and 
right trials that were yellow or purple, but every trial following one response stimulus 
location would always be a purple trial, and the other a yellow trial. The colours were 
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counterbalanced across participants so that half experienced R = yellow and L = purple, 
and the other half R = purple and L = yellow. This continued through training and at test. 
 
4.4.1.4. Procedure 
The procedure was as described for Experiment 3 (see section 4.3.1.4), with participants 
in Current, Previous and Random groups instructed that they were to respond to the side 
of the screen that the circle appeared and not the colour of the stimulus itself. The No-
Colour group were not given this instruction. 
 
4.4.2. Results 
Results were collected and RT and error difference scores were analysed using an 
ANOVA on the eight training Epochs; New Stimulus (Current; Previous; Random; or 
No-Colour); and Subsequence. At test, an ANOVA compared two Epochs; New 
Stimulus; and Subsequence. All details regarding the treatment and analysis of data are 
as for Experiment 3, see section 4.3.2.  
 
4.4.2.1. Same rule learning  
There was a main effect of New Stimulus across training in RT difference scores, 
F(3,92) = 3.40, p = .021, MSE = 9665, ηp2 = .100, but not errors, F(3,92) = .706, p 
= .551, MSE = .268, ηp2 = .022, see Figure 4.11. Across test this was the same, there is a 
main effect across RTs, F(3,92) = 2.98, p = .036, MSE = 2887, ηp2 = .089, but not errors, 
F(3,92) = .701, p = .554, MSE = .062, ηp2 = .022. It was clear that the Previous group 
learned more than the other groups, which was supported by a series of planned 
contrasts based on the results of Experiment 3, which are all shown in Table 4.2. 
Previous is compared first to the Current group, and is significantly better in training 
RTs and test RTs, but not errors across training, nor test. The Previous group learned 
significantly better than the Random group across training in RTs (again see Table 4.2) 
and at test. However, again the numerical advantage was not significant in errors across 
training or test. The difference between Previous and No-Colour groups (see Table 4.2) 
was significant in RTs across training and test; but not training errors nor test. A series 
of Bonferroni corrected pairwise comparisons found no other significant differences 
between New Stimulus conditions. 
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Figure 4.11. RT (top panel) and error (bottom panel) difference scores for participants in 
Experiment 4 for Current (black), Previous (blue), Random (grey) and No-Colour (red) new 
stimuli conditions (tones) across training and test blocks. All participants were trained on Same 
rule sequences. Error bars show standard error. 
 
Table 4.2. Results from ANOVA for planned comparisons regarding the Previous group 
based on the results of Experiment 3 conducted on both RT and error difference scores 
for training and test phases of Experiment 4. 
 RT difference score: Training Error difference score: Training 
Previous vs: F (df = 1,92) p ηp2 (MSE = 302) F (df = 1,92) p ηp2 (MSE = .008) 
Current 4.91 .029 .051 1.46 .231 .016 
Random 6.29 .014 .064 .292 .590 .003 
No-Colour 8.48 .004 .084 1.55 .217 .017 
 RT difference score: Test Error difference score: Test 
Previous vs: F (df = 1,92) p ηp2 (MSE = 361) F (df = 1,92) p ηp2 (MSE = .008) 
Current 5.10 .026 .053 .960 .330 .010 
Random 6.23 .014 .063 1.01 .319 .011 
No-Colour 6.41 .013 .065 1.93 .168 .021 
 
The effect of New Stimulus did not interact with Epoch across training RTs, F(21,644) 
= 1.09, p = .358, MSE = 823, ηp2 = .034; nor errors, F(21,644) = .514, p = .948, MSE 
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= .026, ηp2 = .016. There was also no interaction across test in RTs, F(3,92) = 1.69, p 
= .175, MSE = 548, ηp2 = .052; nor errors, F(3,92) = 1.79, p = .155, MSE = .012, ηp2 
= .055, suggesting that the development of the Previous advantage was not gradual 
across training, indeed it was relatively stable after the first Epoch. Epoch itself had a 
main effect across training RTs, F(7,644) = 29.1, p < .001, MSE = 823, ηp2 = .240, and 
errors, F(7,644) = 25.5, p < .001, MSE = .026, ηp2 = .217; as well as across test RTs, 
F(1,92) = 10.4, p = .002, MSE = 548, ηp2 = .101, and errors, F(1,92) = 7.29, p = .008, 
MSE = .012, ηp2 = .073. This shows the improved performance on consistent 
subsequences compared to inconsistent across training and the reduction of these 
difference scores at test, reflecting learning and extinction, respectively.  
 
When we examine the learning effect by dividing the data up into inconsistent and 
consistent subsequence performance we can see that, like Experiment 3 and unlike the 
RASRN prediction, that it is the poor accuracy and speed to inconsistent subsequences 
in the Previous group that produces the learning advantage for this group (see Figure 
4.12). Random and No-Colour groups are matched on their consistent and inconsistent 
performance almost exactly, but both Previous and Current groups experience 
numerically slower yet more accurate responses to consistent subsequences than the 
Random and No-Colour groups at test. The model predicts improving performance on 
Current inconsistent trials, whilst this is not the case the group do demonstrate across 
training and test the least errors to inconsistent subsequences. This, however, appears to 
be a speed-accuracy trade-off, with the slowest responding to consistent subsequences. 
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Figure 4.12. Average RTs and proportion of errors for human performance on new stimulus 
task for Current (black), Previous (blue), Random (grey) and No-Colour (red) new stimuli 
conditions across training and test blocks for consistent (filled circles and bars) and inconsistent 
(open circles and bars). Error bars show standard error. 
 
4.4.2.2. Subsequence effects and learning 
Participants showed a main effect of Subsequence across training RTs, F(3,276) = 18.6, 
p < .001, MSE = 7389, ηp2 = .168, test RTs, F(3,276) = 13.1, p < .001, MSE = 548, ηp2 
= .125, and test errors, F(3,276) = 4.71, p = .007, MSE = .015, ηp2 = .049; but not 
training errors, F(3,276) = 2.35, p = .092, MSE = .062, ηp2 = .025, see Figure 4.13. We 
can see that in this case the sequential effects demonstrate faster and more accurate 
responding to RLR and LRL subsequences compared to inconsistent RLL and LRR 
subsequences over RRR and LLL responding compared with RRL and LLR 
subsequences. This is entirely in the opposite direction to the subsequence effects found 
in the RASRN (see Figure 4.4). 
 
 




Figure 4.13. RT (top panel) and error (bottom panel) difference scores for subsequences for all 
participants, regardless of New Stimulus condition, across training blocks (left panel) and test 
blocks (right panel). Error bars show standard error. 
 
These Subsequence effects did not interact with New Stimulus in any case: training RTs, 
F(9,276) = .462, p = .830, MSE = 7389, ηp2 = .015; training errors, F(9,276) = .475, p 
= .846, MSE = .062, ηp2 = .015; test RTs, F(9,276) = .437, p = .897, MSE = 2114, ηp2 
= .014; test errors, F(9,276) = .890, p = .516, MSE = .015, ηp2 = .028. New Stimulus and 
Subsequence also had no three-way interaction with Epoch across training: RTs, 
F(63,1932) = 1.26, p = .098, MSE = 807, ηp2 = .039; errors, F(63,1932) = 1.01, p = .464, 
MSE = 824, ηp2 = .032; nor test: RTs, F(9,276) = 1.11, p = .353, MSE = 824, ηp2 = .035; 
errors, F(9,276) = 1.37, p = 200, MSE = .008, ηp2 = .043. This suggests that the 
relationship between the New Stimulus and the trial order did not differentially affect 
the learning or performance on certain subsequences.  
 
4.4.3. Discussion 
The results of Experiment 4 replicate the findings of Experiment 3, that human 
participants learn more about Same rule sequential contingencies when additional 
stimuli correspond with the previous response stimulus location. The RASRN predicted 
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the differential effect of an additional stimulus on the Same rule learning, and correctly 
predicted that the Current group would be worse than the Previous group. However, in 
both the case of tones and colours, the Current group also learned the Same rule 
sequences numerically (though not significantly) better than the Random (and No-
Colour) group, which does not follow the prediction of the RASRN. The model 
predicted that the Current group would actually perform worse than all of the other 
conditions, with the increased activation of current stimuli producing stronger stimulus-
response associations that interfered with sequence learning. The results of Experiments 
3 and 4 do not exclude this possibility, but they suggest that the Previous group has a 
clear advantage over the other New Stimulus conditions.  
 
This suggests that, firstly, tones did not produce some qualitative difference for 
participants depending on whether they were contingent with on-screen response stimuli 
or not, or that they were processed at a faster speed than the response stimuli, giving 
some speed bias to the Current group. That this effect is replicated across two different 
stimulus types despite their differing characteristics, provides strong support for the 
improved learning of the Same rule under incidental conditions when additional stimuli 
reflect the previous response required as being due to the contingent relationship 
between stimulus and sequence.  
 
This study also provides evidence that No-Colour, Random and Current groups learn 
sequences at the same rate. This suggests firstly that participants do not seem to be 
affected by increasing the level of discriminability between stimuli, as in the Current 
group. Having the purple and yellow stimuli to further separate the representations of 
left and right response-stimuli did not improve performance on the task compared to a 
control group, nor did it reduce the learning as predicted by the RASRN. Similarly, 
adding extra stimuli to the task had no negative effect on learning, as in both Current 
and Random cases participants were no worse than the No-Colour group. This suggests 
that these additional stimuli did not distract from sequence learning and therefore this 
suggests that we have evidence not of any sequence learning disadvantage in any group, 
but evidence that the Previous groups can learn more about Same rule sequences.  !  
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4.5. General Discussion 
Whilst adding additional stimuli into the SRT task was shown to have an effect on 
sequence learning, Experiment 4 suggests that random noise or additional attentional 
demands have no effect on learning as there was no difference between Random and 
No-Colour groups in learning difference scores. This provides evidence that the 
occurrence of these new stimuli did not alter learning just because new stimuli were 
introduced, reflecting the claims of Abrahamse et al. (2012) regarding redundant stimuli. 
The Previous group showed significantly more learning of the Same rule sequence than 
the Random group in Experiments 3 and 4, whereas the Current group was not 
significantly better than the Random group in Experiment 3 (although it was 
numerically so) nor either Random or No-Colour groups in Experiment 4. Thus, while I 
have demonstrated the effect expected as a result of RASRN predictions, that the 
Current group would be worse than the Previous group, it is not because the Current 
group was impaired. Instead my results suggest that additional stimuli that have a 
relationship to the previous elements in a sequence seem to have an effect on learning, 
even though these stimuli did not provide predictive information about the current trial 
in themselves. 
 
There are a number of possibilities for this effect, the first being that the Previous 
condition produces a different level of concentration or attention to the task, as the 
stimuli (tones or colours) have no contingent relationship with the current response 
stimuli. This cannot be the case, as the Random condition acts as a control for this 
manipulation and demonstrates no improvement to learning in either Experiment 3 or 4. 
Therefore, the Previous group does not simply provide an environment that encourages 
greater concentration. A further possibility is that non-contingent stimuli produce some 
increase in error, as there are no contingencies between the two current stimuli 
(tones/colours and response locations) in Random or Previous groups, however, as the 
advantage was only observed in the Previous group (and not in Random) this again 
cannot explain the Previous learning advantage. 
 
A further suggestion is that the pattern of new stimuli (tones or colours) follows the 
pattern of on-screen stimuli with a lag of one trial, which means that the sequence is 
experienced twice. This could suggest that participants hear or see a sequence of the 
same precise order on more than one occasion and this gives them twice the amount of 
opportunity to encode or remember the subsequence. This suggests that the Previous 
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group concurrent stimuli are in a sense, non-redundant, as they do offer additional 
information about the task on each trial, even though this is not directly useful it may be 
made use of by an associative system. Instead of all stimuli and contingencies going 
into the same model with some recurrence or memory; this suggests that learning could 
be in some senses isolated, with one set of stimuli encoded separately to another (e.g. 
Cleeremans, 1997; Destrebecqz & Cleeremans, 2003). However, this explanation would 
also require a model that could learn sequences of stimuli separately as the stochastic 
structure of the Same rule could be extracted from both response stimulus locations and 
tones or colours, increasing learning of this sequence. This suggests that a model would 
require separate sets of recurrent networks that sum together (rather than competing) to 
predict the next trial leading to an  increase in the overall representation of the Same 
rule. 
 
It is suggested that the visual system contains functionally separate areas that encode for 
spatial features such as location or orientation, while another part of the visual cortex 
encodes for stimulus properties (e.g. colour), which are dissociated and encode 
informational separately (Ungerleider & Mishkin, 1982) therefore, it could be entirely 
possible that the contingencies across stimulus presentations may be restricted to 
particular dimensions. However, if this was the case then the Current group, which also 
involves two sets of stimuli or dimensions that both follow the sequential rule should 
also see an advantage, which they do not. We could instead assume that the Current 
group’s did not represent response stimulus locations and additional concurrent stimuli 
as two distinct stimuli, as these are contingent and therefore may be bound together and 
represented configurally at input. If the response stimuli and new stimuli (tones or 
colours) were not represented locally, but represented as compound stimuli (for 
example: right-purple, right-yellow; left-purple and left-yellow) then the Current group 
will receive input from only two units (essentially matching the No-Colour case), while 
the other groups will receive input from four units. When these four compound 
representations are used as input to the RASRN, rather than local representations for 
stimuli locations and colour, this does not produce the differences observed in humans, 
with the Random group still performing numerically the best on Same rule learning, 
with no improvement in Previous group responding (see Figure 4.14).  
 




Figure 4.14. MSE difference scores for the RASRN simulations of Current (black), Previous 
(blue) and Random (grey) conditions for networks trained on Same rule sequences when four 
units represent compound stimuli (e.g. right-purple) rather than local representations for 
location and colour, across training and test blocks. Error bars show standard error.  
 
Taken together, it could be possible that Previous groups are given an advantage in 
sequence learning as two lots of sequence learning sum together; but that representing 
the Current stimulus conditions as compound stimuli or perhaps the influence of 
stimulus-stimulus or stimulus-response associations could reduce some advantage that 
dual-sequence learning occurring may provide. This task does not, however, allow the 
examination of learning about tones or colours independently of the influence of 
learning about response-stimuli locations. Whilst the RASRN predicted that the stimuli 
would simply reduce sequence learning, it is possible that participants then were able to 
learn about the additional concurrent stimuli and this could in fact increase sequence 
learning. Without being able to disentangle these two stimulus types it is not possible to 
understand how much participants may have learned about either stimuli and how these 
may then interact with one another. A task design is required where dual-stimuli can be 
separated so that we can investigate how learning about different task elements 
progresses, and how a relationship between sequences and other stimuli might alter 
sequence learning.   
 
What can be concluded from these data is that in humans it seems that additional stimuli 
have an effect on responding, but this was restricted to stimuli that related to the 
previous element in a sequence of trials experienced. Therefore I have provided 
evidence that in a sequence learning task the discriminability of stimuli, properties of 
the stimuli and random variation in some stimuli are not important in sequence learning 
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itself. However, when these stimuli provide additional information about the sequence 
(i.e. provide a representation of the previous trial) then participants can use this to 
significantly improve sequence learning, at least in this case. That this is not observed in 
the Current group suggests that participants may be able to learn some additional aspect 
of the sequence in the Previous group, or that stimulus-stimulus or stimulus-response 
contingencies in the Current group block this effect. However, conclusions regarding 
the reason for this are tentative, as we are unable to assess whether participants learned 
anything about the relationship between tones and responding, either with the previous 
trial or how this impacted on the current trial. Rather than a cue competition effect, then, 
here we have observed that additional stimuli can produce potentiation of learning. To 
investigate how additional stimuli interact further with sequence learning, Chapters 5 
and 6 adapt the SRT task to include additional colour cue stimuli that are predictive in 
their own right. In this way I attempt to further investigate how and whether these 
stimuli are learned about and how they might come to interact with one another.  
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Chapter 5. Implicit cue-response learning  
 
Chapter 4 introduced additional stimuli to the SRT task potentiated sequence learning 
when these new stimuli provided information about the previous element in the 
sequence. To investigate this further, the two-choice SRT task used in Experiments 1 
and 2 was adapted to include a separate cue that occurred before the presence of the 
response stimuli. The aim of this was to create a task that could produce learning about 
cue-response relationships that could then be placed alongside sequential contingencies 
to investigate the interaction between the two. In this Chapter this task is piloted 
without sequential contingencies in order to find evidence of cue-response learning. 
Participants in Experiment 5 demonstrated learning under incidental conditions about a 
central colour cue that predicted a response-stimulus location. This learning was 
simulated across training by the RASRN. A group of participants who completed the 
task under intentional conditions provided a prior probability for explicit knowledge on 
the task, and also themselves demonstrated greater learning in Experiment 6. The 
Intentional performance, when used as a prior in a Bayes factor analysis, provided 
evidence for the null in Experiment 5: that cue-response learning occurred without 
awareness of these contingencies. Altogether I provide evidence that participants are 
able to learn simple cue-response contingencies and this task is therefore suitable for 
use in a dual-cue version alongside sequential contingencies to investigate the 
interaction between cue-response and sequence learning in Chapter 6. 
 
5.1. Introduction 
Chapter 4 provided evidence that participants were able to learn more about sequences 
when an additional stimulus on each trial provided information about the previous 
element in the sequence. As this potentiation of sequence learning was not found when 
these stimuli were random, this suggests that additional sequential information 
increased learning. However, as this potentiation was also not seen when the stimuli 
followed the pattern of the response locations on the current trial, this suggests that a 
more complex relationship may have been occurring between stimuli and responses. 
What this relationship was, however, is hard to say as the tones or colours and response-
stimuli locations correlated with one another throughout training and test. It was 
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therefore not possible to assess learning about the relationship the additional stimuli had 
with responses and isolate this learning from learning about sequences themselves.  
 
In order to understand how the Previous group stimuli were able to interact with and 
increase sequence learning, we need to be able to separate them in some way, and 
therefore the additional stimuli would have to be learned about in their own right as well 
as being related to the sequence itself. If one were able to investigate how simple cue-
response associations were formed under incidental conditions then it would be possible 
to investigate learning about the stimuli and separate this from and understand the 
interaction with sequence learning. Rather than the stimuli simply correlating with the 
sequence of pre-existing response locations, stimuli that have their own contingencies 
with responses could be introduced alongside sequence learning. Therefore, it would be 
possible to separate learning about these contingencies in a test phase and establish how 
they interact with one another. These experiments are described in Chapter 6, but first a 
task design was required that could accommodate sequential contingencies but would 
demonstrate the effect of simple instrumental cue-response contingencies.  
 
There have been a number of studies that have investigated dual-cue SRT tasks in 
sequence learning, where not only are there multiple stimuli, but these stimuli are 
predictive in their own right. Cleeremans (1997) designed a four-choice SRT task where 
participants showed evidence of incidental sequence learning. The sequence was based 
on the location of response-stimuli, which could themselves also be one of four colours. 
These colours also provided predictive information about the location of the next trial 
and participants learned these cue-response contingencies; but they were also instructed 
to look for them and explicitly made aware of their presence. This is an obvious issue if 
I want to examine the influence of automatic, associative learning processes on one 
another, hence a task is required on which participants demonstrate incidental cue-
contingency learning. 
 
In an implicit version of Cleeremans’ (1997) task, Jiménez and Méndez (1999) found 
no learning about cue-response contingencies under incidental conditions, and as such 
were unable to make any inferences about the effect that cue-response learning may 
have had on sequence learning (or indeed, vice versa). This chapter attempts to 
investigate whether people can learn cue-response contingencies incidentally, before 
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examining this learning within the context of a sequence learning task in the following 
chapter. However, few tasks are available in the associative literature to base this on, as 
participants in simple instrumental conditioning experiments often become or are made 
aware of the contingencies (Perruchet, Cleeremans,, & Destrebecqz, 2006).  
 
5.1.1. Designing a hybrid SRT task with instrumental and sequence learning 
As mentioned in Chapter 1, the problem with many studies of simple associative 
learning in humans is they make it so easy for the propositional system to do all the 
work. Mr X has avocado and is sick. Mr X has bannana and is not sick. There is no need 
for an incremental build-up of relationships between contingencies when humans are 
perfectly capable of deducing these relationships rationally using some conscious 
reasoning system (Beckers et al., 2006; Mitchell et al., 2009). Whilst authors increase 
the complexity of the task by increasing the number of stimuli and outcomes (Le Pelley 
et al., 2005), to some extent any evidence of learning might be driven by explicit 
knowledge of one or some subset of contingencies within the entire sample. 
Furthermore, whilst authors claim that elaborate cover stories can in fact mask 
contingencies that participants make predictions about (Vadillo & Matute, 2010), there 
remains the problem of using real-world scenarios that attempt to mask the aims of the 
study but may in fact produce an influence of explicit expectations on learning 
(Perruchet & Pacton, 2006; Waldmann & Holyoak, 1990; 1992).  
 
The SRT task provides an suitable paradigm to study complex sequential contingencies 
that participants are unaware of: as they are required to attend to the stimuli as they use 
these to respond, but the contingencies between previous and current trials are not made 
explicit. The task instructions therefore do not require that attention is drawn towards 
trial order or sequential rules that then must be covered up, as task instructions can 
simply refer to simple key-press responses and performing optimally. The cover story 
of the experiment is not intended nor required to mask any contingencies that 
participants can learn to predict. The instructions; conditions under which learning 
occurs; and the measure of learning all therefore do not require contingencies to be 
made explicit, which are the principles on which the design of this task was based. 
 
The two colours used in Experiment 4 had an effect on learning that avoided the issues 
associated with the perceptual differences between tones and visual stimuli. Therefore, 
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the task was designed to include different colours that would be presented to 
participants with the aim of training incidental differential instrumental conditioning. 
The adapted SRT task in Experiment 4 may have demonstrated modified sequence 
learning as a result of these two colours, but as these were presented concurrently with 
the response-locations the RASRN would predict small learning of these cue-response 
contingencies due to the reduced activation at input. Traditionally, when conditioning 
responses, the onset of the cue or CS presentation occurs before the onset of the US (the 
response stimuli), as in Perruchet et al. (2006). Therefore the cues introduced to this 
task were made to occur before the presentation of the response stimuli.  
 
Practically, if the colours were presented before the response stimulus locations filled 
then they could not be placed within the stimulus location as in Experiment 3, as this 
would evoke a response. Consequently, the experimental design of Aitken (1996) was 
used as the basis for the experiment, where participants were required to respond on a 
two-choice SRT task with response locations at either side of the screen. Participants 
were instructed to simply respond to stimuli but that before one of these appeared; a 
shape would appear in the centre of the screen that, unbeknownst to them, provided 
information about which response location would fill. Aitken (1996) used three shapes: 
a star; cross, or wedge, with the star or cross as controls that had no relationship with 
whether that trial would require a right or left response. The wedge stimuli were drawn 
from a set of categorization stimuli so that, depending on the length of the radius and 
angle of the wedge, they formed two categories that were each perfectly predictive of a 
response location (e.g. Category 1 stimuli always occurred before a right response 
location).  
 
Whilst not intending to study implicit cue-response learning per se, Aitken (1996) 
provides evidence that participants were able to learn that (a certain category of) cues 
predicted a response in the absence of awareness (as indexed by a questionnaire). 
Therefore, the SRT task used in Experiments 1 to 4 was adapted to include a central 
square stimulus that would fill with a colour before the occurrence of a white circle 
response stimulus on either side of the screen. The parameters of Aitken’s (1996) 
experiment were followed, as detailed below, with the aim of producing simple 
contingency learning between colour cues and responding. I was also concerned that 
these contingencies would be far easier to notice than sequences, and so included direct 
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tests of explicit knowledge more sensitive than asking participants to verbally describe 
anything they had noticed. 
 
5.2. Experiment 5: Incidental colour cue-response learning  
In this experiment the SRT task was adapted to introduce a cue that occurred before the 
response-stimuli, similar to the experiment designed by Aitken (1996). These cues were 
different colours that filled inside of a white square outline in the screen centre. Some of 
the colours partially (80%) predicted the response location. I chose to include a number 
of control colours to avoid explicit recognition of contingencies. This initial experiment 
also attempted to maintain the design continuity between Experiments 1 to 4 as the aim 
of introducing the cue-response contingencies was to eventually investigate how these 
would interact with sequence learning. In order to test participants’ awareness of the 
colour contingencies with response-stimuli locations both a post-experimental interview 
and prediction task were given to participants after the task had finished.  The results of 




16 participants (aged between 18 and 24 [M = 19.3]; 12 female and 4 male) were 
recruited from undergraduate students and were awarded £5 in return for participation. 
Participants provided informed consent prior to taking part in one session lasting 
roughly one hour.  
 
5.2.1.2. Materials and stimuli 
The experiment was run on an Apple iMac with MatLab and Psychtoolbox software. 
Participants were seated roughly 50 cm from the screen, which contained three white 
shape outlines on a black background throughout the task. A white outline of a square, 
19 mm in height and width, was present in the center of the screen, with two white 
circle outlines (also 19 mm in diameter) either side of the square. The circles were 
positioned in line with the square outline vertically either and 22 mm either to the left or 
the right of the square outline horizontally in line with experiments 1 to 4. 
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The cue stimulus was a coloured filled square (18.5 mm height and width) that was 
placed within the white square outline in the centre of the screen, giving it the 
appearance of lighting up or filling in. This cue could be one of four colours in 
experimental blocks: red (RGB: 255,0,0); green (RGB: 0,255,0); blue (RGB: 0,0,255); 
or yellow (RGB: 255,255,0). The response stimulus was a coloured filled circle (18.5 
mm diameter) that was placed within one of the two circle outlines, giving the white 
circle outline the appearance of lighting up or filling in. The colours were the same as 
for the cue and matched this colour on each trial. Participants were required to press the 
spatially compatible ‘x’ and ‘>’ key presses on a QWERTY keyboard to the left or right 
response stimulus, respectively.  
 
5.2.1.3. Design 
The experiment was a two-choice SRT task comprising one session of twenty blocks. 
These blocks each contained 120 trials, and so the length of training and number of 
trials differed from Aitken (1996) and these trial numbers were chosen to match 
Experiments 1 to 4. The first fifteen blocks were training, and the final five acted as test. 
 
Colour contingencies. Colour contingencies with certain responses are shown in Table 
5.1. All of the four colours were equally likely within each block and occurred with the 
same frequency across the experiment. Within the training blocks, two of the four 
colours positively predicted a certain response (Predictive); and two colours had no 
positive contingency with a certain response (Non-Predictive), occurring with equal 
likelihood within and across blocks on right and left response trials. Returning to the 
Predictive colours, these had an 80% probability of occurring before a certain trial 
location across training. This followed Posner & Snyder (1975) and meant that the 
conscious detection of contingencies was made that much more difficult.  
 
The colours themselves (red, yellow, green, blue) were randomly allocated to each 
experimental Colour for each participant. Colour 1 predicted a left response on 80% of 
trials, which equates to 24 of the 30 Colour 1 trials per training block (360 across the 
training). Colour 2 predicted a right response on 80% of trials, and therefore occurred 
24 times per block before a right response was required (360 across training blocks). 
Colours 3 and 4 each occurred 225 total times before a right response and on 225 trials 
before a left response was required across training. Overall, the number of non-
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predictive colours meant that the percentage of trials on which a participant was able to 
correctly predict the response-stimulus location given the colour on each trial of training 
was 65%. At test all of these contingencies became 50:50, and each colour was equally 
likely to predict either response. All blocks included an equal number of right and left 
response-stimuli and the number of repeats and alternations was controlled with a 
random sequence of response-stimulus locations that had no relationship to the colours. 
 
Table 5.1. Number and percentage of trials that each of the four Colours across the task 
in Experiment 5 co-occurred with right or left response stimulus locations.  
  Co-occurrence with left response-
stimulus 
Co-occurrence with right response-
stimulus 
 
Trials per block % of total trials 
for that Colour 
Trials per block % of total trials for 
that Colour 
 Predictive     
 Colour 1 24 80% 6 20% 
 Colour 2 6 20% 24 80% 
 Non-Predictive     
 Colour 3 15 50% 15 50% 
 Colour 4 15 50% 15 50% 
 
5.2.1.4. Procedure 
As in previous experiments, participants were instructed to simply respond as quickly 
and accurately as possible. The only difference in instruction was that they were 
instructed to fixate on the coloured square, suggesting that it would help them to 
respond more quickly and more accurately by attracting their attention to the centre of 
the screen. They were informed that the experiment was intended to measure their 
reaction times and errors and its aim was to investigate people’s ability to respond 
quickly and accurately to very simple stimuli over the course of an experiment. They 
were not informed of any relationship between the colours of the stimuli and the 
responses required and no mention was made of anything to learn about or from. They 
were told that the colours changed to make the task less dull and to try and retain their 
attention.  
 
At the beginning of each block participants were instructed to press any key to start. 
Each trial began with an inter-trial interval of 250 ms where a black background with a 
white square outline and two white circle outlines was presented. The cue stimulus (a 
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coloured square in the centre of the screen) would then appear for a variable interval of 
between 250-500 ms (following Aitken, 1996). The response stimulus (the left or right 
white circle) would then appear on screen until either the participant made a keypress 
response or the trial timed out after 4000 ms from the presentation of the response 
stimulus. RTs were measured from the onset of the response stimulus. If participants 
pressed an incorrect key, or the trial timed out, the computer issued a beep sound.  
 
Feedback with average RTs and percentage of errors was given at the end of each block 
and there was a thirty second enforced break, as described for Experiment 1. A short 
verbal structured interview was given at the end of the session, in which participants 
were asked about what they had noticed in the experiment regarding the colours. 
Participants were asked to describe any contingences they may have noticed, and then 
were asked to explicitly guess which response each colour predicted after being told that 
two colours were predictive and that one of each of these predicted a left or right 
stimulus.  
 
After I asked participants whether they had noticed anything about the experiment I 
asked them to complete a simple prediction task whereby the square in the centre would 
fill in with a colour and they would have to respond with the keys used in the 
experiment, although the circle would not fill. They were not put under time pressure to 
do this and were instructed to simply use their intuition, a guess, or any knowledge they 
might have about the task to select their response. Participants responded for two blocks 
of 32 trials with a 250msec RSI, within which each of the four colours were presented 
eight times. The order of presentation was randomised and there was no feedback given 
during or at the end of these two short blocks, and participants were informed that when 
they made a response nothing would happen and neither response stimulus would fill. 
Participants were finally debriefed and thanked for their participation.  
 
5.2.2. Results 
5.2.2.1. Cue-response learning 
Inclusion and exclusion criteria for RTs and errors are detailed in Experiment 1, and 
averages for these were calculated for each of the three Colour Types. These were 
Predictive Consistent (the 80% of Predictive trials that were consistent with the trained 
contingency); Predictive Inconsistent (the 20% of Predictive trials that were inconsistent 
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with the trained contingency); and Non-Predictive (all trials for Colours 3 and 4). An 
ANOVA was conducted for both average RT and proportion of errors (note: not a 
difference score) with Colour Type and Block as factors. As before, all within-subject 
main effects and interactions are reported with a Huynh-Feldt correction to adjust for 
departures from sphericity, however, the uncorrected degrees of freedom are reported.  
 
Training phase. The main effect of Colour Type was significant across training in RTs, 
F(2,30) = 11.2, p < .001, MSE = 205.1, ηp2 = .428; and errors, F(2,30) = 9.68, p = .001, 
MSE = 002, ηp2 = .392, see Figure 5.8. Participants demonstrated an ordinal pattern of 
responding in RTs and errors as one would expect to observe if learning had occurred, 
which is supported by a set of planned contrasts comparing the Colour Types, shown in 
Table 5.2.  
 
 
Figure 5.1. Average RTs (top panel) and proportion of errors (bottom panel) for Colour Types 
across the training and test blocks of Experiment 5. Lines show performance on Predictive 
Consistent (black filled circles); Predictive Inconsistent (red filled circles); and Non-Predictive 
(black open circles) colours. Error bars show standard error. 
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These provide evidence that Predictive Consistent trials are responded to more quickly 
and accurately than Predictive Inconsistent trials, which are significantly slower than 
Non-Predictive trials. Predictive Consistent trials are also responded to significantly 
faster than Non-Predictive trials (again, see Table 5.2) although this trend was not 
significant in the errors. This provides strong evidence of learning about the 
contingencies in place between colours and response-stimulus locations. 
 
Table 5.2. Results from ANOVA for planned comparisons on average RT and 
proportion of errors, comparing the three Colour Types to one another across training. 
 Average RT: Training 
 F (df = 1,15) p MSE ηp2  
Predictive Consistent vs Predictive Inconsistent  19.0 .001 485.0 .559 
Predictive Consistent vs Non-Predictive 5.65 .031 362.8 .274 
Predictive Inconsistent vs Non-Predictive 6.70 .021 382.9 .309 
 Proportion of errors: Training 
 F (df = 1,15) p MSE ηp2  
Predictive Consistent vs Predictive Inconsistent  14.4 .002 .006 .491 
Predictive Consistent vs Non-Predictive 1.24 .283 .005 .076 
Predictive Inconsistent vs Non-Predictive 12.1 .003 .004 .446 
 
There was also a main effect of Block in RTs, F(14,210) = 2.66, p = .005, MSE = 930.9, 
ηp2 = .151, and errors, F(14,210) = 5.37, p < .001, MSE = .002, ηp2 = .392, which is 
shown in Figure 5.1 as a general trend towards faster and less accurate responding 
across the task. Block did interact with Colour Type in the errors, F(28,420) = 1.86, p 
= .020, MSE = .004, ηp2 = .110; but not RTs, F(28,420) = 1.34, p = .176, MSE = 607, 
ηp2 = .082, which highlights the increasing errors made to Predictive Inconsistent 
colours across training; supported by a significant linear interaction contrast comparing 
Previous Inconsistent and Non-Predictive errors, F(1,15) = 5.97, p = .027, MSE = .004, 
ηp2 = .284; and non-significant trend between Predictive Inconsistent and Consistent 
errors, F(1,15) = 4.32, p = .055, MSE = .005, ηp2 = .223. 
 
Test phase. There was no evidence of a main effect of Colour Type at test in RTs, 
F(2,30) = .862, p = .433, MSE = 201.7, ηp2 = .054, nor errors, F(2,30) = .077, p = .926, 
MSE = .001, ηp2 = .005, although the numerical order of RT results follows the pattern 
across training and the error pattern only deviates in increased errors to Non-Predictive 
stimuli (see Figure 59). However, there was a trend towards significance in the first two 
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blocks of test in RTs, F(2,30) = 3.16, p = .070, MSE = 209.6, ηp2 = .174, which resulted 
from significantly faster responding to Predictive Consistent compared to Predictive 
Inconsistent colours (Bonferroni corrected), F(1,15) = 13.2, p = .004, MSE = 151.3, ηp2 
= .469, supported by a non-significant effect in the same direction in the errors, F(1,15) 
= 1.09, p = .312, MSE = .004, ηp2 = .068, see Figure 5.1. The effect size of the RT 
difference apparent across the first two blocks of test suggested that participants still 
showed a strong preference to respond quickly (and not less accurately) to Predictive 
Consistent stimuli, therefore suggesting that some learning remained during extinction. 
However, this learning did not survive across test and rapidly extinguishes.  
 
5.2.2.2. Direct tests of explicit knowledge 
A full consideration of the direct test results is reported in section 5.4.2 alongside results 
from participants who completed the task under intentional conditions, however, they 
are reported here for descriptive purposes. On the post-training interview where 
participants were asked to identify the two predictive colours and report which location 
they predicted, three participants were able to identify both colours correctly, with two 
of these participants identifying the correct location. Ten further participants were able 
to identify one correct colour (five correctly identifying the left colour and five the 
right); although only half of these participants were able to correctly identify the 
location (two left; two right). Three participants were unable to report any correct 
contingencies. This may seem like an alarming number of incidental participants were 
able to correctly identify the predictive colours, however participants have a one-in-six 
chance of getting both colours correct by chance and two-thirds chance of getting one 
colour correct by chance. They are, therefore, just as likely to get both colours correct as 
to be unable to correctly identify either colour if they are guessing.   
 
On the prediction task there were 32 trials in total, with half of these concerning the 
Predictive colours and therefore discussed here. Participants scored on average 8.25 
correct responses on the task (M = 8.25, SE = .727), which is shown in Figure 5.2. 
These correct responses are shown here split for right and left colours, as participants 
may have performed with eight correct responses out of sixteen, but all of these may 
have been about one colour and learning driven by knowledge about this single cue-
response contingency. These results are analysed further in section 5.4.2.  
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Figure 5.2. Graph showing the number of participants who made each number of correct 
responses out of the eight total possible for both Predictive Colours 1 (Left) and 2 (Right) on the 
Experiment 5 Prediction task. 
 
5.2.2.3. Subjective tests of explicit knowledge 
Participants were asked whether they had noticed anything about the task and whether, 
specifically there was any relationship between the colours and responses. Their 
responses to these questions were sorted into five categories: that they were completely 
sure that there were contingencies and sure about their identities; that they were 
confident there were contingencies between colours and responses but could not be 
confident in saying which colours; that they thought perhaps something may have been 
going on in the task, but not sure what it was; that they noticed some things but thought 
it was random; that they did not notice any contingencies and would be surprised to hear 
there were. Of the 16 participants, four responded that they thought perhaps something 
was going on in the task, but that they couldn’t be sure about it nor identify what the 
colours or contingencies may have been. The rest of the participants were surprised that 
there may have been any relationships and all reported that they thought that it was 
random. Whilst this is a crude measure of subjective explicit knowledge, I found no 
difference between the two groups on their prediction task score, t(14) = .783, p = .446, 
SED = 1.70; which goes some way to support the claim that they were subjectively 
unaware of these contingencies. Whilst the questions did not refer precisely to what 
degree participants said they were guessing on the task (Cheesman & Merinkle, 1984), 
they did not correlate with explicit prediction task performance (Chan, 1992), r(16) 
= .205, p = .446, although this measure may lack the required sensitivity to accurately 
conduct this analysis. 
 




Altogether Experiment 5 shows evidence of cue-response learning about how colours 
predicted a response in the SRT task. Participants showed learning across training but 
only some evidence for learning in the first two blocks of test. This suggests that the 
colour cue-response stimulus location contingencies were susceptible to rapid extinction. 
Participants were trained for only 360 Predictive Consistent trials across the experiment 
for each colour (compared to 90 Inconsistent trials), and alongside 900 Non-Predictive 
colour trials. This suggests that whilst this was enough training to produce a learning 
effect across the task itself, that under test conditions where these cue-response 
associations are removed that participants do not continue to respond with reliably 
faster and more accurate responses to the Predictive Consistent response location. That 
this effect reduced rapidly at test was taken into account in Chapter 6, where the length 
of test was reduced and length of training increased. 
 
Whilst this cue-response learning occurred in the absence of any intention to learn, I 
wanted to ensure that this cue-response learning developed in the absence of any 
awareness. Following the suggestions of Z. Dienes (personal communication, August 3, 
2012; Dienes, 2014; in press) an Intentional cue-response experiment was run, whereby 
participants completed the same task but under explicit task instructions. In doing so, 
the participants in this group would perform the explicit tests of knowledge based on 
their consciously acquired knowledge.  
 
5.3. Simulation 10: RASRN simulation of cue-response learning 
The RASRN using the parameters described in Chapter 3 was again used to predict 
human performance under incidental conditions, however, this time on a non-sequential 
learning task. Cleeremans (1997) investigated learning about sequences and cue-
response learning and modelled the cue-response component separately to the recurrent 
network used for sequence learning. In doing so Cleeremans (1997) was able to show 
evidence that this adapted SRN could learn both sequences and cue-response 
contingencies, but without any interaction between the two. As I intend to investigate 
whether cue-response contingencies do, in fact, interact given evidence from Chapter 4, 
I do not start from the position that this learning occurs as a result of a functionally 
separable system. Given that the addition of a separate learning system is not 
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parsimonious I suggest that the RASRN should be able to learn simple cue-response 
contingencies as well as more complex abstract rules.  
 
5.3.1. Simulation details 
The simulation details were mostly as for Chapter 3: Simulation 9 with the slow and 
fast learning rates set at 0.2 and 0.5, respectively. There were 20 hidden units in the 
model and therefore 20 context units, as well as 2 output units representing the 
prediction of the location of t. Additionally, there were two input units representing the 
previous required response (t – 1) and two units representing the current on-screen 
response stimuli (t) there were four additional units to represent the four colours 
described in Experiment 5. Because these stimuli occurred before the presence of the 
current on-screen response stimuli but after the previous response, I gave them 
activation values of 0.4 for on and 0 for off. The previous response (0.75), current 
stimulus (0.1) and context units (1.3 times the hidden unit activations) remained the 
same as for Simulation 9. The model was used to simulate the task experienced by 
human participants in Experiment 5, with 2400 trials run for each network, and 16 total 
networks run to simulate the 16 participants in Experiment 5. As in the human 
experiments there were no sequential contingencies in the trial order that networks were 




The MSEs for each trial were averaged across each Block and Colour Type, as for 
human average RT and proportion of errors. As with human performance, MSEs were 
not further manipulated to produce an index of learning, therefore learning can be 
assessed by the difference between the Colour Types, with lower MSE scores showing 
less difference between the model’s predictions and the next trial location. The results 
of the simulation are shown in Figure 5.3, and show a significant effect of Colour Type 
across training, F(2,30) = 64.4, p < .001, MSE = .001, ηp2 = .811; and test, F(2,30) = 
199, p < .001, MSE = .001, ηp2 = .930. It is clear that the networks performed gradually 
better on Predictive Consistent trials across the experiment and that performance on 
Predictive Inconsistent trials became steadily worse, supported by a significant Block 
by Colour Type interaction across training, F(28,420) = 5.33, p < .001, MSE = .001, ηp2 
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= .262. This interaction was not present at test, F(2,30) = .756, p = .642, MSE = .001, 
ηp2 = .048, and the networks showed no evidence of extinction. 
 
 
Figure 5.3. MSEs for Colour Types across the training and test blocks of the RASRN 
simulation. Lines show performance on Predictive Consistent (black filled circles); Predictive 




The RASRN can learn these cue-response contingencies as the humans do across 
training. However, the networks show strong performance in the absence of extinction 
across test which was not observed in human participants. Whilst the RASRN can again 
account for human learning, this time of cue-response contingencies, it does not fully 
model the pattern of human behaviour. As discussed in the previous chapter, the 
RASRN seems to be missing some elements or parameters that would help it account 
for human behaviour, but these will be discussed further in Chapter 6. For the purposes 
of simulating Experiment 5, the RASRN produces an adequate simulation of human 
performance.  
 
5.4. Experiment 6: Intentional cue-response learning 
Primarily, the aim of the Intentional version of the task was to provide direct knowledge 
of test performance priors in order to compare Incidental performance to the plausible 
performance that we would expect from participants with explicit knowledge of cue-
response contingencies in order to assess evidence for the null (Dienes, 2011; 2014). In 
doing so, the participants were run on a matched experiment, as even though explicit 
knowledge was expected to develop quickly in the task. It was my intention that 
206  Chapter 5: Implicit cue-response learning 
!
participants should experience the same task demands in terms of length and number of 
trials, as well as the pseudorandom test phase, in order to provide a complementary 
condition with which to assess the absence of explicit knowledge in the Incidental 
learning condition. Therefore, the tasks differed only in their instruction and all other 




16 participants (aged between 18 and 26 [M = 19.4]; 15 female and 1 male) were 
recruited from undergraduate students and were awarded £5 in return for participation. 
Participants provided informed consent prior to taking part in one session lasting 
roughly one hour.  
 
5.4.1.2. Materials and Stimuli 
Materials were the same as for Experiment 5 and 6, except that participants were 
provided with a piece of paper at the start of the task with instructions about the task on, 
shown in Figure 5.4. 
 
5.4.1.3. Design 
The design of the experiment followed Experiment 5. 
 
5.4.1.4. Procedure 
The procedure followed Experiment 5 and participants were again instructed that the 
experiment intended to measure speed and accuracy of responding and that the colour 
acted as a fixation point. They were also told that they would be provided with a clue as 
to how to use the colours themselves to improve their performance (as shown in Figure 
5.4). Participants were additionally required to write down which colours they thought 
were Predictive and which colours they thought were Non-Predictive at the end of each 
block on the instruction sheet in Figure 5.4.  
 




Figure 5.4. Instructions available to participants in the Intentional condition describing the 
nature of the relationships in the task and additional task requirement to note down what they 
thought the contingencies were after each block. Spaces to write which colour was which for 
Blocks 4-20 not shown. 
 
5.4.2. Results 
Results were analysed as for Experiment 5 with an ANOVA on RT and proportion of 
errors across Block, Subsequence and Colour Type. 
 
5.4.2.1. Cue-response learning 
Training phase. There was a main effect of Colour Type across training RTs, F(2,30) = 
45.9, p < .001, MSE = 1668, ηp2 = .754; and errors, F(2,30) = 18.8, p < .001, MSE 
= .022, ηp2 = .557, which are shown in Figure 5.5. This clearly demonstrates the same 
ordinal pattern as we would expect from participants if they had learned about colour 
cue-response contingencies, supported by a set of Bonferonni corrected comparisons, 
shown in Table 5.3.  
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Figure 5.5. Average RTs (top panel) and proportion of errors (bottom panel) for Colour Types 
across the training and test blocks of Experiment 5. Lines show performance on Predictive 
Consistent (black filled circles); Predictive Inconsistent (red filled circles); Non-Predictive 
(black open circles) trials. Error bars show standard error. 
 
These demonstrate significant differences across all pairwise comparisons, with faster 
and more accurate responding to Predictive Consistent colours, with slower and less 
accurate responding to Predictive Inconsistent colours, both of which were different to 
the Non-Predictive colours. Therefore, we have convincing evidence of learning across 
training. There was a main effect of Block across training (see Figure 5.5) which 
showed decreasing RTs, F(14,210) = 2.04, p = .044, MSE = 2757, ηp2 = .119; and 
increasing errors, F(14,210) = 2.66, p = .045, MSE = .023, ηp2 = .150, across the task. 
This interacted with Colour Type in errors, F(28,420) = 2.26, p = .028, MSE = .011, ηp2 
= .131, which demonstrates the development of learning across training. 
 
Test phase. There was a main effect of Colour Type at test in the proportion of errors, 
F(2,30) = 4.49, p = .023, MSE = .003, ηp2 = .231; but not in RTs, F(2,30) = 1.68, p 
= .207, MSE = 698, ηp2 = .101, see Figure 5.5. The Predictive Consistent accuracy 
advantage was still significantly better than for Predictive Inconsistent colours, F(1,15) 
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= 7.36, p = .048, MSE = .006, ηp2 = .329, suggesting that some learning in the 
Intentional group was able to survive extinction. The first two blocks of test did not 
provide a significant difference in Colour Type in RTs, F(2,30) = 1.59, p = .220, MSE = 
543, ηp2 = .096; nor errors, F(2,30) = 1.63, p = .217, MSE = .003, ηp2 = .098, suggesting 
that rapid extinction also affected participants under Intentional conditions. 
 
Table 5.3. Results from ANOVA for planned comparisons on average RT and 
proportion of errors, comparing the three Colour Types to one another across training. 
 Average RT: Training 
 F (df = 1,15) p MSE ηp2  
Predictive Consistent vs Predictive Inconsistent  52.4 < .001 3933 .777 
Predictive Consistent vs Non-Predictive 31.4 < .001 1454 .677 
Predictive Inconsistent vs Non-Predictive 42.5 < .001 1359 .739 
 Proportion of errors: Training 
 F (df = 1,15) p MSE ηp2  
Predictive Consistent vs Predictive Inconsistent  19.2 .002 .042 .561 
Predictive Consistent vs Non-Predictive 17.0 .003 .004 .532 
Predictive Inconsistent vs Non-Predictive 18.5 .002 .021 .552 
 
5.4.2.2. Direct tests of explicit knowledge 
All of the participants correctly identified both colours and their locations in the post-
training interview. Performance was therefore perfect without fail on colour 
identification, suggesting that under Intentional conditions it was possible for all 
participants to have full explicit knowledge of the contingencies in the task. Participants 
also performed well on the prediction task, with the results shown in Figure 5.6. 
Participants scored 14.4 on average on the prediction task (M = 14.4, SE = .288) which 
suggests that participants are able to perform well on this task when they have explicit 
contingency knowledge. It is interesting to note, however, that they were unable to 
respond correctly on all of the trials even though they reportedly knew which of these 
responses the colour predicted. Whilst all of the participants were able to make the 
correct response on more than half of the trials for each predictive colour, left and right, 
the task seems to suggest that participants may not be entirely sure, or that the influence 
of the experience of Predictive Inconsistent colours may influence performance on this 
task (Merikle & Reingold, 1992), or that participants did not give the task their full and 
effortful attention.  
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Figure 5.6. Graph showing the number of participants who made each number of correct 
responses out of the eight total possible for both Predictive Colours 1 (Left) and 2 (Right) on the 
Experiment 6 Prediction task. 
 
5.4.2.3. Subjective tests of explicit knowledge 
The direct tests of explicit knowledge are supported by the subjective questions 
regarding how confident participants were about the presence of contingencies in the 
task. Participants all reported that they were sure that contingencies existed and that 
they were confident in their identification of the predictive colours and locations.  
 
5.4.3. Discussion 
Participants who performed the task under Intentional conditions clearly, correctly and 
confidently showed evidence of explicit knowledge about these contingencies. This was 
the intended outcome of the instructional manipulation and these results can therefore 
be used in a Bayes factor analysis to attempt to find evidence for the absence of explicit 
awareness in the Incidental group in the following section. Interestingly, unlike in 
Experiment 2, the Intentional instructions seem to have had a strong effect on how 
much learning was demonstrated by participants, however without a direct comparison 
we are unable to tell whether this is the case. Participants under Intentional conditions 
seemed, like the Incidental group, to suffer from extinction during the test phase in their 
RT and error performance, although a difference between Predictive Consistent and 
Inconsistent errors remained. Therefore, as well as investigating the Incidental group’s 
explicit knowledge I also compared the indirect measures of learning across the task 
between the two groups.    
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5.5. Evidence for implicit learning 
Establishing whether participants were learning colour cue-response contingencies in an 
implicit manner on this task is important. If participants were showing evidence of 
learning under incidental conditions that was driven by explicit knowledge then 
attempting to examine any interaction between cue-response and sequence learning may 
involve two separate processes. Therefore both the indirect RT and error performance 
across the task and the post-training explicit knowledge tests were compared between 
incidental and intentional participants. Rather than relying on this difference to produce 
any conclusive result regarding learning (as in Chapter 2) I decided to use a Bayes 
factor analysis to find evidence for the absence of explicit knowledge. Using the 
procedure outlined by Dienes (2014) I used the explicit performance of the Intentional 
group as a prior probability of aware responding to both post-training direct tests.  
 
5.5.1. Incidental versus Intentional SRT task performance 
Intentional learners were compared to incidental learners using an ANOVA on Block, 
Colour Type and Condition (Incidental versus Intentional). Bonferroni corrections were 
applied to significance values in order to correct for multiple comparisons. There was 
no main effect of Condition across training or test, but Figure 5.7 clearly shows the 
interaction between Colour Type and Condition across training (left panel) in both RTs, 
F(2,60) = 24.1, p < .001, MSE = 1329, ηp2 = .446; and errors, F(2,60) = 6.80, p = .018, 
MSE = .011, ηp2 = .185, with the pattern of learning exaggerated for the Intentional 
group. This suggests that participants are able to learn more when they actively search 
for colour-response contingencies. At test all groups show a flattening of the Colour 
Type effect, which does not show evidence of an interaction with Condition in RTs, 
F(2,60) = .710, p = .978, MSE = 428, ηp2 = .023; nor errors, F(2,60) = 2.59, p = .171, 
MSE = .002, ηp2 = .079, suggesting that both groups suffer from extinction at test. 
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Figure 5.7. Average performance in average RTs (top panel) and proportion of errors made 
(bottom panel) across for Incidental (solid bars); and Intentional (lighter shaded bars) on 
Predictive Consistent (black bars); Predictive Inconsistent (red bars); and Non-Predictive (black 
open/grey bars) Colour Types. Error bars show standard error. 
 
A series of Bonferroni corrected comparisons were conducted on the interaction 
between Condition and the different levels of Colour Type, which are shown in Table 
5.4. These show that across training there was a reliable difference between how well 
the colour-response contingencies were learned, as the Predictive Consistent – 
Predictive Inconsistent difference was significantly larger for the Intentional group in 
both RTs and errors. This was also true of the difference between Predictive 
Inconsistent disadvantage compared to the Non-Predictive colours, as RTs were far 
slower and errors more frequent in the Intentional group. Whilst the interaction was 
significant only in RTs for the difference between Predictive Consistent and Non-
Predictive colours; both this and the numerical direction of the error difference provide 
support to the other training interaction contrasts – that cue-response learning was 
greater in the Intentional group across training. These effects were, however, eradicated 
at test, with no difference observed between either of the two Conditions across the 
Colour Types.  
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Table 5.4. Results from ANOVA for Bonferroni corrected comparisons on average RT 
and proportion of errors, comparing the interaction between Condition and the three 
Colour Types to one another across training 
 Average RT: Training 
 F (df = 1,30) p MSE ηp2  
Predictive Consistent vs Predictive Inconsistent  29.0 < .001 2209 .492 
Predictive Consistent vs Non-Predictive 15.6 < .001 909 .342 
Predictive Inconsistent vs Non-Predictive 20.7 < .001 871 .408 
 Proportion of errors: Training 
 F (df = 1,30) p MSE ηp2  
Predictive Consistent vs Predictive Inconsistent  7.35 .022 .024 .197 
Predictive Consistent vs Non-Predictive 3.49 .141 .004 .104 
Predictive Inconsistent vs Non-Predictive 6.88 .027 .013 .187 
 
5.5.2. Evidence for the absence of awareness  
5.5.2.1. Post-experiment interview 
The results of the post-experiment interview are shown in Table 5.5 and show that all 
participants in the Intentional condition were able to accurately identify not only the two 
colours but also their locations. Of the Incidental condition, only three participants were 
able identify both colours, two of these getting both locations correct. The sample mean 
for the Incidental group was exactly at chance level of performance on the prediction 
task (M = 1.00, SE = .153) whilst the Intentional condition performed perfectly on these 
colour identification questions (M = 2.00, SE = .000). Using the procedure outlined by 
Dienes (2014) a Bayes factor was calculated, by establishing the prior probability that 
participants had explicit knowledge about the task taken from the difference between 
Intentional participants’ performance and chance (1.00). As we expect participants in 
the Incidental experiment to produce less explicit knowledge, it is plausible that any 
value between chance and the performance of Intentional could occur, and hence a 
uniform distribution was chosen. Using 0 then as the sample mean (the difference 
between Incidental performance and chance), a uniform distribution was used to 
calculate a Bayes factor from chance to the prior probability provided by Intentional 
performance (Intentional average score of 2 minus expected score by chance of 1 = 1). 
This produces a Bayes factor of 0.20; which provides evidence for the null and suggests 
that participants in the Incidental group do not respond to these questions with explicit 
knowledge about colour cue-response contingencies.  
214  Chapter 5: Implicit cue-response learning 
!
Table 5.5. Table showing the number of participants in Incidental and Intentional 
conditions who correctly guessed zero, one or both colours as Predictive. Number of 
participants who guess the correct colour regardless of location are shown, with the 
number of participants who also guessed the correct location in brackets.  
 
 
Neither Correct Left Correct Right Correct Both Correct 
Incidental 3 5 (2) 5 (3) 3 (2) 
Intentional 0 0 (0) 0 (0) 16 (16) 
 
5.5.2.2. Prediction task 
The prediction task data are shown for both groups again in Figure 5.8 for comparison, 
which clearly show that participants performed with higher accuracy in Intentional 
groups compared to Incidental groups. Intentional mean performance (M = 14.4, SE 
= .288) was used as a prior, participants in this group scored 6.44 higher than chance (8 
correct), and this was used to plot the normal distribution of plausible explicit 
performance with a standard deviation of half the mean, 3.22.  
 
 
Figure 5.8. Graph showing the number of participants who made each number of correct 
responses out of the eight total possible for both Predictive Colours 1 (Left, filled bars) and 2 
(Right, open bars) on the Prediction task for Incidental (black bars) and Intentional (red bars) 
groups.  
 
Participants in the Incidental condition scored just 0.25 over chance on the prediction 
task (M = 8.25, SE = .727), giving a Bayes factor for a normal distribution of .04, 
providing evidence for the null. Rather than assuming that the likelihood follows a 
normal distribution with explicit performance more likely, it is possible only a number 
of participants have explicit knowledge and therefore the full range from 0 (chance) to 
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6.44 (Intentional prediction task performance above chance) were used in a uniform 
distribution, giving a Bayes factor of .19, still providing good evidence that participants 
did not show explicit knowledge of the colour-response contingencies.  
 
It is also possible, however, that the Incidental group learned far less than the 
Intentional group (see Figure 5.7). To correct for this possibility the estimate for 
incidental performance can be scaled down to approximate what we might expect if 
learning had been less. Using the training data (both RT and proportion of errors) I 
calculated the difference between all three pairs of the Colour Types for Incidental and 
Intentional groups. I then calculated the proportional difference between these 
differences. For example, the advantage for the Incidental group of Predictive 
Consistent versus Predictive Inconsistent colours was 6.19 ms, whereas it was over four 
times bigger in the Intentional group, 29.3 ms: proportional difference of 4.73 times 
more learning. I calculated the average of these across RT and errors and found that 
learning was just under four times greater in the Intentional group, M = 3.85, SD = .967. 
Using this proportional difference I scaled the Intentional performance (6.44) to expect 
1.67 over chance for the Incidental group, with a uniform distribution. This gives a 
Bayes factor or 0.70, which is an inconclusive result. Therefore more participants are 
required to establish confidently that the poor prediction task performance in the 
Incidental group reflects a lack of explicit knowledge, or simply reduced knowledge or 
learning about the task altogether.  
 
5.5.3. Discussion 
Crucially, these analyses provide evidence that participants were able to learn colour-
response contingencies under incidental conditions in the absence of explicit knowledge. 
Participants under Incidental conditions showed evidence for the null in both post-
experiment interview questions and a prediction task, with the results of the Intentional 
participants acting as the prior probabilities for explicit knowledge.  
 
Participants in the Intentional condition learnt significantly more than those in the 
Incidental condition, although they also suffered from extinction. The increased colour-
response learning in the Intentional group compared to the Incidental provides an 
interesting insight into the importance of conscious expectancy when learning such 
contingencies. Explicit knowledge in sequence learning tasks (e.g. Experiment 2; Jones 
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& McLaren, 2009) does not necessarily improve learning, but in the case of Experiment 
6 this seems to be the case. Participants were more cautious in the Intentional condition 
as they were slower and more accurate when performing the task. This goes some way, 
perhaps, to support Reber’s (1989) claim that explicit knowledge is suited to 
contingencies whose relationships are simple, deterministic and easy to verbalise.  
 
5.6. General Discussion 
Participants were able to learn cue-response contingencies under both Incidental and 
Intentional conditions and showed evidence of faster and more accurate responding to 
stimuli consistent with the trained colour-response location than the opposite location. 
The first thing to note about these results is that the Intentional group clearly 
demonstrated explicit knowledge about the colour-response contingencies that was 
consciously accessible. Participants were able to produce confident judgments about the 
presence of these contingencies as all participants were sure of the contingencies and 
correctly reported the colour and locations that they predicted. The incidental 
participants were not sure of these contingencies and performed at chance on guessing 
the colours and a prediction task, which both provided evidence for the null (no explicit 
knowledge) using the Intentional group as the prior probability (Dienes, 2011; 2014). 
 
This suggests that participants are able to learn cue-response contingencies under 
Incidental conditions, but this seems to be somewhat weaker than the sequence learning 
observed in previous chapters. Whilst no direct comparison was made, as the cue-
response learning occurred in the absence of any sequences to learn, the effect was 
quickly extinguished at test suggesting that this incidental learning may not have been 
very robust. This may explain the results of Jiménez and Méndez (1999) who found no 
colour-response learning in their SRT task alongside sequence learning. Cleeremans 
(1997) suggested that colours should be easy to learn about, as these response 
contingencies are simple and do not require complex abstract structures to be learned 
like sequential contingencies do. This is the reason that both sets of authors provide for 
expecting cue-response contingencies to block or overshadow sequence learning.  
 
The cue-response results from Experiment 5 suggest that, when isolated from sequence 
learning, human cue-response learning under incidental conditions is not simply 
stronger because it has a simpler structure. Jiménez and Méndez (1999) did not provide 
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evidence that participants could learn these cue-response contingencies; without the 
influence of sequences. This chapter provides some evidence that cue-response learning 
may be less robust than sequence learning and that a demonstration that participants can 
do this without sequences is needed within such a dual-cue task. Cleeremans (1997), 
Jiménez and Méndez (1999) did not consider the possibility that sequential learning 
may be ideally learned under incidental conditions because of the abstract and complex 
nature of the relationships that are learned (Reber, 1989). When matched for 
contingency, number of trials and number of instances: will humans be able to learn 
sequential contingencies far better under incidental conditions than they can cue-
response contingencies? These issues will be dealt with further in the following chapter. 
 
Whether this Chapter provides suitable evidence of a lack of explicit knowledge is an 
important question, and I conclude that whilst a number of definitions of implicitness 
are addressed, it would still not convince the most determined of single process 
champions. Firstly, the explicit knowledge tests occur after the task and therefore after 
extinction. Any small amount of explicit knowledge that the Incidental group may have 
had could have been eradicated by this period where cue-response contingencies were 
absent. Explicit knowledge does survive this extinction in the Intentional group – who 
show far reduced learning at test than at training that is no different from the Incidental 
group. Therefore, the Intentional learners showed evidence of extinction but their 
explicit knowledge remained.  However, as they also demonstrated some knowledge on 
the indirect measures of learning at test while the Incidental group did not, it could be 
suggested that there is less learning in the Incidental group and therefore easier to 
extinguish, hence it did not survive to test, either indirect or direct tests.  
 
Whilst the subjective measures of knowledge were not entirely sensitive, these go some 
way to address these issues. Further to being apparently unable to perform higher than 
chance on direct test of explicit knowledge, participants were also subjectively unaware 
of these contingencies. All of the participants in the Intentional group were completely 
sure that there were contingencies in the task, correlating perfectly with their perfect 
performance in colour identification. Of the four participants under Incidental 
conditions who reported that they thought something may have been going on in the 
task, there was no difference in their prediction task score to the rest of the group. This 
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suggests that if this measure captured subjective awareness that this did not correlate 
with performance, thus providing further evidence for the absence of awareness.  
 
However, it could be the case that participants in the Incidental condition were reluctant 
to express their knowledge with confidence as they were nervous about being incorrect; 
whereas Intentional participants knew that there were contingencies present and 
therefore that they were correct and thus had no trouble in confidently displaying their 
knowledge. Altogether the sensitivity of the measure of subjective awareness could 
have been improved in order to provide a more detailed account of whether participants 
satisfied the zero-correlation (Chan, 1992) or guessing (Cheesman & Merinkle, 1984) 
criterion. 
 
In summary, Experiment 5 provides good evidence that cue-response contingencies can 
be learned and that they can be learned incidentally. From the perspective of a volitional 
(Jacoby, 1991), subjective (Dienes & Berry, 1997) or knowledge based (Shanks, 2005) 
account of conscious knowledge, this task converges on evidence that participants were 
not aware of cue-response contingencies in the Incidental group. Whilst this learning 
suffered from quite rapid extinction and was not as large as if the task was performed 
with explicit contingency knowledge, it is possible for participants to learn these 
contingencies. The task is therefore usable in attempts to investigate the effect of 
additional stimuli that are themselves predictive of a response on sequence learning, as 
discussed in Chapter 6. The RASRN was able to provide a simulation of these 
incidental learning results, which will be tested alongside the presence of sequential 
contingencies in Chapter 6.  
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Chapter 6. Cue-competition and sequence learning !
This chapter continues to examine the effect of additional stimuli on sequence learning. 
The experiments outlined in Chapter 4 used colour and tone stimuli, whose relationship 
with the sequence had a potentiating effect on sequence learning. These relationships 
meant that it was not possible to isolate learning about sequences from learning about 
additional stimuli, and therefore how additional stimuli improved sequence learning. 
Chapter 5 introduced a task that involved a cue in the centre of the screen that was 
sometimes predictive of a response location, which was used in this chapter to 
investigate the interaction between cue-response and sequence learning. In this chapter I 
used a between-subjects design, comparing learning of participants experiencing either 
one or both of these contingencies. McLaren et al. (2013) observed that when both 
contingencies were in play participants learned sequences but not about colours, 
evidence of cue-competition and an overshadowing effect. Experiment 7, however, 
provides evidence that when the colour contingencies are positively correlated with the 
trial order, this overshadowing effect can be counteracted and the Dual group provides 
good evidence of colour-response learning at test. Experiments 8 and 9 further 
investigated the role of cue-sequence relationships and cue competition by comparing 
two groups who experienced both colour-response and sequential contingencies: in one 
case these cues were correlated, in the other they were not, however conclusive 
evidence of either cue-competition or facilitation effects was not obtained as evidence 
of any colour learning in any group was weak. The RASRN predicted that when 
sequences and cues were correlated, the Dual group would show cue-response 
potentiation; but when uncorrelated the Dual group would show overshadowing of 
sequence learning. Whilst these results are not established by the human data reported 
in this chapter, they are consistent with it, and this provides an indication that the 
RASRN can, to some extent, simulate the relationship between simple contingency 
learning and sequence learning and predict whether overshadowing or the opposite 
effect might be expected. The results provide evidence that the absence of cue-
competition does not simply provide support for a propositional account of learning, 
and that automatic associative approaches can both produce evidence of cue-
competition (McLaren et al., 2013) as well as a suitable account of why it does not 
always occur.    
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6.1 Introduction 
Chapter 4 demonstrated that sequence learning was potentiated by concurrently 
presenting stimuli that had a relationship to the previous trials experienced (Previous 
condition), even though they provided no predictive information about the current trial 
itself. This effect was predicted by the RASRN, as concurrent stimuli that correlated 
with the response stimuli locations showed increased S-R learning that blocked 
sequence learning (the Current group). It appeared that the Previous condition increased 
learning of the Same rule sequence, perhaps through activating the previous sequence 
element and therefore the t – 2 response-location required to predict the current trial (t). 
However, the mechanism that produced this learning effect could not be isolated, as the 
concurrent stimuli (tones or colours) and response-stimuli (locations) followed the same 
sequence. There was no way to separately assess the learning occurring about the tones 
or colour stimuli and the location stimuli, and therefore I was unable to assess how 
these may have interacted to cause the sequence learning effect observed in Chapter 4. 
There was no condition tested in Experiment 3 and 4 in which the concurrent stimuli 
(tones or colours) had a predictive relationship with the required response that was not 
related to the sequence. The aim of this chapter was to attempt to isolate stimulus-
response learning, and investigate further how a trained relationship between stimuli 
and responses would interact with sequence learning.  
 
Finding evidence that incidentally learned contingencies follow associative learning 
effects would provide a strong case for human associative learning (Beesley & Shanks, 
2012). It seems that there is a limited capacity for learning relationships between events, 
as when two contingencies are trained simultaneously (AB+), learning is less than if 
they were trained separately (A+ and B+). This overshadowing effect (Kamin, 1969) is 
an example of cue-competition, when multiple cues come to predict the same outcome. 
Blocking is another example, where one cue is trained to predict the outcome (A+) and 
after training on this contingency another cue is trained in compound (AB+), which 
results in far less learning about the additional cue (B) compared to the pre-trained cue 
(A). There have been a number of studies that have demonstrated cue-competition 
effects in human contingency learning studies (Dickinson, Shanks, & Evenden, 1984; 
Le Pelley, Beesley & Suret, 2007); however, as discussed in previous chapters, these 
tasks are often confounded by the presence of explicit contingency knowledge (Beckers 
et al., 2006; Mitchell et al., 2009). There are a number of studies that aim to avoid these 
issues by attempting to mask learning with cover stories, for example Vadillo, Orgaz 
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and Matute (2009) who had participants perform an overshadowing experiment based 
around a complex refugee saving task where road mines were partially predicted by 
cues contained within a spy radio on screen. Whilst the object of this task was not to 
learn, participants were still required to pay attention to cues and use them, as well as 
the task involving a pre-established causal framework (Waldmann & Holyoak, 1992).  
 
Beesley and Shanks (2012) argue that the solution to these issues lies in implicit 
learning tasks and choose contextual cuing within a visual search task for their 
methodology. Using a task where participants are required to identify the orientation of 
a single target letter (e.g. a ‘T’) amongst a display of distractors (e.g. rotated ‘L’s). 
Unknown to participants, some of these display patterns were predictive of the location 
(not the response cue of orientation) of the target letter. Participants were pre-trained on 
certain distractor patterns (A+) and further patterns were added to the stimulus array 
(AB+), see Figure 6.1 for a schematic representation of the design.  
 
 
Figure 6.1. Representation of the blocking designed used by Beesley and Shanks (2012) in a 
contextual cuing visual search task. The target stimulus (T) is predicted in training phase 1 (left 
panel) by the pattern of the distractor letters (‘L’s) here shown as pattern A. The second training 
phase (central panel) involved training with both pattern A and a further pattern of distractor 
stimuli, shown by Bs. Note, these were the same letters in the task (e.g. ‘L’s). At test, 
participants were exposed to both A and B patterns separately, alongside random locations of 
the B or A distractor letters.  
 
Participants showed learning about each pattern, but no evidence of blocking to the B 
patterns that were trained in compound with the pre-trained A patterns. Indeed, the 
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opposite effect (an increase in learning was observed to the B cue compared to a control 
set of predictors), was observed which suggests that potentiation of learning may have 
occurred. Beesley and Shanks (2012) suggest this provides evidence that humans do not 
exhibit blocking under incidental conditions, which supports a propositional account of 
cue-competition effects in humans (e.g. Mitchell et al., 2009). 
 
As mentioned in Chapter 1, there is an issue with this visual search task as participants 
may not have learned an association between the entire A pattern and the outcome. 
Instead they may have learned about a certain set of visual features within the distractor 
array that are entirely different when presented with the compound training in phase 21. 
This is similar to Shanks and St John’s (1994) criticism of artificial grammar tasks, on 
which participants may have been learning that words containing high frequencies of 
certain letters or groups of letters (e.g. a string of ‘T’s) was actually driving improved 
performance in classifying the words as consistent with the grammar rules or not. 
Therefore these tasks fail the information criterion, as the learning may not be an 
association between pattern A and the outcome; but it may be that the entire visual array, 
or sections of it (for example, a clump of Ls in one corner) are associated with the 
outcome. This further suggests that pattern AB may not show cue-competition effects as 
these may be encoded visually as a whole rather than a separate set of elements.  
 
As reported in the previous chapter, a number of studies with sequence learning and 
additional cues were unable to show evidence of cue-competition (Cleeremans, 2007; 
Jiménez & Méndez, 1999) however these studies failed to provide evidence of 
incidental learning about the cue in its own right. As Chapter 5 demonstrated that 
participants are able to learn about contingencies between a colour cue and the location 
of the required response on that trial, this chapter aims to investigate whether colour or 
sequence learning compete with one another. Previous studies assumed that simple 
contingency learning would overshadow sequences, whereas this thesis suggests that 
either is possible. As Chapter 5 demonstrated rapid extinction of incidental cue-
response contingency learning, whereas Chapters 2 and 4 demonstrated strong sequence 
learning that did not suffer from extinction, when these tasks are put together it seems, 
on this basis, more likely that sequence learning would overshadow learning about 
colour cue-response contingencies.  !!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!
1 Criticism offered by Mike Burton at the London meeting of the Experimental Psychology Society, 
January 10, 2014 
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Indeed, in a recent study using the paradigms reported thus far in this thesis, McLaren et 
al. (2013) used a dual-cue task using both the incidental sequence learning methodology 
(Jones & McLaren, 2009) concurrently with the addition of colour-response 
contingencies similar to Experiment 5. Therefore on each trial there was a contingency 
between the central colour cue and the required response as well as a contingency 
between the previous trials and the current response stimulus location. McLaren et al. 
(2013) trained a group that learned both sequential and colour-response contingencies 
(Dual group) in comparison to sequence-only and colour-only groups: who received 
random colours or pseudo-random sequences, respectively. These participants showed 
that sequence learning in Dual and Sequence groups were no different to one another, 
therefore sequence learning was not affected by the presence of colour-response 
contingencies. It was the colour cue-response learning that was affected, with little or no 
evidence of colour learning in the dual group, suggesting that the presence of sequences 
had overshadowed learning about colour-response contingencies. Therefore it is 
possible to observe cue-competition effects under incidental conditions. These results 
could, furthermore, explain the difficultly that Jiménez and Méndez (1999) had in 
showing evidence of cue-response learning alongside a sequence learning task.  
 
This McLaren et al (2013) study firstly provides evidence of incidental cue-competition, 
as colour cue-response learning was overshadowed by sequence learning. As the 
presence of additional stimuli that related to the previous element in the sequence 
potentiated sequence learning in Chapter 4, I was interested to investigate how the 
relationship between cue-response and sequence learning may act to increase learning. 
Beesley and Shanks (2012) suggest that this is a possibility that may explain their 
results, as there may be some within-compound or configural representation that might 
have increased learning about the ‘blocked’ B pattern (e.g. Urcelay & Miller, 2009). To 
some extent there may be a possible interaction then between competition for learning 
about an outcome and learning about associations between cues. Therefore, the aim of 
the studies reported in this chapter is to systematically investigate cue competition 
under incidental learning in humans. Two separate stimulus types were used to examine 
these effects (colour-response contingencies and exclusive-or sequential contingencies 
of response stimuli locations), which were spatially separated.  
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6.2 Experiment 7: Related cue-response and sequence learning  
A new version of the SRT task was designed that involved the two-choice SRT 
sequential rules employed by Jones and McLaren (2009), and compared learning of 
these contingencies to learning about simple cue-response associations between a 
central colour cue that appeared before the response-stimuli, as outlined in Chapter 5. 
Unlike in the work by McLaren et al. (2013) this task aimed to investigate whether cue-
competition effects would occur if sequences and colours were themselves related. So 
whilst both sequential information (the previous two trials, t – 2 and t – 1) and the 
colour of the cue were predictive of the response location, they were also predictive of 
one another with the same contingency – would cue-competition still be observed?    
 
This meant using colours that each had a lower contingency (66%) with a response, 
rather than 80% in Experiment 5, to match the contingency of sequences and colours. 
By increasing the number of training blocks to eighteen as well as reducing the number 
of test blocks to two, the intention was to increase colour learning and attempt to reduce 
the impact of extinction at test seen in Chapter 5. Therefore, after providing evidence 
that participants can learn both sequence and colour information separately in 
conceptually similar tasks under incidental conditions (Chapters 2 and 5); the first 
experiment in this cue competition series aimed to investigate whether experiencing 
both colour and sequential contingencies that are related to one another in the same task 
would alter learning of either of these relationships.  
 
6.2.1 Method  
6.2.1.1 Participants 
48 participants (aged between 18 and 30 [M = 20.6]; 38 female and 10 male) were 
recruited from first year psychology undergraduate students at the University of Exeter 
were awarded either one course credit (N = 8) or £5 (N = 40) in return for participation. 
Participants provided informed consent prior to taking part in one session lasting 
roughly one hour. Participants were allocated into one of three between subject groups: 
Dual (positive colour and sequence contingencies); Sequence (no colour and positive 
sequence contingencies) or Colour (positive colour and no sequence contingencies). 
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6.2.1.2 Materials and Stimuli 
The experiment was run with all stimuli and materials as in the Incidental condition of 
Experiment 8, see section 5.5.1.2) with a stimulus display of two white circle outlines 
with a square outline in the screen centre. Both the central square (cue-stimulus) and the 
circles to the left and right (response-stimuli) filled with one of four colours: red; 
yellow; green; or blue.  
 
6.2.1.2 Design 
The experiment was a two-choice SRT task comprising of one session of twenty blocks. 
These blocks each contained 120 trials, with the first 18 blocks acting as training and 
the final two blocks acting as test. Participants received either training on blocks 
containing sequential contingencies (Dual, Sequence) or no sequential contingences 
(Colour); and either colour contingencies (Dual, Colour) or no colour contingencies 
(Sequence). There were neither colour nor sequential contingencies present in any 
group during the two blocks of test, so a colour was equally likely to occur with either 
response location, and trial order was pseudorandom.  
 
Sequence construction: Experimental blocks. Those blocks involving sequential 
contingencies were constructed from 40 subsequence triplets of right and left stimuli in 
a similar way for Experiments 1 to 4, as outlined in section 2.2.1.3. This experiment, 
however, followed an exclusive-or rule used in Jones and McLaren’s (2009) study of 
sequence learning. This rule states that if the previous two trials are the same (the 
exclusive case [e.g. right & right, or left & left]) that the current trial will be one 
response (e.g. right), whereas if the previous two trials are different (the or case [e.g. 
right & left, or left & right]) then the current trial will be the other response (e.g. left). 
Right and left response stimuli were counterbalanced across participants and are 
forthwith referred to in terms of Xs and Ys. As in my earlier experiments, of the four 
possible subsequence triplets that follow this rule (XXX, XYY, YYX, YXY), ten of 
each subsequence were arbitrarily randomised and concatenated to form the 120 trials 
for a training block with sequential contingencies. The contingency of the exclusive-or 
rule was therefore 100% on every third trial, as each third trial in the subsequence triplet 
used to construct the trials followed the rule and the overall contingency was 2/3. This 
construction method resulted in a balanced number of X and Ys in each block, as well 
as controlling for sequential effects up to two trials before the current trial (t - 2).  
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Sequence construction: Control blocks. Those blocks involving no sequential 
contingencies (Colour group and all groups at test) were pseudorandom and constructed 
in the same way as for pseudorandom blocks in my earlier experiments (see section 
2.2.2.3). The contingency experienced between the previous two trials (or indeed any 
trial) predicting the current trial using an exclusive-or rule (or any other combination of 
preceding trials) was therefore 50% and participants should have no sequential 
information to learn about. These blocks acted as a control for the sequence learning 
possible in the Dual and Sequence groups. The amount of right and left response stimuli, 
as well as the number of repeats and alternations were balanced and controlled for.  
 
Colour contingency construction. Once the sequence of X and Ys was constructed, the 
colour of the cue stimulus was arranged across the trials within each block, with the 
procedure for this depending on the group that participants were assigned to. All groups 
experienced all four colours equally across and within training and test blocks, with the 
colours (red, blue, green, yellow) themselves randomly allocated to Colours 1 to 4. For 
those groups that received a colour contingency (Dual and Colour), during training 
Colours 1 and 2 (Colour) or all colours (Dual) were Predictive and occurred with a 67% 
contingency with an X or Y trial respectively. Colours 3 and 4 were Non-Predictive for 
the Colour group (and all colours for the Sequence group) and therefore occurred with 
equal likelihood on either X or Y trials.  
 
Colour contingency construction: Dual group training blocks. Across training blocks, 
the Dual group was allocated colours according to the subsequence triplets that made up 
the right and left responses. All colours were assigned to a subsequence ‘pair’: the first 
two trials of a triplet (e.g. XY in XYY). Regardless of the position within the block, any 
trials that are preceded by the first two trials of each of the four trained subsequences 
were assigned a unique colour. For example, Colour 1 would always occur after two 
XX trials. As the third trial followed the exclusive-or rule on 67% of trials, this results 
in a 67% contingency between Colour 1 and X as a result of the contingency of the 
exclusive-or rule already in place. The contingency between the first pair of trials within 
the subsequence themselves and a colour was 100% with the previous trial pair. Colour 
2 occurred after the subsequence pair XY; Colour 3 after subsequence pair YX and 
Colour 4 after subsequence pair YY. There were no control colours in this group and all 
colours therefore had a 67% contingency between cue stimulus colour and response 
stimulus location across training. 
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Colour contingency construction: Colour group training blocks. The colours that 
occurred during training blocks in the Colour group followed the same structure as 
Experiment 5, with Colour 1 predicting an X trial on 67% of those trials and 67% of 
Colour 2 trials predicting a Y response. As in Experiment 5, and contrary to the Dual 
group, these colours were simply assigned according to these contingencies randomly 
across a block with no further constraint or relationship to the subsequences or response 
location.  
 
Colour contingency construction: Control blocks. Across training in the Sequence 
group and at test for all groups, there were no colour contingencies. All four colours 
occurred with equal likelihood on either X or Y trials. These were allocated randomly 
across these trials with no further constraint or relationship to the subsequence or 
responses, meaning the colours had a 50% chance of preceding either response location.  
 
6.2.1.4 Procedure 
The procedure followed previous experiments: all participants were instructed to simply 
respond as quickly and accurately as possible. They were instructed to fixate on the 
coloured square, suggesting that it would help them to respond quicker and more 
accurately by attracting their attention to the centre of the screen. They were informed 
that the experiment intended to measure their reaction times and errors and its aim was 
to investigate people’s ability to respond quickly and accurately to very simple stimuli 
over the course of an experiment. They were not informed of any relationship between 
the colours or sequence of the stimuli and the responses required and no mention was 
made of anything to learn about or from. They were told that the colours changed to 
make the task less dull and to try and retain their attention.  
 
At the beginning of each block participants were instructed to press any key to start. 
Each trial began with an inter-trial interval of 250 ms where a black background with a 
white square outline and two white circle outlines was presented. The cue stimulus (a 
coloured square in the centre of the screen) would then appear for a variable interval of 
between 250-500 ms. The response stimulus (the left or right coloured circle) would 
then appear on screen until either the participant made a keypress response or the trial 
timed out after 4000 ms from the presentation of the response stimulus. The colour of 
the cue and response stimuli were the same on each trial, so if the cue-stimulus was a 
red square then either response stimulus would be a red circle. RTs were measured from 
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the onset of the response stimulus. If participants pressed an incorrect key, or the trial 
timed out, the computer issued a beep sound.  
 
Feedback was given as in all previous experiments at the end of each block and at the 
end of the twenty blocks a short verbal structured interview was given, in which 
participants were asked about what they had noticed in the experiment regarding both 
sequences and colours. Participants were asked to describe any contingences they may 
have noticed, and were required to identify which response each colour predicted. 
Participants were finally debriefed and thanked for their participation.  
  
6.2.2 Results 
RTs and responses were recorded for each participant, with exclusion and inclusion 
criteria as described previously. Average RT and proportion of errors were calculated 
for each of the eight subsequences and separately for each Colour Type. All four 
colours were analysed for Dual and Sequence groups with Predictive Consistent and 
Predictive Inconsistent trials, however only the two Predictive colours were analysed in 
the Colour group. Non-Predictive colours were not included in the analysis as there was 
no equivalent in the Dual group, which exclusively involved Predictive trials. All 
colours in the Sequence group were Non-Predictive, but two (Colours 1 and 3) were 
assigned X as ‘Consistent’ and Y as ‘Inconsistent’, with the opposite dummy label 
assigned to responses for Colours 2 and 4. Sequence learning and colour-response 
learning are analysed separately in the following sections. 
 
Sequence learning: Difference scores. As in Experiments 1 to 4, difference scores were 
calculated from RTs and errors as an index of performance on consistent subsequences 
(XXX, XYY, YXY, YYX) taken from the corresponding inconsistent subsequence 
(XXY, XYX, YXX, YYY), with higher scores reflecting better performance on 
subsequences consistent with the exclusive-or rule.  
 
Colour-response learning: Difference scores. Difference scores were also calculated 
using the same principles as for sequence learning, with Predictive Consistent average 
RTs and proportion of errors taken from Predictive Inconsistent trials to provide a 
difference measure that with greater values reflects better performance on trials where 
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the Predictive colour resulted in the trained contingent response over the response 
Inconsistent with the trained relationship.  
  
6.2.2.1 Sequence learning 
An analysis of variance was conducted on both RT and error difference scores across 
training and test with the factors Block (Training: 18; Test: 2) x Subsequence (4) x 
Group (3).  
 
Training phase. There was a large significant main effect of Group, RT difference score, 
F(2,45) = 23.5, p < .001, MSE = 2679, ηp2 = .511; proportion of error difference score, 
F(2,45) = 13.2, p < .001, MSE = .014, ηp2 = .358, see Figure 6.2.  
 
 
Figure 6.2. RT (top panel) and error (bottom panel) sequence learning difference scores across 
training (left panel) and test (right panel) for the three different groups. Error bars show 
standard errors.  
 
A series of planned contrasts compared the groups, as shown in Table 6.1. Using a 
series of planned comparisons, the Dual group performed significantly better than the 
Colour group, demonstrating strong evidence of sequence learning in the Dual group 
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(see Table 6.1). The Sequence group showed no difference to the Dual group also 
demonstrating strong evidence of sequence learning compared to the Colour group (see 
Table 6.1). Evidence of sequence learning was therefore provided in both Dual and 
Sequence groups. There was no evidence of a main effect of Block, nor for the 
interaction of Block with Group in the RT difference score, which suggests that there 
was no evidence for a change in sequence learning across the experiment. 
 
Table 6.1. Results from ANOVA for planned comparisons on average RT and 
proportion of errors sequence difference scores, comparing the three Groups to one 
another across training in Experiment 7. 
 RT difference score: Training 
 F (df = 1,45) p MSE ηp2  
Dual vs Colour (control) 40.8 < .001 37.2 .476 
Sequence vs Colour (control) 28.6 < .001 37.2 .389 
Dual vs Sequence 1.08 .304 37.2 .023 
 Error difference score: Training 
 F (df = 1,45) p MSE ηp2  
Dual vs Colour (control) 12.2 .001 .001 .213 
Sequence vs Colour (control) 25.1 < .001 .001 .358 
Dual vs Sequence 2.30 .130 .001 .049 
 
 
Test phase. The variable Group demonstrates a main effect at test, RT difference score, 
F(2,45) = 7.67, p = .001, MSE = 1724, ηp2 = .254; proportion of error difference score, 
F(2,45) = 3.74, p = .031, MSE = .013, ηp2 = .142, see Figure 6.2. This provides strong 
evidence of sequence learning that was not eradicated by extinction. A series of planned 
contrasts (see Table 6.2) show that the Dual group was quicker and more accurate in 
responding to trained subsequences at test compared to the Colour group. Again, there 
was no difference between the Dual and Sequence groups; as the Sequence group also 
showed evidence of reliably faster responding and numerically an accuracy advantage 
for trained subsequences compared to the colour group, see Table 6.2. 
 
!  
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Table 6.2. Results from ANOVA for planned comparisons on average RT and 
proportion of errors sequence difference scores, comparing the three Groups to one 
another across the two blocks of test in Experiment 7. 
 RT difference score: Test 
 F (df = 1,45) p MSE ηp2  
Dual vs Colour (control) 15.3 < .001 216 .254 
Sequence vs Colour (control) 4.68 .036 216 .094 
Dual vs Sequence 3.05 .088 216 .063 
 Error difference score: Test 
 F (df = 1,45) p MSE ηp2  
Dual vs Colour (control) 6.94 .012 .002 .134 
Sequence vs Colour (control) 3.81 .057 .002 .078 
Dual vs Sequence .466 .498 .002 .010 
 
The two blocks of test did not have a significant effect on responding, nor with Group; 
Subsequence; or the three way interaction, suggesting that extinction did not occur 
across the two blocks.  
 
6.2.2.2 Colour learning 
To investigate how participants learned about colours an ANOVA was conducted on 
both RT and error difference scores across training and test with the factors Block 
(Training: 18; Test: 2) x Group (3).  
 
Training phase. Across training there was a large effect of Group, RT difference score, 
F(2,45) = 21.5, p < .001, MSE = 2063, ηp2 = .489; proportion of error difference score, 
F(2,45) = 4.60, p = .015, MSE = .015, ηp2 = .170, see Figure 6.5. This can be unpacked 
by planned contrasts (see Table 6.3) with faster and more accurate responding to 
consistent colours compared to inconsistent colours in the Dual group compared to the 
Sequence group. Evidence of learning is also apparent in the Colour group, with 
significantly faster and numerically more accurate responses to trained colours in the 
Colour group compared to the Sequence group; see Table 6.3.  
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Figure 6.3. RT (top panel) and error (bottom panel) colour learning difference scores for the 
three Groups (Dual: black filled bars, Sequence: blue open bars; Colour: red filled bars) across 
training (left panel) and at test (right panel) for Experiment 9. Error bars show standard errors. 
 
There was also a significant difference between Colour and Dual groups in RT 
difference score but not in proportion of error difference score (see Table 6.3). It is 
impossible, however, to ascertain whether this difference is caused by some potentiating 
effect of sequence learning in the Dual group, as Consistent colours and sequences are 
perfectly confounded and across training as the two are correlated measuring colour 
differences scores captures sequence learning in the Dual group. There was no effect of 
Block, nor was there evidence that this interacted with Group.   
!  
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Table 6.3. Results from ANOVA for planned comparisons on average RT and 
proportion of errors colour difference scores, comparing the three Groups to one another 
across the two blocks of training in Experiment 7. 
 RT difference score: Training 
 F (df = 1,45) p MSE ηp2  
Dual vs Sequence (control) 43.0 < .001 57.3 .489 
Colour vs Sequence (control) 11.9 .001 57.3 .209 
Dual vs Colour 9.70 .003 57.3 .177 
 Error difference score: Training 
 F (df = 1,45) p MSE ηp2  
Dual vs Sequence (control) 8.91 .005 .001 .165 
Colour vs Sequence (control) 3.83 .056 .001 .078 
Dual vs Colour 1.06 .309 .001 .023 
 
Test phase. At test the participants showed a main effect of Group, RT difference score, 
F(2,45) = 8.07, p = .001, MSE = 1253, ηp2 = .264; proportion of error difference score, 
F(2,45) = 1.98, p = .149, MSE = .011, ηp2 = .081, see Figure 6.4. The Dual group 
showed evidence at test of significantly faster responding to consistent colours over 
inconsistent colours than the Sequence group (see Table 6.4). This gives us strong 
evidence of learning about colour contingencies in the Dual group, now in the absence 
of confounding sequential learning or effects, as at test there was no correlation between 
the two stimuli. The Colour group showed no difference from the Sequence group in 
speed, but responded with a near-significant trend towards greater error difference 
scores compared to Sequence groups, and numerically more than Dual groups (see 
Table 6.4). However the Dual group was also significantly better than the Colour group, 
RT difference score (see Table 6.4). Therefore we have some evidence of colour 
learning in the Colour group at test, and strong evidence for colour learning in the Dual 
group at test. 
 
There was an effect of Block in errors, RT difference score, F(1,45) = .000, p = .993, 
MSE = .089, ηp2 = .000; proportion of error difference score, F(1,45) = 6.26, p = .016, 
MSE = .051, ηp2 = .122, with a higher error difference in Block 1 (M = .040, SE = .011) 
than 2 (M = .008, SE = .008). This demonstrates the rapid decline in learning because of 
extinction at test. This did not interact with Group, RT difference score, F(2,45) = .872, 
p = .425, MSE = 900, ηp2 = .037; proportion of error difference score, F(2,45) = 2.29, p 
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= .113, MSE = .019, ηp2 = .092 and as with Experiment 5 this suggests that colour 
learning was quick to suffer from extinction. 
 
Table 6.4. Results from ANOVA for planned comparisons on average RT and 
proportion of errors colour difference scores, comparing the three Groups to one another 
across the two blocks of test in Experiment 7. 
 RT difference score: Test 
 F (df = 1,45) p MSE ηp2  
Dual vs Sequence (control) 10.8 .002 313 .194 
Colour vs Sequence (control) .123 .728 313 .003 
Dual vs Colour 13.3 .001 313 .228 
 Error difference score: Test 
 F (df = 1,45) p MSE ηp2  
Dual vs Sequence (control) 1.60 .212 .003 .034 
Colour vs Sequence (control) 3.86 .056 .003 .079 
Dual vs Colour .488 .489 .003 .011 
 
6.2.3 Discussion 
The results clearly show that both Dual and Sequence groups learned sequential 
contingencies well across training, and that this learning was well established and robust 
across extinction at test. The overall amount of sequence learning was largely 
unaffected, it seems, by the presence of colours. Whilst some numerical differences 
existed between Dual and Sequence groups in learning of subsequences, there was no 
interaction and therefore no concrete evidence of differential subsequence learning. The 
only caveat to these conclusions stems from the strong trend towards better performance 
on consistent sequences during test in the RT difference measure for the Dual group 
relative to the Sequence group. But this in no way suggests that learning of sequences 
was poorer in that group. 
 
There was convincing evidence of colour learning, with the Colour group showing 
evidence of learning across training and, to a weaker extent, in proportion of errors at 
test. It is clear that this colour learning is far weaker than the sequence learning, as 
across the two blocks of test we see the effect of extinction for colours only. With the 
evidence of learning from the Colour group enabling a comparison: the Dual group 
performed significantly better at test on the RT difference score than the Colour group. 
It seems that the presence of the sequential contingencies might have affected how well 
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the Dual group learned about colours and performed on them during test. Across 
training it is not possible to compare the groups, as the measurements for consistent 
colours are confounded with consistent sequences and therefore the two are impossible 
to disentangle. At test when the colour and sequence information are separated, we can 
see that the Dual group are above zero on both of their difference score measures, and 
reliably higher than the Colour group in RT difference scores which might suggest that 
the Dual group learn more about colours than the Colour group itself. However, as the 
score for the colour group was numerically higher in the error differences we must be 
cautious in claiming that this was necessarily the case. 
 
Whilst McLaren et al. (2013) reported that two sets of contingencies in such a task 
produced an overshadowing effect on colour learning, Experiment 7 provides evidence 
of either no or the opposite effect. The Dual group performed numerically better when 
examining colour learning than the Colour group. Indeed the studies reported here may 
support the opposite conclusion, that colour learning may be potentiated in the Dual 
group. The source of these contentious results could arise from numerous factors, as the 
differences between McLaren et al. (2013) and the experiments reported here include: 
different colour contingencies; longer training; white response stimuli; and a longer test 
phase. However, the previous work reported in Chapter 4 suggests that the relationship 
between colours and sequences could produce this effect. As we observed that a 
contingency between the stimuli (sequences and additional concurrent stimuli) in 
Chapter 4 produced increased sequence learning, it is possible that a relationship 
between sequences and cues could also produce an increase in learning, or protection 
from overshadowing. As participants in McLaren et al.’s (2013) study had no 
relationship between the two sets of contingencies, colour learning was simply 
overshadowed by the strong sequence learning. 
 
The current study did not, however, provide by any means a conclusive result that 
suggests the Dual group learn more than the Colour group. The Colour group performed 
better in terms of their accuracy to consistent versus inconsistent colours than the Dual 
group at test, and thus the difference could be explained by an attentional or 
motivational difference between the groups, as they may have focused more on speed of 
responding rather than accuracy to trained colours. Further to this, the groups had a 
different number of colour contingencies to learn: whilst the proportion of consistent to 
inconsistent trials was matched across groups, the Dual group had twice as many 
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colours to learn about than the Colour group. This could have encouraged participants 
to notice the contingencies in the Dual condition and employ different strategies or 
systems whilst responding to the task, causing perhaps an increase in colour learning as 
observed in the Intentional condition of Experiment 5. Therefore the groups were 
matched and efforts made to examine the participant’s reportable knowledge about the 
contingencies in play in a further experiment. 
 
6.3 Experiment 8: Cue-response and sequence learning when correlated and 
uncorrelated 
A further experiment was run with the aim of better matching the Dual and Colour 
groups. As Experiment 7 involved four colours in the Dual group and two in the Colour 
group, I wanted to ensure that a comparison could be made between these conditions to 
assess whether the Dual group exhibited learning comparable to or greater than the 
Colour group. Experiment 8 therefore aimed to match the number of Predictive colours 
in the Colour and Dual groups, which was reduced to two, alongside two Non-
Predictive control colours. Thus the groups were matched exactly in both the amount 
and proportion of Predictive consistent, inconsistent and Control trials. Further to this, a 
prediction task was added to the end of the experiment to better assay explicit 
knowledge. I was interested to know whether participants in the Dual group on direct 
tests were different to the Colour group regarding colour cue-response learning.  
 
Experiment 7 also provided evidence that the Dual group exhibited at least the same 
amount of learning as the Colour group, the opposite result to the McLaren et al. (2013) 
study. To investigate this further an additional Dual group was run, one to match the 
Dual group in Experiment 7 (Dual Correlated) and one to match McLaren et al. (2013; 
Dual Uncorrelated). The first of these was a two-Predictive-colour version of the Dual 
group described in Experiment 7 – Dual Correlated, alongside a Dual Uncorrelated 
group that matched the colour contingency construction method involved in the 
McLaren et al. (2013) experiment. The other differences that existed between the two 
Dual groups in Experiment 7 and McLaren et al. (2013): training length; test length; 
colour-response contingency; and colour of response stimuli, were all equated. By 
matching these parameters it was possible to investigate whether manipulation of  Dual 
group correlation (the relationship between colours and sequences) itself produced cue-
competition in one case, and an absence of cue-competition in the other.  
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6.3.1 Method  
6.3.1.1 Participants 
48 participants (aged between 18 and 25 [M = 19.1]; 46 female and 2 male) were 
recruited from first year psychology undergraduate students and were awarded one 
credit in return for participation. Participants provided informed consent prior to taking 
part in one session lasting roughly one hour. Participants were allocated into one of 
three between subject groups: Dual Correlated; Dual Uncorrelated; or Colour. 
 
6.3.1.2 Materials and Stimuli 
The materials and stimuli used were the same as for Experiment 7 (see 6.2.1.2). 
 
6.3.1.3 Design 
The experiment was a two-choice SRT task comprising of one session of twenty blocks. 
These blocks each contained 120 trials, with the first eighteen blocks acting as training 
and the final two blocks acting as test. Depending on the group that participants were 
assigned to, across training participants received either blocks containing sequential 
contingencies (Dual Correlated, Dual Uncorrelated) or no sequential contingencies 
(Colour). All participants received blocks during training that contained colour 
contingencies, and neither colour nor sequential contingencies for the two blocks of test.  
 
Sequence construction. Sequences of rights and lefts were constructed as for 
Experiment 7 (see 6.2.1.3). 
 
Colour construction. All groups experienced all four colours equally across and within 
training and test blocks, as previously described. For all groups, Colour 1 and 2 were 
both Predictive, meaning that across training blocks they had a 67% contingency with a 
response stimulus location. 67% of the time that Colour 1 was present in the cue and 
response stimuli it was on an X trial. Colour 2 had the complementary contingency, and 
when it was present in the cue and response stimuli, 67% of the time this would be a Y 
trial. Colour 3 and 4 were Non-Predictive stimuli and occurred with equal likelihood on 
an X or Y trial. On test trials all colours occurred with equal likelihood on either X or Y 
trials and were allocated randomly across these trials. There was a programming error in 
this experiment that resulted in a non-random appearance of colours at test. Whilst the 
colours occurred equally across right and left trials, the programming error made it 
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more likely for the same colour to repeat on consequent trials. This meant that the test 
phase was not entirely random and participants may have noticed a difference in the 
order that colours occurred. This does not violate the use of the controlled test phase, 
where the colours are all equally likely to occur before a right or left required response, 
this may have introduced some confound to the task. 
 
Colour construction: Dual Correlated group and Colour group. Across training blocks, 
the Dual Correlated group’s trials were allocated colours according to the subsequence 
pairs that made up the right and left responses, similar to what was described in 
Experiment 7 for the Dual group (see 6.2.1.3). To some extent, the Dual Correlated 
group was the same as the Dual group reported in Experiment 7, as after a certain 
subsequence pair (e.g. XX) one Colour would always occur (e.g. Colour 1). However, 
only two total subsequences were predictive in this way, either: XXX & XYY; XXX & 
YXY; YYX & XYY; or YYX & YXY. This was counterbalanced across participants in 
the Dual Correlated group. These pairs were chosen as each possible combination of 
two subsequences that follow the exclusive-or rule that result in opposite (both X and 
Y) responses. Non-Predictive Colours 3 and 4 were distributed across the other half of 
trials with a 50% contingency with X or Y response locations. The Colour group was 
allocated colours across training in the same way as described for Experiment 7 (see 
6.2.1.3). One consequence of this change in training schedule is, of course, that the 
number of predictive colours contributing to an assessment of colour learning has been 
halved, quite possibly reducing power, but this was a necessary compromise to allow 
proper experimental control. 
 
Colour construction: Dual Uncorrelated group. Training blocks for participants in the 
Dual Uncorrelated group were assigned colours according to a different system, which 
involved first placing Colour 1 on every third trial that was an X and Colour 2 on every 
third trial that was a Y. The remaining 80 first and second trials in each block were then 
randomly assigned ten instances of Colour 1 if a Y trial and ten instances of Colour 2 if 
an X trial. The remaining 60 trials (of which an equal amount were X and Y trials) were 
randomly assigned Colour 3 or Colour 4, each balanced across the X and Ys equally. 
Colour 1 and 2 therefore had no relationship with a specific subsequence (although 
Colour 1 Consistent trials were 100% contingent with ‘exclusive’ cases and Colour 2 
Consistent trials were 100% contingent with ‘or’ cases) and overall had a 67% 
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contingency with the required response. Colours 3 and 4 again had no contingency with 
either a subsequence nor a particular response.  
 
6.3.1.4 Procedure 
The procedure followed was the same as described for Experiment 7 (see 6.2.1.4) with 
the addition of a prediction task following the structured interview, as outlined in 
Chapter 5. In this prediction task participants began each block with a “press any key to 
begin” command and on each trial experienced an RSI of 250 ms. The cue stimulus 
would appear and participants were instructed to respond to this cue stimulus with the 
key press response compatible with the response stimulus that they thought would have 
filled during the experiment. A response to a response stimulus was not possible, as the 
white circle outlines did not fill at all during the prediction task. These trials had no time 
out, and participants were told to take as long or short as they liked to make a response 
and they could base this response on either: a random guess; some intuition; or any 
knowledge they had about the task. Participants were finally debriefed and thanked for 
their participation.  
 
6.3.2 Results 
RTs and proportion of errors were recorded and sequence learning difference scores 
calculated as described in Experiment 7 (see 6.2.2). Each participant had an average RT 
and proportion of errors calculated for the three types of colour trials (Predictive 
Consistent; Predictive Inconsistent; and Non-Predictive) and no difference score was 
calculated across training or test for colours.  
 
6.3.2.1 Sequence learning 
An analysis of variance was conducted on both RT and error difference scores across 
training and test with the factors Block (training: 18; test: 2)) by Subsequence (4) by 
Group (3).  
 
Training phase. The variable of interest, Group, demonstrated a main effect across both 
measures, see Figure 6.5: RT difference score, F(2,45) = 10.2, p < .001, MSE = 8484, 
ηp2 = .311; proportion of error difference score, F(2,45) = 4.93, p = .012, MSE = .033, 
ηp2 = .180.  
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Figure 6.4. RT (top panel) and error (bottom panel) sequence learning difference scores for 
Dual Correlated (black filled bars); Colour (red open bars) and Dual Uncorrelated (green filled 
bars) Groups across training (left panel) and at test (right panel). Error bars show standard errors. 
 
A series of planned comparisons unpacks this effect, shown in Table 6.5, demonstrating 
first a significant advantage for Dual Correlated over Colour groups in both RT 
difference score and proportion of error difference score. This demonstrates the learning 
of sequential contingencies by the Dual Correlated group compared to the control 
Colour group who received no contingencies. The Dual Uncorrelated group also 
showed significant sequence learning compared to the Colour group in both RT 
difference score and proportion of error difference score. There was no difference 
between the Dual Correlated and Dual Uncorrelated groups across training. Thus, both 
Dual groups trained on sequential exclusive-or contingencies showed strong evidence of 
learning these across training and did not themselves differ from one another. 
 
!  
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Table 6.5. Results from ANOVA for planned comparisons on average RT and 
proportion of errors sequence difference scores, comparing the three Groups to one 
another across the eighteen blocks of training in Experiment 8. 
 RT difference score: Training 
 F (df = 1,45) p MSE ηp2  
Dual Correlated vs Colour (control) 12.5 .001 118 .218 
Dual Uncorrelated vs Colour (control) 17.5 < .001 118 .281 
Dual Correlated vs Dual Uncorrelated .419 .521 118 .009 
 Error difference score: Training 
 F (df = 1,45) p MSE ηp2  
Dual Correlated vs Colour (control) 6.01 .018 .001 .670 
Dual Uncorrelated vs Colour (control) 8.55 .005 .001 .816 
Dual Correlated vs Dual Uncorrelated .223 .639 .001 .075 
 
Across training participants showed no main effect of Block: RT difference score, 
F(17,765) = 1.55, p = .156, MSE = 9383, ηp2 = .033; error difference score, F(17,765) = 
1.17, p = .291, MSE = .016, ηp2 = .025, the errors participants made differed across 
Blocks depending on the Group (see Figure 6.6), proportion of error difference score, 
F(34,765) = 1.57, p = .031, MSE = .016, ηp2 = .065. Whilst the Colour group remain 
relatively flat around zero, both Dual Correlated and Dual Uncorrelated show a trend 
towards higher proportion of error difference scores and therefore better performance 
across training, providing further evidence of learning.  
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Figure 6.5. RT (top panel) and proportion of error (bottom panel) sequence learning difference 
scores across training for the three different groups. Filled circles indicate groups that were 
trained with sequential contingencies (both Dual Correlated [black] and Dual Uncorrelated 
[green]), with unfilled circles indicating those groups who had no sequential contingencies 
(Colour [red]) and therefore were not expected to demonstrate learning about sequences. Error 
bars show standard error. 
 
Test phase. Group also produced a main effect at test in the RT difference score (see 
Figure 6.5): RT difference score, F(2,45) = 5.39, p = .008, MSE = 2101, ηp2 = .193; but 
not in the proportion of error difference score, F(2,45) = .612, p = .547, MSE = .009, ηp2 
= .026. A series of planned comparisons were conducted (see Table 6.6) demonstrating 
a significant advantage for Dual Correlated over the Colour group in RTs at test, which 
demonstrates the learning of sequential contingencies by the Dual Correlated group 
compared to the control Colour group. The Dual Uncorrelated group also showed 
significant sequence learning compared to the Colour group in the RTs but not in 
proportion of errors (see Table 6.6). There was no difference between the Dual 
Correlated and Dual Uncorrelated groups at test, thus both Dual groups who had 
sequential contingencies showed some evidence of learning at test, and were not 
different from one another in their sequence learning. 
Incidental human sequence learning 243 
Table 6.6. Results from ANOVA for planned comparisons on average RT and 
proportion of errors sequence difference scores, comparing the three Groups to one 
another across the two blocks of test in Experiment 8. 
 RT difference score: Test 
 F (df = 1,45) p MSE ηp2  
Dual Correlated vs Colour (control) 5.69 .021 263 .112 
Dual Uncorrelated vs Colour (control) 9.90 .003 263 .180 
Dual Correlated vs Dual Uncorrelated .578 .451 263 .013 
 Error difference score: Test 
 F (df = 1,45) p MSE ηp2  
Dual Correlated vs Colour (control) 1.22 .275 .001 .026 
Dual Uncorrelated vs Colour (control) .341 .562 .001 .008 
Dual Correlated vs Dual Uncorrelated .272 .604 .001 .006 
 
6.3.2.2 Colour Learning 
An analysis of variance was conducted on both RT and error difference scores across 
training and test with the factors Block (Training: 18; Test: 2) x Colour Type (3) x 
Group (3). Note: there was no problem with weighted averages and therefore the data 
was not collapsed across Epochs as it could be analysed across the full range of blocks. 
The difference score used in Experiment 7 was not used here as each group had all three 
Colour Types and so, in order to better understand the learning processes that may have 
occurred, these raw average RT and proportion of error scores were analysed as in 
Chapter 5.  
 
Training phase: Group comparison. When comparing the groups to one another, across 
training there was no main effect of Group, average RT, F(2,45) = 2.18, p = .125, MSE 
= 218732, ηp2 = .088; proportion of error, F(2,45) = .115, p = .892, MSE = .227, ηp2 
= .005. There was also no interaction between Group and Colour Type in average RT, 
F(4,90) = 2.37, p = .091, MSE = 3802, ηp2 = .095; nor proportion of error, F(4,90) = 
1.66, p = .189, MSE = .014, ηp2 = .069. This suggests that the groups are not different 
from one another across training, and do not differ in the extent to which they are 
learning the trained colour contingencies. This was further supported by a main effect of 
Colour Type in both measures: average RT, F(2,90) = 9.09, p = .002, MSE = 3802, ηp2 
= .168; and proportion of error, F(2,90) = 5.46, p = .014, MSE = .014, ηp2 = .108, 
suggesting the overall pattern of learning is apparent across the three groups (see Figure 
6.8).  
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There was a main effect of Block in the proportion of errors across training, suggesting 
that participants were making more errors as the task went on, F(17,765) = .15,0, p 
< .001, MSE = 12461, ηp2 = .250; average RT, F(17,765) = .911, p = .465, MSE = .017, 
ηp2 = .561. However, Block did not interact with Group; Colour Type; or both Group 
and Colour Type. Therefore, whilst participants may have begun to make more errors, 
participants did not differ in terms of their learning or across Groups across the course 
of training. 
 
Separate analyses of variance were then conducted for each group, with the factors 
Block (Training: 18; Test: 2) x Colour Type (3) to assess learning within the group, as 
no control group was available to compare against as baseline because all groups were 
trained with colour cue-response contingencies. Therefore the difference between 
Predictive Consistent, Predictive Inconsistent and Control colours is the assay of colour 
learning for each group.  
 
Training phase: Dual Correlated group. The Dual Correlated group demonstrated a 
trend towards evidence of colour learning across training in RTs with a strong trend but 
no main effect of Colour Type (see Figure 6.8): average RT, F(2,30) = 4.01, p = .058, 
MSE = 10658, ηp2 = .211; proportion of errors, F(2,30) = 3.27, p = .080, MSE = .033, 
ηp2 = .179. The pattern of results, however, was consistent with those that one would 
expect if learning of colours had occurred. Planned comparisons showed that 
participants in this group had significantly slower RTs, F(1,15) = 9.52, p = .008, MSE = 
4832, ηp2 = .388 and more errors, F(1,15) = 4.89, p = .043, MSE = .031, ηp2 = .246, to 
Predictive Inconsistent colours compared to Non-Predictive. The differences between 
Predictive Consistent colours and both Inconsistent and Non-Predictive colours were in 
the expected direction, with faster and more accurate responding to Predictive 
Consistent colours, but were not significant. 
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Figure 6.6. Average RT (top panel) and proportion of errors (bottom panel) for the different 
Colour Type trials: Predictive Consistent, Predictive Inconsistent and Non-Predictive across 
training (left panel) and test (right panel) for the three groups: Dual Correlated (black bars); 
Dual Uncorrelated (green bars); and Colour (red bars). Error bars show standard error. 
 
Training phase: Dual Uncorrelated group. The Dual Uncorrelated group also 
demonstrated learning of colour contingencies across training in RTs and errors (see 
Figure 6.8) as seen in the main effect of Colour Type, average RT, F(2,30) = 8.81, p 
= .005, MSE = 1124, ηp2 = .370; proportion of error, F(2,30) = 4.40, p = .026, MSE 
= .004, ηp2 = .227. Planned contrasts showed that Predictive Consistent colours were 
responded to reliably faster, F(1,15) = 9,75, p = .007, MSE = 2399, ηp2 = .370; and more 
accurately than Predictive Inconsistent colours, F(1,15) = 5.25, p = .037, MSE = .004, 
ηp2 = .259. RTs also showed a large effect when comparing Predictive Consistent and 
Control colours, F(1,15) = 28.7, p < .001, MSE = 419, ηp2 = .657; but not proportion of 
errors, F(1,15) = .266, p = .613, MSE = .006, ηp2 = .017. There was also evidence of 
learning from the Predictive Inconsistent versus Control colour comparison in 
participants’ errors, average RT, F(1,15) = 1.33, p = .267, MSE = 1414, ηp2 = .082; 
proportion of error, F(1,15) = 8.07, p = .012, MSE = .005, ηp2 = .350. 
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Training phase: Colour group. The Colour group demonstrated learning of colour 
contingencies (see Figure 6.8), although the main effect of Colour Type was confined to 
the RTs: F(2,30) = 6.00, p = .006, MSE = 435, ηp2 = .286; proportion of error, F(2,30) 
= .025, p = .932, MSE = .006, ηp2 = .002. This effect, similar to the Dual Correlated 
group, was driven by the large effect of slower responses to Predictive Inconsistent 
versus Control colours, F(1,15) = 16.2, p = .001, MSE = 629, ηp2 = .520. Whilst the 
Predictive Consistent colours were numerically faster and more accurate than the 
Predictive Inconsistent colours these were not significant differences. Similarly, the 
difference between Predictive Consistent and Control colours was not reliable. 
 
Test phase: Dual Correlated group. The Dual Correlated group showed no main effect 
of Colour Type at test (see Figure 6.8), average RT, F(2,30) = 1.398, p = .263, MSE = 
453, ηp2 = .085; proportion of error, F(2,30) = .578, p = .567, MSE = .003, ηp2 = .037. 
However, the numerical pattern in the errors and the difference between Predictive 
Consistent and Control colours in the RTs followed the pattern shown during training, 
although the Predictive Inconsistent trials were surprisingly fast. This suggests that if 
learning has occurred it may have either: extinguished very rapidly at test; been simply 
a confound of sequence learning; or that the two blocks do not contain enough trials to 
capture the sensitive colour learning effect.  
 
Test phase: Dual Uncorrelated group. The only Group to demonstrate a main effect of 
Colour Type when analysed separately to assess learning at test was Dual Uncorrelated 
in RTs (see Figure 6.8), average RT, F(2,30) = 5.036, p = .026, MSE = 649, ηp2 = .251; 
proportion of error, F(2,30) = .832, p = .435, MSE = .004, ηp2 = .053. This, however, 
showed the opposite pattern to that obtained during training, providing evidence against 
the Dual Uncorrelated group learning about the colour contingencies. Both RTs and 
errors for this group followed the same pattern, with significantly slower RTs, F(1,15) 
= .568, p = .031, MSE = 1416, ηp2 = .275 (and numerically more errors) to Predictive 
Consistent colours compared to Inconsistent, and to Control colours: average RT, 
F(1,15) = 5.33, p = .036, MSE = 984, ηp2 = .262. Predictive Inconsistent trials were not 
significantly different from Control colours. This provides evidence that the Dual 
Uncorrelated group showed no evidence of the expected colour learning at test, and the 
reason for this reverse pattern is not clear.  
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Test phase: Colour group. The Colour group also showed no main effect of Colour 
Type at test (see Figure 6.8), average RT, F(2,30) = 2.33, p = .114, MSE = 3748, ηp2 
= .135; proportion of error, F(2,30) = .717, p = .497, MSE = .003, ηp2 = .160. However, 
similar to the Dual Correlated group, the pattern of results in the errors showed the same 
numerical pattern as during training. The RT data at test also demonstrated a significant 
difference between Predictive Inconsistent and Control colours, F(1,15) = 6.97, p = .019, 
MSE = 1483, ηp2 = .317, with participants making reliably more errors on Predictive 
Inconsistent trials compared to Control colour trials.  
 
Test phase: Group comparison. The groups did not differ at test in RTs or errors, 
average RT, F(2,45) = 2.17, p = .126, MSE = 41474, ηp2 = .088; proportion of error, 
F(2,45) = .228, p = .797, MSE = .163, ηp2 = .010. When collapsed the groups showed a 
main effect of Colour Type in RTs at test, average RT, F(2,90) = 3.85, p = .037, MSE = 
1296, ηp2 = .079; proportion of error, F(2,90) = .092, p = .912, MSE = .003, ηp2 = .002. 
This effect could be unpacked as significantly slower responses to Predictive Consistent 
trials at test compared to Predictive Inconsistent, average RT, F(1,45) = 4.54, p = .039, 
MSE = 1899, ηp2 = .092; and slower responding to Predictive Consistent trials than to 
Control colour trials, average RT, F(1,45) = 4.38, p = .042, MSE = 3093, ηp2 = .089. 
There was no difference between Predictive Inconsistent and Control colour trials, 
average RT, F(1,45) = .603, p = .442, MSE = 919, ηp2 = .013. As the numerical pattern 
is not the same at test, I can conclude little from these results but a possible speed 
accuracy trade-off, where participants were slower and more accurate to Predictive 
Consistent colours, and faster but more likely to make a mistake to Predictive 
Inconsistent colours. Consequently, there is no evidence for colour learning at test in 
this experiment. 
 
6.3.2.3 Prediction task 
Participants performed just below chance on the prediction task, with an average 
amount of correct choices on the prediction task to Predictive colours of 49.4% (M = 
7.89, SE = .527). Using a prior based on a sample of participants who were instructed to 
attend to colours and were made aware of relationships between colours and responses 
from Experiment 6, albeit at a slightly higher contingency (80% rather than 66%), a 
Bayes factor was calculated. As the prior was taken from a sample who were not only 
likely to learn more by nature of having information made explicit to them, but also had 
higher contingencies in play between colours and responses a uniform distribution was 
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chosen, from 0 (chance performance on the task) to 6.44 (the average number of trials 
correct above chance on the prediction task in the intentional group used as a prior). The 
Bayes factor produced from the average number of correct responses greater than 0 is 
0.09, providing evidence for the null and suggesting that there was no evidence of 
explicit knowledge of colour-response contingencies across this sample, demonstrating 
that the Colour groups are showing evidence of learning about colours without 
awareness across training. The Dual groups may not be aware of colour contingencies 
but without evidence of a colour learning effect at test any learning about colours across 
training may have been purely sequence based. 
  
6.3.3 Discussion 
The pattern of results demonstrated in Experiment 8 provides evidence of sequence 
learning in Dual Correlated and Dual Uncorrelated groups, both of which were trained 
with sequential contingencies. This learning was apparent across training and during 
test, with no differences apparent between these two groups. The differences arise when 
considering the colour learning results, which across training provided evidence of 
learning by all three groups, having all been trained with colour contingencies. At test 
however, no groups showed good evidence of colour learning. The Dual Correlated and 
Colour groups demonstrated a similar pattern of results, following the pattern observed 
in training across errors and in part in RTs. The Dual Uncorrelated group however, 
showed an absence of any colour learning at test, with both RT and error data showing 
the opposite numerical pattern to what one would expect if showing evidence of 
learning, supported by significant differences between Colour Types in the opposite 
direction. This could suggest that in the Dual Uncorrelated group any weak learning 
about colour that could have occurred was overshadowed by the presence of the 
sequential contingencies, but I have to acknowledge that the evidence for this 
conclusion is rather weak.  
 
This suggests that the Dual Correlated group had somehow been protected from 
overshadowing by the contingencies in force between the colours and subsequences 
themselves. This could be explained by a variety of learning theories in which either the 
representation of colour and stimuli were bound together whereby the association 
between colour and sequence was built up, and the presentation of one activates a 
representation of the other.  
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Does this effect only apply to the colours and not the sequences? This might suggest 
that the weaker or less salient stimulus (in this case colour) has little to add to the robust 
sequence learning that we observe in both Dual groups, which may already be at ceiling. 
If this were the case, Experiments 3 and 4 would not have produced evidence of the 
potentiation of sequence learning. It could be that the effect of colour on sequence 
learning is minimal, especially and not detected by the group comparison here, as there 
are more colours than in Experiment 4. The lack of sequence learning potentiation may 
have been affected by the presence of Non-Predictive colours, which may reduce the 
potentiating effect of the 100% sequence pair correlated Predictive colours in the Dual 
Correlated group. Further to this, the potentiation of sequence learning seen in 
Experiments 3 and 4 in the Previous group involved a contingency with the previous 
element in the sequence, not the previous two elements in the sequence. Perhaps 
participants are able to learn these simple sequence-stimuli relationships only about the 
previous trial, or within a certain temporal window. Additionally, it could be possible 
that the presence of the Previous stimuli in Experiments 3 and 4 improved learning in 
some other, non-associative way.  
 
This experiment did not provide definitive evidence of colour learning in any group, 
however, as there were no significant effects at test save one difference in the Colour 
RTs to suggest that any group can learn about colours during extinction. However, as 
the Colour group demonstrated evidence of learning across training, which is not 
confounded or produced by sequential contingencies, the test phase may not be sensitive 
enough to capture the effect. Extinction of colour contingency learning may be 
occurring very rapidly. To assay colour learning fully against a control, a Sequence 
group with no colour contingencies was run in the next experiment. In addition to this, 
the problems with the allocations of colours during test in this experiment due to a 
programming error may have influenced the results. Experiment 9 addresses this issue, 
provides a control group for colour learning, and seeks to confirm the tentative 
conclusions drawn from Experiment 8. 
 
6.4 Experiment 9 
The final experiment in this thesis examined once more the difference in sequence and 
colour learning across two Dual groups, replicating Experiment 8. Experiment 9 also 
incorporated two groups that received only one contingency with the other stimuli 
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simply random – a Colour and Sequence group. The issues with the test sequencing in 
Experiment 8 were corrected and a comparison to a control group for colour learning 
(the Sequence group) as a comparison at test was essential. When measuring sequence 
learning the Colour group forms a control across training as well as at test, as no 
sequences were trained in this group. When measuring colour learning the Sequence 
group forms the appropriate control across training and test, as no positive colour-cue 
response contingencies were trained. Therefore, the sequence group offers a control for 
the unavoidable confound of measuring the colour learning across training on trials that 
also measure sequence learning in the Dual groups, as I can compare the Sequence 
group to the Dual and Colour groups to assess colour learning; and compare the Colour 




64 participants (aged between 18 and 49 [M = 21.5]; 53 female and 11 male) were 
recruited from first year psychology undergraduate students and were awarded one 
credit (N = 11) or £5 (N = 53) in return for participation. Participants provided informed 
consent prior to taking part in one session lasting roughly one hour. Participants were 
allocated into one of three between subject groups: Dual Correlated; Dual Uncorrelated; 
Sequence or Colour. 
 
6.4.1.2 Materials and Stimuli 
The materials and stimuli were the same as for Experiment 7 (see 6.2.1.2). 
 
6.4.1.3 Design 
The experiment followed the design of Experiment 8 (see 6.3.1.3), with the addition of 
a Sequence group whose sequence construction and colour construction was the same as 
Experiment 7 (see 6.2.1.3).  
 
6.4.1.4 Procedure 
The procedure was a direct replication of Experiment 8 (see 6.3.1.4). 
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6.4.2 Results 
RTs and errors were measured and sequence learning difference scores were calculated 
as described in Experiment 7 (see 6.2.2). Colour learning was assayed using raw RTs 
and proportion of errors as described in Experiment 8 (see 6.3.2). 
 
6.4.2.1 Sequence learning 
An analysis of variance was conducted on both RT and error difference scores across 
training and test with the factors Block (Training: 18; Test: 2) x Subsequence (4) x 
Group (4).  
 
Training phase. There was a main effect of the variable of interest, Group, in both RT 
and proportion of error difference scores across training (see Figure 6.9), RT difference 
score, F(3,60) = 13.8, p < .001, MSE = 2432, ηp2 = .409; error difference score, F(3,60) 
= 20.7, p < .001, MSE = .027, ηp2 = .256.  
 
Figure 6.7. RT (top panel) and proportion of error (bottom panel) sequence learning difference 
scores across training (left panel) and test (right panel) for the four groups in the study: Dual 
Correlated (black filled bars); Sequence (blue filled bars); Colour (red open bars); and Dual 
Uncorrelated (green filled bars). Filled bars indicate those groups who were trained with 
exclusive-or sequences, open bars the Colour group who were not trained with exclusive-or 
sequences. Error bars show standard error. 
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Using a series of planned comparisons shown in Table 6.7 we can break this down and 
show that the Dual Correlated group showed significant learning of sequential 
contingencies, with higher RT and proportion of error difference scores compared to the 
Colour group who were not trained with any sequential contingencies. The Dual 
Uncorrelated group also showed significant learning across both difference score 
measures compared to the control Colour group (see Table 6.7). The Sequence group 
showed numerically higher scores in errors and a significantly higher RT difference 
score compared to controls (see Table 6.7). Therefore each group that was trained with 
sequential contingences showed evidence of learning about these contingencies. There 
was no difference across training between either of the Dual groups; nor was the Dual 
Correlated group different to the Sequence group, see Table 6.7. The Dual Uncorrelated 
group was no different to the Sequence group in RT difference score, but was however, 
in the proportion of errors, see Table 6.7. Similar to the account of the Random group 
given in Chapter 3, it is possible that the random noise generated by the non-predictive 
colours in the Sequence group may have an adverse effect on some adaptive learning 
rate, thus reducing sequence learning. !
!
Table 6.7. Results from ANOVA for planned comparisons on average RT and proportion of 
errors sequence difference scores, comparing the four Groups to one another across the eighteen 
blocks of training in Experiment 9. 
 RT difference score: Training 
 F (df = 1,45) p MSE ηp2  
Dual Correlated vs Colour (control) 19.6 < .001 33.7 .246 
Dual Uncorrelated vs Colour (control) 36.9 < .001 33.7 .381 
Sequence vs Colour (control) 21.8 < .001 33.7 .266 
Dual Correlated vs Sequence .057 .812 33.7 .001 
Dual Uncorrelated vs Sequence 1.99 .164 33.7 .032 
Dual Correlated vs Dual Uncorrelated 2.72 .105 33.7 .105 
 Error difference score: Training 
 F (df = 1,45) p MSE ηp2  
Dual Correlated vs Colour (control) 6.74 .012 .001 .101 
Dual Uncorrelated vs Colour (control) 12.8 .001 .001 .175 
Sequence vs Colour (control) 2.17 .146 .001 .035 
Dual Correlated vs Sequence 1.26 .266 .001 .021 
Dual Uncorrelated vs Sequence 4.40 .040 .001 .068 
Dual Correlated vs Dual Uncorrelated .952 .333 .001 .016 
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There was a significant main effect of Block across training in the RTs, RT difference 
score, F(17,1020) = 2.30, p = .019, MSE = 3731, ηp2 = .037; proportion of error 
difference score, F(17,1020) = 1.020, p = .432, MSE = .014, ηp2 = .017. This did not 
show evidence of an interaction with Group, which suggests that participants overall 
improved their speed responding to consistent subsequence versus inconsistent 
subsequences across the experiment.  
 
Test phase. There was a main effect of Group across test in the RT difference scores 
(see Figure 6.9), RT difference score, F(3,60) = 5.65, p = .002, MSE = 1294, ηp2 = .220; 
proportion of error difference score, F(3,60) = 1.21, p = .314, MSE = .014, ηp2 = .057. 
The difference between both the Dual and Sequence groups (who have sequential 
contingences present throughout training) compared to Control colours provides 
numerical support for the claim that all groups have learned at test, see Table 6.8. When 
comparing the Dual Correlated, Dual Uncorrelated and Sequence groups at test there 
were no significant differences in either difference score measure, see Table 6.8.  
 
Table 6.8. Results from ANOVA for planned comparisons on average RT and 
proportion of errors sequence difference scores, comparing the four Groups to one 
another across the two blocks of test in Experiment 9. 
 RT difference score: Test 
 F (df = 1,45) p MSE ηp2  
Dual Correlated vs Colour (control) 5.68 .020 162 .086 
Dual Uncorrelated vs Colour (control) 12.1 .001 162 .168 
Sequence vs Colour (control) 13.3 .001 162 .182 
Dual Correlated vs Sequence 1.61 .210 162 026 
Dual Uncorrelated vs Sequence .030 .864 162 .001 
Dual Correlated vs Dual Uncorrelated 1.20 .278 162 .020 
 Error difference score: Test 
 F (df = 1,45) p MSE ηp2  
Dual Correlated vs Colour (control) 1.98 .165 .002 .032 
Dual Uncorrelated vs Colour (control) 3.25 .076 .002 .051 
Sequence vs Colour (control) 1.51 .224 .002 .025 
Dual Correlated vs Sequence .031 .860 .002 .001 
Dual Uncorrelated vs Sequence .330 .568 .002 .005 
Dual Correlated vs Dual Uncorrelated .158 .692 .002 .003 
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6.4.2.2 Colour learning 
An analysis of variance was conducted on RT and error difference scores across training 
and test with the factors Block (Training: 18; Test: 2) x Group (4). These scores were 
calculated from the difference between average RT and proportion of errors to 
Predictive Inconsistent trials minus performance on Predictive Consistent trials. 
 
Training phase: Difference scores. There was a main effect of Group across training RT 
difference scores, F(3,60) = 8.23, p < .001, MSE = 3743, ηp2 = .291; and error 
difference scores, F(3,60) = 4.66, p = .005, MSE = .032, ηp2 = .189, see Figure 6.8.  
 
 
Figure 6.8. RT (top panel) and error (bottom panel) colour learning difference scores across 
training and Blocks for the four Groups: Dual Correlated (black filled circles); Dual 
Uncorrelated (green filled circles); Colour (red filled circles) and Sequence (blue open circles). 
Error bars show standard error.  
 
There was a significant effect of Group when comparing Dual Correlated to the 
Sequence group, RT difference score, F(1,30) = 12.6, p = .001, MSE = 6815, ηp2 = .296; 
proportion of error difference score, F(1,30) = 4.76, p = .037, MSE = .059, ηp2 = .137, 
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providing evidence for Dual Correlated colour learning. The Dual Uncorrelated group 
show a large effect compared to the Sequence group only in speed of response, RT 
difference score, F(1,30) = 21.1, p < .001, MSE = 773, ηp2 = .413; proportion of error 
difference score, F(1,30) = .775, p = .386, MSE = .005, ηp2 = .025. Of course, in both 
Dual groups colour learning is to some extent confounded with sequence learning. 
Importantly, the Colour group show an effect in RTs compared to the Sequence group, 
F(1,30) = 6.54, p = .016, MSE = 892, ηp2 = .179; proportion of error difference score, 
F(1,30) = .889, p = .353, MSE = .006, ηp2 = .029. Therefore the Colour group score 
significantly higher RT difference scores than the Sequence (control for colour learning) 
group. As sequences are not confounded with colours in this group this provides 
evidence of colour cue-response learning. 
 
Separate analyses of variance were conducted for raw average RT and proportion of 
errors for each group, with the factors Block (Training: 18; Test: 2) x Colour Type (3) 
to assess learning within the group. This enables us to further examine the pattern of 
responding compared to the Non-Predictive colours also. 
 
Training phase: Dual Correlated group. The Dual Correlated group demonstrated a 
main effect of Colour Type (see Figure 6.9), average RT, F(2,30) = 9.78, p = .005, MSE 
= 5921, ηp2 = .395; proportion of error, F(2,30) = 6.58, p = .019, MSE = .054, ηp2 = .305. 
This was supported by differences between all of the Colour Types across both RTs and 
errors, firstly with significantly faster and more accurate responding to Predictive 
Consistent trials compared to Predictive Inconsistent trials, average RT, F(1,15) = 10.1, 
p = .006, MSE = 12635, ηp2 = .402; proportion of error, F(1,15) = 6.72, p = .020, MSE 
= .112, ηp2 = .316. Participants were also significantly faster and more accurate in 
training on Predictive Consistent trials compared to Control colour trials, average RT, 
F(1,15) = 4.89, p = .043, MSE = 3941, ηp2 = .246; proportion of error, F(1,15) = 5.20, p 
= .038, MSE = .026, ηp2 = .257. Finally, Predictive Inconsistent trials resulted in slower 
and less accurate responses compared to Control colour trials, average RT, F(1,15) = 
14.3, p = .002, MSE = 49943, ηp2 = .489; proportion of error, F(1,15) = 7.19, p = .017, 
MSE = .034, ηp2 = .324. This provides strong evidence for learning of colour 
contingencies across training in the Dual Correlated group. 
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Figure 6.9. Average RT (top panel) and proportion of errors (bottom panel) across training (left 
panel) and test (right panel) for the four Groups: Dual Correlated (black filled bars); Dual 
Uncorrelated (green filled bars); Colour (red filled bars) and Sequence (blue open bars) on the 
three different Colour Types: Predictive Consistent; Predictive Inconsistent; and Control. Error 
bars show standard error. 
 
Training phase: Dual Uncorrelated group. The Dual Uncorrelated group also 
demonstrated a large main effect of Colour Type (see Figure 6.9), average RT, F(2,30) 
= 17.9, p < .001, MSE = 218, ηp2 = .545; proportion of error, F(2,30) = 8.08, p = .002, 
MSE = .002, ηp2 = .350. Predictive Consistent trials were responded to more quickly and 
accurately than both: Predictive Inconsistent trials, average RT, F(1,15) = 27.8, p < .001, 
MSE = 550, ηp2 = .650; proportion of error, F(1,15) = 10.9, p = .002, MSE = .004, ηp2 
= .420; and Control trials, average RT, F(1,15) = 5.58, p = .032, MSE = 371, ηp2 = .270; 
proportion of error, F(1,15) = 15.1, p = .001, MSE = .002, ηp2 = .510. Predictive 
Inconsistent trials were responded to significantly slower and numerically with more 
errors than Control colour trials, average RT, F(1,15) = 15.8, p = .001, MSE = 5815, ηp2 
= .512; proportion of error, F(1,15) = .864, p = .367, MSE = .003, ηp2 = .054.  
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Training phase: Colour group. The Colour group did not demonstrate a main effect of 
Colour Type, average RT, F(2,30) = 1.64, p = .217, MSE = 510, ηp2 = .098; proportion 
of error, F(2,30) = .088, p = .884, MSE = .002, ηp2 = .006, however the RTs showed the 
pattern one would expect if colour learning had occurred (see Figure 6.8). Colour Type 
did interact with Block in RTs (see Figure 6.10), average RT, F(34,510) = 1.82, p 
= .029, MSE = 556, ηp2 = .108; proportion of error, F(34,510) = 1.33, p = .193, MSE 
= .004, ηp2 = .082, with Control trials showing little change over the experiment, 
whereas slowing occurs across the experiment to both Predictive Colours, regardless of 
whether Consistent or Inconsistent with the trained contingency.   
 
 
Figure 6.10. Average RTs of participants in the Colour group only across training blocks for the 
three Colour Types. Predictive Consistent trials (black filled circles); Predictive Inconsistent 
(red filled circles); and Non-Predictive (black open circles) are plotted. Error bars show 
standard error. 
 
Training phase: Sequence group. Finally, the Sequence group showed no evidence of 
learning, with no main effect of Colour Type, average RT, F(2,30) = 2.97, p = .070, 
MSE = 373, ηp2 = .166; proportion of error, F(2,30) = 2.20, p = .129, MSE = .003, ηp2 
= .128. There was a difference between Predictive Inconsistent and Control colour trials, 
but in the opposite direction in RTs to the differences observed in the other groups, 
average RT, F(1,15) = 5.02, p = .041, MSE = 8843, ηp2 = .251; proportion of error, 
F(1,15) = 5.02, p = .041, MSE = .004, ηp2 = .251, therefore Predictive Inconsistent trials 
were responded to significantly faster yet less accurately than Control trials. This 
provides evidence that the sequence group learned nothing about colour-response 
contingencies; indeed they had no colour contingencies from which to learn.  
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Test phase. At test, there was no main effect of group across the difference score 
measures in either RT, F(3,60) = .508, p = .678, MSE = 576, ηp2 = .025; or errors, 
F(3,60) = .180, p = .909, MSE = .008, ηp2 = .009. No groups show any significant 
effects across any variable or comparison in raw average RTs or proportion of errors, 
with the main effect of interest, Colour Type, showing no evidence of learning in the 
Dual Correlated group: average RT, F(2,30) = .871, p = .429, ηp2 = .055; proportion of 
error, F(2,30) = .025, p = .968, ηp2 = .002; Dual Uncorrelated group: average RT, 
F(2,30) = .966, p = .388, ηp2 = .060; proportion of error, F(2,30) = .332, p = .630, ηp2 
= .022; Colour group: average RT, F(2,30) = .231, p = .795, ηp2 = .015; proportion of 
error, F(2,30) = 2.170, p = .132, ηp2 = .126; nor Sequence group: average RT, F(2,30) 
= .056, p = .940, ηp2 = .004; proportion of error, F(2,30) = .163, p = .778, ηp2 = .011. 
Whilst not significant, both Dual Correlated and Colour groups show numerically faster 
and more accurate responding to Predictive Consistent trials over Predictive 
Inconsistent trials. The opposite pattern is demonstrated in both Dual Uncorrelated and 
Sequence groups, providing no support for the suggestion that either Dual Uncorrelated 
or Sequence groups may have learned colours at test. 
 
When compared to one another there is no main effect of Group at test, average RT, 
F(3,60) = .122, p = .947, ηp2 = .006; proportion of error, F(3,60) = .841, p = .014, ηp2 
= .100, suggesting no difference in the response times or errors made by the groups. 
There is also no evidence of a Colour Type effect, average RT, F(2,120) = .631, p 
= .534, ηp2 = .010; proportion of error, F(2,120) = .230, p = .756, ηp2 = .004, nor an 
interaction between Colour Type and Group, average RT, F(6,120) = .363, p = .901, ηp2 
= .018; proportion of error, F(6,120) = .369, p = .870, ηp2 = .011. 
 
6.4.2.3 Prediction task and post-experimental interview 
Participants performed at chance on the prediction task, with an average amount of 
correct choices on the prediction task to Predictive colours at 51.8% (M = 8.27, SE 
= .438). Using a prior based on a sample of participants from Experiment 6, as for 
Experiment 8 a Bayes factor was calculated. As the prior was taken from a sample who 
were not only likely to learn more by nature of having information made explicit to 
them, but also had higher contingencies in play between colours and responses, a 
uniform distribution was chosen: from 0 (chance performance on the task) to 6.44 (the 
average number of trials correct above chance on the prediction task in the intentional 
group used as a prior). The Bayes factor produced is 0.15, giving evidence for the null 
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and suggesting that there is no evidence of learning across this sample. Examining only 
the groups who were trained with colour (M = 8.33, SE = .492) participants scored 0.33 
correct on average above chance. Using only these groups in the same analysis as 
previously described, the Bayes factor was 0.18, still providing evidence for the null 
and demonstrating that the Dual Correlated, Dual Uncorrelated and Colour groups 
showed evidence of learning without awareness. 
 
When guessing which colours had a relationship with a response in the structured 
interview participants also responded with chance accuracy, with 34 out of 64 
participants choosing the correct colour that predicted a left response and 31 out of 64 
choosing the correct colour that predicted a right response. These participants, however, 
did not all identify both the colour and the correct response location – with 25 of the 34 
participants correct on the left colour suggesting that it predicted a right response and 
only 9 reporting the correct contingency. The right colour was predicted with the same 
degree of accuracy, with 19 participants suggesting that it predicted a left and 12 
accurately reporting that it predicted a right response.  None of the participants could 
accurately describe the sequential rule, but some reported being aware of strings of 
responses on one side, or runs of trials where responses would alternate from one side to 
the other.  
 
6.4.3 Discussion 
This study provided evidence of learning about sequences, with Dual Correlated, 
Uncorrelated and Sequence groups showing strong evidence for sequence learning 
across training and at test compared to the control Colour group. This is not surprising, 
given the body of evidence provided so far that suggests that participants demonstrated 
strong learning of sequences. Sequence learning was unaffected by manipulations of the 
colour stimuli and their presence or relationships with the sequence. 
 
The colour learning observed in this study was again weaker than the learning of 
sequences, and whilst Dual Correlated, Dual Uncorrelated and Colour groups all 
showed evidence of learning across training, none of these effects remained at test in 
either RT or error measures. As the Dual groups experience colour and sequence 
learning that is confounded across training, we therefore have no way to compare these 
groups as colour learning is obviously too weak to show up reliably at test. This may 
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also suggest as previous studies have, that participants did not or could not demonstrate 
learning of colour contingencies. However, learning was evident across training of 
colour contingences in the Colour group, who had no sequential information across 
training to confound, potentiate or give any advantage to any particular response. 
Therefore, it seems likely that colour learning itself suffers rapidly from extinction.   
 
6.5. Simulation 11: RASRN simulation 
To further investigate the processes at play, Experiment 9 was simulated using the 
RASRN. Whilst previous chapters suggest that the model cannot capture the detailed 
pattern of learning, it remains one of few models able to both include a representation of 
the stimulus conditions as well as accounting for human incidental sequence learning. 
As Chapter 4 was inconclusive regarding the interaction of the processes involved in 
human sequence learning with concurrent stimuli; this chapter seeks to integrate the 
results of the human experiments within the simulation context. This simulation 
therefore was not assumed to be an excellent model of the human data, given the 
performance of the RASRN in Chapter 4. However, due to the correlation between 
sequences and concurrent stimuli in Simulation 9 (Chapter 4), it was impossible to 
analyse learning about the stimuli separately. Whilst Experiments 8 and 9 may be 
inconclusive, the mechanisms underlying sequence and cue-response learning do seem 
to interact.  
 
6.5.1. Simulation details 
The RASRN was run for 64 networks following the procedure outlined for Experiment 
9 and the parameters for Simulation 10 (Chapter 5). Again the input units represented 
the two previous required responses (on activation = 0.75); two current response stimuli 
locations (on activation = 0.1); four possible cue colours (on activation = 0.4); and the 
context units (1.3 times the activation of the hidden units on the previous trial). Each 
network was run for the same number of trials as each participant, with 16 networks in 
each of the four conditions.  
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6.5.2. Results 
6.5.2.1. Sequence learning 
Sequence learning was assessed in the same way as for participants using the 
inconsistent minus consistent sequence learning difference score for the trained 
exclusive-or sequences in the Dual Correlated, Sequence and Dual Uncorrelated 
networks. Colour networks acted as a control for sequence learning. The MSE 
difference scores from training and test were analysed by an ANOVA on Block (18 
training; 2 test), Subsequence (4) and Group. There was a main effect of Group across 
training, F(3,60) = 28.0, p < .001, MSE = .002, ηp2 = . 583; but not test, F(3,60) = 2.20, 
p = .097, MSE = .001, ηp2 = .099, which is shown in Figure 6.11.  
 
 
Figure 6.11. MSE sequence learning difference scores across training (left panel) and test (right 
panel) for the four groups of networks in Simulation 11: Dual Correlated (black filled bars); 
Sequence (blue filled bars); Colour (red open bars); and Dual Uncorrelated (green filled bars). 
Filled bars indicate those groups who were trained with exclusive-or sequences, open bars the 
Colour group who were not trained with exclusive-or sequences. Error bars show standard error. 
 
As we can see from the Figure, networks learned significantly more in all three groups 
that were trained with sequences than in the Colour group as shown across training by 
Bonferroni corrected comparisons: Dual Correlated versus Colour, p < .001; Sequence 
versus Colour, p < .001; Dual Uncorrelated versus Colour, p < .001. No other 
comparison was significant, nor were any groups significantly different at test. This 
suggests that sequence learning progressed regardless of the presence of colour-
response contingencies, although the Dual Correlated networks approach a significantly 
higher difference score compared to the control Colour networks, p = .123. This, to 
some extent, follows the performance of human participants as sequence learning was 
not significantly different depending on the colours. On the other hand, the model does 
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not provide evidence of sequence learning at test, which is in clear contrast to the 
performance of human participants. 
 
6.5.2.2. Colour cue-response learning 
The MSE scores for networks were analysed in the same was as for participants in 
Experiment 9, with difference scores taken between Predictive Inconsistent and 
Predictive Consistent trials. These were analysed in an ANOVA across Block (training: 
18, test: 2). A main effect of Group occurs across both training, F(3,60) = 89.5, p < .001, 
MSE = .002, ηp2 = .817, and test, F(3,60) = 377.3, p < .001, MSE = .001, ηp2 = .950, 
shown in Figure 6.12. Networks in Colour, p < .001, and Dual Uncorrelated groups, p 
< .001 performed better than the control Sequence group across training, however there 
was no colour cue-response learning evident in the Dual Correlated group, p > .9. This 
might suggest that there was no colour learning occurring, but what it actually reflects is, 
like in the human participants, training data is confounded by sequence learning. Whilst 
in the case of humans the sequence learning is far greater than the colour cue-response 
learning, in the case of the RASRN sequence learning is far smaller than for humans 
(see the scales on Figures 6.11 and 6.12). Therefore the expression of colour learning 
across training is being restricted by the correlation with sequences, which are 
significantly learned in the Dual Correlated group at test, but these MSE difference 
scores are not large. 
 
 
Figure 6.12. MSE colour learning difference scores across training (left panel) and test (right 
panel) for the four groups of networks in Simulation 11: Dual Correlated (black filled bars); 
Sequence (blue open bars); Colour (red filled bars); and Dual Uncorrelated (green filled bars). 
Filled bars indicate those groups who were trained with exclusive-or sequences, open bars the 
Colour group who were not trained with exclusive-or sequences. Error bars show standard error. 
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At test, however, when colours and sequences no longer correlate we can see that the 
Dual Correlated group have learned significantly more than not only the control 
Sequence networks, p < .001; but also both the Colour, p < .001 and Dual Uncorrelated 
networks, p < .001. Both Colour, p < .001 and Dual Uncorrelated, p < .001 groups show 
evidence of learning about colour cue-response contingencies at test; therefore this 
provides evidence not of overshadowing but potentiation of colour learning in the Dual 
Correlated group.  
 
6.5.3. Discussion 
The results of the RASRN simulations clearly show the incorrect pattern of learning 
effects, as firstly Colour learning difference scores are far higher than those for 
sequence learning. This suggests that the model is learning the colour cue-response 
contingencies far better (or sequences far worse) than human participants. This seems to 
result in the opposite pattern of results observed in humans, namely the overshadowing 
of sequence learning in the Dual Uncorrelated networks; whereas colour learning was 
overshadowed in the experiment run by McLaren et al. (2013) which are supported 
somewhat by the numerical scores in Experiments 8 and 9. Furthermore, the Dual 
Correlated networks produce evidence of colour potentiation, evidence of which was 
not supported by the experimental human results from this chapter, as the lack of 
overshadowing was the extent of the facilitatory effect of sequences on colour learning.  
 
This could suggest that the stimulus units receive an activation value that is far too high, 
which may go some way to explain the terrible performance of the Current group when 
simulated in Chapter 4. The stimulus-response learning was such that it interfered with 
sequence learning, causing decreasing difference scores for all groups – but more 
rapidly for the Current group. By reducing the activation of these stimulus units the 
performance of the Current group may be improved, but this would not produce an 
increase in the sequence learning produced by the Previous networks. That the model 
does produce an overshadowing effect in the Dual Uncorrelated group and a 
potentiation effect in the Dual Correlated group does, however, go some way to support 
the idea that stimuli that are related may not suffer from cue-competition and may 
indeed come to facilitate learning about the other. In summary, however, it is clear that 
the RASRN in its current form is not a good model of human performance on these 
SRT tasks. 
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6.6 General Discussion 
All of the studies presented in Chapter 6 have in common a robust demonstration of 
sequence learning of the exclusive-or rule. Each of the groups in each experiment, 
regardless of whether sequences were trained in the presence of colour contingencies or 
random colours, demonstrate learning of sequences. This indicates that human learning 
systems are well equipped to learn these sequential contingencies. Experiment 7 
provided evidence of Colour cue-response learning in both the Colour and Dual groups 
at test, allowing us to observe that this colour learning was at least no worse in the Dual 
group, providing no evidence for cue-competition. Taken with the work of McLaren et 
al. (2013) this suggests that an absence of cue-competition may occur if the competing 
stimuli are themselves related.  
 
Crucially, the between-subject Experiments 8 and 9 did not find evidence of colour cue-
response learning at test, which meant that a comparison was not possible between the 
groups. Whilst we find evidence of colour learning in Chapter 5, it may be possible that 
the learning was not strong enough to survive extinction, especially as the contingencies 
in this task were reduced from 80% in Chapter 5 to 67% in Experiments 7 to 9. This 
was in order to match the Dual and Colour groups, as well as to match the contingency 
between sequences and colour cues with response stimuli. Experiment 7 provided 
evidence that Colour learning did occur, although this was only in the errors at test, and 
therefore the experiment was not altered to account for this. Using the Sequence group 
as a control for performance effects across training we saw evidence for Colour learning 
in Experiment 9 across training, however it is at test where this is of crucial importance. 
It is a requirement of the task design to compare the Dual groups to the Colour group in 
the absence of sequential contingencies (at test), but the colour cue-response learning 
obviously suffers from rapid extinction. This may suggest that cue-response learning is 
an unsuitable form of learning to attempt to investigate cue-competition. 
 
The lack of colour learning evident in Experiment 7, as well as the overshadowing 
observed in McLaren et al. (2013) and Dual Uncorrelated groups in Experiments 10 and 
11 suggest that colour cue-response contingencies are more difficult for people to learn. 
When matched for frequency and relationship with an outcome, humans may find 
sequential contingencies easier to learn than simple cue-outcome contingencies, a result 
not demonstrated outside of these studies. This suggests that the system learning these 
contingencies must, in some way, give preference to the learning of sequential 
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dependencies. This is discussed further in the context of the other results provided by 
this thesis in Chapter 7, as it may suggest any number of possibilities. The role of time, 
spatial locations, trial order, responding and complexity are all features of sequences. 
Any one of these features may be preferred or given priority to by automatic learning, 
or the many facets of sequences may sum together to increase learning.  
 
Experiment 7 provided evidence contrary to McLaren et al. (2013), who found that 
colour-response contingency learning would be overshadowed by sequence learning. 
Evidence for the opposite effect on colour-response contingency learning was found, 
with the potentiation of colour learning in the Dual group at test compared to the Colour 
group. Experiments 8 and 9 were unable to confirm that the key difference between 
McLaren et al. (2013) was the between cue relationships, but the numerical differences 
do not disagree with the suggestion that Experiment 7 protected colour learning due to 
the relationship between sequence and colours. This can be explained associatively, as 
in the Dual group of Experiment 7 sequence learning itself provides a between-cue 
association with colour learning that means that as the sequence and colours became 
associated, so increasingly do the colours and responses.  
 
Beesley and Shanks (2012) initially dismissed the absence of cue-competition in their 
visual search tasks as evidence for a single process, propositional account of human 
learning. Indeed they saw learning and perhaps some evidence for an increase in 
learning about the blocked cue. The cue competition studies in this chapter suggest that 
this is not clear cut evidence for a propositional account of learning, as it suggests that 
cue-competition is less likely to occur when stimuli are related. Beesley and Shanks 
(2012) use a number of distractor patterns and cue locations, which are different for 
each subject, so it seems unlikely that these patterns are all somehow related to one 
another. However, it is possible that because these are the same modality, or share the 
common feature of the target stimulus location, they are represented configurally as a 
whole or as a shared set of elements whose between-cue associations are strong. Both 
elemental and configural accounts could explain these results and the results found in 
Experiment 7. 
 
These studies therefore suggest that, similar to the proposals of Urcelay and Miller 
(2009), there is no need to propose that potentiation is a result of a different learning 
process when the procedures and stimuli themselves may interact to facilitate learning 
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or result in cue-competition. Urcelay and Miller (2009) suggest that this is a result of 
the configural processing of stimuli that overlap in time. They found that trace 
conditioning (where there is a temporal gap between CS and US) results in potentiation 
whereas delay conditioning (where CS and and US overlap) results in overshadowing. 
These studies do not find evidence for this mechanism per se, as the differences 
between Dual groups are not in the temporal overlap of sequential and colour 
contingencies. This suggests that a between-cue association serves to facilitate learning, 
which may be based on either time or frequency or between stimulus contingency.  
 
Whilst not by any means an exhaustive investigation into cue-competition effects, this 
chapter demonstrated that an absence of cue-competition may not indicate the absence 
of associative processes. A lack of overshadowing and some evidence for the 
potentiation of cue-response learning was found in at least one experiment. However, 
the other tasks suffered from a lack of colour learning in general and solid conclusions 
can not be made. Taken with the results of previous work (McLaren et al., 2013), this 
chapter provides an indication that cue competition may arise from some difference in 
the ability to learn sequences and simple cue-response contingencies, as one is clearly 
learned more easily than the other. While I do not find reliable evidence for cue 
competition in this chapter, this is due to the difficulty that participants have in learning 
these simple cue-response contingencies under incidental conditions. This reflects the 
importance of understanding sequence learning in order to understand automatic 
learning processes as it further reveals a preference in human incidental learning that is 
contrary to the intuitive assumptions of a variety of authors (Cleeremans, 1997; Jiménez 
& Méndez, 1999). This is hard to reconcile propositionally as it suggests that learning 
has an advantage for more complex, sequential stochastic contingencies. We may be 
able to further understand human associative learning by investigating the absence of 
cue-competition when the two contingencies themselves relate.  
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Chapter 7. General discussion and conclusions 
 
The experiments in this thesis have provided evidence of both sequence and cue-
response learning under incidental conditions that go some way to provide evidence for 
automatic, implicit learning processes in humans. An associative model supplied 
predictions regarding how learning about these contingencies would interact, although 
the model proposed in the thesis falls short of accounting for all of the observed 
phenomena. In this chapter I will collect and summarise the key findings across my 
experimental and computational work and discuss them in terms of what this can tell us 
about sequence learning under incidental conditions. I will finally discuss: implications 
for studies of incidental sequence learning; models of sequence learning; an associative 
account of incidental learning; the role of automatic processes within human learning; 
and future research directions.    
 
7.1. Summary of findings 
In Chapter 2 I found that humans can learn sequences under incidental conditions that 
involve a probabilistic sequential rule based on the element in the sequence two trials 
before (t – 2) the current stimulus (t). The central finding of this chapter was that whilst 
learning was observed both for the Different rule sequential contingency (the location of 
t was more likely to be in the opposite location to t – 2) and the Same rule contingency 
(the location of t was more likely to be in the same location as t – 2), there was a 
difference in the amount of learning of these two rules, with participants learning the 
Different rule more than the Same rule. Why this happened was not clear, and the 
following chapter aimed to investigate this. 
 
Chapter 3 provided evidence that a model (RASRN) adapted to include a better 
representation of the task, including the on-screen response stimuli that would occur on 
each trial, was able to simulate the Same vs. Different group difference as well as the 
sequential effects observed in Experiment 1. Therefore, I noted that the inclusion of a 
stimulus representation in the model resulted in better simulation of human performance 
on the task, which suggests that stimulus-response learning can affect sequence learning. 
 
268  Chapter 7: General discussion and conclusions 
!
Taking on board the conceptual addition of current stimulus representation and using 
this to derive a prediction of the RASRN formed the basis for Chapter 4, in which the 
role of stimulus-response associations in a sequence learning task was investigated. 
Both the RASRN and human participants demonstrated that sequence learning differed 
when cues were introduced to the task that related to the sequence of response-stimuli.  
Humans clearly demonstrated greater learning of sequences in the Previous group: 
where response locations were accompanied by concurrent cues that corresponded with 
the previous stimulus element. The Previous group showed more learning than the 
Current group, which showed some evidence of better learning than the Random group 
but was similar to it. The model predicted an overshadowing effect of cue-response 
learning over sequence learning (that the Current group would learn less than both 
Random and Previous, which were predicted to be the same), which was not found in 
participants, and therefore the model was falsified. An associative account would still 
predict that concurrent cues had some effect on sequence learning, however the precise 
interaction between cue-response and sequence learning mechanisms in humans remain 
unclear; and it was not possible to investigate human cue-response learning and assess 
its impact on sequence learning. 
 
In order to assess whether simple cue-response learning could occur, Chapter 5 
investigated whether participants were able to learn cue-response contingencies under 
incidental conditions. Participants demonstrated faster and more accurate responding to 
colour cues that were trained to partially predict one response-stimulus location than to 
both control colour cues and trials that were inconsistent with the trained colour cue 
contingencies. Participants who completed the task intentionally provided a prior 
probability for responding on two direct measures of explicit knowledge: identifying the 
predictive colour cues and a forced-choice prediction task that replicated the context 
and sensitivity of the task. Participants in the incidental condition were at chance on 
these tasks and evidence for the null provided support for the absence of any explicit 
cue-response contingency knowledge.  
 
Given that I found evidence for colour cue-response learning in Chapter 5, I introduced 
these contingencies with concurrent sequential contingencies in Chapter 6, which 
provided evidence that participants learned exclusive-or sequential contingencies (that t 
could sometimes be predicted depending on whether t – 1 and t – 2 were the same or 
Incidental human sequence learning 
!
269 
different) under incidental conditions regardless of the presence of the colour cues. This 
provided evidence that sequence learning was not affected by the presence of cue-
response learning. In the Dual groups trained with both sequence and colour cue-
response contingencies I found evidence that the two cues do not compete when they 
were related to one another. When attempting to compare this Dual Correlated group to 
an Uncorrelated group there was, unfortunately,  little evidence that colour cue-response 
contingencies were learned at all in these experiments. As training performance for 
sequence and colour cue-response learning was confounded in the groups who were 
trained on both contingencies, a comparison was required at test. However, as the 
colour cue-response learning experienced rapid extinction at test, evidence for 
differential colour cue-response learning was minimal and it is therefore difficult to 
draw any firm conclusions regarding the interaction of these learning processes. 
However, taken alongside previous work these results suggest that we can find evidence 
of cue competition in incidental human learning (McLaren et al., 2013) and that this 
overshadowing effect can be avoided (and perhaps even reversed) if the cues 
themselves are related.  
 
7.2. Evidence for implicit learning in humans 
7.2.1. Qualitative differences between explicit and implicit learning 
Chapter 2 compared human sequence learning under incidental and intentional 
conditions with the aim of finding evidence for implicit sequence learning. A variety of 
authors find a qualitative difference between sequence learning under the two 
instructions (Dominey, Lelekov, Ventre-Dominey, & Jeannerod, 1998; Guo et al., 2011; 
Jimenez, Vaquero, & Lupianez, 2006; Jones & McLaren, 2009; Kuhn & Dienes, 2006) 
and this can be taken as evidence for functionally different processes: one under our 
control and one not. Chapter 2 found no evidence of such a difference as there was no 
difference found on indirect RT and error measures of sequence learning between the 
incidental and intentional groups. Whilst one could take the view that the similarity 
between the groups reflects the intentionality of the incidental group, I argued that 
whilst the intentional group seemed to try to look for patterns, they struggled to find 
them. They also reported that intentional effort was unhelpful in completing the task 
quickly and accurately and were therefore not motivated to search and use sequential 
knowledge and subsequently reverted to automatic responding. Some participants 
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reporting that they attempted to count certain patterns, and indeed the comparison of the 
instructed conditions by means of a state-trace analysis are consistent with the 
possibility of multiple learning processes. However, I suggest there were no qualitative 
differences between conditions because participants were unable to work out and apply 
the rule.  
 
However, is rule learning the only way that participants could have learned, and do we 
expect participants to learn more when they have explicit knowledge? Jones & McLaren 
(2009) suggested that participants were able to learn that the subsequence XXX was 
more likely; but no other subsequence trained – suggesting that not the rule itself but a 
specific instance was learned (Dienes & Fahey, 1995; Logan, 1988). Under intentional 
conditions in Experiment 2 in this thesis there was evidence for learning of each 
subsequence – which suggests that they were not learning one specific exemplar. 
Participants may instead have been able to abstract some rule, or some general property 
about the rule from their experience of it, for example that there were ‘quite a lot of 
repeating chunks and runs of alternations’ rather than hypothesis testing specific trial 
orders or particular contingencies and responded with more chunks or runs. Indeed, a 
specific rule-based representation is not a requirement for behaviour that appears to 
follow such a rule (Redington & Chater, 2002). It seems unlikely though that this 
knowledge would result in less learning, which was the case for the intentional 
participants in Experiment 2. 
 
It is suggested that certain stimuli under intentional conditions are learned because of 
their salience (Jones & McLaren, 2009; Lee & Livesey, 2013) which suggests that 
participants may not have experienced any salient subsequence elements in this design, 
as the subsequences (e.g. in the Same group RRR, LLL, RLR and LRL) were all of 
similar salience and therefore no one particular element stood out. This is consistent 
with the work of a variety of authors (Frensch et al., 2003; Rünger & Frensch, 2008) 
who suggest that explicit learning occurs when participants are able to identify stimuli 
that are unexpected and produce anticipatory responses. Therefore, participants may be 
unable to isolate specific instances because of the similarity of the subsequences in this 
task compared to in other tasks (Jones & McLaren 2009; Lee & Livesey, 2013) where 
specific instances may have stood out to participants.  
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An increase in learning might be expected to occur when participants experience 
explicit contingency knowledge (Curran & Keele, 1993). Participants in Experiment 6 
(the Intentional cue-response learning study) were clearly aware of colour cue-response 
contingencies and could report these confidently and with 100% accuracy. These 
participants in the Intentional condition demonstrated far greater learning across the 
training phase of the task compared to the Incidental condition, as participants 
responded far quicker and more accurately to trained locations of predictive colours 
compared to the inconsistent and control colours. Therefore, on this task we have 
evidence of explicit knowledge, which resulted in evidence of stronger learning. This 
supports the proposal that there was a lack of explicit knowledge across the sequence 
learning task in Experiment 1, regardless of the instructed conditions. If we take either 
significantly greater or qualitatively different learning as evidence of explicit learning 
itself, we clearly have very little in Experiment 2. Indeed, this may suggest that the 
sequence learning task is unlikely to be learned explicitly, either through instance or 
some rule based approach. This provides indirect support for Experiment 1 as a 
demonstration of implicit learning. 
  
A further implication of this result is that defining explicit and implicit learning 
processes simply in terms of their volitional properties is not as simple as when dealing 
with explicit and implicit knowledge (e.g. Jacoby, 1991). Participants are not 
responding under incidental conditions with no control over learning, and with complete 
control of learning under intentional conditions. Indeed, in either case participants are 
able to freely think, ignore or invent tasks for themselves, as well as choose to look for 
or ignore patterns that they may notice throughout the experiment. Therefore, whilst the 
manipulation has had some success in producing qualitatively different results 
(Dominey et al., 1998; Jimenez et al., 2006; Jones & McLaren, 2009; Lee & Livesey, 
2013) it seems that even when providing participants with the explicit rule that the 
sequence follows that they do not use this information on all trials (Lee & Livesey 
2013), and therefore do not apply a controlled, explicit response to each stimulus in an 
SRT task. This seems to be a consequence of the SRT task design, which by its nature is 
used to discourage reasoned and controlled responding as the task demands require 
quick responses. 
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As studies of incidental sequence learning hope to capture implicit processes, direct 
tests of knowledge are taken after training on these sequences so as to avoid participants 
noticing or using these sequences (Cleeremans et al., 1998; Shanks & St John, 1994). 
However, higher order probabilistic sequences, as well as complex conditional 
sequences are hard to verbalise or notice as participants tend to learn and rely on the 
simple surface features of a sequence (Dominey et al., 1998). Therefore it may be 
possible to investigate the interaction between the development of sequence learning 
and explicit knowledge using the guessing criterion (Dienes & Berry, 1997), where 
participants are required to report the degree to which they believe they had any 
knowledge about the task. This would not require that participants were informed of 
contingencies, as participants could be instructed at the start of the task that there may 
or may not be contingencies in the experiment. Measures of both participant’s 
knowledge of contingencies as well as their confidence in this knowledge could be 
taken on each block to track participant’s performance across a task. Participants may or 
may not notice; attempt to notice; or use these contingencies, but rather than assuming 
that they have full volitional control of their learning as a result of a between-subject 
manipulation based on a single task instruction, it would be possible to investigate more 
sensitively when and how these strategies are used and affect sequence learning 
throughout a task. 
 
7.2.2. Evidence for implicit cue-response learning 
Participants in Experiment 5 and to some extent 6 provide good evidence for implicit 
learning, as participants demonstrate clear learning of colour cue-response 
contingencies across training in the absence of being able to correctly identify those 
colours (let alone the response location that they predict) more than chance would allow. 
When completing the task intentionally, with the nature of the contingencies provided 
as a hint to ensure explicit knowledge would develop, all participants were able to 
correctly identify both colours with 100% response-location accuracy.  
 
Taking the zero-correlation criterion (Chan, 1992; Dienes & Berry, 1997) regarding 
confidence in knowledge and directly measured task performance, participants in the 
intentional group demonstrated this knowledge with full confidence, whereas only four 
incidental participants mentioned that they may have noticed something during the 
experiment. Classifying these participants as confident and participants who were 
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surprised that there were contingencies as not confident produced no correlation 
between confidence judgements and colour identification accuracy, suggesting further 
evidence for an absence of awareness. This measure of implicitness does not entirely 
follow the suggestions of Dienes and Berry (1997), however, as confidence ratings 
regarding participants’ colour guesses were not taken, with the questions instead 
referring to the extent that participants felt they had noticed relationships within the 
experiment. Whilst this is a conceptually similar question, it does not refer to 
confidence in identifying the correct colour cue-responses.  
 
Performance on a prediction task provided further evidence for the absence of explicit 
awareness, using the intentional group performance as a prior to produce evidence for 
the null – that incidental subjects seemed to have no explicit contingency knowledge. 
However, as the prediction task was calculated after test blocks had been given, 
extinction may have destroyed contingency knowledge that was previously explicitly 
available to incidental subjects (Cleermans et al., 1998; Shanks & St John, 1994). 
Evidence that this is not the case comes from intentional subjects, who also suffered 
from extinction, but were able to produce perfect performance on the identification task. 
However, participants may have simply learned more (and enough) in the explicit 
condition for this to survive the two block test phase. Intentional condition participants 
also had experience of the sheet with the colours they thought were predictive (which 
was removed for the interview and prediction task); as well as any memory for this 
sheet and their answers, which might have increased the explicit knowledge that 
occurred in both groups. As mentioned previously, memory is a consideration in 
assessing implicit and explicit knowledge post-training; and this issue may have 
perhaps been modified by post-test training blocks (e.g. Jones & McLaren, 2009), or 
confidence judgments within the prediction task (e.g. Destrebecqz & Cleeremans, 2003). 
Whilst I considered using confidence judgments for each response in the prediction task, 
I wanted the prediction task to replicate the SRT training context as closely as possible 
to avoid producing a new task in which participants experienced differing demands and 
were unable to express their contingency knowledge from the training setting.  
 
7.2.3 Evidence for incidental cue-competition in humans 
Following the suggestions of Beesley and Shanks (2012) Chapter 6 of this thesis aimed 
to demonstrate cue-competition effects as observed across the animal associative 
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learning literature in humans under, crucially, incidental conditions. There was no 
evidence that any of the groups in Chapter 6 were aware of colour or sequential 
contingencies with responses, which provides a strong foundation for investigating the 
interaction of the cues, and providing evidence for associative processes in humans. In 
the first experiment of Chapter 6, we find similar results to Beesley and Shanks (2012), 
that on an apparently implicit task participants show a trend towards the potentiation of 
learning of the cue that should have been competing for associative strength. In 
Experiment 7 we see that participants demonstrate learning about both sequences and 
colour cure-response contingencies. Beesley and Shanks (2012) suggest that this result 
suggests an absence of cue-competition and therefore that learning under incidental 
conditions is not associatively driven.   
 
I suggest that this should not be the conclusion drawn. The reason, I suggest, for this is 
that the sequences and colours were themselves perfectly related, as each colour was 
100% likely to follow the four possible second order transitions in the task (RR, RL, LL 
and LR). Therefore, while the sequence and colours were both themselves predicting a 
certain response that could be separately analysed at test, they were also themselves 
associated. It is possible that these between cue associations were learned and protected 
the model from cue competition. Taken with the evidence provided by McLaren et al. 
(2013) that this task can produce an overshadowing effect on colours by sequences, this 
provides support for the presence of associative processes on such tasks and may 
provide an explanation for Beesely and Shanks’ (2012) results. Whilst a number of 
patterns were used as cues in these visual search tasks, if the between-element 
associations between items were strongly learned then participants may not have 
experienced cue-competition. This is a possibility, firstly if the stimuli are encoded 
configurally (Urcelay & Miller, 2009) or because the patterns were not trained to 
predict a particular response, but the location of the target stimulus. Therefore the 
contingency between A and B distractor patterns was higher than the contingency 
between either stimuli and a required response and the between cue associations would 
therefore be stronger. 
 
Conclusions that the relationship between stimuli is the mechanism through which cue-
competition effects are reduced or even reversed can, however, only be made tentatively. 
This thesis was unable to provide reliable evidence of any colour cue-response learning 
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across both tasks (Experiments 8 and 9) that attempted to investigate the role of 
between cue associations in predictive cue competition effects. Whilst the numerical 
pattern of colour learning at test followed these predictions, there was both no evidence 
of colour learning in the colour group at test and no evidence for a significant difference 
between the Dual groups at test. This thesis therefore offers the possibility that an 
associative account of human learning processes cannot be dismissed based on the 
absence of a cue-competition effect, as the frequency with which these cues co-occur as 
well as their temporal overlap (Urcelay & Miller, 2009) may encourage between 
stimulus learning that protects from overshadowing. These mechanisms suggest that 
sequence and cue-response learning may indeed share the same, incidental, associative 
learning system. Further work, however, is required to demonstrate and further 
characterise the nature of how between stimulus associations form and themselves 
(differentially) contribute to sequence and cue-response learning.  
 
7.3. Review of the RASRN 
Whilst Chapter 4 ultimately falsifies the RASRN as it stands, the model was 
instrumental in understanding the influence of stimulus-response associations on 
sequence learning that formed the predictions and results outlined in this thesis. Clearly 
I cannot suggest that it is a satisfactory account of learning under incidental conditions, 
nor of human sequence learning under incidental conditions and further work is needed 
to investigate the precise involvement of stimulus representation within recurrent 
models. Whilst other authors have attempted to model additional stimuli and non-
sequential learning using some version of the SRN (e.g. Cleeremans, 1993; 1997; 
Destrebecqz & Cleeremans, 2003), no models have considered that the learning that 
occurs about stimulus-response contingences on each trial may interact with sequential 
learning across trials; therefore the RASRN is unique in this aspect. This provides 
predictions regarding cue competition effects that are supported by the results of 
Chapter 2, and to some extent Chapters 4 and 6; although the precise mechanisms and 
relationships between sequences and cues within the model is not clear. Whilst the 
model as it is reported is therefore incapable of replicating the human learning observed 
in Chapters 4 and 6, the model principles predicted at least some of the results of a cue-
sequence learning interaction. 
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Models of sequence learning do not require stimulus-response associations, as 
contingencies are formed across time. Therefore, humans do not need to make these 
associations, as they are instructed to respond to the stimuli explicitly (no associative 
link required) and therefore performance on SRT tasks of sequence learning have 
progressed happily without these adaptations. I suggest that not only does including 
these stimulus-response links better represent task conditions (Destrebecqz & 
Cleeremans, 2003), but that this has an important influence on how sequences are 
learned (this thesis, Chapters 2 and 3). This approach could still be criticised, as from an 
associative perspective, that humans or animals encode and form associations between 
every element of the environment is not considered to be adaptive for the purposes of 
learning, nor realistic (Pearce & Bouton, 2001). 
 
The RASRN attempts to represent the within-trial time course by a very rough 
approximation using a simple activation difference at input level approximating the 
differential influence of stimuli depending on their temporal relationship to the trial to 
be predicted. More sophisticated ways of doing this are available and discussed in 
section 7.5.3, but in attempting to do so the RASRN has captured some element of the 
increased learning of sequences compared to stimulus-response learning on each trial. 
However, this is clearly not fully represented in the model as the results of the final 
simulation suggest that the RASRN learns cue-response relationships better than 
sequences, as sequence learning is overshadowed in the Dual Uncorrelated simulations. 
This suggests that the activation of current stimulus units should be further reduced in 
comparison to the previous required response activation to increase sequence learning 
relative to colour cue-response learning. This may also suggest that there is more to 
sequence learning compared to simple cue-response learning that is currently not 
captured by the model (for example, spatial location). Indeed, it could be that sequential 
effects or stimulus-response learning are restricting sequence learning in the model in a 
way that does not occur in humans.  
 
The model is able to represent individual differences on the task to some extent, as the 
learning rates and number of hidden units, as well as their starting connection weights 
can all be altered to provide some degree of variability, however it is clear that 
individual error between networks in these stimulations does not reflect human 
performance differences, and regarding motivational and attentional influences that 
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differ across participants and the task itself, the RASRN falls short. The model is 
capable of producing these effects however, with random noise to the hidden layer used 
in the AugSRN to produce distraction on a similar sequence learning task (Cleeremans 
& McClelland, 1991) for example; however this level of detail was not the aim of the 
thesis. So whilst the model was unable to precisely mimic human responses to the task, 
the specificity of these predictions were not taken to be as important as the predictive 
value of simple, relational changes between stimulus relationships within the task.  
 
Further to this, however, the role of responding and feedback is an important component 
of the SRT task that was not modeled by the RASRN. The model simply produces an 
MSE approximating a human RT to the next trial, it assumes that no incorrect responses 
are made, and no error feedback given. In all tasks an incorrect response was followed 
by a beep, which participants often reported as being highly salient and frustrating. 
Whilst this may have had an effect on explicit processes of attention or motivation, error 
feedback is an instrumental reinforcer that may produce significant effects on learning. 
Whilst trials following an error are excluded from the analysis, their impact on learning 
is likely to be significant and to my knowledge error feedback is not represented in any 
version of an SRN. That the RASRN promotes the accurate representation of stimulus 
conditions but does not represent error feedback is a strong criticism of the model.  
 
Therefore, in conclusion the RASRN accounted for the different sequential learning 
observed in human data in a simple, constant RSI two-choice spatial SRT task by 
introducing stimulus-response associations that, uniquely, could compete with sequence 
learning and led to the simulation of the Different rule sequence learning effect. The 
SRN and AugSRN were unable to account for these results and therefore the RASRN 
was instrumental in understanding how humans may have learned these sequences. The 
model predicted that additional stimuli within the SRT task would interact with 
sequence learning, which was found to be the case in humans across Chapters 4 and 6, 
although functionally representing the precise mechanisms by which this occurs 
remains a challenge for any model of sequence learning. 
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7.4. Implications for human sequence learning 
7.4.1. Trial order and sequence learning 
Evidence has been provided that participants can learn probabilistic relationships based 
on a trial experienced before the previous sequence element (t – 2, Chapters 2 and 4) as 
well as the previous two elements together (t – 1 and t – 2, Chapter 6) under incidental 
conditions. That participants are sensitive to, and can learn a variety of probabilistic 
sequential structures under incidental conditions is by no means a novel contribution to 
the literature as experiments training participants on first (D’Angelo, Jiménez, Milliken, 
& Lupiáñez, 2013; Jiménez, Lupiáñez, & Vaquero, 2009; Shanks, Wilkinson, & 
Channon, 2003) and higher order (Cleeremans & McClelland, 1991; Jiménez, Méndez, 
& Cleeremans, 1996; Jones & McLaren, 2009; Lee & Livesey, 2013) probabilistic 
sequences are numerous. However, the number of studies that compare trained 
performance with control groups matched for sequential effects (Anastapolou & Harvey, 
1999) are limited (Jones & McLaren, 2009). Therefore, to some extent, these studies 
contribute to a small body of sequential learning research that adequately controls and 
considers the effect of the previous stimuli in the sequence.  
 
The results of this thesis further support the claim that sequences are learned differently 
depending on their structure (Jones & McLaren, 2009). Chapter 2 provides evidence 
that under incidental conditions participants learned two sequential rules differently 
despite that they essentially involved the same probabilistic rule: that t – 2 predicts t on 
two thirds of trials. A rule-based account would find it hard to reconcile this result, 
unless one assumed that learning that t – 2 equals t is a harder rule to learn than t – 2 
does not equal t, which at first reading is not intuitively plausible. One might suggest 
that some explicit heuristic is more amenable to the Different rule, for example a 
gambler’s fallacy (Jarvik, 1951; Kahneman & Tversky, 1982). Whilst this effect is 
usually considered to be confined to the preceding trial, participants may expect trial 
alternations and therefore be more sensitive to rules embedded in a sequence that 
involve alternations. It is possible therefore that some explicit expectancy enabled better 
learning that t – 2 does not equal t and made it easier to acquire than the Same rule, but 
this is based on a heuristic that is restricted to first-order effects; the influence of 
stimulus order prior to t – 1 has been suggested to have a benefit only for repeats 
(Soetens, Boer, & Hueting, 1985).  
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The results of the RASRN simulation in Chapter 3 suggest that this difference is caused 
by the influence of stimulus-response learning, which at t – 2 is the same stimulus-
response mapping as at t in the Same group, therefore an association between the two 
trials is blocked to some extent by their stimulus-response associations. This suggests 
that the stimulus-response associations can differentially interact with sequence learning 
and sequential effects to produce different patterns of both learning and performance. 
Similarly, Jones & McLaren (2009) observed the absence of learning about the 
subsequence XXX under incidental conditions and suggested that blocking of the 
trained contingency (that XX predicts an X) occurred as a result of transient learning 
that X predicts X reducing the error term for the final X, where learning about the 
trained sequential contingency occurs. An instance or exemplar-based account might 
suggest that this subsequence was simply harder to learn (e.g. Shanks & St John, 1994), 
but Experiment 1 demonstrated that XXX was learned by participants in the Same rule 
group under incidental conditions. This suggests that the effect of trial order on 
sequence learning is itself dependent on the statistical regularities of the sequence to be 
learned. This provides support for of a complex, highly interconnected learning process; 
rather than a simple exemplar based system that can store and retrieve information 
based on the number of occurrences.  
 
7.4.2. Representing stimulus conditions in sequence learning 
A central aim of this thesis was to investigate the relationship between stimuli presented 
to participants on each trial and sequence learning. Experiment 1 and the simulations of 
Chapter 3 suggested that stimulus-response associations played an important role in 
incidental sequence learning as the overall Different versus Same learning effect as well 
as the sequential effects observed in humans under incidental conditions were 
reproduced when the AugSRN included representations of the current trial stimulus 
(RASRN). Models do not require a representation of both t -1 and t when predicting t, 
which is not entirely surprising, as sequence learning is based on contingencies between 
t and previous trials, and not based on the influence of concurrently presented stimuli. 
However, even the low activations (0.1) of current stimuli have a qualitative impact on 
the way a model learns and responds to sequences, and therefore suggests that an 
associative model of sequence learning is highly sensitive to the stimulus conditions 
that occur in between using the previous trial to predict the location of the current trial.  
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Destrebecqz and Cleeremans (2003) criticise the SRN for two reasons, firstly that it 
does not represent time by any other means than a trial-by-trial time-step; and secondly 
because it only examines a prediction of one trial based on the previous, which is 
inconsistent with task demands. I will discuss timing and sequence learning in section 
7.5, but first I will discuss briefly the models presented in the literature that do encode 
some representation of trial t when predicting trial t, starting with the model produced 
by Destrebecqz and Cleeremans (2003). This involved three components, a simple SRN, 
a set of response units and an auto-associator; which represented learning about the 
previous trial; the influence of responding; and simple stimulus-response learning, 
respectively. Competition between sequence learning and stimulus-response learning 
could occur going into the response units, which were activated based on the 
accumulated (and competing) strength of the SRN or auto-associative prediction. 
Learning about the stimulus-response and previous-current trial contingencies was, 
however, conducted separately, and Destrebecqz and Cleeremans (2003) suggest that 
they are inevitably separate.  
 
Similarly, Cleeremans (1993) included a representation of the trial to be predicted in the 
Dual SRN (DSRN) when he attempted to account for the sequence learning results of 
Curran and Keele (1993), who themselves trained participants on a simple six-item 
repeating sequence and found that explicit knowledge and intentional learning 
interacted with implicit sequence learning. The SRN was able to simulate these explicit 
results when a buffer network that contained a memory of the sequence trained to 
predict t, produced an output activation of t which was used alongside t – 1 as input into 
a hidden layer that predicted t. Whilst this model includes a t representation at input to 
predict t, this did not represent the actual stimuli, but was itself a prediction of a model 
that had a memory for the sequence, representing learned explicit knowledge and not 
simply the stimulus presented to participants that enabled them to make a response. 
 
Both of these models include a t representation, in that one is supplied in order to 
predict t (Destrebecqz & Cleeremans, 2003); as well as one that produces a prediction 
of t that is used to better predict t (Cleeremans, 1993). Whilst the RASRN is not the first 
model to attend to and represent these stimulus conditions within a model of sequence 
learning, it is the first model that allows contingencies between these stimulus 
conditions and representations of the sequence to interact and compete at a learning 
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level. The RASRN also deals with the representation of time and stimulus conditions in 
a simple way; using lower activation values for the current stimuli that does not require 
a further learning system. By restricting a recurrent loop to sequential information only 
as is done in Cleeremans work, this presupposes that memory only occurs for certain 
stimuli and not others, which seems a large assumption to make given that the simplest 
account of associative learning would suggest that implicit learning is an entirely 
automatic process whereby associations are formed indiscriminately between 
regularities in the environment (Shanks, 2010).  
 
7.4.3. Temporal effects on sequence learning 
As mentioned previously, the SRN provides a model of learning that can occur in series, 
but beyond trial-by-trial order it is unable to represent time (Destrebecqz & Cleeremans, 
2003). Activations are calculated once per trial, and cannot represent between- or 
within-trial temporal effects. The RASRN goes some way to address these 
shortcomings by altering the activations of locally represented units to represent their 
temporal influence on learning. These activations were based on an assumption that a 
prediction will receive greater influence from representations that can accrue strength 
over time, with stimuli presented just before an event consequently producing less 
activation. This reflects the observations of Destrebecqz and Cleeremans (2001; 2003) 
that sequence learning increases with a function of RSI length and is supported by the 
work of McClelland (1979), who proposed a functional implementation of this with 
incremental propagation of activation in his cascade algorithm. This was successfully 
applied within the adapted SRN of Destrebeceqz and Cleeremans (2003) to represent 
RSI influences on sequence learning. However, this is in contrast to a variety of studies 
that suggest that RSI increases have a negative impact on sequence learning (Frensch & 
Miner, 1994; Stadler, 1995; Willingham, Greenberg, & Thomas, 1997). Frensch and 
Miner (1994) propose that learning of sequences is based on decaying memory 
activations of previous trial representations, and therefore participants are less likely to 
learn with greater time between stimuli.  
 
Whilst previous studies have attempted to examine how the length of RSI influences 
learning (e.g. Shin, 2009; Willingham, Green, & Thomas, 1997), converging on a 
general dual-process account of increasing explicit preparation and decreasing implicit 
learning (e.g. Frensch & Miner, 1994), inconsistencies appear, perhaps as a result of 
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sequence complexity and intervening stimuli (Destrebecqz & Cleermeans, 2001; 2003). 
Further to this, there are a number of studies that suggest that temporal and spatial 
information is encoded separately when learning about sequences (Miyawaki, 2006; 
Rünger, 2012). The RASRN represents time as a constant influence at the input level; 
and Destrebecqz & Cleeremans (2003) can alter the influence of activation according to 
time by incrementally increasing overall activation. Both models improve on the 
representation of time as a trial-by-trial series of discrete events in the SRN, however 
both of these models also represent time as some influence on the amount of input.  
 
These models therefore do not represent the possibility that time itself may be encoded 
within the model and associations between stimuli and time might occur. Indeed, the 
work of Shin (2008) suggests that participants can learn sequences with a constant, 
patterned or random RSI; however learning is stronger for the constant group, consistent 
with an account where time is associated with sequential elements and stronger learning 
produced when RSI is constant and does not vary and therefore interfere with learning. 
Rather than simply using time as an index of how much activation, learning or 
performance effects may occur on a subsequent trial, it can therefore be integrated 
within a model. Whilst time is thus considered important in the sequence learning 
literature, models of sequence learning are yet to appropriately reproduce these real-
time effects and this requires further work. Rather than concentrating solely on the RSI, 
however, future sequence learning research should consider also the interaction between 
the time course of particular stimuli within a trial. 
  
A further explanation for the lack of colour potentiation of sequence learning in the 
Dual Correlated groups in Chapter 6 is the encoding of time. Whilst participants 
experienced somewhat variable intervals between previous response-stimuli and the 
following colour (response latencies plus RSI); their responses themselves were always 
followed after 500msec by these tones or colours in Experiments 3 and 4, which were 
the concurrent stimuli experiments in Chapter 4. Chapter 6 involved 250msec RSIs 
between responses and colours, therefore less learning could have occurred in this 
shorter time (e.g. Dominey, 1998; McClelland, 1979), which is perhaps why no 
sequential learning differences were observed.   
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7.4.4. The role of responding in the SRT task 
The separate encoding of time and stimuli within a model brings me to a discussion of 
the separate encoding of responses. Whilst Chapter 5 provides evidence that participants 
can learn simple stimulus-response contingencies, the sequence learning literature 
converges on the idea that responses are key in learning contingencies (Goschke, 1998). 
Perceptual and motor sequences have been found by a number of studies to produce 
different amounts of sequence learning (Bischoff-Grethe, Goedert, Willingham, & 
Grafton, 2004; Willingham, 1999; Willingham, Wells, Farrell, & Stemwedel, 2000), 
which suggests that making responses in sequence is what drives the robust and 
automatic sequence learning demonstrated across Chapters 2, 4 and 6 in this thesis. This 
is, perhaps, why sequence learning has become the “best behavioral paradigm through 
which to study implicit learning” (Destrebecqz & Cleeremans, 2003, p. 181); as it is 
extremely reliable, replicable and whilst it may differ depending on certain stimulus 
conditions (Chapter 4 in this thesis; Nissen & Bullemer, 1987; Stadler, 1995) or task 
parameters such as RSI, salience, instructions, there are few studies that report a lack of 
sequence learning. Indeed, this thesis provides little evidence that sequence learning 
was damaged by increased or random RSI (Chapter 6); additional random stimuli 
(Chapters 4 and 6); or additional contingencies to learn about (Chapter 6). It is clearly a 
very robust form of learning. 
 
7.5. Implications for how additional cue stimuli interact with sequence 
learning 
Research has considered the influence of additional tasks on sequence learning (e.g. 
Nissen & Bullemer, 1997; Stadler, 1995), but only a small number of researchers have 
examined how additional perceptual stimuli interact with sequence learning (e.g. 
Cleeremans, 1997; Clegg, 2005; Deroost & Soetens, 2006). Few authors have found 
evidence of learning about other contingencies present in the data when sequences are 
in play (Cleeremans, 1997) and those that have provide no evidence of an interaction 
between learning of these two contingencies (Robertson & Pascaul-Leone, 2001). 
However, these studies also provided no evidence that the additional learning also 
occurs incidentally or implicitly, hence separate systems may underlie these data and we 
might expect them not to interact. Chapter 5 provides good evidence that participants 
can learn stimulus-response contingencies without awareness or intention, and Chapter 
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6 some evidence that these are differentially affected by the presence of and relationship 
to sequences themselves.  
 
Chapter 4 suggests that incidental cue-response learning can interact with the same 
processes involved in sequence learning. These stimuli were all task irrelevant, 
insomuch as participants were not required to process these stimuli in order to complete 
the task, nor were they required to classify, recall, count or otherwise interact with the 
stimuli, over and above being instructed to attend to them perceptually, which suggests 
that implicit learning is not restricted to active features of the task set (Abrahamse et al., 
2012). However, some stimuli in my experiments did provide additional information on 
each trial about either: the previous stimulus element (Previous condition: Chapter 4) or 
the current trial itself (Dual groups: Chapter 6), although participants were not informed 
of this, nor were required to attend to this to compete the task. Only the Previous 
condition in both experiments in Chapter 4 showed evidence that additional concurrent 
stimuli had an effect on sequence learning. This suggests that sequence learning was 
largely unaffected by additional stimuli, but that it could be significantly enhanced. 
 
As mentioned in the previous sections, this suggests that a model of associative 
sequence learning should encode for the stimuli presented to participants and that these 
stimuli should not be processed by a separate system (e.g. Cleermeans, 1993; 1997; 
Destrebecqz & Cleeremans, 2003). The RASRN was ultimately unsuccessful within the 
confines of the parameters that produced the predictions regarding the role of these cues 
(Chapters 3 and 4), which would have provided excellent a priori support for the model 
(Boucher & Dienes, 2003). However, I will continue to argue that stimuli and cues must 
be represented within a model of sequence learning; and that whilst separating cue-
response learning from recurrence in a model may possess prima facie simplicity, this is 
neither more parsimonious nor based on legitimate assumptions regarding recurrence.   
 
7.5.1. How do additional cue stimuli affect sequence learning? 
Given that the RASRN predicted that stimulus-response learning would have a 
qualitative effect on sequence learning, the results of Chapter 4 go some way to support 
and expand on this prediction. When considering the influence of response-stimuli and 
their associations with the required response, Chapter 4 demonstrated that in a sequence 
learning task, the response-cue associations between the previous stimulus element and 
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colour or tone presented concurrently with the stimulus on the current trial produced 
increased sequence learning of Same rule sequences. This suggests that participants 
were able to learn a relationship between the concurrent cue stimulus (t) and the 
response-stimulus location at time (t – 1), which resulted in higher activation of the t – 1 
element, and therefore the t – 2 element in the sequence.  
 
This associative explanation of the result is not the only account, however, and it is 
possible that instead participants were able to use the colours to somehow rehearse or 
reinforce the sequence experienced, giving participants in this condition double the 
memory strength, or giving an associative model that is able to extract statistical 
regularities from sequences two shots at extracting the statistical structure of the rule 
itself. Further to this, it possible that these additional concurrent cues made the 
sequential structure more salient, which the cues matching the current trials and random 
cues could not; as participants were able to both find and exploit patterns in the 
response stimuli locations and colours or tones. It seems unlikely that this is case as 
participants were unable to report a contingency between response stimuli or additional 
cues, and were surprised when these were explained.  
 
That concurrent cues can interact with sequence learning by no means suggests that they 
can eradicate sequence learning, which seems to progress robustly in the presence and 
absence of additional stimuli that are or are not related to the sequence. All of the 
experimental work in this thesis containing sequential contingencies (Chapters 2, 4, and 
6) show that humans are able to learn these well, regardless of an absence of explicit 
knowledge or a volitional intention to learn. This is supported by the results of Chapter 
6, which suggest that sequence learning is stronger than cue-response learning, which 
naturally leads to questions about the origin of this discrepancy.    
 
7.5.2. How does sequence learning interact with cue-response learning?  
Previous research on cue-response learning and sequence learning by Jiménez, Méndez 
and Lorda (1993) and Jiménez and Méndez (1999) has been unsuccessful in producing a 
cue-response effect on sequence learning. The authors emphasised that an incidental 
blocking effect was expected (Jiménez, Méndez, & Lorda, 1993) as unlike 
Cleeremans’s (1997) work, they did not make the contingencies between cues and 
responses explicit to participants. Expecting that implicit learning of these simple 
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contingencies would occur, Jiménez and colleagues were surprised that participants did 
not show learning about these more simple relations whilst still showing strong 
sequence learning of a complex probabilistic sequence. These studies are, from the 
perspective adopted in this thesis, flawed as neither provides evidence that participants 
could learn cue-response contingencies without awareness. Without a demonstration 
that cue-response contingencies can be learned, it is not possible to make any 
conclusions about the interaction it my or may not have alongside a sequential rule.  
 
This problem of demonstrating cue-response learning independently aside, Jiménez and 
Méndez (1999) discussed cue-competition and expected it to occur; however they fail to 
consider the possibility that the lack of an effect on sequence learning occurred because 
of cue-competition. Chapter 6 and the work of McLaren et al. (2013) provides evidence 
that this may not be the case, and when contingencies were matched between a simple 
delay conditioned cue-response relationship on the same trial and sequential 
contingencies with the same probabilities across trials this sequence learning 
overshadowed cue-response learning. It seems that the cues in the work of Jiménez and 
Méndez (1999) were not related to the sequence itself, and therefore this thesis offers 
the explanation that (if we assume that these relations could show a learning effect in 
the absence of sequential contingencies) cue-response learning in these studies was 
overshadowed by the presence of sequential contingencies.  
 
The work of McLaren et al. (2013) suggesting that overshadowing of colour cue-
response learning can occur by sequence learning provides an indication that sequential 
contingencies are somehow prepotent under incidental conditions. Whilst colour cue-
response learning was not found in Chapter 6, this was a result of a general absence of 
colour learning in all groups. Whilst we cannot conclude therefore that colours were 
overshadowed, it is clear that humans over the same length of training and within the 
same task are able to learn sequential contingencies that occur with the same frequency, 
and that in some sense carry the same information. It seems that humans demonstrate 
some advantage for sequence learning over simpler cue-response contingencies. This 
could be due to the increased activation of the stimuli within an associative system 
across time, or indeed the role of the response in reinforcing an additional motor 
component to the perceptual stimulus-based sequence learning. This could also provide 
evidence that incidental learning is more sensitive to complex, statistical regularities 
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than simple ones; which follows from the suggestion by Reber (1989) that an implicit 
system is designed to learn the information that an explicit system would find more 
difficult to acquire. This account is supported to some extent by the RASRN, which 
simulated the overshadowing of the weaker learning (sequences) by the stronger 
learning (colour cue-response) in the Uncorrelated group. Although this effect is the 
wrong way round (sequences overshadowed by colours), the model also learned far 
more about colours in all of the networks trained on colours. This suggests that the 
relative weighting of these input activations is wrong, or that an additional component 
of sequences as mentioned here (e.g. time, motor-responses, spatial locations) is absent 
from the model.  
 
The preferential learning of sequences could be explained propositionally even though 
these are more complex, if one suggests perhaps that sequences comprise of multiple 
elements that give participants more time between them to entertain an explicit 
hypotheses about these contingencies. The discrepancy between an explicit trial order 
expectation based on a gambler’s fallacy heuristic, for example, could cause participants 
to notice some difference from what they expect; which may lead to more learning than 
about cue-response contingencies for which they may have no pre-existing expectation. 
Either account would suggest that the results in this thesis provide good evidence that, 
at the very least, the two learning processes are not independent, as I have provided 
demonstrations where each affects the other.   
  
7.5.3. Further questions about the interaction between sequences and cue-response 
learning 
A question about the role of additional cue-response learning in the SRT task worth 
investigating is: what if the cue perfectly predicted the location of the next stimulus? If 
two colours, for example, gave a perfect prediction of the next trial location would 
participants use this information instead of sequence learning? A Mackintosh (1975) 
approach to associability suggests that increased predictiveness will increase attention 
to these cues and therefore the associative strength of this learning. Cleeremans (1997) 
found evidence that both sequence and cue learning occurred in such an experiment 
involving additional concurrent stimuli (that predicted the next trial). There was no 
evidence for any interaction between the two types of learning and Cleeremans (1997) 
represented the additional cues used in his experiment in an adapted version of the SRN 
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on trial t alongside the current response-stimuli information at t to predict t + 1. He 
avoided the issue of interference between cue-response and sequence learning by giving 
them each their own separate set of hidden units and indeed this produced no 
interference in the simulations produced by this adapted SRN as was also the case in 
humans. However, this account is flawed as whilst it produced the isolated cue-response 
and stimulus learning observed in the experiment, participants in the experiment were 
instructed in the cue-response contingencies and had explicit knowledge of these. A 
dual-process explanation of this data would suggest that these learning processes could 
therefore occur independently, and this could be why separating their internal 
representations (hidden units) produced results consistent with the data.  
 
7.6. Implications for an associative account of sequence learning under 
incidental conditions 
 
Central to this thesis is the question as to whether incidental sequence learning can be 
explained by an associative account (Cleeremans, 1993; Jones & McLaren, 2009). The 
evidence provided by my experimental and computational work may not provide a 
definitive answer, but it adds to the body of existing evidence that supports the presence 
of automatic learning processes in humans that follow the predictions of an associative 
account. I suggest that in the larger context of human learning, this supports the 
presence of dual processes as suggested by McLaren and colleagues (McLaren et al., 
2014; McLaren, Green and Mackintosh, 1994). That humans are, of course, able to use 
explicit knowledge and propositions about events to learn relationships between them; 
but that a functionally separate system based on the automatic formation of associations 
exists that can learn complex contingencies between events across time. Further 
questions remain, however, in situating sequence learning within the context of a dual 
process account of human learning. 
  
7.6.1. The interaction of explicit and implicit processes 
The interaction between explicit and implicit processes is a further level of complexity 
not considered in this thesis, which simply assumes that associative processes may 
underlie automatic human learning; but that these can be overruled by our explicit 
intentions. In reality, the case may not be so simple as this (Sun, Slusarz, & Terry, 
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2005) as evidenced in this thesis by the differential influence of intentional instructions 
on sequential (Experiment 2) and cue-response contingency (Experiment 6) learning. 
Participants demonstrated an increase in learning consistent with the idea that explicit 
learning can produce superior knowledge and performance opposed to incidental 
learning; however Experiment 2 provides very little evidence for a learning increase.  
 
This may suggest that volitional learning has a qualitatively different effect on sequence 
learning to simple cue-response learning; supported by the effect of intentional learning 
in Jones & McLaren (2009), which while not matched for training length, did not show 
greater learning but qualitatively different learning (see also, Dominey et al., 1998; 
Jimenez et al., 2006). How this impacts upon a dual-process account is a critical 
question for sequence learning research in humans, which might attempt to isolate the 
two, possible processes, but as previously outlined may do better to consider them both 
together and then attempt to disentangle them in some way. Whilst a qualitative 
difference in sequence learning might suggest different learning processes were 
activated, it also suggests that in Jones and McLaren’s (2009) experiment that learning 
of subsequences that had been acquired across training incidentally was reduced. Indeed 
this aligns with the reduction in overall learning observed in Experiment 2, which as 
discussed earlier suggests that participants were using up resources by searching for 
sequences similar to effects observed in dual task sequence learning situations (Nissen 
& Bullemer, 1987). This perhaps provides an indication that the essential difference 
between sequence and cue-response contingency learning in the explicit sense is the 
difficulty that participants find in both identifying (Jones & McLaren, 2009; this thesis, 
Experiment 1) and applying (Lee & Livesey, 2013) complex probabilistic rules.  
 
Therefore whilst explicit learning may increase as a function of the simplicity of what is 
to be learned; assuming that this is the case for incidental learning may not be wise. The 
incidental learning in this thesis seems, if anything, to follow the opposite pattern and 
increase with (or at least be relatively unaffected by) increased contingency complexity. 
The effect of explicit learning on implicit learning does not suggest that the automatic 
system can actually be turned on and off under our control, but that processing 
resources attributed to encoding stimulus relationships, order and time may be 
interrupted by explicit attention to other external or internal representations (Stadler, 
1995). The influence of implicit, automatic processes on explicit processes requires a 
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further level of analysis that this thesis does not address, as whether participants can 
acquire explicit knowledge as a result of strengthening associative representations 
(Cleeremans, 2006) or some other theory regarding the construction of explicit 
knowledge (e.g. Mitchell et al., 2009; Rünger & Frensch, 2008) was not investigated; 
only in Experiment 6 did any participants provide evidence of explicit knowledge. 
Models such as CLARION (Sun, Slusarz, & Terry, 2005) and ACT-R (Anderson, 1993; 
applied to sequence learning, Lebiere, Wallach, & Taatgen, 1998) are not discussed 
here, but have provided convincing accounts of both implicit and explicit sequence 
learning through hybrid connectionist and symbolic or procedural systems.   
 
7.7. Further research 
7.7.1. Behavioural predictions 
One outcome of the experimental and modeling work in this thesis is the claim that 
stimulus-response associations produced the greater Different rule learning above Same 
rule learning in Experiment 1. A simple experiment to test whether this was the case 
would involve training participants with these two sequential rules, but with a variety of 
different stimuli across both response locations. Participants could be presented with 
any number of different stimuli (different shapes, colours etc.) on the left or right hand 
side of the screen, in any number of locations. Therefore there would be no specific 
place on the screen, colour or shape that could build up an association with either 
response key. Whilst participants would be able to follow response instructions 
regarding a left or right response to any stimuli in that area of the screen, specific 
stimulus-response associations would not be able to interfere with the sequence or right 
and left responses, which would, if my theories are correct, alter sequence learning by 
increasing Same rule learning in the absence of strong stimulus-response associations. 
 
Further behavioral predictions of this thesis involve the role of time, which may 
decrease the amount of sequence learning observed compared to the influence of 
stimulus-response mappings if indeed sequence learning is reduced. Therefore, in the 
experiments in Chapter 2, I expect that a bigger difference between Different and Same 
group learning would be observed with shorter RSIs despite less sequence learning in 
this condition. However, this is highly controversial as some authors (e.g. Fresnch & 
Miner, 1994) suggest that shorter RSIs lead to greater learning. Therefore a short (or no) 
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RSI condition could be compared to a longer RSI condition. I predict that less learning 
will occur in the longer RSI condition, according to the predictions of the RASRN. 
Further to this, shorter RSIs are implicated in increasing the influence of short term 
priming of the previous response, therefore there may be a bigger impact of sequential 
effects in the short RSI condition. Whilst there was no interaction between 
subsequences and learning in the experiments in this thesis, greater or less time between 
trials may alter this and produce less Same rule learning in the short RSI condition and 
less Different rule learning in the long RSI condition as a result of the influence of 
sequential effects. 
 
The thesis also predicts that under the same task instructions experienced in Experiment 
1, that Jones and McLaren’s (2009) result may disappear, as the sequential effects and 
learning under incidental conditions does not match those found in any of the sequence 
learning experiments in this thesis. The best explanation of these differences, especially 
between the control group who should not show any difference whatsoever, is in the 
feedback given at the end of each block. Jones & McLaren (2009) provided participants 
with monetary bonuses, which may have encouraged them to perform faster and more 
accurately, reducing the influence (in terms of learning) of the current on-screen 
stimulus.  
  
7.7.2. Model development  
The challenge remains to develop a model of sequence learning that can account for the 
role of stimulus-response relationships within a task, and considerations for this have 
been mentioned throughout the discussion. The representation of associability, time, 
error feedback and responding are all important when attempting to represent the task 
conditions with even greater specificity. Indeed, if a model was able to learn simple and 
sequential associations as observed in humans under incidental conditions it would 
provide huge power in motivating and enabling further research. The challenge for 
researchers will be centred on the trade-off between increasing explanatory power and 
increasing the number of processes (e.g. associability) and free-parameters in a model, 
which is not to say that this is a criticism in itself (Boucher & Dienes, 2003). With a 
simple, parsimonious model (e.g. the SRN, Elman, 1990) that has extraordinary 
emergent properties (Beesley, Jones and Shanks, 2012) and can roughly simulate a huge 
number of tasks we are able to generate a large body of evidence that roughly supports 
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some association formation in perceptual-motor sequence learning as well as a number 
of other human learning tasks such, for example artificial grammar learning (Dienes, 
1993); speech perception (Gaskell & Marslen-Wilson, 1997); and learning musical 
sequences (e.g. Altmann, Dienes, & Goode, 1995). However increasing specificity 
based on accurately simulating human performance encourages specific predictions that 
can be falsified, leading to a better understanding of detailed learning processes that 
may occur.  
 
7.7.3. Other suggestions 
The first question this thesis asked that remains unanswered and merits further 
experimental attention concerns the overshadowing of cue-response learning by 
sequence learning in Chapter 6. Without definitive evidence for colour cue-response 
learning at test in the group trained only with colours, the conclusions about the 
interaction between learning about the two sets of relations are by no means definitive. 
As the current results suggest that learning about these contingencies can interact – with 
some evidence of overshadowing in work not done as part of this thesis (McLaren et al., 
2013) and possibly potentiation of colour cue-response learning in the first experiment 
of Chapter 6 (as well as in Beesley & Shanks, 2012, although not with sequences); this 
suggests that a system that learns stimulus-response contingencies is not separate from 
one that learns sequential contingencies (e.g. Cleeremans, 1997; Destrebecqz and 
Cleeremans, 2003) if the two cues become associated when correlated.  
 
This has obvious implications for our understanding of automatic learning, and as 
discussed previously further work must demonstrate the presence of learning of 
contingencies without the presence of the other to show that they are in fact learned 
under incidental conditions. Rather than simply training one dual stimulus condition and 
suggesting that participants can or cannot learn about the contingencies (e.g. 
Cleeremans, 1997), we can examine whether this was a result of cue competition effects 
or whether participants are simply unable to learn contingencies. Whilst the 
contingencies in Experiments 7, 8 and 9 were matched across colour cues and 
sequences (all 67%), increasing these colour-cue response contingencies to the 80% that 
produced evidence for implicit learning in Chapter 5 would not devalue any conclusions 
about the nature of the interaction between the two contingencies and simply make it 
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more likely to observe colour learning without the presence of sequential contingencies 
and therefore provide a suitable point of comparison at test.  
 
The role of additional stimuli is further predicted to increase sequence learning when it 
follows the previous stimulus element in the series. This may be a specific effect on the 
Same rule sequential contingencies, which is worthy of further investigation. Whilst the 
RASRN predicted that this learning would reduce the Same rule sequences, further 
experiments are required to ascertain what sequences this may have an effect on. 
Nevertheless, this may more generally be a result of some potentiating influence of the 
representation of t – 1 as part of the sequence on the next trial. It also may provide 
participants with two opportunities to create a stronger memory for the sequence, which 
may in turn lead to strong representation of sequential elements, thus making these 
easier to explicitly recall (Perruchet & Vinter, 2002). This would perhaps, in turn, lead 
to better recall or recognition of these sequence elements which may be captured in 
some direct test of sequence learning (Rünger, 2012; Shanks, 2005), and therefore this 
task might be repeated with a battery of such tests (e.g. Destrebecqz & Cleermans, 
2003; Dienes & Berry, 1997; Wilkinson & Shanks, 2004). If we see increased explicit 
knowledge in the Previous group compared to the other groups, or a correlation between 
subjective and objective measures of explicit knowledge, this may account for the 
increased learning observed across training. 
 
Furthermore, Chapter 6 provided no evidence that colours which followed the previous 
two response-stimulus locations increased sequence learning of the exclusive-or rule, 
but there was a strong trend in that direction in Experiment 7. Therefore, this suggests 
that perfectly correlated colours with the previous two sequential elements did not 
potentiate sequence learning, but perhaps this effect was reduced by the increased 
complexity of this relationship, or the increased number of colours to learn about. This 
provides a number of predictions: either that potentiation of sequence learning is 
restricted to a greater t – 1 representation at t; that participants are unable to strongly 
associate both two previous trials with a current cue; or that the exclusive-or sequence 
learning is unaffected by additional cues.  
 
It is of interest then to assess the extent to which participants learn about these trial-by-
trial response-stimulus-colour-cue relationships; which could be done in a test phase 
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where additional cues were random. This would lead to trials that were both consistent 
and inconsistent with the trained Previous-contingency, on which a significant 
difference in responding could be expected. Further to this, consistent and inconsistent 
trials may also provide a further level with which to analyse the learned relationship 
between cues and response-locations, as it may be possible that a high tone-left 
response contingency is generalised across to current trials, further providing evidence 
for the learning of these contingencies as the positive influence on sequence learning; 
rather than some memory or explicit knowledge of the sequence. 
 
Similarly, it would be of interest to investigate to what extent participants learned or 
indeed were aware of the t – 1 cue contingency between tones or colours on the current 
trial and the previous response-stimulus location. Whilst participants were asked 
whether they were aware of any contingency and none reported one we assume that it 
was an incidental training of this relationship that came to facilitate greater learning. It 
could just as easily been some explicit knowledge. It is therefore an important design 
feature of further investigations to try and isolate the influence of one stimulus from the 
other.  
 
In the task as it stands, this is difficult as the response location sequence is responded to 
whereas the concurrent tones or colours are not. However, it may be possible in the case 
of the tone experiment to investigate response location only responding, and tone only 
responding. In this tone only condition participants would be instructed to make either 
response when they heard a tone, similar to a prediction task instruction. If participants 
have learned about the relationship between Previous tones and the sequences of 
required responses and were using this to improve performance, I predict that they will 
perform better than the Random group on such a task. However, it might be that the 
Previous group were learning about the contingency between their response and the 
next tone, which suggests that in the Previous group they may become worse than the 
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7.8. Concluding comments  
It was the intention of this thesis to improve our understanding of how humans learn 
sequences under incidental conditions by testing predictions of an associative account. I 
have presented both experimental and computational contributions that provide support 
for the role of associations in sequence learning tasks, with the influence of stimulus-
response associations implicated in the learning of different sequences. Whilst it 
remains a challenge to accurately model these results, they are consistent with 
associative predictions based on competition between predictive contingencies within 
the environment. The work reported in this thesis provides strong evidence that humans 
can learn complex probabilistic rules as well as simple stimulus-response contingencies 
automatically and outside of the influence of any explicit knowledge or controlled, 
intentional learning processes. Therefore, in the wider context of cognition, this thesis 
offers a better understanding of sequential associative learning processes within the 
context of a dual process account of human learning.  
 !  
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